THE

ROMAN HISTORY,

FROM THE

Building of *Rome*, to the Ruin of the *Commonwealth*.

Illuſtrated with MAPS, and other Plates.

VOL. X.

By N. HOOKE, Eſq;

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MDCCLXX.

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FROM THE

Building of Rome, to the Ruin of the

MVSEVM BRITAN NICVM

VOL. X.

By N. Hooke, Esq;

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THE Roman Hiſtory.

TENTH BOOK.

From the end of the Year 703, when the Civil War broke out between POMPEY and CÆSAR, to the Second Triumvirate, or the League which was formed between LEPIDUS, ANTONY, and OCTAVIUS, in the Year 710.

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CHAP. I.

A brief relation of the riſe and progreſs of the Conteſt between POMPEY *and* CÆSAR.

FROM the year 693, the *Triumvirate* reigned in *Rome:* The whole management of the public affairs was in the hands of the three moſt powerful men of the State, *Craſſus*, *Pompey*, and *Cæſar*. The latter, during his conſulſhip in 694, had cemented and eſtabliſhed the power of the confederacy; and *Pompey* directed it in his abſence for his own, and the purpoſes of his aſſociates. He was, therefore, in a manner, the Sovereign of the Republic, while *Cæſar* was employed in the conqueſt of *Gaul*. In the year 696, he was inveſted, on the propoſal of *Cicero*, whoſe

Vid. ſupr. Vol. III. p. 415.

whoſe motion was approved of by the Senate, with an abſolute power for five years over all the public ſtores and corn-rents of the Empire; [a] by which means all thoſe who were concerned in the naval, the commercial, and landed intereſt, became his tributaries and dependants. Another law, propoſed at the ſame time by the Tribune *Meſſius*, [b] gave him the additional power of raiſing what fleets and armies he thought fit; with a greater command through all the provinces than their proper Governors had in each. Theſe extraordinary conceſſions to *Pompey* created a jealouſy in *Craſſus*, who, (perceiving himſelf quite eclipſed by his old enemy and rival, now his partner in power, encouraged *Publius Clodius* to put ſome public affronts upon him, which *Pompey* openly reſented, and complained of. A reconciliation, however, was ſpeedily effected by *Cæſar*; and, in 697, the triple league was renewed at *Lucca*; where the Governor of the two Gauls, after three ſucceſsful campaigns, ſpent the winter ſeaſon in the greateſt ſplendor, attended by almoſt all the Magiſtrates and great men

[a] This law was moved and carried by the Conſul *Lentulus Spinther*, one of the heads of the ariſtocratical party, with a view to his own deſigns, and to divert *Pompey* from the thoughts of being employed in re-eſtabliſhing *Ptolemy* on the throne of *Egypt*; an office which the Conſul was ſolicitous ſhould be aſſigned to himſelf.

Vid. ſupr. Vol. III. p. 463-477.

[b] *Cicero*, though he thought the law of *Meſſius* inſufferable, yet held his peace, becauſe the *Pontifices had yet decreed nothing concerning his houſe*;—*Nos tacemus*; *et eo magis, quod de domo noſtra nihil adhuc Pontifices reſponderunt.* Melm. Vol. I. p. 56. Thus were the liberties of *Rome* ſacrificed to the private purpoſes of her pretended Patriots.

of

of the Republic. It was agreed upon by the *Triumviri* that *Pompey* and *Craſſus* ſhould ſue for the conſulate of the following year, take to themſelves what provinces they liked beſt, and continue *Cæſar* in his government of *Gaul* for five years more. How all this was effected has been formerly related. *Craſſus*, before the expiration of his conſulſhip, ſet out for his government of *Syria* and the *Parthian* war: but *Pompey* remained in *Italy*, though inveſted with the command of an army and the government of *Spain*; and there continued to influence all the public tranſactions. His commiſſion for the providing of corn, which expired not till the year 701, furniſhed him with a pretence for not going to his province. He is univerſally accuſed of having given way to all the diſorders of the city, and of having inflamed public diſcord with a view of forcing the Senate to create him *Dictator*; in which ſcheme he ſucceeded ſo far as to get himſelf elected *ſole Conſul* by the unanimous vote of the Senate, and the conſent even of *Cato*. But, while he was inveſted with the whole public authority in the year 701, in order to ſettle the State, he employed it to a very different purpoſe.[c] Before his law took place for diſqualify-

Vid. ſupr. Vol. III. b. ix. ch. 3 and 4.

Vol. III. p. 542.

[c] *Cicero* often extols *Pompey*'s third conſulſhip, ſo far as to call it *divine*; yet he influenced the Judges to condemn *Milo*, whom *Cato* loudly acquitted, while *Sauſeius* was abſolved, who headed *Milo*'s gladiators in forcing the inn where *Clodius* was killed: *Milonem reum non magis invidia facti, quam Pompeii damnavit voluntas: Quem quidem M. Cato palam*

all future Conſuls and Prætors from holding any province till five years after the expiration of their magiſtracy, he was careful to provide an exception for himſelf, and got the government of

palam lata abſolvit ſententia. Vel. Pat. ii. 47. He employed his authority to ſave *Scipio*, though notoriouſly guilty, while he let *Hypſæus* be condemned by an *ex poſt facto* law, who had been his Quæſtor, and ever obſequious to his will. He abandoned *Scaurus*, who had ſerved under him, and to whom he left the government of *Syria* after the Mithridatic war; becauſe, ſays *Aſconius*, he took offence at *Scaurus*'s marrying *Mutia*, his divorced wife;—*in eo judicio neque Pompeius propenſum adjutorium præbuit, videbatur enim apud animum ejus non minus offenſionis contraxiſſe, quod judicium ejus in Mutiam, crimine impudicitiæ ab eo dimiſſam, levius feciſſe exiſtimaretur, cum eam ipſe probaſſet, quam gratiæ acquiſiſſe neceſſitudinis jure, quod ex eadem uterque liberos haberet.* In Arg. Or. pro Scauro. He, with his father-in-law *Scipio*, reſtored alſo the cenſorſhip; but who were elected to this office? Two of the moſt notoriouſly profligate citizens of *Rome*, *Appius* and *Piſo*. How infamous muſt have been the character of *Scipio* himſelf, whom *Pompey* took for his father-in-law and collegue in the conſulſhip, if the following ſtory from *Valerius Maximus* be true: *Æque flagitioſum illud convivium, quod Gemellus Tribunicius viator ingenui ſanguinis, ſed officii intra ſervilem habitum deformis, Metello Scipioni Conſuli, ac Tribunis Plebis, magno cumrubore civitatis comparavit. Lupanari enim domi ſuæ inſtituto, Mutiam et Fulviam, tum a patre tum a viro utramque abductam, et nobilem puerum Saturninum in eo proſtituit.* Lib. ix. c. 1. *Cæſar*, in the beginning of the third book of the civil war, affirms, that many of the deciſions given at this time were ſo little conformable to law, that ſentence was often pronounced by a party of Judges different from thoſe who attended the pleadings. *Tacitus*, it may likewiſe be added, is far from giving us a favourable idea of *Pompey*'s third Conſulſhip: *Cn. Pompeius tertium Conſul, corrigendis moribus delectus, et gravior remediis quam delicta erant, ſuarumque legum auctor idem ac ſubverſor.*—An. iii. c. 28.

of *Spain* continued to him for five years longer. His chief intention, after he had ſecured his own intereſt and power, was to quell the paſſions, and ſtop the ambitious purſuits of his Fellow-grandees. He was under a neceſſity, however, of providing ſomething extraordinary for his partner *Cæſar*; and he conſented to a law diſpenſing with his abſence in ſuing for the Conſulſhip. *Cælius*, Tribune of the people, who promoted this law, had been engaged to it by *Cicero*, at the joint requeſt of *Pompey* and *Cæſar*; [d] and it was carried with the concurrence of all the other Tribunes, though not without difficulty and obſtruction from the Senate. This laſt meaſure in favour of *Cæſar* was entered into by *Pompey* againſt his inclination, and he ſoon had reaſon to repent of it. *Julia*'s death had broken all his ties with her father, and that of *Craſſus* had given a new turn to their ſeveral pretenſions: His commiſſion over the corn-rents of the Empire was expired, and the laws loudly ordered him away to *Spain*, where he had no mind to go. He had been greatly careſſed of late by the Senate, who had truſted him with the whole pow-

[d] *Well then: Shall I declare againſt* Cæſar? *Where then is the faith I plighted him? For I was the means of the diſpenſation being granted him; and, when* Cæſar *ſolicited for my vote at* Ravenna, *at his requeſt, I brought over* Cœlius *to his party. But what do I ſay of* Cæſar? *I was ſolicited to the ſame purpoſe by our darling* Pompey *in that immortal third conſulate of his.* Yet *Cicero*, in his ſecond Philippic, affirms that he endeavoured to diſſuade *Pompey* from ſuffering this law to paſs. There are many ſuch contradictions in *Cicero*'s writings. Ad. Att. vii. 1. Philip. ii. c. 10.

er of the State; but the popular party was, with very good reaſon, better inclined to *Cæſar*. In theſe circumſtances he thought it adviſable to change his ſcheme of politics [e]: And, by *Cicero*'s account to *Cælius* in the very beginning of the year 702, *Pompey* was quite alienated from his father-in-law [f], and aſſociate in power, without having received the leaſt provocation either real or pretended, and had reſolved to act in concert with his enemies. Hitherto, *Pompey* and *Cæſar* had joined their intereſts againſt the chief of the Nobility, and obtained from the people what the Senate would not grant; but, now that the whole power of the Empire was thrown as a kind of prize between two, it was natural that they ſhould divide, and head, reſpectively, the two permanent and

[e] Septimo ferme anno Cæſar morabatur in Galliis, cum medium jam *ex invidia Pompeii* male cohærentis inter Cn. Pompeium et C. Cæſarem concordiæ pignus, *Julia* uxor Magni deceſſit; atque omnia inter deſtinatos tanto diſcrimini duces dirimente fortuna, filius quoque parvus Pompeii, Julia natus, intra breve ſpatium obiit. Tum in gladios cædeſque civium furente ambitu, cujus neque finis reperiebatur, nec modus, tertius conſulatus ſoli Cn. Pompeio, etiam adverſantium antea dignitati ejus judicio delatus eſt: Cujus ille honoris gloria, veluti reconciliatis ſibi optimatibus, maxime a *C. Cæſare* alienatus eſt. *Vell. Pat. lib.* ii. 47.

[f] "I paſſed ſeveral days with *Pompey*, "converſing with "him on nothing elſe but the Republic:——Take this from "me, that *Pompey is an excellent citizen*, prepared both with "courage and counſel for all events which can be foreſeen: "Wherefore give yourſelf up to the man; believe me, he "will embrace you; *for he now holds the ſame opinion with "us of good and bad citizens.*" Ep. Fam. xi. 8. Melm. III. 28. "I left *Pompey an excellent citizen*, and in readineſs a-"gainſt all events which we may dread." *Ad Att.* iv. 8.

and diſtinct parties in the Republic, the *Ariſtocracy and the People.*

Eight years ſucceſſively had *Cæſar* conducted the *Roman* arms in *Gaul* with ſuch amazing ſucceſs as intitled him to a triumph for the actions of every campaign[g]; no wonder, therefore, that his enemies among the Nobles ſhould feel an apprehenſion of his growing power with the people, who, before the recent proofs he had given of his ſuperior military abilities, and of his amiable qualities, had in many inſtances diſtinguiſhed him by ſingular marks of their eſteem, affection, and confidence. *Pompey* too was undoubtedly jealous of his glory as a Captain, which, it muſt be confeſſed, exceeded his own; and he eaſily foreſaw that, if *Cæſar* was permitted to ſue for the conſulſhip, and to enter upon it at the expiration of his military command, he would become maſter of the Republic; and, after his magiſtracy, procure, by a law of the people, the moſt conſiderable province, with a powerful army;

[g] Novemque æſtatibus vix ulla non juſtiſſimus triumphus emeritus. *Vel. Pat.* L. ii. c. 47. Dicam enim ex animo, Patres conſcripti, quod ſentio, et quod vobis audientibus ſæpe jam dixi. Si mihi nunquam amicus C. Cæſar fuiſſet, ſed ſemper iratus: Si, aſpernaretur amicitiam meam, ſeſeque mihi implacabilem inexpiabilemque præberet, tamen ei, cum tantas res geſſiſſet gereretque quotidie, non amicus eſſe non poſſem. Cujus ego imperio non Alpium vallum contra adſcenſum tranſgreſſionemque Gallorum, non Rheni foſſam, gurgitibus illis redundantem, Germanorum immaniſſimis gentibus objicio et oppono. Perfecit ille, ut, ſi montes reſediſſent, amnes exaruiſſent non naturæ præſidio, ſed victoriâ ſuâ, rebuſque geſtis Italiam munitam haberemus. *Cic. in Piſ.*

while he himſelf in the mean time would be obliged to withdraw to his government of *Spain.* Thus *Pompey* and the *Ariſtocracy*, though agreeing in little elſe, were induced to unite their ſtrength againſt the conqueror of *Gaul.*

A coalition was therefore formed, and a reſolution taken to revoke *Cæſar*'s command before the time was out, and to oblige him to come as a private man to ſue for the conſulſhip; in which caſe he had been expoſed to the mercy of his enemies, and *Cato* had threatened publicly to bring him to a trial. But this reſolution was very difficult to be put into practice, as it would neceſſarily occaſion, as a previous ſtep, the *repeal of two laws*, the one made by the Senate itſelf, the other by the people, with the unanimous concurrence of the Tribunes, and with the approbation of *Pompey.*

The Conſuls for the year 702 were *Servius Sulpitius* and *M. Claudius Marcellus*, who had been elected by the joint intereſt of *Pompey* and *Cæſar. Cato* had ſtood candidate with them; but, having diſpleaſed the people by an ill-timed ſeverity, he was rejected. *Plutarch* informs us, that he had obtained a decree from the Senate, ordering the candidates to make intereſt by themſelves, and not by their friends; ſo that the people were deprived not only of their uſual bribes, but of the ſatisfaction of being courted: And he refuſed alſo, ſays the ſame author, to condeſcend to that ſubmiſſive manner of ſoliciting which is common on ſuch occaſions, and behaved with great ſtate, *chuſing rather to preſerve the dig-*

dignity of his character, than to acquire the dignity of Conſul. On the very day he had loſt his election, as if quite unconcerned for what had happened, he was ſeen in the *Campus Martius* playing at tennis; a behaviour which *Plutarch* greatly extols, but which might have been nothing elſe but an affectation of ſingularity, or a conſequence of that haughty rage, which made him declare, that he would no more ſtand candidate for any magiſtracy.

Marcellus, [h] intirely devoted to *Pompey,* was no ſooner entered into office, than he began the attack upon *Cæſar,* by declaring his intention to abrogate immediately his command, and to appoint him a ſucceſſor, alleging that the war in *Gaul* was now brought to a concluſion. But he was

Suet. in Cæſ. cap. xxviii. Dio. l. xl. p. 148.

[h] Dr. *Middleton, Vol.* II. *p.* 196, has given the following character of him: "He was the head of a family, which, "for a ſucceſſion of many ages, had made the firſt figure "in *Rome*; and was himſelf adorned with all the virtues that "could qualify him to ſuſtain that dignity which he derived "from his noble anceſtors. He had formed himſelf in a par-"ticular manner for the bar, where he ſoon acquired great "fame; and, of all the orators of his time, ſeems to have "approached the neareſt to *Cicero* himſelf in the character "of a complete ſpeaker. His manner of ſpeaking was "elegant, ſtrong, and copious; with a ſweetneſs of voice, "and propriety of action, that added a grace and luſtre to "every thing that he ſaid. He was a conſtant admirer "and imitator of *Cicero*; and of the ſame principles in "peace, and on the ſame ſide in war." His fierceneſs, however, it may be remarked, againſt *Cæſar,* ſo ill-timed, gives us no great idea of his prudence or his honour: It was this probably which procured the conſulſhip ſucceſſively to two of his relations.

was ſtopped for ſome months in this purſuit, probably by *Pompey*'s falling ill ſoon after his promotion to the conſulſhip, and by the oppoſition of his collegue *Sulpitius*, [i] who, being of a more

[i] "*Sulpitius* was of a noble and patrician family, of the ſame "age, the ſame ſtudies, and the ſame principles with *Cicero*, "with whom he kept up a perpetual friendſhip. They went "through their exerciſes together when young, both at *Rome*, "and at *Rhodes*, in the celebrated ſchool of *Molo*: Whence "he became an eminent pleader of cauſes, and paſſed through "all the great offices of the State, with a ſingular reputa-"tion of wiſdom, learning, and integrity; a conſtant admi-"rer of the modeſty of the ancients; and a reprover of the "inſolence of his own times. When he could not arrive at "the firſt degree of fame, as an Orator, he reſolved to excel "in what was next to it, the character of a Lawyer; chuſing "rather to be the firſt, in the ſecond art, than the ſecond "only in the firſt: Leaving therefore to *Cicero* the field of "eloquence, he contented himſelf with ſuch a ſhare of it as "was ſufficient to ſuſtain and adorn the profeſſion of the law. "In this he ſucceeded to his wiſh; and was far ſuperior to "all who had ever profeſſed it in *Rome*; being the firſt who "reduced it to a proper ſcience, or rational ſyſtem; and "added light and method to that which all others before him "had taught darkly and confuſedly. Nor was his know-"ledge confined to the external forms, or the effects of the "Municipal laws; but enlarged by a comprehenſive view "of univerſal equity, which he made the interpreter of its "ſanctions, and the rule of all his deciſions; yet he was "always better pleaſed to put an amicable end to a contro-"verſy, than to direct a proceſs at law. In his political be-"haviour he was always a friend to peace and liberty; "moderating the violence of oppoſite parties, and diſcoura-"ging every ſtep towards civil diſſenſion; and, in the wars "which enſued, he was ſo buſy in contriving projects of an ac-"commodation, that he gained the name of *the peace-maker*. "Through a natural timidity of temper, confirmed by a "pro-

more moderate temper, and addicted to neither faction, over-ruled his motions. The enemies of *Cæſar* contented themſelves therefore with making vows for the ſucceſs of the *Bellovaci*, with whom he was engaged in war; and for the deſtruction of the *Roman* General. *Marcellus* had alſo made ſome attempt to deprive *Novum Comum*, a colony, which *Cæſar*, when Conſul, had ſettled at the foot of the *Alps*, of the freedom of the city, granted to it by a law preferred by *Vatinius*. He was likewiſe fruſtrated in this deſign, yet reſolved to have no regard to the privilege of the colony; and, having caught a *Comenſian* Magiſtrate, who was acting the citizen at *Rome*, he ordered him to be ſeized, and publicly whipped; an indignity from which all citizens were exempted by law; bidding the man go, and ſhew theſe marks of his citizenſhip to *Cæſar* [k]. Suet. in Cæſ. 28.

The elections of Magiſtrates for the enſuing year engaged the attention of the city in the months

" profeſſion and courſe of life averſe from arms, though he " preferred *Pompey*'s cauſe as the beſt, he did not care to fight " for it; but, taking *Cæſar*'s to be the ſtrongeſt, ſuffered his " ſon to follow that camp, while he himſelf continued " quiet and neuter: For this he was honoured by *Cæſar*, " yet could never be induced to approve his government. " From the time of *Cæſar*'s death, he continued ſtill to ad- " viſe and promote all meaſures which ſeemed likely to eſta- " bliſh the public concord; and died at laſt, as he lived, in " the very act and office of *peace-making*." *Middl. p.* 361.

[k] " All the other colonies on that ſide of the *Po* had be- " fore obtained from *Pompey*'s father the rights of *Latium*, " [Jus Latii] that is, the freedom of the city of *Rome* to " thoſe

months of *July* and *Auguſt*; and *Pompey*'s faction generally prevailed. *C. Claudius Marcellus* and *L. Paulus*[1] were choſen Conſuls. The firſt, who was

" thoſe which had borne an annual magiſtracy in them. Hence " *Cicero* blames this act of *Marcellus* as violent and unjuſt. " *Marcellus*, ſays he, *behaved ſhamefully in the caſe of the* " *Comenſian*; *for, if the man had never been a Magiſtrate, he* " *was yet of a colony beyond the Po*; *ſo that Pompey will not be* " *leſs ſhocked at it than Cæſar himſelf.*" Middl. p. 44. Thoſe who had not been Magiſtrates might give their votes in the aſſemblies of *Rome*, if ordered by the preſiding Magiſtrate to vote in ſuch a tribe: But only the Magiſtrates could pretend to any office.

[1] *Cicero* wrote congratulatory letters to them both from *Cilicia*, and another to *M. Marcellus*, which, as it informs us how the Conſuls thoughts were taken up before the elections, we ſhall inſert it here:

To *Marcus Marcellus*, Conſul.

" I very warmly congratulate you on your relation *Caius* " *Marcellus* being elected to ſucceed you: As I ſincerely re- " joice in your having received this happy fruit of your " pious affection to your family, of your patriot-zeal to your " country, and of your illuſtrious deportment in the conſular " office. I can eaſily imagine the ſentiments which your ad- " dreſs on this occaſion has created in *Rome*; and as to " myſelf, whom you have ſent to theſe far diſtant parts of " the globe; believe me, I ſpeak of it with the higheſt and " moſt unfeigned applauſe. I can with ſtrict truth aſſure " you, that I have ever had a particular attachment to you " from your earlieſt youth: As I am ſenſible, you have al- " ways ſhewn by your generous offices in promoting my " dignities, that you deemed me worthy of the moſt diſtin- " guiſhed honours. But this late inſtance of your judi- " cious management in procuring the conſulſhip for *Mar-* " *cellus*, together with the proof it affords of the favour in " which you ſtand with the Republic, has raiſed you ſtill " higher in my eſteem. It is with great complacency, there-

was couſin-german to *M. Marcellus*, carried his ſuit in competition with *Calidius*, an eminent orator and friend to *Cæſar*, and was zealouſly attached to *Pompey*. The ſecond ſet out alſo in his adminiſtration with principles agreeable to thoſe of his collegue.

Marcus Cælius, *Cicero*'s friend and correſpondent, obtained the ædileſhip this year. He had been Tribune of the people in *Pompey*'s third conſulſhip, and had diſtinguiſhed himſelf in that office by his zeal for *Milo*, and was reputed of the ariſtocratical faction [m].

Curio likewiſe obtained the tribunate, which he ſought with no other deſign, as many imagined, than for the opportunity of mortifying *Cæſar*, againſt whom he had hitherto acted with great fierceneſs. He [n] was a young Nobleman of

" fore, I hear it obſerved by men of the firſt diſtinction for " ſenſe and merit, that, in all our words and actions, our " taſtes and ſtudies, our principles and purſuits, we bear a " ſtrong reſemblance to each other. The only circumſtance, " that can render your glorious conſulate ſtill more agreeable " to me, will be your procuring a ſucceſſor to be nominated " to this province as ſoon as poſſible. But if this cannot " be obtained ; let me intreat you at leaſt not to ſuffer my " continuance here to be prolonged beyond the time limited " by your decree, and the law which paſſed for that purpoſe. " In a word, I hope upon all occaſions to experience in my " abſence the benefit of your friendſhip and protection. " Farewell." *Ep. Fam.* xv. 9. *Melm.* iii. 35.

[m] See ſome account of him, Vol. III. p. 483. and 550.

[n] " The circumſtance of *Curio*'s ſtanding candidate for the " tribuneſhip", ſays *Cælius* " in a letter to *Cicero*, in 702, " greatly alarms thoſe who are unacquainted with the real " good qualities of *Curio*'s heart. I hope, and indeed be- " lieve Ep. Fam. viii. 4. Melm. iii. 32.

of great ſpirit, parts, and eloquence; but addicted beyond all meaſure or modeſty to the prevailing luxury and gallantries of a moſt diſſolute age. In his youth, he had been the leader of the young Nobility, and a warm aſſertor of the authority of the Senate againſt the power of the Triumvirate. Upon his firſt taſte of public honours, his ambition and thirſt of popularity had engaged him in ſuch expence and prodigality, that, to ſupply the magnificence of his ſhews and plays, he had contracted an immenſe debt.

The Conſul *Marcellus*, who, when taken up in theſe elections, had ſeemed to have dropped the deſign of abrogating *Cæſar*'s proconſular power °, upon which he was ſo intent in the beginning of his magiſtracy, reſumed the affair after the Conſuls were choſen. "At a meeting of the Senate [ſays *Cælius* to *Cicero*] held "on

Ep. Fam. viii. 4. Melm. iii. 32. [Dated Aug. 1, 702.]

"lieve, he will act agreeably to his profeſſions, and join with "the Senate in ſupporting the friends of the Republic. I am "ſure, at leaſt, he is full of theſe deſigns at preſent; in "which *Cæſar*'s conduct has been the principal occaſion "of engaging him. For *Cæſar*, though he ſpares no pains "or expence to gain over even the loweſt of the people to "his intereſt, has thought fit to treat *Curio* with ſingular con-"tempt. The latter has behaved with ſo much temper "upon this occaſion, that he, who never acted with artifice "in all his life, is ſuſpected to have diſſembled his reſent-"ment, in order the more effectually to defeat the ſchemes "of thoſe who oppoſe his election; I mean the *Lælii* and "the *Antonii*, together with the reſt of that wonderful party."

° "*Marcellus*, ſays *Cælius* to *Cicero*, has dropped the deſign "upon which he was lately ſo intent: But not ſo much "from indolence, I believe, as prudence." *Ep. Fam.* viii. 2. *Melm.* iii. 29.

" on *the* 22*d of July*, in the temple of *Apollo* [p], " upon a debate relating to the payment of the " forces commanded by *Pompey*, mention was " made of that legion, which, as appeared by " his accounts, had been lent to *Cæſar*; and " he was aſked of what number of men it con- " ſiſted, and for what purpoſe it was borrowed? " In ſhort, *Pompey* was puſhed ſo ſtrongly upon " this article, that he found himſelf under a ne- " ceſſity of promiſing to recal this legion out of " *Gaul*; but he added at the ſame time, that " the clamours of his enemies ſhould not force " him to take this ſtep too precipitately. *It was* " *afterwards moved, that the queſtion might be put* " *concerning the election of a ſucceſſor to Cæſar.* " Accordingly the Senate came to a reſolution " that *Pompey* (who was juſt going to the army " at *Ariminum* [q], and did immediately after ſet " out

[p] The temple of *Apollo* was ſituated without the town, and the Senate was aſſembled there, that *Pompey*, who was actually Governor of *Spain*, and commanded a conſiderable army, might be preſent: And all the matter of this deliberation had been probably concerted with him.

[q] This army was probably part of the four legions which were decreed to *Pompey* for the ſupport of his government of *Spain*. He feigned at this time a reſolution of going to that province which was oppoſed by *Cæſar*'s enemies and *Cicero* himſelf. The laſt writes thus to *Atticus* on the *6th of July*: " It appeared to me likewiſe as if *Pompey* " (according to what you wrote me *Varro* had ſaid) would " moſt certainly go to *Spain*. *This reſolution by no means met* " *with my approbation. I eaſily made* Theophanes * *ſenſible* " *that* Ad. Att. V. 11.

* A learned *Greek* of *Mitylene*, who was *Pompey*'s conſtant companion, and wrote his life.

" out for that purpoſe) ſhould be ordered to " return to *Rome* with all expedition; *that the* " *affair*

" *that he could do nothing better than to remain where he was.* " That *Græcian* therefore will do all he can to detain " him, and indeed I know that *Pompey* has a great deference " for his opinion." From this it appears that *Cicero* and all the Ariſtocratics thought, that on *Pompey*'s preſence reſted the ſafety of what they called the *Republic.*

In another letter to his friend *Atticus*, he writes: " As to " the affairs of *Rome*, we have ugly accounts of *Curio* and " *Paulus*; not that I ſee any danger while we have *Pompey:* " Let him only keep his health, and we are ſafe." [*Non quo ullum periculum videam ſtante Pompeio, vel etiam ſedente; valeat modo.*] " But I am concerned for my friends *Curio* and " *Paulus.*" *Ad Att.* vi. 3. Yet the ſame *Cicero* has the confi- " dence, in a ſubſequent letter, written to *Aulus Cæcina*, in 707, to affirm ſolemnly, that he always adviſed *Pompey* to go to his government, and boaſts, at the ſame time, of his having never been deceived in the foreſight of future events. " Now, if the principles" ſays he, " of the *Etruſcan* ſci- " ence, in which you were inſtructed by your illuſtrious and " excellent father, did not deceive you with reſpect to me; " neither will my preſages be leſs infallible with regard " to you. They are derived, indeed, not only from the " maxims and records of the moſt diſtinguiſhed ſages, whoſe " writings, you well know, I have ſtudied with great appli- " cation; but from a long experience in public affairs, and " from having paſſed through various ſcenes both of proſpe- " rity and adverſity. I have the ſtronger reaſon to confide " in this method of divination, *as it has never once deceived* " *me, during all theſe dark and diſtracted times: Inſomuch that,* " *were I to mention my predictions, I am afraid you would ſuſ-* " *pect that I framed them after the events I pretend to have* " *foretold.*——*I always gave it as my opinion, that Pompey* " *ſhould go to his government of* SPAIN: With which if he " had happily complied, we ſhould never have been in- " volved in this fatal civil war."—*Ep. Fam.* vi. 6. *Melm.* ix. 34. This is moſt evidently falſe; and we ſhall ſee him

" out

" *affair relating to a general election of new gover-*
" *nors for all the provinces might be debated in his*
" *preſence.* This point, adds *Cœlius*, I imagine
" will be brought before the Senate on *the 13th*
" *of this month*; when, if no infamous obſtacles
" ſhould be thrown in the way by the Tri-
" bunes, the Houſe will certainly come to ſome
" reſolution; for *Pompey*, in the courſe of the
" debate, let fall an intimation, that he thought
" every man owed obedience to the authority
" of that Aſſembly."

Thus the Senate threw themſelves precipitately into the arms of *Pompey*. The affair was not debated on *the 13th of Auguſt*, becauſe *Marcellus*, though he had exerted himſelf in the purſuit of his deſign, was not able to aſſemble a complete number of Senators. Many abſented themſelves, being in *Cæſar*'s intereſt; others were backward, becauſe they ſaw that theſe motions tended to a rupture, and that nothing could be legally determined; the Tribunes of *Cæſar*'s party being always ready to interpoſe their negative. At laſt, an Aſſembly was held on the *30th of September*; and *Pompey*, who, in a preceding meeting, had opened himſelf ſo far as to declare, that *Cæſar ought not to be admitted as a candidate for the conſulſhip, whilſt he retained his command in Gaul*, now let fall an expreſſion which was much obſerved, and gave, ſays *Cœlius* to *Cicero*, confident hopes of his good intentions;

out in his politics in almoſt every circumſtance: Yet *Cornelius Nepos*, and all *Cicero*'s Commentators, have taken his word for it, and are aſtoniſhed at his prophetic diſcernment.

that he could not, without great injuſtice, determine any thing in relation to the provinces under Cæſar's command before the 1ſt of March; but that, after that time, he ſhould have no ſort of ſcruple. It was reſolved accordingly by the Senate, *that the Conſuls elect,* L. PAULUS *and* C. METELLUS, *ſhould move them on the 1ſt of March to ſettle the conſular provinces; and, if any Magiſtrate ſhould interpoſe to hinder the effect of their decrees, that he ſhould be deemed an enemy to the Republic; and, if any one actually interpoſed, that this vote and reſolution ſhould be entered into the journals as an order of the Senate to be conſidered ſome other time by the Houſe, and laid before the people.* In this ſame Aſſembly, *Pompey* being aſked, *what if a negative ſhould be put on the 1ſt of March, upon the decree for recalling Cæſar?* He declared, that he looked upon it juſt as the ſame thing, whether *Cæſar* openly refuſed to obey the orders of the Senate, or ſecretly procured ſome Magiſtrate to obſtruct them. *What,* ſaid another, *if he ſhould inſiſt on being Conſul, and holding his province alſo? What,* replied *Pompey, if my ſon ſhould take a ſtick, and beat me?* From expreſſions of this kind, it was generally conceived that a rupture would undoubtedly enſue between *Pompey* and *Cæſar:* And indeed the votes of the Senate, and the meaſures taken at the ſame time by *Pompey,* were no leſs than a declaration of war againſt *Cæſar,* who loſt no time to prepare himſelf againſt this attack of his enemies. As ſoon as he had vanquiſhed the *Bellovaci,* he applied himſelf to quiet the affairs of his province, that he might be able

to

to give all his attention to the city, and have his army in readineſs to ſupport him. At the ſame time he left no ſtone unturned to procure friends among the Magiſtrates of the enſuing year. He firſt attempted to gain *C. Marcellus*; but, finding him too rigid, he addreſſed himſelf to *L. Paulus*, to whom he is ſaid to have given 1500 talents, or about three hundred thouſand pounds, which he employed in building a noble palace adjoining to the Forum. He gave a much greater ſum to the Tribune *Curio*, who, by his prodigalities, had not only waſted his immenſe fortune, but had contracted a debt of ſix hundred thouſand ſeſterces, or about half a million[r]. The Conſul and Tribune agreed therefore, ſecretly, to ſuffer nothing prejudicial to *Cæſar*'s intereſt to paſs during their magiſtracy; but both continued to appear in the party of *Pompey*[s].

[r] Momentumque fuit mutatus Curio rerum,
Gallorum captus ſpoliis, et Cæſaris auro.
Lucan. Lib. iv. 819.

Caught by the ſpoils of *Gaul*, and *Cæſar*'s gold,
Curio turn'd traitor, and his country ſold.

The *vendidit hic auro Patriam* of *Virgil* is alſo applied to the caſe of *Curio*. *Servius.*

[s] "As for *Paulus*," ſays *Cælius*, in a letter to *Cicero*, dated *the 18th of Nov.* "he declares moſt vehemently againſt ſuffering *Cæſar* to continue in *Gaul*, and our friend *Furnius* is "the only Tribune, whom I ſuſpect of obſtructing his meaſures for that purpoſe: *Curio*," ſays he, in the ſame letter, "I foreſee will undertake two things; he will in the firſt "place attempt to weaken the authority of *Cæſar*; and in "the next endeavour to throw ſome little advantages on the "ſide of *Pompey*." Ep. Fam. viii. x. Melm. iv. 14.

Ep. Fam. viii. 10. Melm. iv. 14.

In the laſt months of this year, the city was greatly alarmed by the news ſent them by *Caſſius* of an invaſion of the *Parthians*. As the Senate had no opinion of the military ſkill of *Bibulus* and *Cicero*, who governed in *Syria* and *Cilicia*, the two frontier provinces, ſome were of opinion that the command ſhould be given to *Pompey*; and he himſelf ſeemed to reliſh the propoſition[t]. This project would ſerve his ends in *Aſia*, and would furniſh a pretext for ſtaying in *Italy*, and taking from *Cæſar* two of his legions. Others were for aſſigning this expedition to *Cæſar* and his army; and many named the Conſuls as the moſt proper perſons to be employed. And theſe Magiſtrates, in the apprehenſion that they would either be nominated to a commiſſion, which they did not reliſh, or ſuffer the diſgrace of its being delegated to others, forbore to convene the Senate; though they thereby incurred the cenſure of neglecting the public intereſt. But whether indolence, or puſillanimity, was the real motive of their declining the conduct of the war, it was concealed under the ſpecious appearance of modeſty; and thus the year was ſpun out without doing any effectual buſineſs. The Senate, however, with a view to weaken *Cæſar*, taking advantage of the general apprehenſion of an irruption of the *Parthians* into *Syria*, ordered that *Pompey* and *Cæſar* ſhould each of them furniſh

[t] "I ſhall be able," ſays *Cicero* to *Atticus*, "with the re-"inforcement of *Dejotarus*, to keep the *Parthians* in play "*till Pompey arrives: His letter informs me that he will be* "*appointed to that command.*" Ad Att. vi. 1.

a legion

a legion to be ſent into that province. But *Pompey*, inſtead of giving one of his, called for that which he had formerly lent to *Cæſar*; and *Appius* was diſpatched to take the command of it, and to bring it into *Italy*. *Cæſar*, though he eaſily ſaw through the policy of his enemies, obeyed without demur the decree of the Senate, and not only delivered to *Appius Pompey*'s legion, but alſo the 15th cantoned at that time in *hither Gaul*, which was immediately replaced by the thirteenth. *Plutarch* ſays that he gave to each ſoldier of the two legions 250 drachms, about 8l. ſterling; a circumſtance which *Cæſar* himſelf has not mentioned. Theſe troops were no ſooner arrived in *Italy*, but they had quarters aſſigned them in *Campania*, near *Capua*, inſtead of being ſent into *Syria*.

L. Æmilius Paulus,
C. Claudius Marcellus, } Conſuls.

The beginning of the year 703 was very quiet, but the calm ſoon ended in a mighty tempeſt. *Curio*, who had already ſold himſelf to *Cæſar*, and who had hitherto acted inſidiouſly with the friends of *Pompey*, and even ſigned the decrees of the Senate againſt *Cæſar*, was now looking out for a pretext to quarrel with his party: With this view he applied to the Pontifical College for an *intercalation*, in order to lengthen out the period of his tribunitian miniſtry; and, the prieſts rejecting his demand, their refuſal furniſhed him with the pretence he wanted, and gave a colour, ſuch as it was, to the deſertion he had long meditated. He inſtantly declared againſt the Senate, and harangued the

Y.R. 703. Bef. Chr. 49. 402 Conſ.

U. R. 703. Bef. Chr. 49. 402 Conſ.

people in favour of *Cæſar*, threatening, at the ſame time, to propoſe not only an *agrarian* and a *viarian* law[u], but a law alſo which would impower the ædiles to diſtribute corn among the people. Theſe motions, however, ſoon gave way to one that was more important and intereſting. *C. Marcellus* propoſed, on the *1ſt of March*, the affair of the conſular provinces, as it had been ordered by the vote of the Senate of *the*

[u] *Conſules autem habemus ſumma diligentia: Adhuc ſenatuſconſultum niſi de feriis Latinis nullum facere potuerunt. Curioni noſtro tribunatus conglaciat: Sed dici non poteſt quomodo hic omnia jaceant: Niſi ego cum tabernariis et aquariis pugnarem, veternus civitatem occupaſſet . . . . Quod tibi ſupra ſcripſi Curionem frigere, jam calet. Nam ferventiſſimè concerpitur. Leviſſimè enim, quia de intercalando non obtinuerat, transfugit ad populum et prò Cæſare loqui cœpit*; legemque viariam non diſſimilem agrariæ Rulli et alimentariam, quas jubet ædiles metiri, jactavit. *Hoc nondum ſecerat, cum priorem epiſtolæ partem ſcripſi. Cælius Ciceroni. He threatens likewiſe to propoſe a viarian law, ſomewhat of the ſame tendency with the agrarian one which was formerly attempted by Rullus.* This place muſt be corrupted; for the *viarian* and *agrarian* laws were different. The former regarded the keeping of the high roads in repair, and regulated the equipages of travellers, impoſing a tax on them; and the latter is thus explained by *Cælius*, in a letter written in the end of the year 702: "I forgot "to mention that *Curio* deſigns to make an attempt to pro- "cure a diviſion of the lands in *Campania*: it is pretended "that *Cæſar* does not concern himſelf in this matter; cer- "tain however it is, that *Pompey* is very deſirous of having "the diſtribution ſettled before *Cæſar*'s return, that he may "be precluded from applying them to his own purpoſes." *Ep. Fam.* viii. 10. *Melm.* iv. 14. *Cæſar's agrarian* law had not probably been executed in its whole extent, and *Curio* meant to carry the remaining part into execution. *Cælius* compares the *agrarian* law of *Curio* to that of *Rullus*, to ſhew his diſapprobation of it.

30th

30th of September. *Paulus*, the other Conſul, was ſilent; but *Curio*, after giving his approbation to the propoſition, demanded that *Pompey* ſhould likewiſe be ordered to renounce the government of *Spain*, and the command of the legions allotted to him; declaring, that the Republic could never be free, till both he and *Cæſar* were reduced to the condition of private citizens; and that, if the one was continued in command, the other ought not to be ſtripped of his authority; which, in that caſe, was neceſſary to preſerve the balance, and to prevent the Republic from being at the diſpoſal of one man. The Senate, not being willing to make a decree ſo contrary to the intereſt of *Pompey*, rejected the Tribune's propoſal; who, in return, put his negative on every other reſolution. Y. R. 703. Bef. Chr. 49. 402 Conſ. Appian. Bel. Civ. l. ii.

When the news of the debate reached *Pompey*, who was then in *Campania*, he wrote, with a falſe modeſty which deceived no-body, "that, whatever honours had been heaped upon him, they had been freely granted him by the good-will of his fellow-citizens, without his ever ſoliciting any: That, lately, he had been forced into a third conſulſhip, and to take the government of *Spain* for another five years; and that they ſhould always find him ready to reſign, at their will, an employment which he had received with reluctance." Theſe proteſtations he even renewed on his return to *Rome*; but *Curio*, who was not to be put off with fair words, inſiſted upon his carrying his promiſes into exe- Ibid.

V. R. 703. Bef. Chr. 49. 402 Conſ.

cution, aſſuring him of a like ſubmiſſion from *Cæſar*.

There were freſh debates upon this ſubject; and *Cælius* has given the following accounts of them to *Cicero*: "As to political affairs; the efforts of all parties are at preſent directed to "a ſingle point: And the general conteſt ſtill "is, in relation to the provinces. *Pompey* ſeems "to unite in earneſt with the Senate, *that the* "*13th of November may be limited for Cæſar's re-* "*ſigning his government.* *Curio*, on the contrary, "is determined to oppoſe this to the utmoſt; "and, accordingly, has relinquiſhed all his other "ſchemes, in order to apply his whole ſtrength "to the affair in queſtion. As to our party, "you well know their irreſolution; and conſe- "quently will readily believe me when I tell you "they have not the ſpirit to puſh their oppoſition "to the laſt extremity. The whole myſtery of "the ſcene in ſhort is this: *Pompey*, that he may "not ſeem to oppoſe *Cæſar*, or to aim at any "thing but what the latter ſhall think perfectly "equitable, repreſents *Curio* as acting in this "affair merely upon his own authority, and with "no other view than to create diſturbances. It "is certain, at the ſame time, that *Pompey* is "much averſe to *Cæſar*'s being elected Conſul "before he ſhall have delivered up his govern- "ment, together with the command of his "army: And indeed he ſeems to be extremely "apprehenſive of the conſequences, if it ſhould "prove otherwiſe. In the mean time he is ſe- "verely attacked by *Curio*: Who is perpetually

Ep. Fam. viii. 12. Melm. vi. 6.

"re-

"reproaching him with deviating from the prin- Y. R. 703. Bef. Chr. 49. 402 Conf.
"ciples on which he acted in his ſecond conſul-
"ſhip. Take my word for it, notwithſtanding
"all the difficulties they may throw in *Curio*'s
"way, *Cæſar* will never want a friend to riſe
"up in his cauſe: And if the whole turns, as
"they ſeem to fear, upon his procuring ſome
"Tribune to interpoſe his negative to their de-
"crees, I will venture to pronounce that he may
"remain in *Gaul* as long as he ſhall think pro-
"per."

"Do you know, my dear *Cicero*, what a vic- Ep. Fam. viii. 13. Melm. vi. 8.
"tory *Curio* has lately obtained in relation to
"the provinces? The Senate, in purſuance of
"a former order, having aſſembled to conſider
"of the obſtruction which ſome of the Tribunes
"had given to their decree; *M. Marcellus* moved
"that the application might be made to thoſe
"Magiſtrates to withdraw their proteſt: *But*
"*it was carried in the negative by a conſiderable*
"*majority.* *Pompey* is at preſent in ſuch deli-
"cate circumſtances, that he will ſcarce find any
"meaſures, I believe, perfectly to his ſatisfac-
"tion. The Senate, however, ſeem to intend,
"by the reſolution I juſt now mentioned, *that*
"*Cæſar ſhall be admitted as a candidate for the con-*
"*ſulſhip, notwithſtanding he ſhould refuſe to reſign*
"*his government.*" *Cicero* ſpeaks of this reſolu-
tion in a letter to *Atticus*, and produces it as
a proof that the intentions of the Senate were Ad. Att. vii. 7.
not true to the intereſt of the Commonwealth:
"For, had the motion," ſays he, "of *Marcellus*
"been vigorouſly ſupported, *Curio*'s oppoſition
"would

Y. R. 703. Bef. Chr. 49. 402 Conſ.

"would have been vain, and *Cæſar* muſt ne-
"ceſſarily have reſigned his command." But this meaſure had been certainly unconſtitutional: And *Pompey*, who had often ſhewn himſelf ungrateful to his friends, and cruel to his enemies, had no merit with the greater part of the Senate, *comparatively* with *Cæſar*, who never courted them, but relied intirely upon the people, while his antagoniſt, as induced by his intereſt, had applied to the one and to the other.

Ep. Fam. viii. 14. Melm. vi. 25.

"As to political affairs; I have often men-
"tioned to you, that I imagined the public tran-
"quillity could not poſſibly be preſerved be-
"yond the preſent year: And the nearer we
"approach to thoſe contentions, which muſt
"inevitably ariſe, the more evident this danger
"appears. For *Pompey* is determined moſt ſtre-
"nuouſly to oppoſe *Cæſar*'s being Conſul, unleſs
"he reſigns his command: And *Cæſar*, on the
"contrary, is perſuaded that he cannot be ſafe
"upon thoſe terms. *He has* offered, however, to
"throw up his commiſſion, provided *Pompey*
"will do the ſame. And thus their very ſuſpi-
"cious alliance will probably end at laſt in an
"open war . . . . . With reſpect to our preſent
"diviſions, I foreſee that the Senate, together
"with the whole order of Judges, will declare in
"favour of *Pompey*: And that all thoſe of deſpe-
"rate fortunes, or who are obnoxious to the
"laws, will liſt themſelves under the banners of
"*Cæſar*. As to their armies, I am perſuaded
"there will be a great inequality. . . . . But
"to anſwer your queſtion in a few words, con-
"cerning

"cerning my ſentiments of public affairs; if "one or other of our Chiefs ſhould not be em- "ployed againſt the *Parthians*, I am perſuaded "great *diſſenſions* will ſoon enſue: *diſſenſions*, my "friend, *which nothing can terminate but the ſword*, "*and which each of them ſeem well inclined and pre-* "*pared to draw.*" [x]

Y. R. 703. Bef. Chr. 49. 402 Conſ.

The

[x] Theſe accounts are the moſt authentic we have: What *Suetonius*, or *Plutarch*, or *Appian*, add to them, cannot be depended upon, being full of blunders and abſurdities. The relations, nevertheleſs, of theſe authors, are copied by almoſt every writer of *Roman* hiſtory. *Appian* talks of a *debate* in the Senate, in which the Conſul *C. Marcellus* having put the queſtion ſeparately, firſt, whether they were of opinion that *Pompey* ſhould lay down his command, the majority anſwered in the negative: Then putting the queſtion, whether a ſucceſſor ſhould be named to *Cæſar*? All agreed to it. But that *Curio*, re-uniting what the Conſul had ſeparated, put to the vote another queſtion, Whether they ſhould not both be ordered to diſmiſs their armies; twenty-one rejected it, and 370 anſwered in the affirmative; *all*, ſays he, *affectionate to the public good:* Whereupon the Conſul diſmiſſed the Aſſembly, crying, *Well then, take Cæſar for your maſter.* He adds, that ſoon after, a falſe rumour coming that *Cæſar* had paſſed the *Alps*, and was marching directly to *Rome*, the city was alarmed, and the Conſuls propoſed to the Senate to ſend for the legions at *Capua*, to employ them againſt him as an enemy to the State; but that, upon *Curio*'s declaring the report to be falſe, the Conſul in great wrath, ſaid: *Since, in conſulting with the Senate,* I am hindered to provide for the ſafety *of the commonwealth, I will provide alone, according to the power I am intruſted with.* Then, ruſhing out of the city with his collegue, [who was *L. Æmilius Paulus, Cæſar*'s faſt friend] and preſenting a ſword to *Pompey*, *we order you*, ſaid he, *my collegue and I, to march againſt Cæſar, and fight for your country*; and, to *that end, we give you the command of the army at Capua, and all the forces*

Y. R. 703. Bef. Chr. 49. 4th Conſ.

The conſular elections were carried by *Pompey* and his party. *Sergius Galba*, a Lieutenant of *Cæſar*, who ſtood candidate, was rejected; and *L. Lentulus Crus* and *C. Marcellus*, his fierceſt enemies, were choſen.

Cæſar, after the campaign of the year 702, had made it his buſineſs in the winter-ſeaſon to pacify his province, and to take away all occaſion of future inſurrections. He treated the cities honourably; rewarding generouſly the Noblemen and Leading-men, and did not burden the country with new impoſitions. In the ſpring, he haſtened into *Italy*, under the pretence of aſſiſting his Quæſtor *Antony* in his ſuit for the augurate; but in reality to take a nearer view of the tranſactions in the city, and to encourage his party there. The news therefore which he received of *Antony*'s[y] ſucceſs, before he reached *Italy*,

in Italy; with power to raiſe troops at your diſcretion. Pompey declared he would obey them, becauſe it was their command; adding, however, theſe words, *if no better expedient can be found.* *Plutarch* has much the ſame tale, but has added, moſt ridiculouſly, that the Senate followed the Conſul, and that the whole city put on mourning. *Dio* has adopted only a part of the ſtory, and tells us that the ſubject of the debate was, whether *Curio* ſhould be turned out of the Senate; *Appius*, the Cenſor, having declared that, in his judgment, he ought to be degraded. He obſerves, that only *C. Marcellus* and the two Conſuls elect went to *Pompey*. *Lib.* xl. *p.* 151.

[y] We have an account of this election in a letter from *Cæ-*
"*lius* to *Cicero*:" If you had taken the King of *Parthia*
"himſelf priſoner, and ſacked his metropolis, it could not
"make you amends for your abſence.—You have loſt indeed

Italy, did not ſtop him. It was then time to thank the municipal towns for the aſſiſtance they had given his friend upon his recommendation, and to recommend unto them his own caſe touching the conſulate, which he purpoſed to apply for the next year. He was received with extraordinary reſpect and affection: All the people came forth to meet him; ſacrifices were offered over the whole country; and the gates where he was to paſs, the market-places, and the temples were adorned as in a day of triumph. After making his tour through the municipal towns, and agreeing with his friends at *Rome*, he left *T. Labienus* to command in *Italy*, and went himſelf into *Gaul* to review his army and put it in readineſs to act on the firſt call.

A. R. 703. Bef. Chr. 49. 402 Conſ.

In

"a ſubject of inexhauſtible mirth, by not being ſpectator of "the very ridiculous figure which the luckleſs [*L.*] *Domitius* "diſplayed, when he lately found himſelf diſappointed in "his election. The aſſembly of the people was exceed-"ingly numerous upon this occaſion; but the force of party "bore down all before it, and even carried away many of the "friends of *Domitius* from his intereſt. This circumſtance "he imputes to my management; and as he conſiders the "preference which has been given to his competitor *An-*"*tony*, as a real injury done to himſelf, he honours me with "the ſame marks of his diſpleaſure with which he diſtin-"guiſhes the moſt intimate of his friends. He is at pre-"ſent indeed a very diverting compound of wrath and in-"dignation; which he impotently diſcharges, in the firſt "place againſt myſelf for promoting the election of *M. An-*"*tony*; and in the next againſt the people, for expreſſing too "much ſatisfaction in his repulſe." *Ep. Fam.* viii. 14 *Melm.* vi. 15.

U. R. 703. Bef. Chr. 49. 4on Conſ.

In the end of the year 703, he returned to *Italy*: And, when he came thither, he found that the two legions which he had diſmiſſed, and which, by the decree of the Senate, ſhould have been employed againſt the *Parthians*, had been delivered to *Pompey* by *C. Marcellus*, the Conſul, and were kept in the neighbourhood of the city; and that every meaſure had been taken to abrogate his command, and reduce him to the ſtate of a private citizen. Here he was joined by *Curio*, who, after ſome fruitleſs attempts to prohibit *Pompey*'s levies, ſeeing the oppoſite party greatly incenſed againſt him, had left the city before the expiration of his office.

Mark Antony[z] ſucceeded him in the tribunate on

[z] Dr. *Middleton* has collected, from *Cicero*'s writings, the hiſtory of *M. Antony*'s life to the commencement of the civil wars; and the reader will allow me to tranſcribe this article from that intelligent hiſtorian.

"*M. Antony*, who now began to make a figure in the affairs of *Rome*, was of an ancient and noble extraction; the grandſon of that celebrated ſtateſman and orator who loſt his life in the maſſacres of *Marius and Cinna*: His father had been honoured with one of the moſt important commiſſions of the Republic; but, after an inglorious diſcharge of it, died with the character of a corrupt, oppreſſive, and rapacious Commander. The ſon, trained in the diſcipline of ſuch a parent, whom he loſt when he was very young, launched out at once into all the exceſs of riot and debauchery, and *waſted his whole patrimony before he had put on the manly gown*; ſhewing himſelf to be the genuine ſon of that father, who was born, as *Salluſt* ſays, *to ſquander money, without ever employing a thought on buſineſs, till a preſent neceſſity urged him.* His comely perſon, lively wit, inſinuating addreſs, made young *Curio* in-

on *the* 10*th of November*, and in all his zeal for *Cæſar*. He was no ſooner in poſſeſſion of his office, Y. R. 703. Bef. Chr. 49. 402 Conſ.

" infinitely fond of him; ſo that, in ſpight of the commands " of a ſevere father, who had often turned *Antony* out of doors " and forbidden him his houſe, he could not be prevailed " with to forſake his company; but ſupplied him with " money for his frolics and amours, till he had involved " himſelf on his account in a debt of *fifty thouſand pounds*. " This greatly afflicted old *Curio*; and *Cicero was called* " *in to heal the diſtreſs of the family*; whom the ſon in- " treated, with tears in his eyes, to intercede for *Antony*, as " well as for himſelf, and not ſuffer them to be parted: But " *Cicero*, having prevailed with the father to make the ſon eaſy, " by diſcharging his debts, adviſed him to inſiſt upon it as a " condition, and to inforce it by his paternal power, that " he ſhould have no farther commerce with *Antony*. This " laid the foundation of an early averſion in *Antony* to *Ci-* " *cero*, increaſed ſtill by the perpetual courſe of *Antony*'s " life, which fortune happened to throw among *Cicero*'s in- " veterate enemies: For, by the ſecond marriage of his " mother, [*Julia*, a relation of *Cæſar*'s] he became ſon-in- " law to that *Lentulus* who was put to death for conſpiring " with *Cataline*, by whom he was initiated into all the ca- " bals of a traiterous faction, and infected with principles " pernicious to the liberty of *Rome*. To revenge the death " of this father [in-law] he attached himſelf to *Clodius*; " and, during his tribunate, was one of the miniſters of all " his violences; yet was detected at the ſame time in ſome " *criminal intrigue* in his family, injurious *to the honour of* " *his patron*. From this education in the city, he went " abroad to learn the art of war under *Gabinius*, the moſt " profligate of all Generals;" [*Plutarch* tells us, that *Antony* not being able to endure the madneſs of *Clodius*, and appre- henſive of the power of his enemies, withdrew himſelf, and retired into *Greece*, where he inured his body to warlike ex- erciſes, and applied his mind to the ſtudy of eloquence; and that it was with difficulty that he was prevailed upon by *Gabinius* to ſerve under him.] " who gave him the com-

" mand

Y. R. 703. Bef. Chr. 49. 402 Conſ.

office, than he propoſed that the two legions taken from *Cæſar* ſhould be ſent into *Syria*; that

" mand of his horſe in *Syria*; where he ſignaliſed his cou-
" rage in the reſtoration of King *Ptolemy*, and acquired the
" firſt taſte of martial glory, in *an expedition undertaken againſt*
" *the laws and religion of his country.*" [an expedition which *Cicero* encouraged his great and noble friend *Lentulus Spinther* to undertake.] " From *Ægypt*, inſtead of coming home,
" where his debts would not ſuffer him to be eaſy, he went
" to *Cæſar* into *Gaul*, the ſure refuge of all the needy, the
" deſperate, and the audacious :" [This is not a fair manner of repreſenting *Antony*'s behaviour. Was not *Cæſar*'s camp the ſchool of military ſkill, and the field of glory? Had not *Cæſar*, among his Lieutenants, *P. Craſſus*, ſo much extolled by *Cicero*: *Quintus Cicero*, *M. Brutus*, and many other Officers of great merit: And where could *Antony* ſpend his youth better?] " And, after ſome ſtay in that province,
" being furniſhed with money and credit by *Cæſar*, he re-
" turned to ſue for the *quæſtorſhip*. *Cæſar* recommended
" him in a preſſing manner to *Cicero, intreating him to ac-*
" *cept Antony's ſubmiſſion, and pardon him what was paſt, and*
" *to aſſiſt him in his preſent ſuit: With which Cicero readily*
" *complied*, and obliged *Antony* ſo highly by it, that he decla-
" red war preſently againſt *Clodius, whom he attacked with*
" *great fierceneſs in the Forum, and would certainly have killed,*
" *if he had not found means to hide himſelf under ſome ſtairs.*
" *Antony* openly gave out, *that he owed all this to Cicero's ge-*
" *neroſity, to whom he could never make amends for former*
" *injuries, but by the deſtruction of his enemy* CLODIUS. Being
" choſen Quæſtor, he went back immediately to *Cæſar*, with-
" out expecting *his lot, or a decree of the Senate*, to appoint
" him his province; where, though he had all imaginable
" opportunities of acquiring money, yet, by ſquandering, as
" faſt as he got it, he came, a ſecond time, *empty and beggarly*
" *to Rome*, to put in for the *tribunate*; in which office, after
" the example of his friend *Curio*, having ſold himſelf to
" *Cæſar*, he was, as *Cicero* ſays, *as much the cauſe of the enſu-*
" *ing war, as Helen was of that of Troy.*" Phil. ii. 21, 22. Midd. p. 64.

all

all new levies ſhould be ſtopped, and that all thoſe who had already given in their names, and taken the oath, ſhould be releaſed from their obligation, and even be forbid to ſerve. Y. R. 703. Bef. Chr. 49. 402 Conſ.

On *the* 21*ſt*, he made a ſpeech to the people, which was a perpetual invective on *Pompey*'s conduct from his firſt appearance in public, with great complaints againſt the violent and arbitrary condemnation of citizens, and the terror of his arms; and it was probably on this occaſion that he read *Cæſar*'s letter to the people, mentioned by *Plutarch*, in which he expreſſed a deſire that both *Pompey* and he, quitting their governments and diſmiſſing their armies, ſhould ſubmit to their judgment. Ad Att. vii. 8. In Pomp.

According to *Suetonius*, *Plutarch*, and *Appian*, *Cæſar* made other equitable overtures, propoſing to part immediately with eight of his legions and *Tranſalpine Gaul*, provided he might keep two legions with the *Ciſalpine* province, or but one legion with *Illyricum* and *Ciſalpine Gaul*, till he was made Conſul. *Plutarch* and *Appian* add, that *Pompey* was ſatisfied with theſe conditions, but that they were rejected by the Conſuls; a circumſtance extremely improbable: For *Pompey*, it is certain, was as averſe to peace as the moſt determined of *Cæſar*'s enemies. In an interview that *Cicero* had with him, on the 10*th* of *December*, *Pompey* told him, that *there was no hope of an accommodation*, and that war was inevitable; and, finding *Cicero* wholly bent on peace, he contrived to have a ſecond conference with him at *Lavernium*, on the 27*th*, before he reached the city,

Y. R. 703. Bef. Chr. 49. 402 Conf.

in hopes to allay his fears, and to turn him from the vain project of an accommodation, which might contribute to cool the zeal of his friends in the Senate. He declared, *that there could be no pacification, but such as was treacherous and dangerous; and that, if Cæsar should resign the command of his army, and take the consulship, he would throw the Republic* [a] *into confusion.* At this time he was even actually disposing of all the governments; and he tried to engage *Cicero* to go to *Sicily, though neither the resolution of the Senate nor the orders of the People had given him any command in that quarter.* He farther assured *Cicero*, that, when *Cæsar* heard of the earnest and mighty preparations that were making against him, he would throw up his pretensions to the consulship, and stick by his army and government: "But supposing," added he, "that "*Cæsar* should act *like a madman*, and fly to ex- "tremities, I should despise every thing he "could do, and should place an intire confidence "in my own and the Republic's forces [b]." "In "short,

[a] He means the *Aristocratic* faction.

[b] This extravagant confidence betrays great weakness in *Pompey*, and the historians bring several reasons to account for it. He looked upon himself, it is said, as the idol of the people of *Italy*: For, having fallen dangerously ill, in the beginning of this same year, in *Campania*, the whole country made sacrifices to the gods for his recovery, and the example was followed by the rest of *Italy*: And, when he appeared in public, such multitudes came forth to see him, that no place could contain them. *Plutarch*, it may likewise be observed, has informed us, that *Appius* and those who brought him

" ſhort," ſays *Cicero*, " though I was frequent-
" ly checked by reflecting on the doubtful events
" of war; yet I was made the more eaſy, when
" I heard a General, of ſuch courage and ſuch
" experience and authority, diſcourſing, like a
" Stateſman, upon the dangers that might at-
" tend an inſincere accommodation [c]."

Y. R. 703. Bef. Chr. 49. 402 Conſ.

Ad Att. vii. 8.

him the two legions from *Gaul* very much viliſied *Cæſar*'s actions there, and gave out ſcandalous reports in derogation of his honour, telling Pompey *that he was unacquainted with his own ſtrength and reputation, if he made uſe of any other forces againſt* Cæſar *than his own; for ſuch was the ſoldiers hatred to* Cæſar *and their love to* Pompey, *that they would all come over to him upon his firſt appearance.* Whatever were the cauſes which raiſed in him ſo favourable an opinion of his power and ſecurity, certain it is that he proceeded ſo far as to laugh at thoſe who ſeemed to dread the war; and ſomebody telling him, that, if *Cæſar* determined to march to *Rome*, there was nothing to oppoſe him, *Pompey* anſwered: *In whatever part of Italy I ſtamp with my foot, there will riſe up legions.*

[c] *Cicero*, in a letter to *Atticus* on the ſubject of his interview with *Pompey* on the *10th of December*, writes thus: " *Pompey* ſaid, that he had long perceived *Cæſar* to be alie-
" nated from him, but had received a very late inſtance of
" it: For that *Hirtius* came from *Cæſar* a few days before,
" and did not come to ſee him; and, when *Balbus* promiſed
" to bring *Scipio* an account of his buſineſs the next morning
" before day, *Hirtius* was gone back to *Cæſar* in the night:
" This he takes for a clear proof of *Cæſar*'s reſolution to
" break with him." *Ad Att.* vii. 4. Had not *Pompey* given *Cæſar* ſufficient provocation? If *Cæſar* had acted with the perfidious inſincerity of *Pompey*, it had been an eternal blemiſh upon his character.

CHAP. II.

Cæſar *is ordered, by a Decree of the Senate, to diſband his army, and, in caſe of refuſal, is declared a public enemy. The Conſuls and other Magiſtrates are veſted with extraordinary powers.* Cæſar *paſſes the* Rubicon *with one legion, and, in two months time, makes himſelf Maſter of all* Italy.

C. CLAUDIUS MARCELLUS,
L. LENTULUS CRUS, } Conſuls.

Y. R. 704. Bef Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

ON the *1ſt of January*[d], *Curio* came to *Rome*, and produced letters from *Cæſar* to the Senate, in which, after enumerating his many ſervices to the Republic, and anſwering the accuſations

[d] The months of the *Roman* kalendar, at this time, did not perfectly correſpond with thoſe of our *Julian* year; but the difference was not ſo great as our learned Biſhop *Uſher* has made it. *Annals*, p. 639. According to him the *1ſt of January* of this *Roman* year anſwered to the *22d of October* of the *Julian* year, 50 before *Chriſt*; ſo that the autumnal months were carried back into ſummer, and the winter months into autumn. It is impoſſible to reconcile this way of reckoning with the unanimous teſtimony of the ancient hiſtorians. And the Primate pretends that they were deceived by *Cæſar's* reformation of the Kalendar. But it is alſo irreconcileable with the facts related by them; and it is aſtoniſhing that Abbé *Mongault*, Dr. *Middleton*, and M. *Crevier*, who have examined ſo narrowly into every thing relating to theſe times, did not perceive this miſtake. *Cicero*, in a letter to *Tiro*, whom he had left ſick beyond ſeas, dated the *29th of January*, charges him not to ſail during winter: *Cave feſtines aut committas,*

ut

cuſations of his enemies, he declared, "that he "was willing to lay down his command, if *Pom-* "*pey* ſhould alſo conſent to that meaſure; and "that, as there could be no ſafety for him up- "on any other terms, he would immediately, "if his demand was not complied with, march "into *Italy*, and revenge the injuries done to himſelf and the Commonwealth." It was with great difficulty that the Tribunes procured theſe letters to be read; but nothing could prevail with the Conſuls to permit their contents to come under the deliberation of the Houſe: And they propoſed to debate on the ſtate of the Commonwealth. *Lentulus* declared that he would not be wanting to the Senate and the common cauſe, if they would deliver their opinions with freedom and courage: But that, if they continued to regard *Cæſar*, and affected to court his friendſhip, he would diſclaim intirely their authority. *Scipio*, father-in-law to *Pompey*, ſpoke to the ſame purpoſe: He ſaid that *Pompey* was firmly

Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 49 Conſ.

Cæſar de Bell. Civ. Com. lib. i.

ut aut æger aut hieme naviges; and he adds, that he imagines the hard winter has prevented his letters from reaching him: *Neque enim meas puto ad te litteras tanta hieme perferre.* Ep. Fam. xvi. 11. Could *Cicero*, then in the Southern parts of *Italy*, call the beginning of *November hard winter?* No; he ſpeaks of letters written in the end of *December*. In a letter dated the *7th of April*, ad Att. x. 2. he ſays, the ſwallow is come, *garrula* [*hirundo*] *en adeſt*, or the ſpring is come. The *1ſt* of *April* therefore could not anſwer to any part of the month of *January*; it was certainly *March*. The ingenious M. *de la Nauze*, Member of the Royal Academy of Literature in *Paris*, has proved the firſt day of this *Roman* year to be the *16th* of *December* of the *Julian* year, which is fifty-five days later than our learned Primate.

Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

bent not to abandon the Republic, if he found the Senators ready to ſupport him: But that, if they cooled or were remiſs in their reſolves, it would be in vain for them to expect his aid, if they ſhould afterwards find it neceſſary to apply for it. The ſpeech of *Scipio* was conſidered as proceeding from *Pompey*, who was at that time in the ſuburbs. Others propoſed milder councils. *M. Marcellus* objected to any deliberation on this matter till troops were raiſed over all *Italy*, and an army got ready, under whoſe protection the Senate might proceed with freedom and ſafety in their debates. It was moved by *Callidius*, that *Pompey* ſhould be ſent to his government of *Spain*, in order to take away all occaſion of diſcord; becauſe *Cæſar*, it was ſaid, had reaſon to fear that the two legions, taken from him, were retained by *Pompey* in the neighbourhood of *Rome*, to be employed againſt him. *M. Cælius* ſpoke to the ſame purpoſe. But they were all ſeverely reprimanded by the Conſul *Lentulus*, who expreſsly refuſed to put *Callidius*'s motion to the vote: And *M. Marcellus*, awed by the Conſul's rebuke, retracted what he had ſaid. Thus the clamours of *Lentulus*, the dread of an army at the gates of *Rome*, and the menaces of *Pompey*'s friends, intimidating the greateſt *part of the Senate*, it was carried, *though with great difficulty, that Cæſar ſhould be ordered to diſband his army before a certain day then fixed; and that, in caſe of diſobedience, he ſhould be declared an enemy to the Republic.* This is *Cæſar*'s account, and it appears to be a true one,

from

from the conduct of the Senate in the laſt year, and from *Cicero*'s letters [e]. The boaſted advantage of *Pompey*'s having the ſupport of the Senate muſt be conſidered, of conſequence, as nothing more than a fair appearance; and was in reality a new infringement of the liberty of his country; ſince it was procured by the moſt illegal and tyrannical means. Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

M. Antony and *Q. Caſſius*, Tribunes of the People, put their negative on the decree of the Senate; but their prerogative was diſputed, and a debate enſued, in the courſe of which many ſevere ſpeeches were made againſt them. He who ſpoke with the greateſt warmth and paſ- Cæſ. de Bel. Civ. Com. lib. i.

[e] He writes to *Atticus* in the end of *December*: "I am daily more apprehenſive of the public commotions, for even "our patriots are not ſo unanimous as they ought to be: "How many Knights, how many Senators have I ſeen, *who "have bitterly inveighed againſt the whole of Pompey's conduct, "and eſpecially the unſeaſonable journey he has undertaken?*" Ad Att. l. vii. 5. [This journey was probably to give directions for the raiſing of troops.] *Ibid.* 6. "I am in great concern "about the public, nor have I hitherto found a *Man*, who "did not think it better to yield to *Cæſar* all he demands, "than enter upon a civil war." *Cicero* himſelf was of the ſame opinion, as he declares in the ſame letter: "You will aſk "me then, what are my real ſentiments? Why, truly, *they "are not the ſame with my words.* My ſentiments are, that "any conceſſion is preferable to a civil war: *But I will talk*, "and that too from no ſervile motive, *in the ſame ſtrain that "Pompey does.* For indeed it would be of the worſt conſequence "to the public, and particularly unbecoming in me, ſhould I "differ from *Pompey* at this important juncture." *Unbecoming* to ſpeak his real ſentiments, and to adviſe what he thought was for the public good! This, it muſt be confeſſed, is a very ſtrange morality.

Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

ſion was moſt applauded by the *Pompeian* faction. The aſſembly broke up without coming to any determination; and *Pompey*, in the evening, ſent for all thoſe who were of his party, and commended the forward, and reproved and animated the more moderate. Multitudes of veterans, who had formerly ſerved under him, flocked to *Rome* from all parts, allured by the expectation of rewards and dignities: And a great number of Officers belonging to the legions lately returned by *Cæſar* had likewiſe orders to attend him. The city was filled with troops.

Cæſ. de Bell. Civ. Com. lib. i.

The conteſt between the Conſuls and the Tribunes was renewed the following days, and continued till the *7th*, during which time *Piſo*, the Cenſor, father-in-law to *Cæſar*, and *L. Roſcius*, the Prætor, who had ſerved under *Cæſar* in *Gaul*, offered to go to him and acquaint him with the ſtate of affairs, demanding only ſix days for that purpoſe. Others propoſed to ſend Deputies to him: But all theſe propoſals were rejected by the Conſuls, and by *Scipio*, *Cato*, and the other chiefs of the *Ariſtocratical* faction. The tribunes were threatened, or, according to *Appian* [f], were ordered

[f] *Appian* ſays, "that *Marcellus* and *Lentulus* ordered *Antony* "and *Caſſius* to leave the Senate, leſt no regard ſhould be "had to their dignity: That *Antony*, leaping from his ſeat "in great rage, invoked the faith of the gods and men, and "lamented that an authority, which had been hitherto held "ſacred, was no longer a ſecurity; and that thoſe who pro-"poſed ſalutary advice were driven out of the Senate, as if "they had been guilty of murder or ſome other crime: That, "after pronouncing theſe words, he inſtantly departed in a

ordered to leave the Houſe: And the Senate had recourſe to that decree, which was never uſed but in the greateſt extremity, *that the Conſuls, Prætors, Tribunes of the People, and the Proconſuls that were near Rome, ſhould take care that the Commonwealth received no detriment*[g]. *Antony* and *Caſſius* left the city that ſame night, diſguiſed like ſlaves, in a hired carriage, and ſtopped not till they got to *Rimini*. *Curio* and *M. Cælius* ſoon followed them. Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

The following days the Senate aſſembled *without the city*, where *Pompey* confirmed every thing he had before intimated by the mouth of *Scipio*: He applauded the reſolution and courage of the Senators, and acquainted them, that he had ten legions already in arms, and was beſides well informed that *Cæſar*'s troops were by no means ſatisfied with their General, and had even refuſed to ſupport and follow him. It was then propoſed that troops ſhould be raiſed all over *I-* Cæſ. de Bell. Civ. Com. lib. i.

" fury, foretelling, in a prophetic ſtrain, the wars, proſcrip-
" tions, baniſhments, and confiſcations with which the city
" was threatened, and making horrid imprecations againſt
" thoſe who were the cauſe of all theſe miſeries." On the contrary, *Cicero*, in a letter to *Tiro*, dated the 12*th of January*, writes thus: " *Curio* in conjunction with *Q. Caſſius* and *M.*
" *Antony*, without the leaſt violence being offered to them,
" have withdrawn themſelves to *Cæſar*. They took this ſtep
" immediately after the Senate had given in charge to the
" *Conſuls*, the *Prætors*, and the *Tribunes of the People*, toge-
" ther with thoſe of us who are inveſted with *proconſular*
" *power*, to take care of the intereſt of the Republic." *Ep. Fam.* xvi. 11. *Melm.* vii. 1.

[g] *Id. Jan.* or the 7*th* of *January*: The 28*th* of *October* according to Biſhop *Uſher*, but rather the 12*th* of *December*.

taly;

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taly; that *Pompey* ſhould be ſupplied with money out of the public treaſury; that *Fauſtus Sylla* ſhould be ſent Proprætor to *Mauritania*; and that King *Juba* ſhould have the title of King and Ally to the people of *Rome*. *Marcellus*, the Conſul, oppoſed the laſt of theſe motions, and *Philippus*, Tribune of the people, would not agree to the proprætorſhip of *Sylla*. The other motions were approved of. The affair of the provinces, two of which were conſular, and the reſt prætorian, came next to be canvaſſed. *Syria* was allotted to *Scipio*, and *Tranſalpine Gaul* to *L. Domitius*. To the prætorian provinces Governors were aſſigned without the privity or approbation of the people, and they inſtantly departed for their ſeveral commands. Thus war was in effect declared againſt *Cæſar*; and meaſures were taken to arm the whole empire in order to cruſh him. The *Pompeians* flattered themſelves that, before *Cæſar* could draw his forces together from the ſeveral quarters of *Gaul* where they were quartered, *Pompey* would have a conſiderable army on foot, with which he might poſſeſs himſelf of the principal parts of *Italy*, obſtruct his acceſs to *Rome*, and hold him continually employed, till the army from *Spain*, conſiſting of five legions under the command of *Afranius*, *Petreius*, and *Varro*, came up upon his rear, to complete his overthrow. They did not doubt but he would be deſerted by great numbers of his Officers and ſoldiers, and that the two *Gauls* would riſe againſt him; every part of thoſe provinces, excepting only the colonies beyond

Ep. Fam. xvi. 12. Melm. vii. 5.

beyond the *Po*, being thought utterly averſe to him. Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

Cicero arrived at *Rome* on *the 4th of January*, with all the pomp of his *proconſular* and *imperatorial* dignity: And, in this diſordered ſtate of the city, he ſollicited a decree for his triumph, to which, as he informs us, in a letter to *Tiro*, "the Senate, in a very full Houſe, immediately "conſented: But that the Conſul *Lentulus*, in "order to appropriate to himſelf a greater ſhare "in conferring this honour, told them, that he "would propoſe it himſelf in proper form as "ſoon as he ſhould have diſpatched the affairs "that were neceſſary in the preſent conjuncture." Ep. Fam. xvi. 11. Melm. vii. 1. In the ſame letter, which is dated the *12th of January*, he adds, "I am unhappily fallen into "the very midſt of public diſſenſion, or, rather "indeed, I find myſelf ſurrounded with the "flames of a civil war. It was my earneſt de-"ſire to have compoſed theſe dangerous fer-"ments: And I probably might, if the paſſions "of ſome in both parties, who are equally eager "for war, had not rendered my endeavours in-"effectual.——We are raiſing forces with all "poſſible diligence, under the authority and "with the aſſiſtance of *Pompey*: Who now be-"gins, ſomewhat too late, I fear, to be ap-"prehenſive of *Cæſar*'s power.——I act with "great moderation: And this conduct renders "my *influence* with both parties ſo much the "ſtronger. The ſeveral diſtricts of *Italy* are "aſſigned to our reſpective protections: And

"*Capua*

Y. R. 704. Bef. Ch. 48. 403 Conſ.

"*Capua* is the department I have taken for "mine." And in a letter, dated the 29*th of January*, he obſerves, "It has been the perpetual "purpoſe of all my ſpeeches, my votes, and "my actions, ever ſince I returned to *Rome*, to "preſerve the public tranquillity, *but an invin-* "*cible rage for war had unaccountably ſeized not* "*only the enemies, but even thoſe who are eſteemed* "*the friends of the Commonwealth:* And it was in "vain I remonſtrated that nothing was more "to be dreaded than a civil war.——Upon my "return to *Rome*, it was too late to inforce my "pacific ſentiments: I was wholly unſupported "in my opinion, and not only found myſelf "among a ſet of men, *who were madly inflamed* "*with a thirſt of war*, but was conſidered like-"wiſe as one, who, by a long abſence, was "quite unacquainted with the true ſtate of the "Commonwealth [h].

Ep. Fam. xvi. 12. Melm. vii. 5.

Ep. Fam. iv. 1. Melm. vii. 22.

Cæſar was at *Ravenna*, when he received the firſt intelligence of the proceedings againſt him. He aſſembled his troops, and acquainted them with the grateful requital which his long and glorious ſervices had met with from the Senate. In his ſpeech, he inſiſted on nothing ſo much as the violation of the tribunitian power in the perſons of *Antony* and *Caſſius*. He complained of the innovation introduced into the Commonwealth, which checked, by the terror of arms, the authority of the *Tribunes*: He ſaid, "that

[h] It is remarkable that *Cicero*, in his letter to *Tiro*, talks of his influence with both parties, and that here he complains of his being totally diſregarded.

"*Sylla*,

" *Sylla*, who had made it his buſineſs to hum- Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 463 Conſ.
" ble, and almoſt annihilate that magiſtracy,
" had yet left it the liberty of oppoſition; but
" that *Pompey*, who valued himſelf for having Cæſ. de Bell. Civ. Com. lib. i.
" reſtored it to all its prerogatives, deprived it
" now of that privilege which it had always
" enjoyed." His Officers and ſoldiers having teſtified their readineſs to defend him and the Tribunes, he ſent diſpatches to his Lieutenants in *Gaul* to quit their winter-quarters and come to him with all expedition; and he himſelf entered immediately upon action, and marched to *Ariminum*. There he found *Antony* and *Caſſius*, whom he produced in the ſervile diſguiſe they had been forced to put on for their ſecurity: And the ſight of them greatly exaſperated the ſoldiers, who made freſh proteſtations to their General, that they would follow him wherever he ſhould think proper to lead them [i].

Cæſar,

[i] *Suetonius (in Vit. Cæſ. c.* 31.) mentions ſeveral particulars which I have not thought worthy of being inſerted into the text of this hiſtory. He ſays, " that, as ſoon as *Cæſar* was in-
" formed that the interpoſition of the Tribunes had been
" over-ruled, and that they themſelves had been forced to
" ſave themſelves by flight, he *privately* diſpatched away
" ſome battalions; and, to prevent any ſuſpicion of his de-
" ſign, he attended at a public ſhew, and examined the mo-
" del of a ſchool for gladiators, which he intended to build;
" and ſat down to table with his friends as uſual: That after
" ſun-ſet, having cauſed mules from a neighbouring mill to
" be put to his chaiſe, he ſet out with all poſſible ſecrecy and
" a ſmall retinue; but, his lights going out, he loſt his way,
" and wandered a long time in the dark, till, meeting at
" break of day with a guide, he got on foot through ſome
" narrow

Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

Cæſar, ſenſible of what importance celerity was in his preſent ſituation, to prevent the efforts of his enemies, and to raiſe the courage of his

"narrow paths into the road again, and came up with his "troops on the banks of the *Rubicon*, which was the boundary "of his province: And that there he remained ſilent and "penſive for ſome time, muſing on the greatneſs of his at-"tempt; then, turning to thoſe about him, *we may ſtill re-"treat*, ſaid he, *but, if we paſs this little bridge, we muſt put "all to the deciſion of the ſword.*" *Cæſar* mentions nothing of all this. The great ſecrecy ſo much inſiſted on could ſerve no purpoſe; nor is it conſiſtent with *Cæſar*'s ſpeech to his ſoldiers at *Ravenna*. His heſitation on the banks of the *Rubicon* is quite ridiculous: His determination had been taken long before, and indeed was not free: But let us proceed with this curious narrative.

"Whilſt *Cæſar* was demurring upon the matter, a man of "an extraordinary ſize and ſhape appeared of a ſudden, ſit-"ting by the river, and playing on a rural flute. The no-"velty of the ſight drew together a great many of the ſol-"diers, and among the reſt a trumpeter, from whom the ex-"traordinary man, ſnatching the trumpet, leaped into the "water, and, ſounding a charge, went over to the other "ſide; upon which *Cæſar*, without farther conſideration, "croſſed the river, crying out aloud, *Let us go where the "Gods ſo remarkably call us, and where the fury of our enemies "drives us: The lot is caſt.*"

The ſame hiſtorian adds, "and accordingly, paſſing the "river with his army, and having received the Tribunes of "the people, he, with *tears in his eyes* and *his cloaths torn "away from his breaſt*, implored the protection of the ſol-"diers." Could *Cæſar* be ignorant of the attachment of his ſoldiers to him? Had they not followed him with an intire confidence for nine years? Had he not endeared himſelf to them by the unwearied care he had taken of their ſubſiſtence, and by his magnificent preſents? Did not both the ſoldiers and Officers ground the hopes of their fortunes upon his generoſity and protection?

friends,

friends, did not loſe a moment, but ſent *M. Antony* with five cohorts to ſeize *Aretium*, and other Officers to ſecure *Piſaarum*, *Fanum*, and *Ancona*, while he himſelf remained at *Ariminum* to levy troops. And, being informed that the Prætor *Thermus* had entered *Iguvium* with five cohorts, and was endeavouring to fortify the town, whoſe inhabitants he knew to be well inclined to his intereſt, he detached inſtantly *Curio* to oppoſe him with three cohorts, drawn from the towns he had already got poſſeſſion of. *Thermus* left the place on *Curio*'s approach, and was deſerted by his ſoldiers in his retreat. *Attius Varus* alſo, who commanded in *Auximum*, was obliged to abandon it, on account of the diſaffection of the townſmen to his cauſe, and, being attacked in his retreat, was likewiſe deſerted by his troops, part of which went to their homes, and the reſt joined themſelves to *Cæſar*.

Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

Arezzo. Peſaro. Fano. Eugubio.

Oſmo.

The firſt report of this march towards *Rome* ſtruck the Magiſtrates with ſuch a panic, that they precipitately came to the ſhameful reſolution of forſaking the city. *Pompey* had treated with contempt the menaces of his rival, but it plainly appeared that he was utterly unprepared to oppoſe him. Inſtead of marching towards *Cæſar*, and taking the command of the troops cantoned in *Picenum* and the neighbouring provinces, he withdrew to the two legions near *Capua*, whither he was ſoon followed by the Conſuls and the chief Senators of his faction. *Cæſar* affirms that their conſternation was ſo great, that, when the Conſul *Lentulus* came to the treaſury

Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 703 Conſ.

fury to deliver out the money to *Pompey*, in conſequence of the decree of the Senate, he ſcarce waited the opening of the inner door, but haſtily left the place, upon a falſe rumour that *Cæſar* was approaching, and that ſome of his cavalry were already in view. However, *Pompey* ſent orders to the Commanders in the North of *Italy*, to ſtop *Cæſar*'s progreſs as much as poſſible:

Aſcoli.

And *Lentulus Spinther* threw himſelf into *Aſculum*, a town of *Picenum*, with ten cohorts, while at the ſame time *L. Domitius* took poſſeſſion of *Corfinium*, a ſtrong town in the country of the *Peliani*, at the foot of the *Appenine*, on the *Adriatic* ſide, where he propoſed to make a ſtand till *Pompey* could come up.

At *Capua*, the Conſuls took courage, and began to renew their levies in the ſurrounding colonies. This town had always been the common ſeminary or place for educating gladiators for the great men of *Rome*; and there *Cæſar* had a famous ſchool of them at this time, which he had long maintained under the beſt maſters, for the occaſions of his public ſhews in the city. And, as they were very numerous and well furniſhed with arms, there was reaſon to apprehend that they would break out, and make ſome attempt in favour of their Maſter, which, in the preſent ſtate of affairs, might be of dangerous conſequence. *Pompey* therefore, we are told, thought it neceſſary to take them out of their ſchool, and to diſtribute them among the principal inhabitants of the place, *aſſigning two to each Maſter of a family*, by which he ſecured them

Mid. p. 69.

them from doing any miſchief. But *Cæſar*'s account is very different; he tells us, "that *Lentulus* ſummoned the gladiators into the Forum, gave them their liberty, furniſhed them with horſes, and commanded them to follow him: But, being admoniſhed by his friends that this ſtep was unanimouſly condemned, he diſperſed them into the neighbouring towns of *Campania* to keep garriſon there." It is probable that *Lentulus* had raſhly employed, or thought of employing, the gladiators, in the manner here mentioned, but that *Pompey*, ſenſible of the impropriety of arming ſlaves againſt their Maſter, had diſpoſed of them as we have juſt now related [k].

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De Bell. Civ. Com. lib. i.

While preparations were thus making on the ſide of *Pompey*, and while *Cæſar* was puſhing on the war with incredible vigour, meſſages were ſent by the two Generals to each other concerning an accommodation. Before *Cæſar* left *Ariminum*, young *L. Cæſar*, whoſe father was one of his Lieutenants, came to him, and told him, that he was impowered to inform him, "that

[k] It appears from a letter of *Cicero* to *Atticus*, that, in relation to theſe gladiators, there were two different reports at different times: "I was miſinformed," ſays he, "as to "what I wrote to you, upon the ſtrength of *Torquatus*'s intel-"ligence, with regard to *Cæſar*'s gladiators at *Capua*: For "*Pompey* has quartered them very judiciouſly among the "inhabitants, two to each family. There were five thou-"ſand, and they threatened to break out. This was a mea-"ſure greatly for the ſervice of the public." *Ad Att.* vii. 14. I cannot think there could be *five thouſand* gladiators in one ſchool: Perhaps there may be an error in the number,

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" *Pompey* was deſirous of clearing himſelf to *Cæ-*
" *ſar*, leſt he might interpret thoſe actions as
" deſigned to affront him, which had no other
" aim but the good of the Commonwealth; the
" advantage of which it was *Pompey*'s conſtant
" maxim to prefer to any private intereſt; and
" that *Cæſar*, in the opinion of *Pompey*, ſhould
" ſacrifice his paſſion and reſentment to the ſame
" noble motive, and not prejudice his country
" by puſhing too far his reſentment againſt his
" private enemies." The Prætor *Roſcius*, who had a commiſſion of the like nature from *Pompey*, joined likewiſe in the negotiation. *Cæſar* made anſwer, " that the intereſt of the Commonwealth
" had always been dearer to him than life; and
" that, though he could not help being alarm-
" ed at the malice of his enemies, who had fruſ-
" trated the good intentions of the *Roman* people
" in his favour, by cutting off ſix months from
" his command, and obliging him to return to
" *Rome* to ſue for the conſulſhip, he had yet,
" for the ſake of his country, patiently ſubmit-
" ted to this aſſault upon his honour. That his
" propoſal of diſbanding the armies, on both
" ſides, which he had made in his letter to the
" Senate, had been rejected; and that new levies
" were making all over *Italy*. That the two le-
" gions, which had been taken from him under
" the pretence of the *Parthian* war, were ſtill
" retained in the ſervice of his enemies; and
" that the whole State was in arms. That all
" this aimed evidently at his deſtruction: But
" that, nevertheleſs, he was ready to agree to

" any

" any propoſal, and expoſe himſelf to any dan- Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conf.
" ger for the ſake of his country. Let *Pompey*
" [he continued] *go to his government: Let all*
" *the armies be diſbanded: Let every one through-*
" *out Italy lay down his arms: Let every thing that*
" *participates of terror and force be removed: Let*
" *the elections of magiſtrates be made with perfect*
" *freedom: And let the Republic be adminiſtered by*
" *the authority of the Senate and People.* And,
" the better to ſettle all theſe articles, and in
" order to corroborate them with an oath, let
" *Pompey* himſelf draw nearer, or ſuffer *Cæſar*
" to approach him; as all differences may moſt
" eaſily be determined by a conference [1]."

E 2 *L. Cæſar*

[1] *Cicero*, in a letter to *Tiro*, dated the 29*th of January*, gives a quite different account of *Cæſar*'s propoſals, which is followed by Dr. *Middleton*: " *Cæſar* is reported to have " offered us [*feruntur conditiones*] the following conditions: " In the firſt place, *that Pompey ſhall retire to his government* " *of* Spain; in the next, *that the army we have raiſed ſhall be* " *diſbanded, and our garriſons evacuated.* Upon theſe terms he " promiſed to *deliver up the farther Gaul into the hands of L.* " *Domitius, and the nearer into thoſe of Conſidius Nonianus*; " the perſons to whom theſe provinces have been reſpec- " tively allotted. He farther engages to reſign his right of " ſuing for the conſulſhip in his abſence, and is willing to " return to *Rome* in order to appear as a candidate in the re- " gular form. We have accepted theſe propoſitions, *pro-* " *vided he withdraws his forces from the ſeveral towns he has* " *taken*, that the Senate may aſſemble at *Rome* in order to " paſs a decree for that purpoſe. If he ſhould think proper " to comply with this propoſal, there are hopes of peace; " not indeed of a very honourable one, as the terms are im- " poſed upon us; yet any thing is preferable to our preſent " circumſtances. But, if he ſhould refuſe to ſtand to his " overtures, Ep. Fam. xvi. 12. Melm. vii. 5.

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L. Cæſar and *Roſcius*, having received this anſwer, departed for *Capua*, near which place they found *Pompey* and the Conſuls, and laid *Cæſar*'s

" overtures, we are prepared for an engagement: But an en-
" gagement which *Cæſar*, after having incurred the general
" odium of retracting his own conditions, will ſcarce be able
" to ſuſtain." It is not at all probable that *Cæſar* made the propoſals here mentioned: Becauſe he would thereby have given himſelf up to his enemies. *Cicero*, therefore, was either ill informed, or *L. Cæſar* added to what *Cæſar* had propoſed: And this, according to *Dion. Caſſius*, was really the caſe. The following extracts from *Cicero*'s letters to *Atticus*, concerning this whole negotiation, cannot, I think, be diſagreeable to the reader, who may compare them with *Cæſar*'s relation, to which I have given the preference:

" I ſaw *L. Cæſar* at *Minturnæ* on the 23*d* of *January* in
" the morning. This rope of ſand, for I cannot call him a
" man, was charged with propoſitions ſo abſurd, that I ima-
" gined *Cæſar* deſigned them as a ridicule upon all negotia-
" tions, eſpecially as he gave ſo important a commiſſion to
" ſo inconſiderable a creature. I cannot account for his con-
" duct any other way, unleſs (which may poſſibly be the caſe)
" this Envoy has catched up ſome random expreſſions of
" *Cæſar* and converted them into a commiſſion for himſelf."
Ad Att. vii. 13. Guthrie's *tranſl.* It is plain, that *L. Cæſar* did not explain his commiſſion to *Cicero* on the 23*d*, as *Cicero* explained it ſix days after to *Tiro*, or *Cicero* would not have treated it with ſuch contempt.

" On the 23*d*, *L. Cæſar* delivered *Cæſar*'s propoſals to
" *Pompey*, while he was at *Theanum* with the Conſuls. The
" terms were approved of, on condition that he ſhould with-
" draw his troops from all the places, not within his own go-
" vernment, that he had ſeized. If he would do that, it was
" agreed that we ſhould return to *Rome*, and that the Se-
" nate ſhould ratify the treaty. *At preſent I am in hopes we*
" *ſhall have peace*; becauſe *Cæſar* thinks he has gone too far,
and *Pompey* that his army is too weak." *Ad Att.* vii. 14. [dated the 25*th*.]

" Upon

Cæſar's propoſals before them. After delibe- V. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.
rating upon the affair, they ſent a reply in writing

" Upon my arrival at *Capua* yeſterday, being the 25*th* of " *January*, I had a meeting with the Conſuls and many others " of the Senate. All of them wiſhed that *Cæſar* would draw " off his troops and ſtand to the terms he had propoſed. *Fa-* " *vonius* was the only man who expreſſed his diſlike of his " impoſing terms upon us; but he was very little regarded " in the meeting, for *Cato* himſelf would now rather com- " ply than fight. He declares, however, that he intends to " be preſent in the Senate, where, I am afraid, he will do " great hurt.——We have here great variety of opinions as " to public matters. It is generally imagined that *Cæſar* will " not ſtand to his propoſals, which he is thought to have made " to divert us from making the neceſſary preparations to " oppoſe him in the field. For my own part, I am of opi- " nion, that he will ſtand to them ſo far as to withdraw his " troops from the towns not in his government. For he will " have gained his ends, if he ſhould be made Conſul, and the " concluſion of this ſcene will be leſs guilty than its com- " mencement. But ſtill we muſt be under his buffet; for we " are ſcandalouſly unprovided both as to troops and money; " having left to his mercy not only the private property, but " the public treaſury of *Rome*." *Ad Att.* vii. 15. [dated the 26*th*.]

" We are now in great ſuſpenſe concerning two points. " The one is, how *Cæſar* will proceed upon the anſwer which " *L. Cæſar* was charged with to lay before him. The other " is, how *Pompey* will act, who writes to me, *that, in a few* " *days, he will be at the head of an effective army, and gives* " *me hopes that, when he arrives at* PICENUM, *we ſhall be* " *in a condition to return to* ROME. He has with him *Labie-* " *nus*, who takes it for granted that *Cæſar*'s army is but weak, " and his deſertion has put our friend *Pompey* into high ſpi- " rits." *Ibid. Ep.* xvi. [dated the 29*th*.]

" Now you doubtleſs know the anſwer which *Pompey* ſent to " *Cæſar* by *L. Cæſar*, and the letter he ſent him by the ſame " hand; for *they were written and delivered with a view of*

" *making*

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by the ſame meſſengers, which informed *Cæſar that he muſt quit Ariminum, return to Gaul, and diſband*

" *making them public.* I have blamed *Pompey* in my own mind, " as he himſelf has a very perſpicuous ſtyle, for employing " our friend *Settius* in drawing up a writing of ſo great im- " portance, eſpecially as it is to be made public: Nor, to " ſay the truth, did I ever ſee any thing more truly in the " *Settian* ſtyle. But, from *Pompey*'s letter, it is plain that *Cæ-* " *ſar* has been denied nothing; that he has obtained all, and " more than he demanded: And, as he has obtained his de- " mands, impudent as they are, he would be the worſt of " madmen ſhould he break off the accommodation. For " what right had he, or you, or any man to ſay, I will do ſo " and ſo, if *Pompey* will go to *Spain*, and if he will withdraw " his troops from *Italy?* Yet even this has been complied " with, though I own the compliance does not now come " with ſo good a grace, after the government has been at- " tacked and hoſtilities commenced, as it would have done " before, when he demanded the diſpenſation with his ab- " ſence while he ſtood for the conſulate. After all, I am ap- " prehenſive, that even theſe terms will not ſatisfy him. It " was no good ſymptom that he continued his operations " during the dependence of the treaty which he committed " to *L. Cæſar*, and before he had any anſwer. At preſent, " he is ſaid to proceed more violently than ever." *Ibid. Ep.* xvii. [dated *Feb.* 2.]

" We hear that the city is wonderfully pleaſed with *Pom-* " *pey*'s anſwer, and that it was approved of in an aſſembly " of the people. I always thought it would; and that *Cæſar* " would loſe his intereſt, ſhould he reject it. But, ſhould he " accept it—alas, ſay you, which is the leſſer evil? This " is a queſtion I cannot anſwer, *unleſs I knew in what for-* " *wardneſs our preparations are. Ibid. Ep.* 18, [dated *Feb.* 3.]

" I am really ſo far from having any thing to write, that I " have withdrawn a letter which I was to have ſent you, be- " cauſe it was ſo full of hopes for the beſt, founded upon my " informations of the diſpoſitions of the aſſembly of the people " of *Rome*, and upon my own ſuggeſtions that *Cæſar* would

" never

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diſband his army; which conditions being performed, Pompey would go into Spain: And that, in the mean time, till he gave ſecurity for the performance of what he had promiſed, neither Pompey nor the Conſuls would diſcontinue their levies.

Cæſ. de Bell. Civ. Com. lib. i.

It was by no means, in the opinion of *Cæſar*, a fair propoſal, that he ſhould be obliged to quit *Ariminum* and return to *Gaul:* whilſt *Pompey* held provinces and legions that had not been legally allotted to him; and *that he ſhould diſmiſs his army, whilſt Pompey was levying troops, and only promiſed to go to his government without fixing a day:* An evaſion by which, was he to be found in *Italy* even at the expiration of *Cæſar*'s conſulſhip, he could not be charged with a breach of faith. His forbearing to appoint a time for

"never reject the terms that were granted him, eſpecially as "they were propoſed by himſelf. Mean while, on the morn- "ing of the 4*th* of *February*, I received letters from you, "from *Philotimus* and *Furnius*, with one to the latter from "*Curio*, ridiculing the whole of *L. Cæſar*'s negotiation. We "are indeed reduced to a deſperate paſs.——I am ſetting out "for *Capua*, where I can be better informed of *Pompey*'s ſitua- "tion." *Ibid. Ep.* xix. [dated *Feb.* 4.]

"This juncture requires fewneſs of words. I deſpair of "peace: We are unprovided for war. You cannot imagine "*two more deſpicable creatures than our Conſuls.* After coming, "as I was ordered, to *Capua*, through a deluge of rain up- "on the 4*th* inſtant, in hopes of hearing and underſtanding "our preparations, I have miſſed them here, and when they "come they will come unprovided and unprepared. As to "*Pompey*, he is ſaid to be at *Luceria* to put himſelf at the head "of ſome cohorts of *Attius*'s legions, who are thought to be "wavering." *Ibid. Ep.* xx. [dated *Feb.* 5.]

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a conference, and his declining to approach nearer, gave little reaſon to hope for a peace [m].

T. Labienus,

[m] "It ſeems very evident," ſays the ingenious author of the life of *Cicero*, "that *Cæſar* had no real thoughts of peace, "by his paying no regard to *Pompey*'s anſwer, and the tri- "fling reaſons which he gave for ſlighting it. The ſending "a meſſage ſo important by a perſon ſo inſignificant as young "*L. Cæſar* looked, ſays *Cicero*, as if he had done it by way "of contempt, or with a view to diſclaim it, eſpecially when, "after offering conditions which were likely to be accepted, "he would not ſit ſtill to wait an anſwer, but continued his "march with the ſame diligence, and in the ſame hoſtile "manner as before." He is therefore of opinion, "that *Cæ-* "*ſar* had a double view in offering theſe conditions; for by "*Pompey*'s rejecting them, *as there was reaſon to expect, from* "*his known averſion to any treaty*, he hoped to load him with "the odium of the war; or, by his embracing them, to ſlacken "his preparations and retard his deſign of leaving *Italy*; "whilſt he himſelf, in the mean time, by following him with "a celerity that amazed every body, might chance to come "up with him, and give a deciſive blow to the war; from "which he had nothing to apprehend, but its being drawn "into length. *I now plainly ſee*, ſays *Cicero*, *though later* "*indeed than I could have wiſhed, on account of the aſſurances* "*given me by Balbus, that he aims at nothing elſe, nor has ever* "*aimed at any thing from the beginning but* POMPEY'S *life.*" *Midd.* p. 72, 73. But this is the concluſion of a man whoſe mind was confounded by continual diſappointments, (for indeed he was no prophet, as he is commonly ſuppoſed to have been) and diſturbed by a thouſand vain fears. *Cicero* apprehended alſo that *Cæſar* would prove a *Phalaris, ſack Rome, and commit all manner of cruelties.* Such paſſionate expreſſions are no authorities. *Velleius Paterculus*, (l. ii. c. 50.) has, from the conſideration of *Cæſar*'s conduct, inferred juſt the contrary: *At Cæſar Domitio legionibuſque Corfinii, quæ una cum eo fuerant, potitus, duce aliiſque qui voluerant abire ad Pompeium, ſine dilatione dimiſſis, perſecutus Brundiſium, ita ut appareret, malle, integris rebus & conditionibus, finire bellum,*

quam

T. Labienus, *Cæſar*'s principal Lieutenant in the *Gallic* war, who had not only eminently diſtinguiſhed Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

quam opprimere fugientes.——As to the arguments brought in proof of *Cæſar*'s inſincerity, they are very weak. 1. *Cæſar*'s reaſons for paying no regard to *Pompey*'s anſwer are no ways trifling. If he had ſubmitted to go back to his province, whilſt *Pompey* remained in *Italy* to influence the public deliberations, his cauſe was diſcredited, and he was evidently undone. He would have been obliged to ſubmit to every thing impoſed upon him by *Pompey* and his adherents, backed by the forces he would ſoon have had at hand. 2. *Cæſar*'s meſſage was given not only to *L. Cæſar*, but alſo to the Prætor *Roſcius:* And *L. Cæſar* was employed for no other reaſon, than becauſe he had brought a meſſage from *Pompey*. 3. It would have been folly in *Cæſar*, while his enemies were making preparations againſt him with the utmoſt diligence, to have ſuſpended his military operations in a conjuncture when all depended upon expedition. And I oppoſe to the authority of Dr. *Middleton* that of *Matius*, of whom *Cicero* gives this character: (*Ad Att.* ix. 11.) "*Indeed I think him* "*a diſcreet, wiſe man, and he has been always reckoned an ad-*"*viſer of peaceable meaſures.*"—"As we had a great deal of converſation, ſays *Cicero*, I ſhewed him *Cæſar*'s letter to "me, and I begged to know what he meant by his expreſſions "of his wanting to be directed by my *advice, intereſt, autho-*"*rity*, and *aſſiſtance* in all things. His anſwer was, that he "made no doubt *Cæſar* applied to me for my aſſiſtance and "intereſt in bringing about an accommodation.——*He was* "*very poſitive that* CÆSAR*'s ſentiments were pacific*, and "promiſed to recommend the thing to himſelf." *Velleius Paterculus*, who, in general, is not unfavourable to *Pompey* and his cauſe, intirely condemns the *Pompeians* in this negotiation. After ſaying: *Alterius ducis cauſa melior videbatur, alterius erat firmior: Hic omnia ſpecioſa, illic valentia: Pompeium Senatus auctoritas, Cæſarem militum armavit fiducia:—Vir antiquus et gravis Pompeii partes laudaret magis, prudens ſequeretur Cæſaris; et illa glorioſa, hæc terribiliora duceret:* He adds, *Nihil relictum a Cæſare, quod ſervandæ pacis cauſa tentari*

See Chap. III.

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Midd. p. 70.

tinguiſhed himſelf by his military exploits, but had raiſed an immenſe fortune, deſerted his General about this time, and came over to *Pompey*. This added a new life to his cauſe, and raiſed an expectation that many more would follow the example. He was much careſſed and carried about every-where by *Pompey*, who promiſed himſelf great ſervice from his fame and experience, and eſpecially from his credit in *Cæſar*'s army, and his knowledge of his councils: But his account of things, like that of all deſerters, was accommodated rather to pleaſe than to ſerve his new friends; repreſenting *the weakneſs of* CÆSAR'*s troops, their averſion to his preſent deſigns, the diſaffection of the two* Gauls, *and diſpoſition to revolt*; the contrary of all which was found to be true in the event: And as he came to them alone, without bringing with him any of thoſe troops with which he had acquired his reputation, ſo his deſertion had no other effect than to ruin his own fortunes without doing any ſervice to *Pompey* [n]. *Cæſar* behaved on this occaſion

tari poſſet: Nihil receptum a Pompeianis; cum alter Conſul juſto eſſet ferocior; Lentulus vero ſalva rep. ſalvus eſſe non poſſet; M. autem Cato moriendum ante, quam ullam conditionem civis accipiendam reip. contenderet: ut deinde ſpretis omnibus quæ Cæſar poſtulaverat, tantummodo contentus cum una legione titulum retinere provinciæ; privatus in urbem veniret, et ſe in petitione conſulatus ſuffragiis pop. Rom. committeret decrevere. L. ii. c. 49.

[n] *Cicero* thinks aloud in his letters to his friend *Atticus*, and it is entertaining to conſider his various views of the ſame objects, and the ſhiftings of his mind. *Ep.* vii. 12. *ad Att.* dated *Jan.*

ſion with great magnanimity: He took very little notice of his Lieutenant's deſertion, though the example might have been of dangerous conſequence in the beginning of a war of this na- Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conf.

Jan. 22. "It is next to certain that *Labienus* has left *Cæſar*. "In that caſe, if he had gone to *Rome*, while the Magiſtrates "and the Senate were there, he would have been of great "uſe to our party. It would have intimated that the beſt "of *Cæſar*'s friends had condemned him as a traitor to his "country. The fact is indeed ſo, but, at the preſent juncture, "*it is of leſs uſe, becauſe our party cannot avail itſelf of it; and* "*I believe that Labienus himſelf repents of what he has done.* "Yet, after all, there is a poſſibility that his leaving *Cæſar* "is falſe; we, however, depend upon it as a certainty."

Ep. xiii. "I look upon *Labienus* to be a *Hero. We have not* "*for theſe many years had ſo noble an inſtance of Roman ſpirit.* "Had it no other effect, *it has that of galling Cæſar, but I* "*am in hopes of ſeeing it productive of more ſolid conſequences.*"

Ibid. "*Labienus*, whom I think a *truly great man*, came "on the 22*d* inſtant to *Theanum*, where he had a conference "with *Pompey* and the Conſuls. What the import and reſult "of it was, I will write to you when I am better informed. "—— *Labienus* ſeems to have given us ſpirits." Yes, *Pompey*, encouraged by him, talked big, *that he would ſoon be at the head of an effective army*; that *he would march into Picenum*, and put things into ſuch a poſture that *the Senate might ſafely return to Rome.*

Ad Att. viii. 2. *Feb.* 17. "There is no dignity in *Labi-* "*enus.*" And thus the Hero, the high-ſpirited *Roman*, ſinks into a baſe deſerter:

——— *Fortis in armis*
Cæſareis Labienus erat; nunc tranſfuga vilis.
Lucan. v. 345.

About the ſame time *Piſo*, *Cæſar*'s father-in-law, left the city: This ſtep engages all *Cicero*'s affection to him, and raiſes his prophetic ſpirit: *I am in love with* Piso, *and I can foreſee the diſlike he has ſignified of his ſon-in-law's conduct will make a great impreſſion on the public.*

ture;

Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

ture; and ſent after him all his equipage, and every thing he had left behind.

There were now little hopes of an accommodation between the two ambitious Chiefs: Matters were too far engaged, and their enmity too openly declared. Their reciprocal propoſals, which were drawn up in writing and immediately publiſhed, were no more than manifeſtoes to juſtify their conduct. *Pompey*, whoſe chief reliance was on his troops in *Spain*, and the forces of the Eaſt, which were abſolutely in his intereſt, reſolved to hazard nothing in *Italy*, and, while he remained there, his ſole aim was to gain time. *Cæſar*, on the contrary, who had nothing to depend on but his army, and the preſent favourable diſpoſitions of the people of *Rome*, was bent upon puſhing his point, with all poſſible celerity. From *Auximum*, where we left him, he traverſed the whole country of *Picenum*[o], as far as *Cingulum*, with only one legion. He was joyfully received in all parts by the inhabitants, who were dazzled undoubtedly by the ſplendor of his victories, and the reputation of his generoſity: And they furniſhed his army with every thing neceſſary. Even *Cingulum* itſelf, a town founded by *Labienus*, and built at his own expence, ſent deputies to him with an offer of their ſubmiſſion and ſervices; and

Cæſ. de Bell. Civ. Com. lib. i.

[o] *Picenum* was reduced before the 8*th* of *Feb.* for *Citero*, in a letter to *Atticus* of that date, (vii. 21.) writes, "*Picenum* "is loſt; nobody knows it but myſelf, by letters I have re- "ceived from *Dolabella*. I expect every moment to hear of "*Cæſar*'s being in *Apulia*, and *Pompey* on ſhipboard."

and he demanded from it a certain number of ſoldiers, which were immediately ſent to him. There he was joined by the 12*th* legion, and, with this additional force, he continued his march to *Aſculum*, of which *Lentulus Spinther* had taken poſſeſſion, with ten cohorts. *Lentulus*, on the firſt news of his approach, quitted the place, and, in his retreat, was almoſt intirely deſerted by his men: He joined, with the few that remained, *Vibullius Rufus*, whom *Pompey* had ſent into *Picenum*, to encourage his followers in thoſe parts. This Commander, underſtanding the ſtate of affairs, and ſeeing himſelf unable to make head againſt *Cæſar*, drew together, from the neighbouring provinces, as many of *Pompey*'s levies as he could meet with, and, among the reſt, ſix cohorts under the command of *Ulcilles Hirrus*, who were flying from *Camerinum*, where they had been quartered; and, having formed, out of all theſe, thirteen cohorts, he poſted by great journeys to *Corfinium*, where *Domitius* had already got together twenty-two, well diſpoſed to *Pompey*'s cauſe. Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

Pompey's intention was not that thoſe numerous cohorts ſhould remain in *Corfinium*, and there become a prey to *Cæſar*: He wrote the moſt preſſing letters to *L. Domitius* to bring them to him; and theſe, as their contents are both intereſting and neceſſary for the underſtanding of *Pompey*'s conduct, ſhould not be omitted, I think, by any one who writes the hiſtory of theſe times.

Y.R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

CN. MAGNUS, Proconſul, to DOMITIUS, Proconſul.

Ad Att. viii. 12.

"I AM ſurpriſed at my not hearing from "you, and that all my public intelligence comes "through other hands than yours. With forces "ſo diſunited as ours are it is impoſſible for us "to be a match for our enemies; but, were "they united, I am in hopes we may be yet "the means of ſaving our country and pro-"viding for our own ſafety. Therefore, as *Vi-*"*bullius* wrote to me, on the 9*th* of *February*, "that you were about to march from *Corfinium* "to join me with your army, I cannot compre-"hend why you have altered your reſolution. "The reaſon *Vibullius* intimated to me, *viz.* that "you had intelligence of *Cæſar*'s march from "*Firmum* to the caſtle of *Truentum*, was a tri-"fling one: For, the quicker the enemy's ad-"vances were towards you, your diſpatch ought "to have been the greater to join me, before *Cæ-*"*ſar* could have the means of either obſtructing "your march, or of cutting off my communi-"cation with you. I therefore, in the moſt "earneſt manner, intreat you again to take the "very firſt opportunity of marching to *Luceria*, "before the troops which *Cæſar* propoſes to draw "together can cut off our communication with "one another. Should any endeavour to per-"ſuade you to remain as a guard to their pro-"perties, you cannot refuſe to ſend me the co-"horts which came from *Picenum* and *Cameri-*

"*num*,

" *num*, and which have left behind them all " their fortunes." Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

CN. MAGNUS, Proconſul, to DOMITIUS, Proconſul.

" *M. CALENIUS* brought me a letter " from you the 16*th* of *February*, informing " me, that you intended to obſerve *Cæſar*'s mo- " tions; and, ſhould he point his march for " me by the ſea, that you would forthwith join " me in *Samnium*; but, ſhould he tarry about " thoſe parts, that you was reſolved to check " him, in caſe he ſhould attempt to extend his " quarters. I am ſenſible this reſolution pro- " ceeds from your courage and magnanimity; " but we muſt be upon our guard, leſt our be- " ing divided may give the enemy a ſuperiority, " as his army, which is already ſtrong, is hourly " increaſing. It is inconſiſtent with your wiſ- " dom to have an eye only to the number of " cohorts which *Cæſar* at preſent commands " againſt you, without reflecting upon the great " force of cavalry and infantry which he will, in " a very ſhort time, aſſemble. The letter I re- " ceived from *Buſſenius* is an evidence that his " ſtrength will be much more conſiderable ſoon; " for he tells me, and his intelligence is con- " firmed by many other correſpondents, that " *Curio* has drawn all the garriſons out of *Um- " bria* and *Tuſcany*, and is marching at their " head to join *Cæſar*. Now ſhould all theſe " troops join, and part of them be detached Ad Att. viii. 12.

" towards

Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

" towards *Alba*, while part of them defile to-
" wards you, you muſt be ſhut up, as the ene-
" my needs not fight you but upon his own
" terms: Neither can you, ſingly, in the face
" of ſuch an enemy, ſend out foraging par-
" ties to maintain your numbers. I therefore
" again earneſtly conjure you forthwith to march
" all your troops hither, the Conſuls having
" come to the ſame reſolution.

" I ordered *Metuſcilius* to acquaint you, how
" neceſſary it was for me to take care, that the
" two legions ſhould not, without the *Picen-*
" *tine* cohorts, come in ſight of *Cæſar*'s quar-
" ters. You are therefore to give yourſelf no
" concern, if you ſhall hear that I retreat upon
" *Cæſar*'s advancing againſt me. I muſt take
" care not to engage myſelf too far; for both
" the ſeaſon of the year, and the diſpoſitions of
" my ſoldiers, render it impracticable for me to
" form a regular incampment; nor would it be
" adviſeable for me to draw all our garriſons
" from the fortified places, leſt I ſhould be cut
" off from all retreat. I have, therefore, aſſem-
" bled no more than fourteen cohorts at *Luceria*.
" The Conſuls are either to join me with the
" troops they have drawn from the fortified
" places, or they are to go to *Sicily*. For we
" muſt either have an army ſtrong enough to
" force our way through the enemy, or we muſt
" take poſſeſſion of ſuch paſſes as they cannot
" force. Now both theſe expedients are im-
" practicable at this juncture, both becauſe *Cæ-*
" *ſar* is Maſter of a great part of *Italy*, and be-
" cauſe

" cauſe *Cæſar* is maſter of great part of *Italy*, and " becauſe our army is neither ſo well provided, " nor ſo numerous as his. We are therefore to " be the more cautious in expoſing the intereſts of " the Republic. I again conjure you inſtantly " to join me with all your troops. We may yet " reſtore the government, if we ſerve her in con- " cert with one another; but, by being diſſi- " pated and diſunited, we ſhall become weak. " Such are my ſentiments. Y. R. 704. Bef. Ch. 48. 403 Conſ.

" *P. S.* When I had finiſhed this letter, *Sica* " delivered to me your letter and commiſſion, " exhorting me to march towards *Corfinium*; " but that, I think, is what I cannot venture " to do, eſpecially as I put no great truſt in the " fidelity of the legions I command."

Pompey, who had become ſenſible of the impoſſibility of defending *Rome*, and of his error in leaving the public money a prey to *Cæſar* [p], had

[p] " The leaving the public treaſure at *Rome* a prey to " *Cæſar* is cenſured more than once by *Cicero*, as one of the " blunders of his friends: [See *Ad Att.* vii. 12. 15.] but it is " a common caſe in civil diſſenſions, for the honeſter ſide, " through the fear of diſcrediting their cauſe by any *irregular* " *act*, to ruin it by an *unſeaſonable moderation*. The public " money was kept in the temple of *Saturn*, and the Con- " ſuls contented themſelves with carrying away the keys, " *fancying that the ſanctity of the place would ſecure it from vi-* " *olence*; eſpecially when the greateſt part of it was a fund of " the ſacred kind, ſet apart by the laws for occaſions only of " the laſt exigency, or the terror of a *Gallic* invaſion." Dr. *Middl.* p. 104. *Cicero* ſays that he adviſed the carrying away of this *ſacred treaſure*. [*Ad Att.* ix. 2.] And it was all along the

Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403. Conſ.

had ſent, on the 7th of *February*, the Tribune *C. Caſſius* to *Capua* with directions to the Conſuls to return to the city, which they were to leave, after taking all the money out of the Sacred Treaſury. But one of the Conſuls wrote back to *Pompey*, that he ſhould firſt make himſelf Maſter of *Picenum*. The thing was now become impracticable: "Return to *Rome*," ſays *Cicero*, "where is their convoy? "Return from "*Rome*, how ſhall they obtain leave?" Notwithſtanding this teſtimony of *Cicero*, our modern Hiſtorians commonly ſuppoſe that *Lentulus* did venture to go to *Rome*, and that it was on this occaſion, that, frightened by a falſe report of *Cæſar*'s approach, he betook himſelf to flight without waiting till the inner door was opened, which is alſo contrary to the expreſs teſtimony of *Cæſar*.

Ad Att. vii. 21.

Cæſar, having made himſelf Maſter of *Aſculum*, ordered the ſoldiers who had deſerted *Lentulus* to be ſought after, and new levies to be made. He remained there but one day, to ſettle what related to proviſions, and purſued his march to *Corfinium*. His advanced parties found five cohorts employed in breaking down a bridge three miles diſtant from the town, who inſtantly retired upon the firſt attack; and *Cæſar* brought his legions under the very walls where he pitched his camp.

the intention of *Pompey* and the Conſuls ſo to do, and it would have been done, had not their fears deprived them of their ſenſes.

As

Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conf.

As this was the firſt place which dared to make head againſt *Cæſar*, every body expected with impatience what would be the ſucceſs of the enterpriſe. The *Pompeians*, [q] both at *Rome* and in other parts of *Italy*, conceived great hopes, and did not doubt but *Pompey* would advance to the aſſiſtance of *Domitius*, to which he was earneſtly preſſed by that Commander; who repreſented by letters, "that it would be eaſy in that cloſe "country to ſhut up *Cæſar* between two armies, "and cut off all his proviſions; and that, unleſs "this courſe was followed, a great number of "Senators and Roman Knights would be ex-"poſed to imminent danger." He, at the ſame

"[q] A letter from *Philotimus* informed me on the 9th of *Fe-"bruary*, in the evening, that *Domitius* was at the head of "a ſtrong army, which had been joined by the cohorts from "*Picenum*, under the conduct of *Lentulus* and *Thermus*; that "*Cæſar* was apprehenſive his communication would be cut "off, which could be eaſily effected; and that the Patriot "party at *Rome* had recovered their ſpirits, and that the re-"bels were in a manner thunderſtruck. Though I am in-"formed that this good news is little better than viſionary; "yet this letter from *Philotimus* has brought to life *M. Lepi-"dus*, *L. Torquatus*, and the Tribune *C. Caſſius*, who are "with me at *Formiæ*. For my own part, I am afraid they "are not ſo well founded as the accounts are of our being "almoſt ſurrounded by the enemy, and that *Pompey* is retiring "from *Italy*." Ad Att. vii. 23.

"At preſent I have a ſmall gleam of hope, and it is "chiefly occaſioned by the letter which came from *Rome* "concerning *L. Domitius* and the *Picentine* cohorts. Every "thing ſince has put on a more chearful aſpect, and no body "thinks of flying, as they intended. *Cæſar*'s threatening "manifeſto's are deſpiſed; in ſhort, our reports concerning "*Domitius* are good, thoſe concerning *Afranius* ſtill better." Ibid. *Ep.* 26.

U. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

time, made preparations for a vigorous defence: He diſpoſed engines all round the walls, appointed every one his particular poſt, and, to animate his men, promiſed every ſoldier four acres of land out of his own eſtate, and in proportion to every centurion and volunteer.

Cæſar de Bell. Civ. Com. lib. i.

Cæſar, who was not without apprehenſions of being attacked by *Pompey*, employed the three firſt days after his ſitting down before *Corfinium* in ſtrongly fortifying his camp, and in procuring corn from the neighbouring towns. He did not, however, keep altogether within his intrenchments. Being informed that the people of *Sulmona*, a town ſeven miles diſtant from *Corfinium*, deſired to put themſelves under his protection, but were hindered by *Q. Lucretius*, a Senator, and *Attius*, a *Pelignian*, who held them in ſubjection with a garriſon of ſeven cohorts; he ſent thither *M. Antony* with five cohorts, whoſe enſigns were no ſooner deſcried from the walls, than the gates were thrown open, and the whole people in a body, both ſoldiers and townſmen, came out to congratulate *Antony* on his arrival. *Lucretius* and *Attius* endeavoured to eſcape over the walls; but *Attius* was taken. *Antony* returned the ſame day; and *Cæſar*, having joined the cohorts to his army, ſet *Attius* at liberty. His army was now alſo conſiderably increaſed by the arrival of the eighth legion, with two and twenty cohorts of new levies, and about three hundred horſe from the King of *Noricum*. This obliged him to form a ſecond camp on the other ſide of the town under the command of *Curio*, who had brought

brought up theſe recruits, as *Pompey* had foreſeen, and foretold to *Domitius*. He employed the following days in drawing a line with redoubts round the place; which was nearly completed, when the meſſengers that had been ſent by *Domitius* to *Pompey* returned with this anſwer: Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

CN. MAGNUS, Proconſul, to DOMITIUS, Proconſul.

"YOUR letter of the 17*th of February* came "to my hands, adviſing me of *Cæſar*'s having "incamped before *Corfinium*. I foreſaw and fore-"warned you of what has happened; that, as "things now ſtand, he would not venture to "fight you; and that he would draw together all "his forces to coop you up, to obſtruct the "communication between you and me, and to "prevent your joining the well-affectioned troops "you command with my ſuſpected legions. Your "letter alarms me the more, becauſe I cannot "ſtake the whole fortune of the Republic upon "the loyalty of the troops that ſerve under me; "nor am I yet joined by thoſe the Conſuls have "levied. I therefore recommend it to you to do "all you can, if it is now poſſible, to diſengage "yourſelf, and immediately to join me, before "the enemy's junction can be completed; for "our new recruits cannot march time enough "to this rendezvous; and, though they were al-"ready come up, you are ſenſible how little de-"pendence there is on raw men, who are ſtrangers "to one another, againſt a veteran army." *Pom-* Ad Att. viii. 13.

V. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

pey wrote at the ſame time the following letter to the Conſuls:

CN. MAGNUS, Proconſul, to C. MARCELLUS and L. LENTULUS, Conſuls.

Ad Att. viii. 13.

"BEING perſuaded, that, while we remained ſcattered, we could neither ſerve the Republic, nor defend ourſelves, I wrote to *L. Domitius*, that he ſhould make all haſte to join me with his whole force; and, if he had any apprehenſions with regard to himſelf, that he ſhould ſend me the nineteen cohorts which were upon their march to join me from *Picenum*. It happened, as I dreaded, that *Domitius* was ſurrounded, without having with him forces ſufficient for a regular incampment; my nineteen cohorts and his twelve being quartered in three different towns: (for he had ſtationed ſome of them at *Alba*, and ſome at *Sulmo*;) nor, indeed, could he eſcape ſhould he attempt it. Now, you muſt know, that this accident gives me the greateſt diſquiet imaginable. At the ſame time that I earneſtly deſire to deliver ſo many illuſtrious *Romans* from the danger of being beſieged, it is impoſſible for me to relieve them; becauſe I judge it unſafe to march the two legions I command here into thoſe quarters; and of thoſe two legions I can bring together no more than fourteen cohorts; having thrown a garriſon into *Brunduſium*, and taken care of *Canuſium*, which I did not think proper

Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

" proper to leave without a ſufficient force to de-
" fend it.

" As I was in hopes that our army would grow
" ſtronger, I charged *Lælius* with a requeſt, if
" you thought proper, that one of you ſhould re-
" pair to me, and that the other ſhould go to
" *Sicily* with the troops you have raiſed at *Capua*
" or in its neighbourhood, and with the levies of
" *Fauſtus*; that *Domitius* ſhould join them with
" his twelve cohorts; and that the reſt of the
" troops ſhould aſſemble at *Brunduſium*, and be
" ſhipped over from thence to *Dyrrachium*. Now,
" as things are circumſtanced, it is as much out
" of my power, as out of yours, to relieve *Domi-*
" *tius*, who cannot get off by the mountains:
" And we are to take care that the enemy ſhall
" neither come up with thoſe fourteen wavering
" cohorts, nor overtake me in my march. I there-
" fore think proper, and I am joined in ſentiments
" by *Marcellus*, and the other Senators in this
" place, to march the troops I have with me here
" to *Brunduſium*. I therefore requeſt you to
" make all poſſible diſpatch to join me there,
" with as many troops as you can get together.
" My opinion is, that you give to the troops,
" you have with you, the arms you propoſed to
" ſend to me; and, if you have more than are re-
" quiſite for that purpoſe, it will be of great ſer-
" vice, if they can be conveyed in waggons to
" *Brunduſium*. I beg that you will give our
" friends advice concerning that matter. I have
" ſent to require the Prætors, *P. Lupus* and

Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 405 Conſ.

"*C. Coponius*, to join me, and to reſign to you "the command of their forces."[1]

Domi-

[1] In a letter from *Cicero* to *Atticus*, there is a ſhort letter from *Pompey* to the Conſuls on this occaſion, which was written before that which we have now tranſcribed: It runs thus: "I received a letter from *L. Domitius* on the *17th of* "*February*, of which I incloſe you a copy. Now, though I "had not written to you, I know you are ſenſible how im-"portant it is for the Commonwealth, that, as ſoon as poſ-"ſible, there ſhould be a general muſter at one place of all "our forces. Therefore, if you pleaſe, you will make all "poſſible diſpatch to join me; and leave at *Capua* ſuch a "garriſon as you ſhall judge ſufficient." Ad Att. viii. 6. Here *Pompey* conceals his anſwer to *Domitius*, and his reſolution of leaving *Italy*. *Cicero*, who did not doubt but the rendezvous was in order to march forwards, is in great terror for the event on the meeting of the two armies. In the next letter he ſeems to have penetrated into *Pompey*'s deſign; and, in the eighth, he reflects thus on *Pompey*'s conduct: "Diſgraceful and therefore miſerable meaſure! for ſuch are "my ſentiments, that what is diſgraceful is the laſt, nay the "only character of miſery. He had foſtered up *Cæſar*'s "power; of a ſudden he begins to fear him, he diſcourages "all advances to an accommodation, he neglects all prepa-"ration for war, he abandons the city, his miſconduct loſes "*Picenum*, he pins himſelf up in *Apulia*, he prepares to go "to *Greece*, he forſakes us without bidding us adieu, and "utter ſtrangers to thoſe mighty, thoſe monſtrous reſolutions. "Well, all at once a letter comes from *Domitius* to him, and "another from him to the Conſuls.—*Pompey* retires to *Brun-*"*duſium*." [*Cicero* is often too ſevere upon his friend *Pompey* even in regard to his military capacity: The letters above do not ſhew him to have been at this time *ſo bewildered and out of his ſenſes*, as *Cicero* repreſents him in ſeveral of his epiſtles, for no other reaſon, perhaps, than becauſe he did not think proper to make this timorous and talkative orator privy to his motions.] "Where or when are we to emerge, head-

"ed

Domitius thought proper to diſſemble the contents of the letter he had received from *Pompey*, and declared in Council, that this General of the Republic would ſpeedily come to their aſſiſtance: And he exhorted his troops to behave with courage, and to obey thoſe orders which were neceſſary for providing every thing for a vigorous defence. But as his looks and ſpeech were found to diſagree, and as he behaved not with his uſual compoſure and firmneſs, and was obſerved, contrary to his cuſtom, to be much in conference with his friends, it was not poſſible to conceal the truth. In the evening of the ſame day, the ſoldiers diſcovered that they were not to receive any ſuccour, and that their Commander was meditating his eſcape: And they began to mutiny, and by means of their Under-officers to make known their thoughts to one another. "They were be-" ſieged (they ſaid) by *Cæſar*, who had already " in a manner completed his works; and their " General *Domitius*, in whoſe promiſes of aſſiſt-" ance they had placed their chief hope, aban-" doning all concern for their ſafety, was contri-" ving to eſcape privately by flight: Wherefore " it was their buſineſs to look to their own pre-" ſervation." The *Marſi*, ignorant of the mo-

Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

Cæſ. de Bell. Civ. Com. lib. i.

" ed as we are by a General who knows ſo little of his pro-" feſſion, that he was a ſtranger to the important ſituation of " *Picenum*? His miſconduct carries its condemnation upon " its own face.——Even at this time I am ignorant of his " deſigns, but am inceſſantly endeavouring to fiſh ſomewhat " out of him by letters: Nothing can be more unmanly " or unmeaning than the whole of his management." *Ad Att.* vii. 13.

" tive

U. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 49 Conſ.

tive that prompted their companions to mutiny, at firſt oppoſed this reſolution, and poſſeſſed themſelves of the ſtrongeſt part of the town; and the diſpute grew ſo warm that it almoſt came to be decided by the ſword. But, as ſoon as they underſtood that *Domitius* was preparing for a private eſcape, they dropped their oppoſition, and joined in the ſedition. The perſon of *Domitius* was then ſecured, and Deputies were ſent to *Cæſar*, to inform him, "that the town and the "garriſon were ready to receive his orders."

Though *Cæſar* was fully ſenſible of what great importance it was to get poſſeſſion of the town immediately, and join ſo numerous a garriſon to his own army, leſt by largeſſes, promiſes of ſpeedy relief, or falſe reports, any change ſhould be produced in the minds of the ſoldiers; yet fearing that, if he introduced his troops into it in the night, they would take that opportunity to plunder it, he ſent back the Deputies with thanks for their proffer, and delayed the taking poſſeſſion of it till the next day. But he cauſed the walls and the gates to be watched with the greateſt care: He diſpoſed his men along the works, not at certain diſtances, as uſual, but in one continued range, ſo as to touch each other, and to form a circle; and he ordered the military Tribunes and Officers of the cavalry to patrole about the works, and not only to be upon their guard againſt ſallies, but to take care to prevent the eſcape of any particular perſons. Not a man in the camp cloſed his eyes that night: All were buſy in executing the General's orders, and in

conjecturing the fate of the *Corfinians*, of *Domitius*, *Lentulus*, and the other illuſtrious *Romans* confined in the town. Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

About the fourth watch of the night, *Lentulus Spinther* called from the wall to the guard, and deſired to be conducted to *Cæſar*. His requeſt being granted, he came out of the town, attended by ſome of *Domitius*'s ſoldiers, who never left him till he was in *Cæſar*'s preſence: "He "begged *Cæſar* to ſpare his life, and pardon the "injuries he had done him, in conſideration of "their former friendſhip. He owned the many "great favours he had formerly received from "him; that, by his intereſt, he had been elected "into the College of Prieſts, obtained the go-"vernment of *Spain*, after the expiration of his "prætorſhip, and that he had been aſſiſted by "him when he was candidate for the conſulſhip." Here *Cæſar*, interrupting him, ſaid, "that he "was not come out of the bounds of his province "with an intent to injure any one: But to repel "the injuries done to him by his enemies; to "revenge the wrongs of the Tribunes; and to "reſtore the *Roman* people, who were oppreſſed "by a ſmall faction of the Nobles, to their li-"berty and privileges." *Lentulus*, encouraged by this ſpeech, aſked leave to return into the town; "where" he ſaid, "the aſſurances he had ob-"tained of his own ſafety, would contribute not "a little to the conſolation of others, ſome of "whom were ſo terrified, that they were ready "to take deſperate reſolutions." Three in the morning.

As

V. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conf.

As ſoon as it was light, *Cæſar* ordered before him all the principal men. Theſe were *L. Domitius*, *P. Lentulus Spinther*, *L. Vibullius Rufus*, *Sextus Quinctilius Varus*, Quæſtor, and *L. Rubrius*; who were of Senatorian rank; and *Domitius*'s ſon, and ſeveral young men of quality, with ſome *Roman* Knights, and a few Decurions or Senators of the neighbouring municipal towns. When they appeared, he gave orders to ſecure them from the inſults of the ſoldiery; and, addreſſing them in a few words, he reproached them with their animoſity to him, which he ſaid he had not deſerved, and then ſet them all at liberty. He likewiſe reſtored to *Domitius* ſix millions of ſeſterces, which that General had brought with him to *Corfinium*, and had depoſited in the hands of the two Treaſurers of the town. As this was public money aſſigned by *Pompey* for the payment of his forces, *Cæſar* might juſtly have ſeized it; but, he ſays, he was willing to ſhew himſelf generous as well as merciful. He ordered *Domitius*'s ſoldiers to take the uſual oath to him, and ſet out immediately for *Apulia*, in purſuit of *Pompey*; who, having now loſt, by the raſhneſs of *Domitius*, the half of his forces, and the only troops well-affectioned to his cauſe, was under the neceſſity of retiring with all expedition, and of abandoning *Italy* to his rival.[3]

484371. ſterl.

[3] *Cæſar* made himſelf maſter of *Corfinium* viii. *kal. Mar.* or the 22*d* of *February* of the *Roman* year: According to *Uſher*, the 11*th* of the *Julian December*; but really on the 26th of *January*. *Cælius*, in a letter written to *Cicero*, while *Cæſar* was marching from *Corfinium* to *Brunduſium*, ſays: "Look "upon

Mean-while, a notion univerſally prevailed among the *Pompeians*, of *Cæſar*'s *cruel and revengeful temper*, from which horrible effects were apprehended: *Cicero* himſelf was ſtrongly poſſeſſed with it, as appears from many of his letters; where he ſeems to take it for granted, that he would be a ſecond *Phalaris*, not a *Piſiſtratus*; a bloody, not a gentle tyrant. This he inferred from the *violence of his paſt life*; *the nature of his preſent enterpriſe*; *and, above all, from the character of his friends* and *followers*; who were, generally ſpeaking, a needy, profligate, audacious crew; prepared for every thing that was deſperate. It was affirmed likewiſe, with great confidence, he had openly declared, that he was now coming to revenge the deaths of *Cn. Carbo*, *M. Brutus*, and *all the other Marian Chiefs*, whom *Pompey*, when acting under *Sylla*, had cruelly put to death for their oppoſition to the *Syllan* cauſe. His generous and magnanimous behaviour to his moſt inveterate enemies, taken at *Corfinium*, allayed all theſe vain ſuſpicions and fears, and confirmed what he had always given out, that *he ſought nothing by the war, but the ſecurity of his perſon and dignity*. The following letter to *Oppius*

A. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 703 Conſ.

Middl. p. 79.

" upon *Cæſar*'s troops, my friend, and tell me, whether one " would not imagine, by the gaiety of their countenances, " that, inſtead of having fought their way through the rough- " eſt and coldeſt countries in the *hardeſt winter*, they had " been regaling themſelves in all the delicacies of eaſe and " plenty?"—" *Nonne tibi noſtri milites, qui duriſſimis et fri-* " *gidiſſimis locis*, teterrima hieme, *bellum ambulando confece-* " *runt, malis orbiculatis eſſe paſti videntur?*" Ep. Fam. viii. 15. Melm. vii. 7.

and

A. U. C. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ. and *Balbus* was publiſhed at that time, and expreſſes the motives of his conduct.

CÆSAR to OPPIUS and BALBUS.

Ad Att. ix. 7. "I AM extremely glad at your expreſſing, "under your hands, your great approbation of "what has paſſed at *Corfinium*: I will follow your "advice with the greater pleaſure, that it was al-"ways my own diſpoſition to act with the utmoſt "lenity, and to court an accommodation with "*Pompey*. Let us try whether it be poſſible, by "this means, to regain the affections of man-"kind, and to make our ſucceſſes durable; ſince "others by cruelty fell into deteſtation: and none "of them, excepting *Sylla*, whom I don't chuſe "to imitate, enjoyed his ſucceſſes long: Let us "ſhew the world a new method of conquering; "and let *clemency and munificence be my only guards*. "I have already formed ſome ſchemes; and ma-"ny more may be formed, for effecting this. "I deſire you to turn your thoughts to the ſame "ſubject.

"I took priſoner *Cn. Magius*, one of *Pompey*'s "maſters of the works; but, according to the "plan I laid down, I inſtantly diſmiſſed him. "He is the ſecond maſter of the works who has "fallen into my hands, and whom I have diſ-"miſſed. If they want to ſhew their gratitude, "they will exhort *Pompey* to prefer my friendſhip "to that of thoſe men, who have ever ſhewn "themſelves both his and my enemies; and by "whoſe

" whoſe practices the public is reduced to its pre- Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.
" ſent ſtate."

This conduct gave a conſiderable turn to his affairs; [t] while the behaviour of *Pompey*, on the other

[t] " Are you not ſenſible, ſays *Cicero* to *Atticus*, what a " diſcerning, what a vigilant, what a reſolute Commander " the Commonwealth has to do with. By Heavens! if he " does not imbrue his hand in blood, or ſtretch it out in ra- " pine, he will become the darling of thoſe who dreaded him " moſt. I have had a great deal of talk with our townſmen, " and a great deal with our country gentlemen in theſe " quarters: And, take my word for it, they have no con- " cern but about their lands, their farms, and their money. " You ſee what a paſs things are come to. They fear the " man they truſted; they love the man they feared. It is " with anguiſh that I recollect the miſcarriages and miſcon- " duct that have brought us to this." Ad At. viii. 13.

From this firſt experiment of *Cæſar*'s clemency, *Cicero* took occaſion to ſend him a letter of compliment, and to thank him particularly for his generous treatment of *Lentulus*, who, when Conſul, had been the chief author of his reſtoration; to which *Cæſar* returned the following anſwer: Middl. p. 81.

" YOU judge rightly of me, for I am thoroughly known " to you, that nothing is farther removed from me than cru- " elty; and, as I have a great pleaſure from the thing itſelf, " ſo I rejoice and triumph to find my act approved by you: " Nor does it at all move me, that thoſe, who were diſmiſſed " by me, are ſaid to be gone away to renew the war againſt " me; for I deſire nothing more, than that I may always act " like myſelf; they like themſelves. * I wiſh that you " would

* *Domitius* retired to his country-houſe at *Coſa*, in *Tuſcany*; and, having manned ſome ſhips with his own ſervants, ſet ſail for *Marſeilles*; which he held for *Pompey*, with conſent of the inhabitants, and defended it, as we ſhall ſoon ſee, againſt *Cæſar*. *Ad. Att.* ix. 6. *Cæſar de Bell. Civ. lib.* ii. *Lentulus* went ſecretly to his houſe at *Puteoli*; and, after concealing himſelf for ſome time, he joined *Pompey*. *Vibullius Rufus* went alſo to *Pompey*, who ſent him into *Spain*, charged with orders to his Lieutenants there: And *Varus* ſailed for *Africa*.

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other hand, appeared every day more and more deſpicable. He fled perpetually before an enemy whom his pride and perverſeneſs were ſaid to have driven to the neceſſity of taking arms; and he was continually throwing out threats againſt thoſe who did not follow him: Before he ſet out from *Brunduſium*, he talked of nothing but proſcriptions, and of acting in imitation of *Sylla*; and his future conduct ſufficiently anſwered theſe early profeſſions.

Cæſ. de Bell. Civ. Com. l. i.

As ſoon as he got intelligence of the ſurrendry of *Corfinium*, he retreated from *Luceria* to *Canuſium*, and from thence to *Brunduſium*.[u] Here he ordered

"would meet me at the city, that I may uſe your council "and aſſiſtance as I have hitherto done in all things. No- "thing, I aſſure you, is dearer to me than *Dolabella*; I "will owe this favour therefore to him: Nor is it poſſible "for him indeed to behave otherwiſe, ſuch is his humanity, "his good ſenſe, and his affection to me. Adieu!" *Ad Att.* ix. 16.

[u] *Pompey* was now obliged to declare what he had never before owned, his deſign of quitting *Italy*, and carrying the war abroad; he gave notice of it to *Cicero*, and wrote two letters to him at *Formiæ*, to preſs him to come away directly; but *Cicero*, already much out of humour with him, was diſguſted ſtill the more by his ſhort and negligent manner of writing, upon an occaſion ſo important: The ſecond of *Pompey*'s letters, with *Cicero*'s anſwer, will explain the preſent ſtate of their affairs, and *Cicero*'s ſentiments upon them.

CN. POMPEIUS MAGNUS, Proconſul, to M. CICERO, Emperor:

"IF you are in good health, I rejoice: I read your letter "with pleaſure: For I perceived in it your ancient virtue "by your concern for the common ſafety. The Con-

"ſuls

ordered all the new levies to join him; and, arming three hundred ſlaves and ſhepherds, he fur-

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" ſuls are come to the army, which I had in *Apulia*: I ear-
" neſtly exhort you, by your ſingular and perpetual affection
" to the Republic, to come alſo to us; that, by our joint ad-
" vice, we may give help and relief to the afflicted State.
" I would have you make the *Appian* way your road, and
" come in all haſte to *Brunduſium*. Take care of your
" health." *Ad Att.* viii. 11.

M. CICERO, Emperor, to CN. MAGNUS, Proconſul.

" WHEN I ſent that letter, which was delivered to you at
" *Canuſium*, I had no ſuſpicion of your croſſing the ſea for the
" ſervice of the Republic, and was in great hopes that we
" ſhould be able either to bring about an accommodation,
" which to me ſeemed the moſt uſeful, or to defend the Re-
" public with the greateſt dignity in *Italy*. In the mean
" time, before my letter reached you, being informed of your
" reſolution by the inſtructions which you ſent to the Con-
" ſuls, I did not wait till I could have a letter from you, but
" ſet out immediately towards you, with my brother, and
" our children, to *Apulia*. When we were come to *The-*
" *anum*, your friend *C. Meſſius*, and many others, told us,
" that *Cæſar* was in the road to *Capua*, and would lodge that
" very night at *Æſernia*: I was much diſturbed at it; be-
" cauſe, if it was true, I not only took my journey to be pre-
" cluded, but myſelf alſo to be certainly a priſoner. I
" went on, therefore, to *Cales*, with intent to ſtay there,
" till I could learn from *Æſernia* the certainty of my intelli-
" gence: At *Cales*, there was brought to me a copy of the
" letter which you wrote to the Conſul *Lentulus*, with which
" you ſent the copy alſo of one that you had received
" from *Domitius*, dated the 18*th* of *February*, and ſignified
" that it was of great importance to the Republic that all the
" troops ſhould be drawn together, as ſoon as poſſible, to one
" place; yet ſo as to leave a ſufficient garriſon in *Capua*.
" Upon reading theſe letters, I was of the ſame opinion
" with all the reſt, that you were reſolved to march to *Cor-*

" *finium*

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furniſhed them with horſes. The Prætor, *L. Manlius*, in his retreat from *Alba*, with ſix cohorts,

" *finium* with all your forces; whither, when *Cæſar* lay before " the town, I thought it impoſſible for me to come. While " this affair was in the utmoſt expectation, we were in- " formed at one and the ſame time both of what had hap- " pened at *Corfinium*, and that you were actually marching " towards *Brunduſium*: And, when I and my brother re- " ſolved, without heſitation, to follow you thither, we were " advertiſed by many, who came from *Samnium* and *Apulia*, " to take care that we did not fall into *Cæſar*'s hands; for " that he was upon his march to the ſame places where our " road lay, and would reach them ſooner than we could " poſſibly do. This being the caſe, it did not ſeem adviſe- " able to me, or my brother, or any of our friends, to run " the riſk of hurting, not only ourſelves, but the Republic, " by our raſhneſs: Eſpecially when we could not doubt, but " that, if the journey had been ſafe to us, we ſhould not " then be able to overtake you. In the mean while I received " your letter, dated from *Canuſium*, the 21*ſt* of *February*, in " which you exhort me to come in all haſte to *Brunduſium*: " But, as I did not receive it till the 29*th*, I made no " queſtion but that you were already arrived at *Brunduſium*; " and all that road ſeemed wholly ſhut up to us, and we " ourſelves as ſurely intercepted as thoſe who were taken " at *Corfinium*: For we did not reckon them only to be pri- " ſoners, who were actually fallen into the enemy's hands, " but thoſe too not leſs ſo, who happen to be incloſed " within the quarters and garriſons of their adverſaries. Since " this is our caſe, I heartily wiſh, in the firſt place, that I " had always been with you, as I then told you, when I re- " linquiſhed the command of *Capua*, which I did not do for " the ſake of avoiding trouble, but becauſe I ſaw that the " town could not be held without an army, and was unwil- " ling that the ſame accident ſhould happen to me, which, to " my ſorrow, has happened to ſome of our braveſt citizens " at *Corfinium*: But, ſince it has not been my lot to be with " you, I wiſh that I had been made privy to your councils;

horts, and the Prætor *Rutilius Lupus*, from *Terracina*, with three, perceiving *Cæſar*'s cavalry at

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" for I could not poſſibly ſuſpect, and ſhould ſooner have be-
" lieved any thing, than that, for the good of the Republic,
" under ſuch a leader as you, we ſhould not be able to ſtand
" our ground in *Italy*: Nor do I now blame your con-
" duct, but lament the fate of the Republic; and, though I
" cannot comprehend what it is which you have followed,
" yet I am not the leſs perſuaded that you have done nothing
" but with the greateſt reaſon. You remember, I believe,
" that my opinion always was, firſt, to preſerve peace, even
" on bad conditions; then about leaving the city; for, as
" to *Italy*, you never intimated a tittle to me about it; but I
" do not take upon myſelf to think that my advice ought
" to have been followed: I followed yours; nor that for the
" ſake of the Republic, of which I deſpaired, and which is
" now overturned, ſo as not to be raiſed up again without a
" civil and moſt pernicious war. I ſought you; deſired to
" be with you; nor will I omit the firſt opportunity which
" offers of effecting it. I eaſily perceived, through all this
" affair, that I did not ſatisfy thoſe who are fond of fighting:
" For I made no ſcruple to own, that I wiſhed for no-
" thing ſo much as peace; not but that I had the ſame
" apprehenſions from it as they; but I thought them more
" tolerable than a civil war: Then, after the war was be-
" gun, when I ſaw that conditions of peace were offered
" to you, and a full and honourable anſwer given to them,
" I began to weigh and deliberate well upon my own conduct,
" which, conſidering your kindneſs to me, I fancied that I
" ſhould eaſily explain to your ſatisfaction: I recollected that
" I was the only man who, *for the greateſt ſervices to the pub-*
" *lic, had ſuffered a moſt wretched and cruel puniſhment: That*
" *I was the only one, who, if I offended him, to whom, at the*
" *very time when we were in arms againſt him, a ſecond con-*
" *ſulſhip and moſt ſplendid triumph were offered, ſhould be involved*
" *again in all the ſame ſtruggles*; ſo that my perſon ſeemed
" to ſtand always expoſed a ſa public mark to the inſults of
" profligate citizens: Nor did I ſuſpect any of theſe things

" till

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a diſtance, commanded by *Bivius Curius*, were extremely diſconcerted; and, while they meditated what ſtep to take, their ſoldiers deſerted them, and joined the troops under the conduct of *Curius*. Several other parties, flying different ways, fell in, ſome with *Cæſar*'s foot, others with his cavalry. *Cn. Magius*, of *Cremona*, *Pompey*'s maſter of the works, or chief engineer, being taken in his way to *Brunduſium*, was brought to *Cæſar*, who ſent him back to *Pompey* with this meſſage: "That, as he had not yet obtained an interview, "his deſign was to come to *Brunduſium*, there to "confer with him in relation to the common "ſafety; becauſe they ſoon would be able to "diſpatch, in a perſonal treaty, what, if mana-

"till I was openly threatened with them: Nor was I ſo much "afraid of them, if they were really to befal me, as I judged "it prudent to decline them, if they could honeſtly be "avoided. You ſee, in ſhort, the ſtate of my conduct "while we had any hopes of peace; what has ſince hap-"pened deprived me of all power to do any thing: But "to thoſe whom I do not pleaſe I can eaſily anſwer, *that I "never was more a friend to C. Cæſar than they*, nor they ever "better friends to the Republic than myſelf: The only dif-"ference between me and them is, that as they are excellent "citizens, and I not far removed from that character, it "was my advice to proceed by way of treaty, which I under-"ſtood to be approved alſo by you; theirs by way of arms; "and, ſince this method has prevailed, it ſhall be my care "to behave myſelf ſo, that the Republic may not want "in me the ſpirit of a true citizen, nor you of a friend. "Adieu." *Ad Att.* viii. 11. The expoſtulations in the latter part of this letter were certainly uſeleſs, unfriendly, and ill-timed. His excuſes in the firſt part were all falſe; for he owns to *Atticus*, *that, in truth, he was willing to conſider a little longer what was right and fit for him to do.*—viii. 12.

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"ged by the intervention of others, might run "into a tedious negociation." It appears, by a letter of *Cæſar* to *Oppius*, [x] that *Pompey* ſent back *Magius*, as ſoon as *Cæſar* arrived before *Brunduſium*, with ſome propoſals which we know nothing of; nor of thoſe in return which were then made by *Cæſar*. Young *Balbus* was ſent alſo after the Conſul *Lentulus*, to endeavour to engage him to ſtay in *Italy*, and to return to the city, by the offer of every thing that could tempt him; and *Cicero* ſeems to think that *Lentulus* might have complied with the invitation, if *Balbus* and he had met; but the Conſul had ſailed before *Balbus* could come up with him. Y.R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

In fine, *Cæſar* was ſo bent upon an accommodation, that, ſeeing *Magius* [y] did not return Cæſ. de Bell. Civ. Com. l. i.

[x] "On the 9*th* of *March*, I arrived at *Brunduſium*, and "have inveſted it. *Pompey* is within the place. He ſent "*Magius* to me, to treat of peace. I anſwered him as I "thought proper. I was willing you ſhould be inſtantly in-"formed of this. When I ſhall have any proſpect of an ac-"commodation, I will let you know without loſs of time." *Ad Att.* ix. 13. "I have no copy," ſays *Cicero*, "of the "propoſals you aſk for, ſent by *Cæſar* to the Conſuls and "to *Pompey*: While I was upon the road, I ſent you thoſe "brought by *Ægypta*; by which, I ſuppoſe, you may ga-"ther the ſubſtance of the others." *Ad Att.* ix. 15.

[y] *M. Crevier* (Vol. XIII. p. 255.) taking it for granted that *Cæſar* means to ſay in this place that *Magius* was never ſent to him by *Pompey*, makes a very ſevere and haſty reflexion upon his veracity. "*Cæſar*" [to uſe the words of this hiſtorian] "ſays, in his Commentaries, *that Magius brought him* "*back no anſwer from Pompey*; but we have a letter from "*Cæſar* to *Oppius* and *Balbus*, which proves the contrary. "*Pompey*," ſays he, "has *ſent Magius to me, with overtures*

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to him, as he expected, he diſpatched *Caninius Rebilus*, one of his Lieutenants, a relation and intimate friend of *Scribonius Libo*, to confer with him on the ſubject. His orders were to exhort *Libo*, in the moſt earneſt manner, to procure an interview between him and *Pompey*: To repreſent to him that, by this means, peace might be concluded upon reaſonable terms; and that the honour of it would redound to him by whoſe mediation both parties ſhould be prevailed with to lay down their arms. *Libo*, after conferring with *Caninius*, waited on *Pompey*, and returned with this anſwer: "That the Conſuls were abſent, "without whom *Pompey* had no power to treat "of an accommodation." *Pompey*'s averſion to all negociations was known to his party;[z] and, leſt

"*of peace, and I have anſwered him what I thought proper.* "It is difficult to reconcile theſe contradictions, but by "ſuppoſing that *Cæſar* has not been ſcrupulouſly faithful "as to facts in his Commentaries; particularly in what re- "gards the civil war. *Aſinius Pollio*, who accompanied him "in ſeveral expeditions, expreſsly accuſed him of it. So "that this great man, this generous, elevated ſoul, diſ- "dained not to diſhonour himſelf by falſehood, and to ſup- "preſs the truth in a work deſtined for poſterity." The letter cited by *M. Crevier*, and which is copied above, proves that *Cæſar* expected *Magius* again. His firſt meſſage by him, when taken priſoner, was only in general terms, to demand an interview; he made no propoſals. *Cæſar* has neglected to mention *Magius*'s firſt viſit; or, perhaps, as in many other places of his Commentaries, there are ſome lines wanting.

[z] "Your laſt letter is dated the 1*ſt* of *March*; and in "it you wiſh for an interview, and do not deſpair of an ac- "commodation between *Cæſar* and *Pompey*; but, in my pre- "ſent

leſt the Conſuls ſhould engage in one againſt his will, he was all along very deſirous of ſending them out of *Italy*. Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

Cæſar ſat down, on the *ninth* of *March*, before *Brunduſium* with ſix legions; three of which were compoſed of veteran ſoldiers, and the reſt of new levies drawn together upon his march. He had ſent *Domitius*'s troops directly from *Corfinium*, towards *Sicily*, not caring to bring them near *Pompey*'s quarters. The Conſuls had ſailed on the *4th* with thirty cohorts, and there were ſtill twenty in the town with *Pompey*. Nor was it certainly known whether he continued there for want of ſhipping to tranſport his troops, or with the deſign to keep poſſeſſion of *Brunduſium*, that he might be maſter of the whole *Adriatic* ſea, the fartheſt parts of *Italy*, and the country of *Greece*, in order to make war on both ſides the Gulph. *Cæſar*, having loſt all hopes of an accommodation, and fearing that it was his intention to keep footing in *Italy*, reſolved to puſh the war with vigour, and to deprive him of the advantages he might reap from the port of *Brunduſium*. The following works were contrived by him for this purpoſe. He carried on a mole on each ſide of the haven where the entrance was narroweſt, and the water ſhallow. But as this undertaking could not be carried quite acroſs the port, by reaſon of the great depth of the ſea, he prepared double floats of Cæſ. de Bel. Civ. Com. l. i.

"ſent way of thinking, I cannot believe that there will be "any interview; or, if there is, that *Pompey will agree* "*to any terms.*" Ad. Att. viii. 15.

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timber, thirty feet ſquare, which were each ſecured by four anchors, to enable them to reſiſt the fury of the waves. Theſe, which were to extend all the way between the two moles, were covered over with earth and faſcines, that the ſoldiers might paſs and repaſs with eaſe, and have firm footing to defend them. The front and ſides were armed with a parapet of hurdles; and every fourth float had a tower of two ſtories, the better to keep the enemies ſhips at a diſtance, and to guard the work from fire and the ſhocks of veſſels.

Againſt theſe preparations *Pompey* made uſe of ſeveral large ſhips, upon which he raiſed turrets three ſtories high; and, having filled them with engines and darts, he let them looſe upon *Cæſar*'s floats in order to break through the ſtaccado, and interrupt the progreſs of the works. Thus daily ſkirmiſhes happened with darts, arrows, and ſlings, at a diſtance; and *Cæſar* had ſpent nine days in theſe works, and had half-finiſhed the ſtaccado, when the ſhips employed in the firſt embarkation were ſent back by the Conſuls. *Pompey*, either alarmed at *Cæſar*'s works, or becauſe from the firſt he had reſolved to abandon *Italy*, immediately prepared to carry off the reſt of his forces: And, the better to ſecure his retreat, and to hinder the enemy from breaking into the town during the embarkation, he walled up the gates, barricaded the ſtreets, or cut ditches acroſs them, which he filled with pointed ſtakes, and covered with hurdles and earth. The two ſtreets which led to the port,

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and which he left open for the paſſage of his men, were fortified with a double paliſado of very ſtrong well-ſharpened ſtakes. After theſe precautions, he ordered the ſoldiers to embark in ſilence, having placed on the walls and towers ſome ſelect archers and ſlingers, who were to wait till all the troops had got aboard; and were then, upon a ſignal given, to retire to ſome ſmall ſhips that waited for them at a convenient diſtance. V.R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

The inhabitants of *Brunduſium*, diſſatisfied with *Pompey*'s ſoldiers, and provoked by the damage done to their town by his works, found means to give notice to *Cæſar* of his departure, from the tops of their houſes. He immediately upon this intelligence ordered ſcaling-ladders to be prepared, and the ſoldiers to repair to their arms, that he might not loſe any opportunity of acting. *Pompey* weighed anchor a little before night, and gave the ſignal for recalling the ſoldiers that were upon the walls, who retired with all poſſible expedition to the ſhips prepared for them. At the ſame time the ſcaling-ladders were applied to the walls, and *Cæſar*'s troops entered the town: But, being informed by the *Brunduſians* of the ſnares and ditches provided for them by the enemy, they were obliged to take a circuit; which gave *Pompey* time enough to put to ſea. Two tranſports only, impeded by *Cæſar*'s mole, were taken with the troops on board.

Thus *Pompey*, on the 17*th* of *March*, abandoned all *Italy* to his rival. It is the opinion of many, that he ſaw from the beginning he ſhould

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ſhould be reduced to this neceſſity; but had kept the ſecret to himſelf, and had humoured his party in the contrary notion, often talking big to keep up their ſpirits. In this view, after the deſertion of *Labienus*, he wrote to *Cicero*, "that "in a few days he would have a firm army, with "which he would march againſt *Cæſar* into "*Picenum*; ſo that the Senate might have an "opportunity of returning to the city." *Cicero* may be quoted as of this opinion. In a letter to *Atticus*, he writes to the following purpoſe:

Ad. Att. viii. 11.

"*Pompey* and *Cæſar* are rivals in power—— "*Pompey* did not abandon *Rome* becauſe it was untenable, nor *Italy* becauſe he was driven out "of it; it had all along been his intention to "move earth and ſea, to rouſe barbarous mo- "narchs, to introduce the troops of barbarous "nations into *Italy*, and to levy numerous ar- "mies. He has many to ſecond him in what he "has long thirſted for, a ſpecies of *Sylla*'s ty- "ranny." But *Cicero* writes not always to his friend his real ſentiments; he ſays and unſays: He is now all love, and the moment after all indignation. He begins the tenth letter of the ninth book with theſe words: "I have nothing "to write to you; becauſe, ſince I anſwered "yours, the day before yeſterday, I have had no "freſh intelligence. But as fretting not only "keeps me from ſleeping, but gives me the "greateſt pain while I am awake; I ſet myſelf "down to ſcribble ſomewhat or other, *in which "I have no manner of meaning, but to converſe as it "were with you, who are my only comfort.*" And I

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do not perceive any thing in the hiſtory of the commencement of this war, but what convinces me that *Pompey* thought himſelf capable of defending *Italy*; in which opinion he was certainly confirmed by *Labienus*, who would never have quitted *Cæſar*, if he had thought otherwiſe. He gave the ſtrongeſt aſſurances to his party before the rupture, that *Cæſar* would never dare to proceed in an hoſtile manner; and that, if he was mad enough to do ſo, he held him in the utmoſt contempt. He had provided himſelf with two legions of veteran troops, and ordered levies all over *Italy* ſufficient to form eight other legions: And he ſent his Officers with troops to ſtop *Cæſar*'s progreſs. But he was greatly diſappointed in every thing he relied upon, and his ſpirits were ſunk by theſe diſappointments. The ſudden panic that ſeized the town on the firſt news of *Cæſar*'s march, and made the two Conſuls and all the Senators of *Pompey*'s faction fly out of it, put a ſtop to all levies there. In the ſouthern parts, on whoſe affection *Pompey* depended ſo much, the levies went on but ſlowly: The people ſhewed a great backwardneſs to enliſt. The northern parts ſhewed themſelves, contrary to his expectation, to be in *Cæſar*'s intereſt, and ſurrendered to him upon the firſt ſummons: Even many towns declared for him before they were ſummoned. The *Pompeian* Commanders were deſerted every-where by their troops, which inſpired *Pompey* with a juſt diffidence of the two legions that had been taken from *Cæſar*; and which conſtituted, in reality, his

Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

Ad. Att. viii. 3.

Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

his chief ſtrength. Laſtly, *Cæſar*'s aſtoniſhing celerity baffled all his attempts to preſerve *Italy*: For, from his ſetting out at *Ravenna* with one legion, though he was forced to take in all the great towns on his road, and ſpent ſeven days before *Corfinium*, and nine before *Brunduſium*; yet in two months he marched the whole length of *Italy*, entered *Brunduſium* with ſix legions, and was maſter of four more at leaſt in different parts of the country.

Middl. p. 73.

A very ingenious and juſtly-admired writer, to whoſe performance we are much indebted, but to whoſe opinions we are not always diſpoſed to ſubſcribe, ſpeaks in the following manner of *Cæſar*'s enterpriſe: "If we conſider the "famous paſſage of the *Rubicon*, abſtractedly "from the event, it ſeems to have been ſo hazar- "dous and deſperate, that *Pompey* might reaſon- "ably contemn the thought of it, as of an at- "tempt too raſh for any prudent man to ven- "ture upon. If *Cæſar*'s view indeed had been "to poſſeſs himſelf only of *Italy*, *there could have* "*been no difficulty in it*: His army was undoubt- "edly the beſt which was then in the world; "fluſhed with victory, animated with zeal for "the perſon of their General, and an overmatch "for any which could be brought againſt it into "the field: But this ſingle army was all that he "had to truſt to; he had no reſource: The loſs "of one battle was certain ruin to him; and "yet he muſt neceſſarily run the riſk of many "before he could gain his end: For the whole "Empire was armed againſt him; every pro-

"vince

" vince offered a freſh enemy, and a freſh field " of action, where he was like to be expoſed to " the ſame danger as on the plains of *Pharſalia.* " But, above all, his enemies were maſters of " the ſea, ſo that he could not tranſport his forces " abroad without the hazard of their being " deſtroyed by a ſuperior fleet, or of being " ſtarved at land by the difficulty of conveying " ſupplies and proviſions to them: *Pompey* relied " chiefly on this ſingle circumſtance, and was " perſuaded that it muſt neceſſarily determine " the war in his favour: So that it ſeems ſurpri- " ſing how ſuch a ſuperiority of advantage, in the " hands of ſo great a Commander, could poſſibly " fail of ſucceſs; and we muſt admire rather " *the fortune*, than *the conduct of Cæſar*, for car- " rying himſelf ſafe through all theſe difficulties " to the poſſeſſion of the Empire."

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But it muſt be remembered, on the other hand, that a certain deſtruction would have attended *Cæſar*, if he had ſubmitted to the decree made againſt him by the Senate. He would thereby have been diſarmed at once, and reduced to the condition of a private citizen: And *Pompey*, with all the power of the State in his hands, would eaſily have diſappointed him of the conſulſhip. He intended, it is certain, to do ſo, and even to bring him to trial, as *Cato* and others were continually threatening him: And, of this laſt circumſtance, *Cæſar*, according to *Suetonius*, was really apprehenſive. " He en- " gaged in the war," ſays that hiſtorian, " be- " cauſe he was afraid of being called to an ac-

Suet. in Cæſ. 30.

" count

Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

"count for what he had done in his firſt conſul-
"ſhip, contrary to the religion, the laws, and
"the authority of the Tribunes: For *Cato* often
"declared, and with an oath too, that he would
"impeach him as ſoon as he diſbanded his army:
"And it was commonly talked, that, *if he re-*
"*turned a private perſon, he would, like Milo, be*
"*tried with a guard to attend the Court.* This
"circumſtance *Aſinius Pollio* has confirmed,
"when he ſays that *Cæſar*, upon viewing his
"enemies ſlaughtered and put to flight upon
"the plains of *Pharſalia*, ſpoke theſe words:
"*They would have it ſo: I Caius Cæſar, who have*
"*performed ſuch great things, muſt have undergone*
"*a ſentence of condemnation, had I not deſired the*
"*aſſiſtance of my army.*"

If it was ſo evident, [as Dr. *Middleton* will have it] that *Pompey* could not defend *Italy*, this threw at once an immenſe power into *Cæſar*'s hands, and put him in poſſeſſion of the fortunes of all his enemies: Which conſideration he might think ſufficient to induce them not to purſue their ſcheme of depriving him of his government; and it certainly would have had this effect, if *Pompey* had not deceived the Senate by aſſuring them that he had an army ſufficient to defend the city. This is very plain from the many reproaches which were thrown on *Pompey*, when things went contrary to the general expectation.

Cæſar, with an army of martial and experienced ſoldiers, and poſſeſſed of *Italy*, *Gaul*, and the adjacent iſlands, was an overmatch for the reſt of the

the world. For what was the fighting world? Truly, ſix legions of veterans in *Spain*, and an army of new levies out of *Italy* and the oriental provinces, with two legions that had ſerved under *Cæſar*, and three more diſperſed in *Aſia*. *But Cæſar*, it is ſaid, *muſt run the riſk of many battles, all the empire was armed, and every province offered a freſh field of action*: This, however, was not the caſe: It was, on the contrary, moſt evident from the beginning, that one general engagement would decide the fate of the two Chiefs; and, with regard to the provinces, it muſt be obſerved, that they were quite indifferent in the quarrel, and could not ſtop, if they intended it, the progreſs of the conqueror. Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

In fine, *Cicero* does not always repreſent *Cæſar*'s enterpriſe *as a kind of madneſs*. Here is his account to his friend *Atticus*: "I perceive *Cæſar* "to be very ſtrong in infantry, in cavalry, in "ſhipping, and in auxiliary Gauls; whoſe num-"bers *Matius*, I believe, exaggerated, when he "ſaid they had offered to maintain for him, at "their own expence, ten thouſand foot, and ſix "thouſand horſe. But, ſuppoſing this to be a "vaunt, yet it is certain that he is very ſtrong; "and he will not, like *Pompey*, be obliged to "maintain his forces upon extraordinary im-"poſts; for he will have the riches of all *Rome* "at his command: And add to this *Cæſar*'s "enterpriſing ſpirit, and the weakneſs of our Pa-"triots, who are grieved at war for no other "reaſon, than becauſe they have incurred *Cæſar*'s "reſentment.——*Cæſar*, however, has been more "mo- See Middl. P. 74. Ad. Att. ix. 13.

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"moderate than he appeared to be at ſetting "out, and the common people have loſt the "great affection they had for *Pompey*, and ſeem "fond of him. The ſituation therefore of *Cæſar* "is ſuch, that, ſuppoſing he cannot conquer, "*yet I cannot ſee how he can be conquered.*——I "do not underſtand whom you call *Patriots*: "I know of none: I mean I know of no order "of men deſerving that appellation: Take them "man by man, they are very worthy gentlemen: "But, in civil diſſenſions, we are to look for "patriotiſm in the conſtituent members of the "Body Politic. Do you look for it in the Se-"nate? Let me aſk you by whom were the "provinces left without governors?——Do you "look for patriotiſm among the farmers of the "revenue? Alas! they never were ſteady, and "now *they are entirely devoted to Cæſar.* Do you "look for it in our trading, or in our landed in-"tereſt? They are fondeſt of peace. Can you "imagine that they have any terrible apprehen-"ſions of living under a monarchy; they, to "whom all forms of government are indifferent, "provided they enjoy their eaſe?——When "his ſtream of power was weak, it might have "been eaſily ſtopt. But now he is maſter of "*eleven legions* [of veterans] *and as much cavalry* "*as he pleaſes to draw into the field.* Think "upon the *towns beyond the Po, the mob of Rome,* "upon ſo great *a majority of the Tribunes,* upon "a profligate riſing generation, upon a General, "with ſuch ſagacity to contrive, and ſuch bold-"neſs to execute.

Ad Att. vii. 7.

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"It was with reluctance I undertook that "commiſſion at *Capua*; not that I would have "declined it, had we been acting upon any "concert: But I could ſee *no declared, ſincere* "*concern for their country in any of our public* "*bodies*; *nor, in reality, among private perſons.* "Our Patriots were without ſpirit and activity, "as uſual, and as I had foreſeen; while *the mob* "*diſcovered a manifeſt bias to Cæſar*; and moſt "of them were fond of a change." Theſe extracts from *Cicero* ſeem to contain a very natural and true deſcription of the times; and this deſcription leads us to conſider the juſtice of *Pompey*'s or *Cæſar*'s cauſe. The ingenious author above-cited has given his deciſion on this head, in the following paſſage from *Cicero*; which we muſt beg leave to accompany with our remarks. *You have held* [*Cicero* had been ſpeaking of *Cæſar*] *your government ten years, not granted to you by the Senate, but extorted by violence and faction*: [Was not this the caſe with every other grant at this time? Was the *Gabinian*, or the *Manilian*, or the *Meſſian* law, more legally preferred? The government of *Gaul* was given to *Cæſar* by a law of the people, which the Senate thought fit to confirm by a decree of their own] *the full term is expired, not of the law, but of your licentious will: But allow it to be a law*; [*Cicero* allowed it to have been ſuch, and voted for it; and he himſelf engaged *Cælius* to propoſe, in favour of *Cæſar*, another bill to diſpenſe with his preſence in ſuing for the conſu-

Ad Att. viii. 3.

Middl. p. 67. Ad Att. vii. 9.

V. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conf.

late during the continuance of the law in queſtion] *it is now decreed, that you muſt have a ſucceſſor:* [By whom? By the people? No: By decree of the Senate? No: For the Tribunes interpoſed: By a vote of the Senate? Yes: But of the Senate awed illegally by the power of *Pompey*] *you refuſe; and ſay, Have ſome regard to me: Do you firſt ſhew your regard to us: Will you pretend to keep an army longer than the people ordered, and contrary to the will of the Senate?* To this paſſage from *Cicero Dr. Middleton* has added: "But *Cæſar*'s ſtrength lay not in the "goodneſs of his cauſe, but of his troops: "——The flight of the Tribunes gave him a "plauſible handle to begin, and ſeemed to "ſanctify his attempt; but his real motive, "ſays *Plutarch* [*in Ant.*] was the ſame that "animated *Cyrus* and *Alexander* before him to "diſturb the peace of mankind; the unquench-"able thirſt of Empire, and the wild ambition "of being the greateſt man in the world; "which was not poſſible, till *Pompey* was firſt "deſtroyed."

In this ſtate of the merit of *Cæſar*'s cauſe, we have two aſſertions which require a particular conſideration. It is affirmed, that the full term appointed for *Cæſar*'s government of *Gaul* was expired; and that he continued to hold his province againſt law in defiance of the Senate and of the people of *Rome*: And *Dr. Middleton* has ſaid, in another place, that the *1ſt of March* of the year 703 *was the term preſcribed to*

p. 45.

it

it by law. Secondly, *Cæſar* is condemned as guilty of an impudent and treacherous behaviour in not obeying the orders of the Senate. Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ. I. 39.

Now, as to the firſt point, *Dr. Middleton* is certainly miſtaken, and contradicts *Cicero* himſelf, when he ſuppoſes that *Cæſar*'s government was to laſt but eight years, and ended on the *1ſt of March*, 703. *Dio Caſſius* indeed ſays, that *Cæſar*'s government was only prolonged to him for three years; but he is in this contradicted by every other hiſtorian, and by indubitable facts. *Cæſar*, in his harangue to his ſoldiers at *Ravenna*, tells them, that they had ſerved under him for nine years; and it appears by what he mentions ſoon afterwards, that, beyond the period fixed by the decree of the Senate for diſbanding his forces, there wanted *ſix months* to complete the time allotted to him by law. The complaints of the Tribunes of the people againſt the Senate, for pretending to abrogate a law of the people, were evidently grounded upon this ſuppoſition. What could mean the privilege granted him in the year 701, when *Pompey* was ſole Conſul, *of ſuing for the conſulſhip in his abſence*, if his government was to expire before he could legally preſent himſelf as a candidate? And it would have expired, if it had not been *decennial.* In fine, *Cicero* owns, in other places, that *Cæſar* had law on his ſide: "Yet, "ſuch is the General we are either to encounter, "or we are to gratify him *in what he can already claim by law.*" Ad Att. vii. 7. And Monſieur l'Abbe *Mongault*

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has thus remarked on the paſſage of *Cicero* cited above: "*Cicero* writes here in the *Pompeian* "ſtyle, or he means only that *Cæſar*'s govern- "ment would nearly expire about the time of "the elections of the next Conſuls; and that "therefore he might well conſent to leave it, "in order to come and ſtand candidate in per- "ſon, as was required of him: Or, perhaps, "*Pompey*'s faction began to reckon the years of "*Cæſar*'s government, from the very moment "that the law was paſſed at *Rome*, allotting "that province to him; but the general and le- "gal method was to reckon from the day in "which the Governor entered his province."

As to the ſecond point, I ſhall not interpoſe my judgment: The reader, who has had the whole evidence laid impartially before him, will, probably, have determined for himſelf. I ſhall, however, beg leave to inſert a paragraph or two from the ſpirited performance of our late poet laureat.

The character and conduct of Cicero conſideredfrom the hiſtory of his life, by Dr. Middleton, p. 183.

"After ſeveral difficulties, doubts, debates, "and political ſchemes, to make bad matters "worſe, at laſt the Senate, *without any notice ta- "ken of the people's right to confirm or reject it,* "came to this bold reſolution, that *Cæſar ſhould "diſmiſs his army by a certain day, or be decla- "red an enemy*, &c. Does not the very menace "in this vote imply a doubt or apprehenſion "of its not being obeyed? And whence could "that doubt come but from a conſciouſneſs *of "their ſeverity in taking his command from Cæſar,*

"*be-*

" *before the time of its legal duration was expired?* Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.
" Was this a treatment that the high ſpirit of
" *Cæſar* could comply with, or quietly bear?
" Or, indeed, if he would have borne it, where,
" at that time, was the policy of it? What good
" was the Senate or the public to reap by it?
" Would they have leſs reaſon to be afraid of
" *Pompey*'s power, becauſe *Pompey* then muſt
" have had leſs reaſon to be afraid of *Cæſar*;
" while they were both rivals, they could be
" but *candidates* for empire; but, when one of
" them was deſtroyed, the other of courſe be-
" came equal to their maſter duly elected.
" Could they then imagine that *Cæſar*, whoſe
" ſtrength (ſays *Dr. Middleton) lay not in the*
" *goodneſs of his cauſe, but of his troops*, would
" chuſe to come from the head of them merely
" to humble himſelf into a private innocent
" man, and to *depend upon the favour of Pom-*
" *pey for his future preferment?* Or, if this was
" really what their wiſdom propoſed by their
" ſage and ſober vote, why, at leaſt, when they
" knew *Cæſar* was ſo formidable in the field,
" would they not previouſly chooſe to ſoften
" him into obedience by giving him a reaſon-
" able hope that ſome ſuch *great* and *gracious*
" honour ſhould be ſecured to him? But, per-
" haps, the neglect of this civility might be ow-
" ing to the *ſic volo* of *Pompey*, whoſe diſregard
" of *Cæſar* might not as yet have given them
" his orders to make him any ſuch propoſal;
" *his orders*, I call them, becauſe, whatever at

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" this time was propoſed in the Senate went but " very ſlowly forward, that had not an eye to " the intereſt or good-liking of *Pompey*. It " would be therefore the greateſt abſurdity to " ſuppoſe ſo raſh and enterpriſing a vote could " have come from them *ex mero motu*, as the " free and voluntary act of their own pious care " of the public. No, had that been their caſe, " had they been their own maſters, it can ad- " mit of no doubt but that *Pompey*, as well as " *Cæſar*, would have had the ſame diſbanding " vote paſſed upon him too. But, *Cæſar* be- " ing then abroad and *Pompey* at home, they na- " turally choſe to be moſt afraid of the dan- " ger that was neareſt to them."

Vid. ſupr. Chap. I.

Cicero, we may remember, in the account he gives of his interview with *Pompey*, tells us, that, as to public affairs, *Pompey* talked in ſuch a ſtrain, *as if a war was inevitable, without giving the leaſt hopes of an accommodation.*

Cibber, p. 186.

" While ſuch [continues our Laureat] was " the diſpoſition of *Pompey*'s mind, we can be " no longer in doubt from whence came this " peremptory vote upon *Cæſar*.

" Thus the government *de jure* having ut- " terly loſt its power, the only debateable queſ- " tion now was, whether *Pompey* or *Cæſar* " ſh ould be the ſole governor *de facto*. A me- " lancholy election for liberty! Nor had it a " better appearance to *Cicero*, who tells us, *that* " *which ſide ſoever got the better, the war muſt* " *neceſſarily end in tyranny; the only difference*

" *was*,

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" *was that, if their enemies conquered, they ſhould* " *be proſcribed; if their friends, be ſlaves.*

" This being the moſt equal light that the " cauſe of *Pompey* or of *Cæſar* can ſtand in, we " muſt either ſuppoſe, that, had *Cæſar*, in obe- " dience to the Senate, diſbanded his army, the " public liberty would have been of courſe re- " ſtored; or that, if it would not, *(as there is* " *not the moſt diſtant pretence to ſay it would)* it " then muſt follow, that, whether *Pompey* or " *Cæſar* had prevailed, it could have wrought " no different conſequence to the *Roman* liberty; " the ruin of which, under the ſole dominion of " either, muſt (as *Cicero* confeſſes) have been " equally inevitable: Let this be granted, and " neither the virtue, nor the critical learning of " poſterity, will ever think this cauſe a diſpu- " table point, or give the leaſt preference to the " pretenſions of either of theſe celebrated com- " petitors. 'Tis true, they may tell us, that " *Pompey had the fairer appearance in the Senate's* " *ſupport.* Yes, but in nothing more than *ap-* " *pearance*; not by *their free and independent* " *choice, but by the palpable terror of his arms*; " nor from their opinion of his better intentions " to the public, than they conceived of *Cæſar*'s; " but the plain truth is, that, in this ſituation, " they rather choſe to let *Pompey*'s orders ſeem " to be their own, than that any thing ſhould " appear to be tranſacted without their autho- " rity. If *Cæſar* then was not ſo tame as the " Senate in yielding up his liberty, or refuſed

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"to obey the mandate of an intimidated au-
"thority; rather chooſing, if he could not live
"like a *Roman*, to die like *Cæſar*: Will this
"ſtand in no excuſe for him? Or, will it
"be too partially favourable, ſhould we call his
"ſlighting ſuch a Senate an almoſt laudable
"ambition? For never ſurely can it be urged
"that *Cæſar's diſobeying them was a more crimi-
"nal infringement of the public liberty than was
"Pompey's keeping them in fear of him.* And yet,
"again, if the preſumption of either their diſ-
"obeying or commanding could be *mitigated by
"appearances, Cæſar, by his offering to lay down
"his arms, provided Pompey might be under the
"ſame obligation at the ſame time, made an ad-
"vancement to the Patriot, which* POMPEY *had
"not virtue enough to diſſemble.* And though
"it may have been objected, that this com-
"pliance of *Cæſar* was all but grimace, with-
"out the leaſt intention of his making it good;
"yet, as this is but an *imaginary charge*, it
"ought at leaſt to have been brought to a
"proof before *Cæſar* could be juſtly condem-
"ned upon it. But *Pompey's abſolutely, and,
"without heſitation, refuſing the propoſal, was an
"open declaration, that no peaceable terms ſhould
"prevail upon him to part with a grain of his
"power.* While *Pompey*, therefore, lies under
"this imputation, he ſtands in a leſs favourable
"light, or was, rather a more notorious offen-
"der than *Cæſar*."

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

Cæſar, *after ſettling every thing in the South of* Italy, *and taking meaſures to ſecure* Sicily *and* Sardinia, *ſets out for* Rome. *In his way, he has a conference with* Cicero, *who ſoon after retires to* Pompey's *camp. At* Rome, *he ſeizes the public treaſure; and, finding the Senate unwilling to act any part, he takes upon himſelf the public adminiſtration. After a ſtay of ſix or ſeven days, he ſets out for* Spain.

CÆSAR was very ſenſible, that, to put a ſpeedy end to the war, the beſt plan he could follow was to paſs the ſea immediately, and endeavour to come up with *Pompey* and the Conſuls in their preſent defenceleſs ſtate, before they could draw the tranſmarine forces together. But the execution of this deſign was at preſent abſolutely impracticable; for all the ſhips had been carried off the coaſt; and to gather others from *Picenum*, *Sicily*, and the coaſts of *Gaul*, was a tedious buſineſs, and in the winter ſeaſon ſubject to great uncertainty. Dreading therefore this delay and loſs of time, he determined to go to *Spain*, whither alſo a very intereſting conſideration called him. It appeared of dangerous conſequence to ſuffer a veteran army to ſtrengthen themſelves in his rival's intereſt by new levies of horſe and foot, and to prepare a ſure reſource for their General, when driven

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driven out of *Greece* and *Aſia:* And he could never have a more favourable opportunity of conquering *Spain*, and the legions there, than when *Pompey* was at ſuch a diſtance from them, and unable to give them any aſſiſtance. He reſolved therefore upon this expedition, ſaying, *he would go firſt to find an army without a General, and then return to a General without an army.* It is commonly ſuppoſed, that *Pompey* committed a capital error in not going to *Spain*, and in neglecting to put himſelf at the head of the beſt troops he had, in a country devoted to his intereſt, and commodious for the operations of his naval force; and *Cicero* is cited, as being ſo much of this opinion, that, when he firſt heard of *Pompey*'s reſolution to go to *Greece*, he called it *monſtrous.* But it is to be conſidered, that *Pompey* had at this time no fleet in readineſs; and, if he had ſailed for *Spain* directly, he would not have had influence enough in the Eaſt to have raiſed the fleets and armies, which, by his preſence there, he was enabled to collect. *Cæſar* would have been before-hand with him; and, by tranſporting a few legions into *Greece*, would have awed all the States of the Eaſt, who were moſt of them very indifferent about this quarrel: And *Pompey*, in the mean time, would have been cooped up in *Spain*, and precluded from every province of the Empire beſides *Africa.*

Middl. p. 118.

Cæſ. de Bell. Civ. Com. lib. i.

Cæſar, before he left *Brunduſium*, ſent orders to all the municipal towns upon the ſeveral coaſts to aſſemble all the veſſels they could, and

and ſend them to that port: And, knowing of what importance it was to his credit, that *Italy* ſhould be abundantly ſupplied with proviſions, which *Pompey* was determined to cut off by every poſſible method, [a] he immediately diſpatched *Valerius*, one of his Lieutenants, into *Sardinia*, with one legion; and *Curio* into *Sicily* with three; commanding him, as ſoon as he had maſtered this iſland, to paſs over into *Africa*. Then, having put his legions into winter-quarters in the towns along the coaſt, at *Brunduſium*, *Tarentum*, *Sipontum*, and other places, in ſuch a manner as to lock up all the paſſages by ſea, and having ordered levies over the whole country, he ſet out for *Rome*.

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Ad Att. ix. 15.

Ad Att. ix. 19.

In the midſt of his military operations, he had neglected no means of gaining over to his party all thoſe who were not his avowed enemies. As ſoon as he was informed that the Senators had left *Rome*, he wrote to many of them to re-

Ad Att. vii. 17.

[a] (*Ad Att.* ix. 9.) "I perceive a moſt deſtructive war ready "to break out, which *Pompey* will begin by famiſhing *Italy*; "And yet I mourn for not taking part in this war; a war! "ſo deteſtable, that, tho' there is nothing more unnatural "than not to aſſiſt our parents, yet have the leaders of it ta- "ken their meaſures for famiſhing the moſt venerable, the "moſt ſacred of all parents, I mean their country. My ap- "prehenſions are not founded upon conjecture, but upon "what I have heard from themſelves. This fleet that is "gathering from *Alexandria*, *Colchis*, *Tyre*, *Sidon*, *Aradus*, "*Cyprus*, *Pamphylia*, *Lycia*, *Rhodes*, *Chios*, *Bizantium*, *Leſbos*, "*Miletus*, *Smyrna*, and *Coos*, is deſigned to intercept the pro- "viſions of *Italy*, and to ſeize the coaſts of the corn coun- "tries."

turn,

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turn, and deſired *Trebatius* to write to *Cicero* to beg of him not to abſent himſelf from the city: And, after *Cicero* had left it, he employed all their common friends to uſe their endeavours to induce him to imitate the conduct of ſome other Conſulars, who had determined to preſerve a *neutrality*. *Cicero*, upon theſe applications, keeping at a diſtance from *Pompey*, *Cæſar* imagined they had made an impreſſion upon him; and he began to attempt another point with him, viz. *to perſuade him to come back to Rome, and aſſiſt in the Councils of the Senate*, which he deſigned to ſummon at his return from following *Pompey*. With this view, in the hurry of his march towards *Brunduſium*, *Cæſar* ſent him the following letter.

Middl. p. 90.

CÆSAR, Emperor, to CICERO, Emperor.

Ad Att. ix. 6.

"WHEN I had but juſt time to ſee our "friend *Furnius*, nor could conveniently ſpeak "with, or hear him, was in haſte, and on my "march, having ſent the legions before me; "yet I could not paſs by without writing, and "ſending him to you with my thanks: Though "I have often paid this duty before, and ſeem "likely to pay it oftener, you deſerve it ſo well "of me. I deſire of you, in a ſpecial man-"ner, that, as I hope to be in the city ſhortly, "I may ſee you there, and have the benefit of "your advice, your intereſt, your authority, "your aſſiſtance in all things. But to return

" to the point: You will pardon the haſte and " brevity of my letter, and learn the reſt from " *Furnius*." To this very polite letter *Cicero* made the following anſwer. Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

CICERO, Emperor, to CÆSAR, Emperor.

" UPON reading your letter, delivered to " me by *Furnius*, in which you preſſed me to " come to the city, I did not ſo much won- " der at what you there intimated, of your de- " ſire to uſe my *advice* and *authority*, but was at " a loſs to find out what you meant by my *in-* " *tereſt* and *aſſiſtance*: Yet I flattered myſelf into " a perſuaſion, that, out of *your admirable and* " *ſingular wiſdom*, you were deſirous to enter " into ſome meaſures for eſtabliſhing the peace " and concord of the city; and in that caſe I " looked upon my temper and character as fit " enough to be employed in ſuch a deliberation. " If the caſe be ſo, and you have any concern " for the ſafety of our friend POMPEY, and of " *reconciling him to yourſelf, and to the Republic*, " you will certainly find no man more proper " for ſuch a work than I am, who, from the " very firſt, have always been the adviſer of " peace both to him and the Senate; and, ſince " this recourſe to arms, have not meddled with " any part of the war, but *thought you to be* " *really injured by it, while your enemies and en-* " *viers were attempting to deprive you of thoſe ho-* " *nours which the Roman people had granted you.* " But as at that time I was not only a favourer

" of

Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

" of your dignity, but an encourager alſo of o-
" thers to aſſiſt you in it; ſo now the dignity of
" *Pompey* greatly affects me: For many years
" ago I made choice of you two, with whom
" to cultivate a particular friendſhip, and to be,
" as I now am, moſt ſtrictly united. Where-
" fore I deſire of you, or rather beg and im-
" plore with all my prayers, that in the hurry of
" your cares you would indulge a moment to
" this thought, how by your generoſity I may be
" permitted to ſhew myſelf an honeſt, grateful,
" pious man, in remembering an act of the
" greateſt kindneſs to me. If this related only
" to myſelf, I ſhould hope ſtill to obtain it from
" you: But it concerns, I think, both your
" honour and the Republic, that by your means
" I ſhould be allowed to continue in a ſituation
" the beſt adapted to promote the peace of you
" two, as well as the general concord of all the
" citizens. After I had ſent my thanks to you
" before on the account of *Lentulus*; for giving
" ſafety to him who had given it to me; yet,
" upon reading his letter, in which he expreſſes
" the moſt grateful ſenſe of your liberality, I
" took myſelf to have received the ſame grace
" from you, which he had done: Towards
" whom, if by this you perceive me to be
" grateful, let it be your care, I beſeech you,
" that I may be ſo too towards *Pompey*." [b]

In

[b] (*Middleton*, p. 92.) *Cicero* was cenſured for ſome paſſages of this letter, which *Cæſar* took care to make public, *viz.*

In his way to *Rome*, *Cæſar* had a conference with *Cicero*, at *Formiæ*, on the 29*th of March*; of which, Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

viz. the compliment on *Cæſar's admirable wiſdom*; and, above all, the acknowledgment *of his being injured by his adverſaries in the preſent war*: In excuſe of which he ſays: (*Ad Att.* viii. 9.) "that he was not ſorry for the publication "of it, for he himſelf had given ſeveral copies of it; and, "conſidering what had ſince happened, was pleaſed to have "it known to the world how much he had always been in-"clined to peace; and, that in urging *Cæſar* to ſave his "country, he thought it his buſineſs to uſe ſuch expreſſions "as were the moſt likely to gain authority with him, with-"out fearing to be thought guilty of flattery, in urging him "to an act for which he would gladly have thrown himſelf "even at his feet."

He received another letter on the ſame ſubject, and about the ſame time, written jointly by *Balbus* and *Oppius*, two of *Cæſar's* chief confidents: "The advice, not only of little "men, ſuch as we are, but even of the greateſt, is generally "weighed, not by the intention of the giver, but the event; "yet, relying on your humanity, we will give you what "we take to be the beſt in the caſe *about which you wrote "to us*; which, though it ſhould not be found prudent, yet "certainly flows from the utmoſt fidelity and affection to "you. If we did not know from *Cæſar* himſelf, that, as "ſoon as he comes to *Rome*, he will do what in our judg-"ment we think he ought to do, treat about a reconcilia-"tion between him and *Pompey*, we ſhould give over ex-"horting you to come and take a part in thoſe delibera-"tions; that, by your help, who have a ſtrict friendſhip "with them both, the whole affair may be ſettled with eaſe "and dignity: Or, if, on the contrary, we believed that "*Cæſar* would not do it, and knew that he was reſolved "upon a war with *Pompey*, we ſhould never try to perſuade "you to take arms againſt a man to whom you have the "greateſt obligations, in the ſame manner as we have always "intreated you, not to fight againſt *Cæſar*. But, ſince, at

"pre-

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which, the latter gives the following account to his friend *Atticus.* "My diſcourſe with him, "ſays

"preſent, we can only gueſs, rather than know what *Cæſar* "will do, we have nothing to offer but this, that it does "not ſeem agreeable to your dignity, or your fidelity, ſo "well known to all, when you are intimate with them both, "to take arms againſt either; and this we do not doubt "but *Cæſar*, according to his humanity, will highly ap- "prove: Yet, if you judge proper, we will write to him, to "let us know what he will really do about it; and, if he re- "turns us an anſwer, we will preſently ſend you notice what "we think of it, and give you our word, that we will ad- "viſe only, what we take to be moſt ſuitable to your ho- "nour, not to *Cæſar*'s views; and are perſuaded that *Cæſar*, "out of his indulgence to his friends, will be pleaſed with "it." *Ad Att.* ix. 8. This joint letter was followed by a ſe- parate one from *Balbus*: "Immediately after I had ſent the "common letter from *Oppius* and myſelf, I received one "from *Cæſar*, of which I have ſent you a copy; whence "you will perceive how deſirous he is of peace, and to be re- "reconciled with *Pompey*, and how far removed from all "thoughts of cruelty. It gives me an extreme joy, as it "certainly ought to do, to ſee him in theſe ſentiments. "As to yourſelf, your fidelity, and your piety, I am entirely "of the ſame mind, my dear *Cicero*, with you, that you "cannot, conſiſtently with your character and duty, bear "arms againſt a man, to whom you declare yourſelf ſo "greatly obliged; that *Cæſar* will approve this reſolution, "I certainly know from his ſingular humanity; and that "you will perfectly ſatisfy him, by taking no part in the "war againſt him, nor joining yourſelf to his adverſaries; "This he will think ſufficient, not only from you, a per- "ſon of ſuch dignity and ſplendor; but has allowed it even "to me, not to be found in that camp, which is likely to "be formed againſt *Lentulus* and *Pompey*, from whom I have "received the greateſt obligations: It was enough, he ſaid, "if I performed my part to him in the city and the gown, "which

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" ſays he, was ſuch as would rather make him " think well of me than thank me. I ſtood " firm in refuſing to go to *Rome*; but was de- " ceived in expecting to find him eaſy; for I " never ſaw any one leſs ſo: He was condemn- " ed, he ſaid, by my judgment; and, if I did " not come, others would be the more back- " ward: I told him that their caſe was very " different from mine. After many things ſaid " on both ſides, he bad me come, however, and " try to make peace: Shall I do it, ſays I, in

" which I might perform alſo to them, if I thought fit; " wherefore I now manage all *Lentulus*'s affairs at *Rome*, and " diſcharge my duty, my fidelity, my piety to them both: " Yet, in truth, I do not take the hopes of an accommoda- " tion, though now ſo low, to be quite deſperate, ſince *Cæſar* " is in that mind in which we ought to wiſh him: One thing " would pleaſe me, if you thought it proper, that you would " write to him, and deſire a guard from him, as you did " from *Pompey*, at the time of *Milo*'s trial, with my appro- " bation: I will undertake for him, if I rightly know *Cæ-* " *ſar*, that he will ſooner pay a regard to your dignity, than " to his own intereſt. How prudently I write theſe things, " I know not; but this I certainly know, that, whatever I " write, I write out of a ſingular love and affection to you; " for, (let me die, ſo as *Cæſar* may but live) if I have not ſo " great an eſteem for you, that few are equally dear to me. " When you have taken any reſolution in this affair, I wiſh " that you would let me know it, for I am exceedingly ſol- " licitous that you ſhould diſcharge your duty to them both, " which in truth I am confident you will diſcharge." *Dr.* " *Middleton* is of opinion, that the offer of a guard was in- " ſinuated to deprive him of the liberty of retiring: But, con- " ſidering *Cæſar*'s moſt generous behaviour, even to his ene- " mies, this ſuſpicion ſeems to be intirely groundleſs.

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" my own way? Do you imagine, replied he, " that I will preſcribe to you? I will move the " Senate then, ſays I, for a decree againſt your " going to *Spain*, or tranſporting your troops into " *Greece*, and ſay a great deal beſides in bewail- " ing the caſe of *Pompey*: I will not allow, re- " plied he, ſuch things to be ſaid: So I thought, " ſays I, and for that reaſon will not come; be- " cauſe I muſt either ſay them, and many more, " which I cannot help ſaying, if I am there, or " not come at all. The reſult was, that, to " ſhift off the diſcourſe, he wiſhed me to conſi- " der of it; which I could not refuſe to do, and " ſo we parted. I am perſuaded, that he is not " pleaſed with me; but I am pleaſed with my- " ſelf; which I have not been before of a long " time. As for the reſt; good Gods, what a " crew he has with him! What a helliſh band, " as you call them! [c] —— What a deplorable " affair! What deſperate troops! What a la- " mentable thing, to ſee *Servius*'s ſon, and *Ti- " tinius*'s, with many more of their rank in that " camp, which beſieged *Pompey!* He has ſix le- " gions; wakes at all hours; fears nothing; I ſee no end of this calamity. His declaration at

[c] " There was a time [ſays *Gibber*, p. 192.] when theſe " followers of *Cæſar* were all heroes with *Cicero*, they being " ſtill the ſame ragamuffins that had done glorious buſineſs " abroad for the Republic under the ſame command of *Cæ- " ſar*, and did as effectually (valiant raſcals as they were) as " if they had been all Saints or Patriots." Has not the il- luſtrious Conſul, who ſaved *Rome*, condeſcended to ſing their exploits in Greek verſe?

" the laſt, which I had almoſt forgot, was odious; Y.R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.
" that, if he was not permitted to uſe my advice,
" he would uſe ſuch as he could get from others,
" and purſue all meaſures that were for his ſer-
" vice."

Cicero fancied to himſelf, that *Cæſar* deemed his preſence in the city as of the greateſt importance to his cauſe, and meant to get a deciſion from him, that, in the abſence of the Conſuls, the Aſſembly for the elections of the new Magiſtrates might be held by a Prætor: But *Cæſar*, it is probable, did not think his preſence of ſo much uſe, and certainly never intended to force him into a compliance, but to win him by addreſs, and the counſels of his friends.

While *Cæſar* was on the road to *Rome*, young *Quintus Cicero*, the nephew, a fiery, giddy youth, privately wrote to him to offer his ſervice, with a promiſe of ſome information concerning his uncle; upon which, being ſent for, and admitted to an audience, he aſſured *Cæſar*, *that his uncle was utterly diſaffected to all his meaſures, and determined to leave Italy and go to* POMPEY. The boy was tempted to this raſhneſs *by the hopes of a conſiderable preſent*, and gave much uneaſineſs by it both to the father and the uncle, who had reaſon to fear ſome ill conſequence from it: But *Cæſar*, deſirous to divert *Cicero* from declaring againſt him, and to quiet the apprehenſions which he might entertain for what was paſt, took occaſion to ſignify to him, in a kind letter from *Rome*, that he retained *no reſentment of his refuſal to come*

Middl. p. 97. Ad Att. x. 4, 5, 7.

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to the city, though Volcatius Tullus and Servius Sulpicius [two Conſular Senators] *had complained that he had not ſhewn the ſame indulgence to them.* And *Curio* told him a few days after, that, when *Dolabella* was earneſtly ſollicitous that he ſhould come to *Rome*, *Cæſar*, in an anſwer, returned him many thanks, and told him, that he was not only ſatisfied, but pleaſed at his not coming. He aſſured him alſo that *Cæſar* would have made no difficulty in granting him the favour he had granted to *Philippus*, that of remaining neuter: That he might act as if the thing was agreed on with *Cæſar* himſelf; and that he would write to him, that matters were ſo ſettled between them: He added, that, if he pleaſed, he might leave *Italy*, and paſs through *Sicily* to go into *Greece*. Yet *Cicero*'s behaviour and reſidence in thoſe villa's of his, which were neareſt to the ſea, gave riſe to a general report, that he was waiting only for a wind to carry him over to *Pompey*; upon which, *Cæſar* ſent him another preſſing letter to try, if poſſible, to diſſuade him from that ſtep.

CÆSAR, Emperor, to CICERO, Emperor.

Ad Att. x. 8.

"THOUGH I never imagined that you "would do any thing raſhly or imprudently; yet, "moved by common report, I thought proper "to write to you, and beg of you, by our mutual "affection, that you would not run to a declining "cauſe, whither you did not think fit to go while "it ſtood firm. For you will do the greateſt in-

"jury

" jury to our friendſhip, and conſult but ill for " yourſelf, if you do not follow where fortune " calls: For all things ſeem to have ſucceeded " moſt proſperouſly for us, moſt unfortunately " for them: Nor will you be thought to have " followed the cauſe (ſince that was the ſame, " when you choſe to withdraw yourſelf from their " Councils) but to have condemned ſome act of " mine; than which you could do nothing that " could affect me more ſenſibly, and what I beg, " by the rights of our friendſhip, that you " would not do. Laſtly, what is more agree- " able to the character of an honeſt, quiet man, " and good citizen, than to retire from civil " broils? from which ſome, who would gladly " have done it, have been deterred by an ap- " prehenſion of danger: But you, after a full " teſtimony of my life, and trial of my friend- " ſhip, will find nothing more ſafe or reputable, " than to keep yourſelf clear from all this con- " tention. The 16*th* of *April*, on the road." Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

Antony, alſo, whom *Cæſar* left to guard *Italy* in his abſence, wrote to him to the ſame purpoſe, and on the ſame day.

ANTONIUS, Tribune of the People and Proprætor, to CICERO, Emperor.

" IF I had not a great eſteem for you, and " much greater indeed than you imagine, I " ſhould not be concerned at the report which Ad Att. x. 8.

Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

" is ſpread of you, eſpecially when I take it to
" be falſe. But, out of the exceſs of my affec-
" tion, I cannot diſſemble, that even a report,
" though falſe, makes ſome impreſſion on me.
" I cannot believe that you are preparing to croſs
" the ſea, when you have ſuch a value for *Do-*
" *labella*, and your daughter *Tullia*, that excel-
" lent woman, and are ſo much valued by us
" all, to whom, in truth, your dignity and ho-
" nour are almoſt dearer than to yourſelf: Yet
" I did not think it the part of a friend not to
" be moved by the diſcourſe even of ill-deſign-
" ing men, and wrote this with the greater in-
" clination, as I take my part to be the more
" difficult on the account of our late coldneſs,
" occaſioned rather by my jealouſy than any in-
" jury from you. For I deſire you to aſſure
" yourſelf, that nobody is dearer to me than
" you, excepting my *Cæſar*, and that I know al-
" ſo that *Cæſar* reckons *M. Cicero* in the firſt
" claſs of his friends. Wherefore, I beg of you,
" my *Cicero*, that you will keep yourſelf free
" and undetermined, and deſpiſe the fidelity of
" that man who firſt did you an injury, that he
" might afterwards do you a kindneſs; nor
" fly from him, who, though he ſhould not love
" you, which is impoſſible, yet will always de-
" ſire to ſee you in ſafety and ſplendor. I have
" ſent *Calpurnius* to you with this, the moſt in-
" timate of my friends, that you might per-
" ceive the great concern which I have for your
" life and dignity."

Cælius

Cælius alſo wrote to him on the ſame ſubject; but finding, by ſome hints in *Cicero*'s anſwer, that he was actually preparing to run away to *Pompey*, he ſent him a ſecond letter, in a moſt pathetic, or, as *Cicero* calls it, *lamentable ſtrain*, in hopes to work upon him by alarming all his fears. Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ. Ad Att. x. 9.

COELIUS to CICERO.

"BEING in a conſternation at your letter, by which you ſhew that you are meditating nothing but what is diſmal, yet neither tell me directly what it is, nor wholly hide it from me, I preſently wrote this to you. By all your fortunes, *Cicero*, by your children, I beg and beſeech you not to take any ſtep injurious to your ſafety: For I call the gods and men and our friendſhip to witneſs, that what I have told, and forewarned you of, was not any vain conceit of my own, but after I had talked with *Cæſar*, and underſtood from him, how he reſolved to act after his victory, I informed you of what I had learned. If you imagine that his conduct will be always the ſame, in diſmiſſing his enemies and offering conditions, you are miſtaken: He thinks and even talks of nothing but what is fierce and ſevere [d], and is gone away much out of hu- Ep. Fam. viii. 16.

[d] It is evident that *Cælius* writes thus to frighten *Cicero*, whom he knew to be a coward. *Curio* told him alſo, in his way to *Sicily*, that *Cæſar*'s clemency flowed not from his natural diſpoſition, but becauſe he thought it popular; and that, if he once loſt the affections of the people, he would be cruel. *Ad Att.* x. 4.

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" mour with the Senate, and thoroughly pro-
" voked with the oppoſition which he has met
" with, nor will there be any room for mercy.
" Wherefore, if you yourſelf, your only ſon,
" your houſe, your remaining hopes be dear to
" you; if I, if the worthy man your ſon-in-law,
" have any weight with you; you ſhould not de-
" ſire to overturn our fortunes, and force us to
" hate or to relinquiſh that cauſe in which our
" ſafety conſiſts, or to entertain an impious wiſh
" againſt yours. Laſtly, reflect on this, that
" you have already given all the offence which
" you can give by ſtaying ſo long behind; and
" now to declare againſt a Conqueror, whom
" you would not offend, while his cauſe was
" doubtful, and to fly after thoſe who run away,
" with whom you would not join while they
" were in a condition to reſiſt, is the utmoſt
" folly. Take care that, while you are aſhamed
" not to approve yourſelf one of the beſt citi-
" zens, you be not too haſty in determining
" what is the beſt. But, if I cannot wholly pre-
" vail with you, yet wait at leaſt till you know
" how we ſucceed in *Spain*, which, I now tell
" you, will be ours as ſoon as *Cæſar* comes
" thither. What hopes they may have when
" *Spain* is loſt, I know not; and what your view
" can be in acceding to a deſperate cauſe, by
" my faith, I cannot find out. As to the thing,
" which you diſcover to me by your ſilence
" about it, *Cæſar* has been informed of it; and,
" after the firſt ſalutation, told me preſently
" what

" what he had heard of you: I denied that I " knew any thing of the matter, but begged " of him to write to you in a manner the moſt " effectual to make you ſtay. He carries me with " him into *Spain*; if he did not, I would run " away to you, wherever you are, before I " came to *Rome*, to diſpute this point with you " in perſon, and hold you faſt even by force. " Conſider, *Cicero*, again and again, that you " do not utterly ruin both you and yours; that " you do not knowingly and wilfully throw " yourſelf into difficulties, whence you ſee no " way to extricate yourſelf. But, if either the " reproaches of the better ſort touch you, or you " cannot bear the inſolence and haughtineſs of " a certain ſet of men, I would adviſe you to " chuſe ſome place remote from the war, till " theſe conteſts be over, which will ſoon be de- " cided: If you do this, I ſhall think that you " have done wiſely, and you will not offend " *Cæſar* [e]."

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[e] The concluſion, the partial concluſion of Dr. *Middleton*, p. 106, from theſe letters, is as follows: " Theſe letters give " us the moſt ſenſible proof of the high eſteem and credit in " which *Cicero* flouriſhed at this time in *Rome*: When in a " conteſt for empire, which force alone was to decide, we ſee " the Chiefs on both ſides ſo ſollicitous to gain a man to their " party, who had no peculiar ſkill in arms, or talents for war: " But his name and authority was the acquiſition which they " ſought; ſince, whatever was the fate of their arms, the " world, they knew, would judge better of the cauſe which " *Cicero* eſpouſed. The ſame letters will confute, likewiſe, " in a great meaſure, the common opinion of his want of " reſolution

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The ſubſtance of his anſwers to theſe letters from *Cæſar*, *Antony*, and others, is contained in

" reſolution in all caſes of difficulty, ſince no man could ſhew " a greater than he did on the preſent occaſion, when, " againſt the importunities of his friends, and all the in- " vitations of a ſucceſsful power, he choſe to follow the " cauſe which he thought the beſt, though he knew it to be " the weakeſt."

The ſame elegant panegyriſt of *Cicero* has laid open, in the following manner, the motives of his conduct at this time. P. 109, 110, 113. " From the time of his leaving the city, " together with *Pompey* and the Senate, there paſſed not a ſin- " gle day in which he did not write one or more letters to " *Atticus*, the only friend whom he truſted with the ſecret " of his thoughts. From theſe letters it appears, that the " ſum of *Atticus*'s advice to him agreed intirely with his own " ſentiments, that, if *Pompey remained* in *Italy, he ought to* " *join with him*; *if not, ſhould ſtay behind, and expect what* " *freſh accidents might produce.* This was what *Cicero* had " hitherto followed; and as to his future conduct, *though he* " *ſeems ſometimes to be a little wavering and irreſolute*, yet the " reſult of his deliberations conſtantly turned in favour of " *Pompey.* His perſonal affection for the man, preference of " his cauſe, the reproaches of the better ſort, who began to " cenſure his tardineſs, and, above all, his gratitude for " favours received, which had ever the greateſt weight with " him, made him reſolve at all adventures to run after him; " and though he was diſpleaſed with his management of the " war, and *without any hopes of his ſucceſs*; though he knew " him before to be no politician, and now perceived him, he " ſays, to be no General; yet, with all his faults, he could " not endure the thoughts of deſerting him, nor hardly for- " give himſelf for ſtaying ſo long behind him.——What " held him ſtill a while longer was the tears of his family, " and the remonſtrances of his daughter *Tullia*, who in- " treated him to wait only the iſſue of the *Spaniſh* war, and " urged it as the advice of *Atticus*.——Purſuing at laſt the

" reſult

in the following letter to *Cælius*, which is written with particular care. Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

CICERO

" reſult of all his deliberations, and preferring the conſi-
" deration of *duty* to that of his ſafety, he imbarked to fol-
" low *Pompey* on the *eleventh of June.*"

Mr. *Melmoth* has given a quite different, and, I think, a truer account of *Cicero*'s motives. He thinks that his conduct, during this important criſis, evidently ſhews the ſtrength and meaſure of his patriotiſm: " Upon the news that *Cæ-*
" *ſar* was marching into *Italy*, *Pompey* was appointed General
" in chief of the *republican* forces: And the principal Ma-
" giſtrates, together with thoſe who were inveſted with pro-
" conſular power, were diſtributed into different cantons in
" *Italy*, in order to raiſe troops for the defence of the com-
" mon cauſe. *Cicero* had his particular diſtrict aſſigned him
" among the reſt: But, inſtead of executing this important
" commiſſion with ſpirit and vigour, he remained altogether
" inactive at his ſeveral villa's in that part of *Italy*. And this
" he ſignified to *Cæſar*, by means of their common friend
" *Trebatius*; who had written to him in *Cæſar*'s name, in or-
" der to prevail with him to return to *Rome*: *I anſwered* Tre-
" batius *that what he required of me was impracticable at this*
" *juncture; But that I lived in my own farms, and did not*
" *concern myſelf in the new levies of troops, or any public buſi-*
" *neſs. Ad Att.* vii. 37. *Pompey*, in the mean time [a month
" after] was preſſing *Cicero* to join him: But he excuſed him-
" ſelf by repreſenting, that, while he was actually on the
" road for that purpoſe, he was informed that he could not
" proceed without the danger of being intercepted by *Cæſar*'s
" troops. *Epiſt.* 2. *Cic. ad Pomp. apud Epiſt. ad Att.* viii. *Ci-*
" *cero*, however, is ſo ingenuous as to acknowledge in the
" ſame letter to *Pompey*, that, ſo long as there were hopes
" that the negociations for a peace would be attended with
" ſucceſs, he thought it a juſtifiable piece of prudence not
" to be too active in forwarding the preparations that were
" carrying on againſt *Cæſar*, *remembering*, he ſays, *how much*
" *he had formerly ſuffered from the reſentment of the latter in*
" *the*

Cic. Lett. b. vii. 17.

CICERO to MARCUS COELIUS.

Y.R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

Ep. Fam. ii. 16. Melm. vii. 14.

"I SHOULD have been extremely affected by your letter, if reaſon had not baniſhed from

"*the affair of his exile.* This was explaining at once the "true principle of his whole conduct: And he avows it more "expreſsly in a letter to *Atticus: Then, ſay you, why did not "you go beyond ſeas with Pompey? I tell you it was out of my "power to do it: And I refer you to the days and dates of our "letters. At the ſame time I will frankly confeſs what I might "have eaſily conceived; I was, perhaps, in the wrong in lay-"ing too great a ſtreſs upon a certain circumſtance, in which I "was deceived. I have flattered myſelf with the hopes of an "accommodation: Should that happen, I was unwilling to have "*Cæsar for my enemy, when he was reconciled with* Pom-"*pey. I was ſenſible that they were ſtill the ſame men: And* "*it was this that occaſioned my indeciſion.* Ad Att. x. 8. *Pom-*"*pey*, however, had no ſooner ſet ſail for *Greece*, than *Ci-*"*cero* was ſtruck with the conſciouſneſs of his having acted "an unworthy part: *Hitherto I was vexed and uneaſy, be-*"*cauſe unable to come to any reſolution. But, now that* Pom-"*pey and the Conſuls have left* Italy, *it is no longer vexation* "*and grief, it is anguiſh and diſtraction.*——*I am not, believe* "*me, in my ſenſes, ſo overwhelmed am I with the infamy, I* "*think, I have incurred. Ad Att.* ix. 6. After ſeveral de-"liberations, therefore, he was determined, he tells *Atticus*, "to follow *Pompey*, without waiting for the event of *Cæſar*'s "arms in *Spain. Ad Att.* ix. 19. x. 8. This reſolution, "nevertheleſs, ſoon gave way to a ſecond: For, having re-"ceived ſome accounts which contradicted a former report "that had been ſpread concerning the advantageous poſture "of *Pompey*'s affairs, *Cicero* renounced his intention of join-"ing him, and now purpoſed to ſtand neuter. *Ad Att.* x. "9. But a new turn in favour of *Pompey* ſeems to have brought "*Cicero* back to his former ſcheme. For, in a ſubſequent letter

" from my heart all its diſquietudes, and deſpair " of ſeeing better days had not long ſince har- " dened it againſt every new impreſſion of grief; " yet, ſtrong as I muſt acknowledge my deſpon- " dency to be, I am not ſenſible, however, that " I ſaid

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" letter to *Atticus*, wherein he mentions ſome reaſons to be- " lieve that *Pompey*'s affairs went well in *Spain*, and takes " notice, likewiſe, of ſome diſguſt, which the populace ex- " preſſed towards *Cæſar* in the theatre; we find him reſuming " his deſign of openly uniting with *Pompey*. And, accord- " ingly, he reſolved to join thoſe who were maintaining *Pom- " pey*'s cauſe in *Sicily*. *Ad Att.* x. 12. It does not appear, " by any of his letters, upon what motive he afterwards " exchanged his plan, for that of ſailing directly to *Pompey*'s " camp in *Greece:* Which, after various debates with him- " ſelf, he, at length, executed. There is a paſſage, how- " ever, in *Cæſar*'s Commentaries, which perhaps will render " it probable, that the news which, about this time, was con- " fidently ſpread at *Rome*, that *Cæſar*'s army had been almoſt " totally defeated in *Spain*, was the determining reaſon that " ſent *Cicero* to *Pompey*. The fact was, that *Afranius* and *Pe- " treius* had gained ſome advantages over *Cæſar:* But, as " they magnified them in their letters to *Rome*, much be- " yond the truth; ſeveral perſons of note, who had hitherto " been fluctuating in their reſolutions, thought it was high " time to declare themſelves, and went off immediately to " *Pompey*." *De Bell. Civ.* i. 55. *Cicero* very well knew from the beginning, which was the moſt honourable part for a man of his political principles to act under his connections with the Chiefs of the ariſtocracy, and his formal engagements to *Pompey*; but the prudential part was not ſo clear a point. He dreaded *Cæſar*'s reſentment, but he was ſtill more afraid of the reſentment of *Pompey:* " I find I am " either way in danger; from the one party by not doing my " duty, and from the other by doing it; and ſo diſtracted are " public affairs, that I can ſteer no courſe but what is full " of perils."

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"I ſaid any thing in my laſt, which could juſtly "raiſe the ſuſpicion you have conceived. What "more did my letter contain than general ex-"preſſions of diſſatisfaction at the ſad proſpect of "our affairs? A proſpect, which cannot, ſurely, "ſuggeſt to your own mind leſs gloomy appre-"henſions than it preſents to mine. For I am "too well perſuaded of the force of your pene-"tration to imagine that my judgment can diſ-"cover conſequences which lie concealed from "yours. But I am ſurpriſed that you, who "ought to know me perfectly well, ſhould be-"lieve me capable of acting with ſo little policy "as to abandon a riſing fortune, for one in its "decline, at leaſt, if not utterly fallen; or ſo va-"riable, as not only to deſtroy at once all the in-"tereſt I have eſtabliſhed with *Cæſar*, but to de-"viate even from myſelf, by engaging at laſt in "a civil war, which it has hitherto been my de-"termined maxim to avoid. Where then did "you diſcover thoſe unhappy reſolutions you im-"pute to me? Perhaps you collected them from "what I ſaid of ſecluding myſelf in ſome ſe-"queſtered ſolitude. And indeed you are ſenſi-"ble how ill I can ſubmit, I do not ſay to en-"dure, but even to be a witneſs of the inſolencies "of the ſucceſsful party: A ſentiment, my friend, "which once, I am ſure, was yours no leſs than "mine. But in vain would I retire, whilſt I pre-"ſerve the title with which I am at preſent diſ-"tinguiſhed, [of *Imperator*] and bear about this "embarraſſing parade of Lictors. Were I eaſed

"of

" of this troubleſome honour, there is no part of " *Italy* ſo obſcure, in which I ſhould not be well " contented to hide myſelf. Yet theſe, my lau- " rels, unwelcome as they are to myſelf, are the " object both of the envy and the raillery of my " malevolent enemies. [f] Nevertheleſs, under all " theſe temptations of withdrawing from ſo diſ- " guſting a ſcene, I never once entertained a " thought of leaving *Italy* without the previous " approbation of yourſelf and ſome others. But " you know the ſituation of my ſeveral villa's: " And as it is among theſe that I am obliged " to divide my time, that I may not incommode " my friends; the preference I give to thoſe which " ſtand on the ſea-coaſt has raiſed a ſuſpicion that " I am meditating a flight into *Greece*. If peace, " indeed, were to be found in that country, I " ſhould not perhaps be unwilling to undertake " the voyage: But to enter upon it, in order to " engage in a war, would be altogether incon- " ſiſtent, ſurely, with my principles and charac- " ter; eſpecially, as it would be taking up arms " not only againſt a man who I hope is perfect- " ly well ſatisfied with my conduct, but in favour

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[f] *Cicero*, undoubtedly, gave upon this occaſion but too much colour to the cenſure of his enemies: For it could not but have a very ſtrange appearance, that he ſhould preſerve the thoughts of a triumph, at a time when his country was bleeding with a civil war. But, as he was extremely ambitious of this honour, he was greatly unwilling to renounce it; ſtill flattering himſelf, perhaps, that ſome accommodation between *Cæſar* and *Pompey* would afford him an opportunity of enjoying what he ſo ſtrongly deſired. *Melmoth.*

" of

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" of one whom it is now impoſſible I ſhould ever " render ſo. In a word, as I made no ſecret to " you when you met me at my *Cuman* villa, of " the converſation which had paſſed between *Am-* " *pius* and myſelf, you could not be at a loſs to " gueſs my ſentiments upon this head: And in- " deed you plainly ſaw how utterly averſe I was " to the ſcheme of *Pompey*'s deſerting *Rome*. Did " I not then affirm, that there was nothing I " would not ſuffer, rather than be reduced to " follow the civil war beyond the limits of *Ita-* " *ly*? And has any event ſince happened, that " could give me juſt reaſon of changing my ſen- " timents? On the contrary, has not every cir- " cumſtance concurred to fix me in them. [z]

" Be aſſured, (and I am well perſuaded 'tis " what you already believe) that the ſingle aim " of my actions, in theſe our public calamities, " has been to convince the world, that my great " and earneſt deſire was to preſerve the peace of " our country; and, when this would no longer

[z] Notwithſtanding *Cicero*'s ſtrong aſſertions, that he had no thoughts of joining *Pompey*, he had actually determined to do ſo a few days before he received the preceding letter from *Cœlius*; as appears by an epiſtle to *Atticus*, wherein he expreſsly tells him, *that he was only waiting for a fair wind.* But, before he wrote the preſent letter, he had received ſome news not altogether favourable to *Pompey*'s party: In conſequence of which, he renounced his former deſign, and was now determined, (though he does not think proper to own it in this letter) to retire to *Malta*, as a neutral iſland. This reſolution, however, he ſoon afterwards rejected, and reſumed his firſt intentions of following *Pompey* into *Greece*. And this ſcheme he at length executed. *Ad Att.* x. 8, 9.

" be

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"be hoped, that there was nothing I wiſhed "more, than to avoid taking any part in the ci- "vil war. And I ſhall never, I truſt, have rea- "ſon to repent of firmly perſevering in theſe ſen- "timents. It was the frequent boaſt, I remem- "ber, of my friend *Hortenſius*, that he had ne- "ver taken up arms in any of our civil diſſen- "ſions. But I may glory in the ſame honeſt "neutrality, with a much better grace: As that "of *Hortenſius* was ſuſpected *to have ariſen from* "*the timidity of his temper*; *whereas mine*, I think, "*cannot be imputed to any motive of that unwor-* "*thy kind.* [*Cicero* ſeems to have been ſenſible that *Cælius* intended to frighten him into a neu- trality] "Nor am I in the leaſt terrified by thoſe "conſiderations, with which you ſo faithfully and "affectionately endeavour to alarm my fears. "The truth of it is, there is no calamity ſo ſe- "vere, to which we are not all of us, it ſhould "ſeem, in this univerſal anarchy and confuſion, "equally and unavoidably expoſed. But if I "could have averted this dreadful ſtorm from "the Republic, at the expence of my own pri- "vate and domeſtic enjoyments, even of thoſe, "my friend, which you ſo emphatically recom- "mend to my care, I ſhould moſt willingly "have made the ſacrifice. As to my ſon, (who "I rejoice to find has a ſhare in your concern) I "ſhall leave him a ſufficient patrimony in that "honour with which my name will be remem- "bered, ſo long as the Republic ſhall ſubſiſt: "And, if it be deſtroyed, I ſhall have the con-

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"ſolation at leaſt to reflect, that he will ſuffer no-
"thing more than muſt be the common lot of
"every *Roman*. With regard to that dear and
"excellent young man, my ſon-in-law, whoſe
"welfare you intreat me to conſider; can you
"once doubt, knowing, as you perfectly do, the
"tenderneſs I bear, not only for him, but for
"*Tullia*, that I am infinitely anxious upon his
"account? I am the more ſo indeed, as it was
"my ſingle conſolation amidſt theſe general diſ-
"tractions, that they might poſſibly prove a
"means of protecting him from thoſe inconve-
"niencies in which his too generous ſpirit had
"involved him. [h] How much he ſuffered from
"them during the time he continued in *Rome*, as
"well as how little that circumſtance was to
"my credit, are points which I chooſe to leave
"to your own inquiry.

"Affairs in *Spain*, I doubt not, will termi-
"nate in the manner you mention. But I nei-
"ther wait the event of them in order to deter-

[h] It ſhould ſeem, by this paſſage, that *Dolabella*, who had contracted very conſiderable debts, was at this time under ſome difficulties from his creditors: From whom *Cicero* flattered himſelf that *Cæſar*'s power would have protected him. Some commentators, however, inſtead of *liberalitate*, adopted in this tranſlation, read *libertate*; And ſuppoſe that *Cicero* alludes to the proſecution in which *Dolabella* had been engaged againſt *Appius*. But, whichever be the true word, the ſentiment is obſervable. For, ſurely, it was utterly unworthy of *Cicero* to find the leaſt conſolation amidſt the calamities of his country, in the hope that they might prove a ſcreen to *Dolabella*, either from the juſtice of his creditors, or the malice of his enemies. *Melmoth.*

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" mine my conduct, nor am I acting in any other " reſpect with the leaſt artifice. If the Republic " ſhould be preſerved, I ſhall certainly hold my " rank in it: But, if it ſhould be ſubverted, you " yourſelf, I dare ſay, will join me in my inten- " ded ſolitude. But this latter ſuppoſition is, " perhaps, the vain and groundleſs ſurmiſe of " a diſturbed imagination; and affairs, after " all, may take a happier turn than I am apt to " preſage. I remember the deſpondency which " prevailed in my earlieſt days amongſt our pa- " triots of more advanced years[i]: Poſſibly my " preſent apprehenſions may be of the ſame caſt, " and no other than the effect of a common " weakneſs incident to old age. Heaven grant " they may prove ſo! And yet you have heard, " I ſuppoſe, that a robe of magiſtracy is in the " looms for *Oppius*; and that *Curtius* has hopes " of being inveſted with the double-dyed pur- " ple: But the principal workman, it ſeems, " ſomewhat delays him. I throw in this little " pleaſantry, to let you ſee I can ſmile in the " midſt of my indignation.

[i] The contrary of this was the truth: For *Cicero* was at this time determined to wait the event of *Cæſar*'s expedition againſt the Lieutenants of *Pompey* in *Spain*. And for this purpoſe he had thoughts of retiring to *Malta*: *Melitum, opinor, capeſſamus* (ſays he to *Atticus*) *dum quid in Hiſpania.* Ad Att. x. 9. Melm.

[j] This alludes to the contentions between *Sylla* and *Marius*: Which, notwithſtanding the probability of their terminating in the total ſubverſion of the Conſtitution, the Republic, however, ſurvived. *Melm.*

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"Let me adviſe you to enter into the affair "which I formerly mentioned concerning *Do-* "*labella*, with the ſame warmth as if it were "your own. I have only to add, that you may "depend upon it I ſhall take no haſty or incon- "ſiderate meaſures. But, to whatever part of "the world I may direct my courſe, I intreat "you to protect both me and mine, agreeably "to your honour and to our mutual friend- "ſhip. Farewell."

Cicero tarried about two months in *Italy*, after *Cæſar*'s departure, under continual perplexities, whether to ſtay or to go; to wait the iſſue of the *Spaniſh* war, or to depart before it; whether to ſail to *Sicily* firſt, or to *Malta*, or to *Pompey*'s camp. He reſolved, at laſt, to croſs the ſea to *Pompey*: yet, knowing all his motions to be narrowly watched, took pains to conceal his intention, eſpecially from *Antony*, who reſided at this time in his neighbourhood, and kept a ſtrict eye upon him. He ſent him word, therefore, by letter, *that he had no deſign againſt Cæſar; that he remembered his friendſhip, and his ſon-in-law Dolabella; that, if he had other thoughts, he could eaſily have been with* POMPEY; *that his chief reaſon for retiring was to avoid the uneaſineſs of appearing in public with the formality of his lictors.* But *Antony* (who ſaw through his fineſſe) wrote him a ſurly anſwer; which *Cicero* calls a *Laconic mandate*, and ſent a copy of it to *Atticus*, *to let him ſee*, he ſays, *how tyrannically it was drawn.*

Middl. p. 305.

Ad Att. x. 10.

"How

——— "How ſincere is your way of act- Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.
"ing? for he, who has a mind to ſtand neu-
"ter, ſtays at home; he, who goes abroad,
"ſeems to paſs a judgment on the one ſide or
"the other. But it does not belong to me to
"determine, whether a man may go abroad
"or not. *Cæſar* has impoſed this taſk upon me,
"not to ſuffer any man to go out of *Italy*.
"Wherefore it ſignifies nothing to me to ap-
"prove your reſolution, if I have no power to
"indulge you in it. I would have you write to
"*Cæſar*, and aſk that favour of him: I do not
"doubt but you will obtain it, eſpecially ſince
"you promiſe to retain a regard for our friend-
"ſhip."

Antony, after this letter, he tells us, never came to ſee him, but ſent an excuſe, *that he was aſhamed to do it, becauſe he took him to be angry with him*, giving him to underſtand, at the ſame time, by *Trebatius*, *that he had ſpecial orders to obſerve his motions*[k]. In theſe circumſtances, while Ad Att. x. 12. 15.

[k] *Cicero*, in his letters to *Atticus*, vents his ſpleen againſt *Antony*: He thus deſcribes his uſual equipage in travelling about *Italy*: "He carries with him in an open chaiſe the "famed actreſs *Cytheris*; his wife follows in a ſecond, with "ſeven other cloſe litters full of his whores and boys. See "by what baſe hands we fall; and doubt, if you can, whe-"ther *Cæſar*, let him come vanquiſhed or victorious, will "not make cruel work among us at his return." Among *Antony*'s other extravagances, he had the inſolence to appear ſometimes in public, *with his miſtreſs Cytheris, in a chariot drawn by lions*. But *Cicero* tells his friend that, *though the beaſts were fierce, the Maſter himſelf was very tame*. *Pliny* gravely reflects

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he was preparing all things for his voyage, and waiting only for a fair wind, he removed from his *Cuman* to his *Pompeian* villa beyond *Naples*, which, not being ſo commodious for an embarkment, would help to leſſen the ſuſpicion of his intended flight[1]. He at laſt ſtole away on

reflects on this frolic, and ſpeaks of it *as a deſigned inſult on the Roman people, as if, by the emblem of lions, Antony intended to give them to underſtand, that the fierceſt ſpirits of them would be forced to ſubmit to the yoke.* *Plutarch* alſo mentions it, but both of them place it *after the battle* of *Pharſalia*, though it is evident, from *Cicero*'s letters, that it happened long before. *Ad Att.* x. 10. 13. *Middl.* p. 107.

[1] *Cicero*, ad Att. x. 12, writes: "I often propoſe to myſelf "the example of *Cælius Caldus*," [a conſular man of the *Marian* faction, who raiſed troops for *Marius*, when at war with *Sylla*, and was killed in the attempt to ſupport him] "Could I find an occaſion of imitating him, I would not let "it ſlip.——I perceive the legions, which *Cæſar* raiſed in "*Italy*, are very ill-affected to him: But he has not a greater "foe than he is to himſelf. You rightly fear his abandoning "himſelf to all exceſſes, which he certainly will, if he grows "deſperate. This is the reaſon why I ought to attempt "ſomething *in the ſpirit of a Cælius*, but, I hope, with better "ſucceſs." And, in *Ep.* 15, he ſays: "The opportunity "for executing my project of imitating *Cælius* ripens every "day: If a ſtandard was erected, numbers would flock to it." Now, while he was at his *Pompeian* villa, his friend *Ninnius* brought him a meſſage from the Officers of the three cohorts, which were in garriſon at *Pompeii*, to beg leave to wait upon him the day following, in order to deliver their troops and the town into his hands; but, inſtead of liſtening to the overture, he ſlipped away the next morning before day, to avoid ſeeing them. "I reflected, ſays he, on the fate of *Cælius*." *Ep.* 16. "I do not blame, ſays Abbé *Mongault*, his circum-"ſpection; but why does he boaſt ſo much of his proweſs?"

the

the *eleventh of June* [m], with his *ſon*, his *brother*, and nephew, and arrived ſafely at *Dyrrachium* [n]. Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

To make ſome amends for his paſt behaviour, and gain the greater authority with his party, he furniſhed *Pompey, who was in great want of money, with a large ſum out of his own ſtock, for* Ad Att. xi. 3, 13.

[m] According to *Uſher*'s computation on the *firſt* of *April*, or thereabout, of the *Julian* year. Now, if *Cicero* ſet out ſo early in the year, it is not poſſible that he ſhould have heard any thing of the affairs of *Spain*, as he certainly did; for it was about harveſt-time, when *Cæſar* forced *Pompey*'s Lieutenants to capitulate; and he reduced them to this extremity in forty days, ſo that he had ſcarce got into *Spain* by the month of *April* of the *Julian* year. According to our calculation, he ſailed about the 15*th* of *May*. In a letter dated the 16*th* of *May* of the *Roman* ſtyle, *ad Att.* x. 17, he writes: *Nunc quidem æquinoctium nos moratur, quod valde perturbatum erat.* Abbé *Mongault* and Mr. *Guthrie*, deceived by our learned Primate, have tranſlated theſe lines in this ſenſe: *I wait for the equinox, the ſeaſon of which is now in great confuſion.* But it is plain that the *equinox* was paſſed; *quod perturbatum erat: The equinox, which has been very tempeſtuous, ſtops me.* In the next letter, dated the 19*th* of *May*, he ſays he is detained by the dead calms more than by the guards that watch him: *Me mirifice tranquillitates adhuc tenuerunt.* This deſcription of ſtorms and ſubſequent calms agrees very well with the month of *April*, in which, according to our computation, theſe letters were written, one on the 22*d*, the other on the 25*th*.

[n] We have no account of the manner and circumſtances of his voyage, or by what courſe he ſteered towards *Dyrrachium*: For, after his leaving *Italy*, all his correſpondence with it was in a great meaſure cut off, ſo that, from *June*, in which he ſailed, we find an intermiſſion of about nine months in the ſeries of his letters, and not more than *four* of them written to *Atticus* during the continuance of the war. *Ad Att.* xi. 1, 2, 3, 4. Middl. p. 114.

Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

the public ſervice. But he met with nothing but diſguſt: He was reproached by ſome for coming ſo late; and *Cato* blamed him for coming to them at all, and deſerting that neutral poſt, which might have given him the better opportunity of bringing about an accommodation. *Pompey* gave him no employment; and his counſels were ſlighted as timorous and cowardly; ſo that he ſoon repented of having embarked in the war, contrary to the advice of his beſt friends. In this diſagreeable ſituation he reſumed his uſual way of raillery, and, what he could not diſſuade by his authority, endeavoured to make ridiculous by his jeſts. By this conduct he is ſaid to have provoked *Pompey* ſo far, that he told him, *I wiſh you would go over to the other ſide, that you may begin to fear us:* And it gave occaſion afterwards to *Antony*, in a ſpeech to the Senate, to cenſure the levity of his behaviour in the calamity of a civil war, and to reflect not only upon his fears, but the unſeaſonableneſs alſo of his jokes [o]. Having paid this attention to the greateſt civil character of his time, let us

[o] Some of *Cicero*'s ſayings on this occaſion are preſerved by different writers. When *Pompey* put him in mind of *his coming ſo late* to them: How can *I come late*, ſaid he, *when I find nothing in readineſs among you?* And upon *Pompey*'s aſking him ſarcaſtically, *Where his ſon-in-law Dolabella was*; *He is with your father in-law*, replied he. To a perſon newly arrived from *Italy*, and informing them of a ſtrong report at *Rome, that Pompey was blocked up by Cæſar*; and *you ſailed hither therefore*, ſaid he, *that you might ſee it with your own eyes.* Vid. Macrob. Sat. ii. 3. Plut. in Cic. *Middl.* p. 116.

return

return to *Cæſar*, whom we left in his progreſs to *Rome*. Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conf.

Cæſar, ſo vigorous in action, ſo temperate in victory, was now become the object of public admiration all over *Italy*. The municipal towns in the ſouthern parts, who, the year before, had put up prayers for *Pompey*'s recovery, were now as earneſt to ſhew their zeal for his rival; and he every-where received congratulations on his ſucceſs. The people flocked to *Rome*, not only thoſe whom particular favours had attached to his perſon, but thoſe alſo, who, guided by their intereſt, thought, with *Cælius*, that in civil contentions, when it came to arms, the *ſtronger* ſide was the *beſt*, becauſe the *ſafeſt*. Several alſo of the Nobles, of the *honeſt*, were more complaiſant than *Cicero*; and did not think it adviſeable to diſregard *Cæſar*'s ſollicitations: Among theſe were *Servius Sulpicius*, *Volcatius Tullus*, and *M. Lepidus*. The city neither wanted a Senate, nor its Magiſtrates, except the Conſuls: The Prætors adminiſtered juſtice as uſual; and the Ediles were making preparations for the public games. *M. Antony* and *Q. Caſſius*, two Tribunes of the people, the moſt zealous in *Cæſar*'s intereſt, convoked, on his arrival, the Senate in the ſuburbs, that he might be preſent without the infringement of the laws.

Ad Att. ix. 1, 5, 12.

Ep. Fam. viii. 16.

Dio. l. xli.

In his harangue to the Houſe, after complaining of the injuries of his enemies, he ſaid, "that "he had never affected *extraordinary* and *illegal*

Cæſ. de Bell. Civ. Com. lib. i.

Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

"gal honours [p], but waited patiently the time "preſcribed by the laws to ſollicit for a ſecond "conſulſhip. That the people, with the con-"currence of the whole college of Tribunes, "had allowed him to ſtand candidate, though "abſent, and that even in the conſulſhip of *Pom-*"*pey*; who might have prevented the paſſing of "the decree, if he had diſapproved of it; and "who could now have no good reaſon to oppoſe "it. That he had given proof of his modera-"tion, by having voluntarily propoſed, that "both parties ſhould lay down their arms; a "meaſure which would have diveſted him of "his government and command. That the ma-"lice of his enemies was ſuch, that they ſought "to impoſe terms upon him, to which they "would not ſubmit themſelves; chuſing rather "to involve the ſtate in a civil war, than to part "with their armies and provinces. That he had "been injured by having two of his legions taken "away from him, and that the violation of the "authority of the Tribunes was oppreſſive and "inſolent. That he had frequently made offers

[p] *Pompey* had been habituated to them from his youth, and made haughty and inſolent by them: He would bear no equal, and *Cæſar* did not think himſelf obliged to acknowledge him for his ſuperior:

Nec quemquam jam ferre poteſt Cæſarve *priorem*,
Pompeiuſve *parem.*—— Lucan.

"Sure then *Cæſar* comes nearer to the commonwealth's-man "than *Pompey*. *Pompey*'s *no equal* has a viſible tinſture of of-"fenſive ambition; while *Cæſar*'s *no ſuperior*, at moſt, aſpires "but to a ſhare in commanding." *Cibber.* p. 183.

"of

"of peace, and had often deſired an interview; "and that all his efforts for an accommodation "and the public good had been ineffectual." Upon all theſe accounts, he requeſted and conjured the Senate to take the Republic under their protection, and to aſſiſt him to govern it: And, if they declined, he ſaid, through fear, this important charge, he would take it wholly upon himſelf. He then propoſed to ſend Deputies to *Pompey* to treat of an accommodation. "Nor was he moved, he told them, by a re- "flection which *Pompey* had made lately in the "Houſe, that to ſend Deputies was to acknow- "ledge the ſuperiority of him to whom they were "ſent, and a mark of timidity in the ſender. "This, he ſaid, was a low way of thinking; and, "in the ſame manner as he had endeavoured at "a ſuperiority in action, he would alſo ſtrive at "a ſuperiority in juſtice and equity." This propoſal of a deputation was generally applauded; but no one was found who would undertake the office: And three days were ſpent in debates and excuſes upon this point. For *Pompey* had declared, before his departure, *that he ſhould look upon thoſe who ſtaid behind in Rome equally guilty with thoſe who were in* CÆSAR'*s camp* [q].

A. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

Dio

[q] *Cicero* himſelf was not very forward to undertake the taſk of peace-making; and others might very well be backward: He writes thus to *Atticus*: "But, if *Cæſar* does not leave me "at liberty to ſtand neuter, you adviſe me to declare myſelf "publicly a mediator for an accommodation. No danger "ſhall deter me from that: For, ſurrounded as I am with "dangers,

Ad Att. ix. 7.

Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

Dio writes, that, having alſo aſſembled the people without the city, he harangued in the ſame ſtrain, and promiſed to keep up plenty in *Rome*, by ſending corn from *Sicily* and *Sardinia*, and to make a donative of three hundred ſeſterces to each of the poorer citizens; and that, in conſequence of theſe pacific ſpeeches, the *Romans* reſumed the appearance of peace, which they had put off from the taking of *Rimini*; but were far from being eaſy. The great number of *Ceſar*'s ſoldiers in the city; the little confidence to be put in a language which the circumſtances of affairs might dictate; and the examples of *Marius* and *Sylla*, who had made as fair promiſes

L. xli. p. 160. About 2 l. 10 s.

" dangers, act how I will, why not expoſe myſelf to that " which will do me the moſt honour? But *I am afraid leſt this* " *ſhould gall Pompey, and engage him to give me a very bad re-* " *ception.* For our friend affects ſtrangely the domination of " *Sylla.* I know what I ſay, and he has never made leſs a " ſecret of any thing in his life, than he does of this. If " ſuch, ſay you, are his diſpoſitions, would you follow him? " Believe me, my friend, I follow him for the kindneſſes he " has done me, not as he is the head of a party. I befriend " him as I did *Milo*, as I did ——, Then, ſay you, you diſ- " approve of his cauſe. No, it is an excellent one: but, " remember what I ſay; he and his party will act ſcanda- " louſly. They will endeavour to ſtarve *Rome* and *Italy*, then " plunder and burn their country, and ſeize the properties of " monied men.——If *Pompey* prevails, we will not leave in " *Italy* one ſtone upon another." And *Ad Att.* ix. 10. he ſays, " What threatenings againſt our free towns, againſt ſome of " our patriots in particular, and againſt *all thoſe who ſtaid be-* " *hind!* How frequent was that ſaying in *Pompey*'s mouth, " *Could Sylla do ſuch a thing, and cannot I do it!*"

at

at firſt; all contributed to excite the anxiety and terror of the more deliberate and thoughtful. V. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

Cæſar, finding that the Senate was backward to take any reſolution, and that his enemies had engaged *Metellus*, one of the Tribunes, to oppoſe his deſigns, was not willing to waſte his time to no purpoſe; and he reſolved not to commit the ſame error his enemies had been guilty of, in leaving behind them the public money. He therefore ordered the Treaſury to be broke open, and ſeized the money for his own uſe. *Metellus* had the boldneſs to attempt to obſtruct him in this meaſure; and *Cæſar* is ſaid to have treated him with unuſual roughneſs; telling him *that it was in vain to talk of laws in the midſt of arms; and that he was Maſter, not only of the money, but of the lives of all thoſe whom he had conquered.* The Tribune, not being intimidated by theſe terrible words, and perſiſting in his oppoſition with the applauſe of ſome that were preſent, *Cæſar* threatened to kill him, adding: *Young man, conſider it is harder for me to ſay it than to do it.* Some people, ſays *Plutarch*, yet ventured to repreſent, that there was in the Treaſury a ſacred fund, not to be employed but under the terror of a *Gallic* invaſion: *I have entirely removed that ſcruple*, replied *Cæſar*, *by ſubduing the Gauls.* He found there, according to *Pliny*'s computation, twenty-five thouſand bars of gold, thirty-five thouſand of ſilver, and forty millions of ſeſterces[r]. About 322,916l.

Cæſar

[r] *Pliny* has alſo related, l. xxxiii. 3, that *Cæſar* took out of the Treaſury 1500 pounds of *Laſer* of *Cyrene*, a drug of great value

Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

Cæſar left the city immediately after this neceſſary but unpopular ſtep, and, as *Curio* told *Cicero*, much diſturbed to ſee the people diſguſted with it. He had reſolved to ſpeak to them before he ſet out, but he durſt not venture upon it for fear of ſome affront: And hurried away much diſcompoſed, having made a ſtay of *only* ſix or ſeven days.

value among the ancients, and much eſteemed by them, not only for medicinal uſe, but for ſauce. This drug is, however, according to the opinion of an author much to be depended on in theſe matters, what we now call *aſſa fœtida*, the taſte and ſmell of which are ſcarce to be borne. The Orientals are to this day very fond of it. *Crevier.*

Geoffroi Mat. Med. t. ii. p. 606.

CHAP. IV.

The reduction of SARDINIA *by* VALERIUS, *of* SICILY *by* CURIO, *and of* SPAIN *by* CÆSAR.

CÆSAR, before he ſet out for *Spain*, committed the care of the city to the Prætor *L. Æmilius Lepidus*, who was afterwards Triumvir with *Antony* and *Octavius*: He appointed *Antony* to command the forces in *Italy*, named his brother *C. Antonius* to the government of *Illyricum*, and *Licinius Craſſus* to that of *Ciſalpine Gaul*. He alſo gave orders for the ſpeedy fitting out of two fleets, the one to guard the coaſts of the *Adriatic*, of which he made *Dolabella* Admiral; the other, under the direction of *Q. Hortenſius* [a], the ſon of the

[a] Young *Hortenſius* had been diſinherited by his father, who left his great wealth to his wife *Marcia*. This lady had been

the famous Orator of that name, was to protect those of the *Tuscan* sea. He set at liberty, at the same time, the unfortunate *Aristobulus*, formerly King of the *Jews*, and sent him to *Judea*, to raise commotions there, and give disturbance to *Scipio*, who was gone to his province of *Syria*, to gather forces and money for *Pompey*. Y. R. 702. Bef. Chr. 48. 203 Conf.

Valerius and *Curio* had been appointed at *Brundusium* to pass over into *Sardinia* and *Sicily*; and they now set out with *Cæsar* for the execution of his orders, in which they met with no opposition. The inhabitant of *Gallaris*, now *Cagliari*, the principal town in *Sardinia*, no sooner heard of *Valerius*'s commission, than they drove out *Cotta*; who commanded there for *Pompey*, and who, finding the whole island in *Cæsar*'s interest, fled precipitately into *Africa*.

Cato had been sent into *Sicily* by *Pompey* some weeks before he left *Italy*. On his arrival there, he applied himself with great diligence to gather forces for both the sea and land service. He re-

been married before to *Cato*, by whom she had several children; and was actually with child when he consented to let his friend have her. When she was a rich widow, *Cato* took her back again: Which gave, says *Plutarch*, in *Cat.* an occasion to *Cæsar* to reproach him with covetousness and mercenary views. For, said he, *if he wanted a wife, why did he part with her? And, if he did not, why did he take her again? Unless he gave her only as a bait to Hortensius; and lent her when she was young, to have her again when she was rich.* This behaviour of *Cato* did not inspire the young man with any zeal for his and *Pompey*'s cause; and, though the father was a pillar of the *Aristocratical* faction, it is no wonder to see the son employed on the *popular* side.

fitted

Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

fitted old ſhips and cauſed new ones to be built, and he ordered the ſeveral ſtates of the iſland to furniſh him with levies of horſe and foot. He alſo ſent his Officers to raiſe troops in *Lucania*, and the country of the *Brutii*. But, perceiving that he was not to be ſupported by *Pompey*, and muſt truſt entirely to his own ſtrength, he did not think it expedient to defend his province: And, calling his officers together, he complained of *Pompey*, who, without any previous preparations, had involved the Commonwealth in an unneceſſary war; and who, when queſtioned by himſelf and others, in the Senate, had aſſured them that he was in readineſs to ſuſtain it. Having declared, in this manner, his ſentiments, he quitted the iſland on the approach of *Curio*. *Cicero* was much ſcandaliſed at this conduct, being perſuaded that he might have held his poſſeſſion without difficulty, and that all honeſt men would have flocked to him, eſpecially when *Pompey*'s fleet was ſo near to ſupport him. *I wiſh*, ſays he, *that Cotta may hold out Sardinia, as it is ſaid he will; for, if ſo, how baſe will Cato's behaviour appear!* And he cites *Curio*, as being of this opinion, who, he ſays, confeſſed, that, if *Pompey*'s fleet had appeared upon the coaſt and begun to act, *he would himſelf have run away the firſt*[t].

Cæſ. de Bell. Civ. Com. l. i.

Ad Att. x. 4, 7, 16.

Cæſar,

[t] *Plutarch in Cat.* and *Appian de Bell. Civ.* l. ii, relate, that *Aſinius Pollio*, having brought over ſome troops to *Meſſana* before *Curio*'s arrival, *Cato* ſent to him to inquire, by whoſe authority, whether of the Senate or the people, he had

Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

Cæſar de Bell. Civ. Com. lib. i.

Cæſar, on his arrival in *Gaul*, was informed that *Pompey* had ſent *Vibullius Rufus* into *Spain*; who, not many days before, had been taken priſoner at *Corfinium*, and had been ſet at liberty; that *L. Domitius*, named by the Senate to the government of *Gaul*, was expected at *Marſeilles*; and that, to prepare the way for his reception, the *Maſſilian* Deputies in *Rome*, young men of the firſt quality, had been ſent home by *Pompey*, before he left the city; and had been exhorted by him to remain in their ancient attachment and fidelity to the Senate, and not to ſuffer the memory of his paſt ſervices to their country to be blotted out by thoſe they had ſince received from *Cæſar*. The inhabitants of *Marſeilles*, in conſequence of theſe remonſtrances, had determined to ſhut their gates againſt *Cæſar*, and called to their aid the *Albiti*, a barbarous people who had long been under their protection, and inhabited the adjoining mountains. They laid in ſtores of proviſions, ſet up work-ſhops for the making of arms, refitted their navy, repaired their walls and gates, and neg-

had landed in his province: That *Pollio* anſwered, *it was by the authority of him who was Maſter in Italy*: That *Cato*, at the ſame time, being informed that *Pompey* had really ſailed for *Dyrrachium*, ſaid he could eaſily drive *Pollio* out of *Sicily*; but, as greater forces were coming to join him, he would not engage the iſland in a war; and after complaining, not of *Pompey*, as *Cæſar* relates, but of the *Gods*, *who gave Pompey ſucceſs in every fooliſh and diſhoneſt enterpriſe, and now abandoned him when he was defending his country*, he adviſed the people of *Syracuſe* to ſubmit to *Curio*, and provide for their own ſafety.

V. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

lected nothing to put their town in a ſtate of defence.

Strabo l. iv. p. 179.

The government of the city was ariſtocratical, the whole power being in the hands of a Senate conſiſting of ſix hundred Nobles, who held their places for life: But out of this number there was formed a Council of fifteen for the execution of the laws and diſpatch of buſineſs. *Cæſar* ſent for theſe, and exhorted them to follow the example and authority of all *Italy*, which was now in his intereſt, rather than the will of one particular perſon and his adherents. The Counſellors, returning into the city, aſſembled the Senate on this important occaſion, which ſent back the following anſwer: "That they ſaw that the *Romans* "were divided into two parties, and that it did "not belong to them to decide the quarrel. "That at the head of theſe parties were *Pompey* "and *Cæſar*, both patrons of their city; the firſt "having added to its dominion the country of "the *Volcæ-Arecomici* and *Helvii*; the other that "of the *Salyæ*: And that, as they were equally "indebted to both, it did not become them to "aſſiſt the one againſt the other; but to remain "in a ſtate of neutrality, and to grant to neither "an admittance into their town or port."

This anſwer had juſt been given, when *Domitius* arrived at *Marſeilles*, with a fleet of ſeven gallies, which he had manned with the ſlaves, freedmen, and peaſants, who belonged to his lands in *Tuſcany*. He was received, however, into the town, was appointed its Governor, and charged with the adminiſtration of the war; and by his order

der the *Maſſilian* fleet was ſent out immediately to ſail along the coaſts, that it might ſeize and bring in all the merchant-veſſels it could find, in order that they might be made fit for ſervice, or taken to pieces to repair others. *Cæſar* was incenſed at theſe proceedings, and, being ſenſible of the conſequence of leaving behind him in the intereſt of his enemies a city which was the key of *Gaul*, he reſolved to lay ſiege to it directly both by ſea and land. He appointed three legions for this purpoſe, and, at the ſame time that he prepared towers and other works for the approaches by land, he had twelve gallies built at *Arles*; which, being completed, and brought down the *Rhone* to *Marſeilles* in thirty days, he gave the command of them to *Decimus Brutus*, and charged *C. Trebonius* with the conduct of the ſiege. Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

The employment *Cæſar* found ſo unexpectedly at *Marſeilles* delayed not his *Spaniſh* expedition. While preparations were making for the ſiege, he ſent *C. Fabius* with three legions that were quartered near *Narbonne*, to take poſſeſſion of the paſſes of the *Pyrenees*, which were guarded by a party of *Afranius*'s troops: And this Commander, having forced theſe, advanced by long marches towards the main army. *Pompey* had three Lieutenants in *Spain*, *Afranius*, *Petreius*, and *Varro*: The firſt of theſe was at the head of three legions in the nearer *Spain*: The other two, reckoning their new levies, had each two legions. *Petreius* commanded from the *Caſtilian* foreſt to the *Anas*: *Varro* from the *Anas* quite through *Luſitania* and

Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

the territories of the *Vettones.* Theſe Lieutenants, upon the arrival of *Vibullius Rufus*, had conſulted together, and agreed, that *Petreius* ſhould join *Afranius* with his two legions, and that *Varro* ſhould remain in further *Spain* and ſecure that province. They raiſed with all diligence eighty cohorts among the *Spaniards*, and five thouſand horſe; and determined to make *Ilerda* the ſeat of the war, on account of its convenient ſituation, upon a riſing ground, twenty miles from the *Iberus*, between the rivers *Sicoris* and *Cinga*.

Lerida.

Segre.

Cæſar ſent after *Fabius* what other legions he had in *Gaul* not employed at the ſiege of *Marſeilles*; which could not be more than two, unleſs he brought from *Italy* the three with which he had made himſelf maſter of it. To theſe legions he added ſix thouſand auxiliary foot, and three thouſand horſe, who had ſerved under him in all his former wars; and he was now furniſhed with as many more. For, having heard that *Pompey* was coming with his whole force through *Mauritania* into *Spain*[n], he ſent circular letters to all the *Gallic* States, inviting by name thoſe of the moſt known and approved valour, and, in particular, a ſelect body of mountaineers from *Aquitania*, where it borders upon the *Roman* province. And, to aſſure himſelf the better of the fidelity of both officers and ſoldiers in his army, he bor-

[n] It was reported at this time in *Italy*, that *Pompey*, at the head of a great army, had paſſed through *Illyria* into *Germany*: And *this news*, ſays *Cicero*, *is grounded upon indiſputable authority*. *Ad Att.* x. 9.

rowed

rowed ſums of money of all his Tribunes and Centurions; which he diſtributed among the ſoldiers; by that means engaging his officers by their own intereſt, and the ſoldiers by his liberality. He ſoon followed himſelf, with nine hundred horſe, which he had kept for a body-guard. Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

Fabius, before *Cæſar*'s arrival, had left nothing unattempted for gaining the country round about to his party by his letters and ambaſſadors. He had already laid two bridges over the *Sicoris*, four miles diſtant from each other, for the convenience of foraging, having conſumed all the paſture on his ſide of the river. *Pompey*'s Generals did the ſame, and with the ſame view; which occaſioned frequent ſkirmiſhes between the horſe. It happened, one day, that two of *Fabius*'s legions, going out to guard the foragers, according to cuſtom, had paſſed the river, and, the carriages and cavalry endeavouring to follow after, the bridge broke down on a ſudden, and prevented them from joining the foot. This *Afranius* and *Petreius* perceiving, by the hurdles and other materials that came ſwimming down with the ſtream, immediately detached four legions, with all their cavalry, to attack the two legions. *L. Plancus*, who commanded the foraging guard, ſeized a riſing ground, and, forming his men in two diviſions, poſted them back to back, and ſo made a double front to prevent their being ſurrounded by the enemy's horſe. By this diſpoſition, though inferior in number, he was enabled to ſuſtain the furious charge of the *Pompeian* legions and cavalry, till the colours of two legions, which

Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

Fabius ſent over by the further bridge to the aſſiſtance of his party, were deſcried at a diſtance. Their approach put an end to the engagement, and both armies returned to their ſeveral camps.

Two days after this engagement, *Cæſar* arrived in the camp*: And he ordered the bridge that had broke down to be inſtantly repaired. The next day he took a view of the country, and, leaving ſix cohorts to guard the bridge and the camp, he marched with the reſt of his forces in three lines to *Ilerda* and ſtopped near *Afranius*'s camp, where he remained under arms, and offered him battle on an even ground. *Afranius* drew out his troops and formed them half-way down the hill. *Cæſar*, finding that he declined an engagement upon equal terms, reſolved to encamp within four hundred paces of the foot of the mountain; and, to hinder his troops from being alarmed or interrupted in their works by ſudden incurſions from the enemy, he ordered the ſoldiers of the third line, while thoſe of the firſt and ſecond continued in order of battle, to cut a ditch fifteen feet broad behind them, without throwing up a rampart, which would have been perceived by the enemy. Thus the front of his camp was ſecured by a ditch, before *Afranius* had the leaſt ſuſpicion of his deſign to encamp ſo near him. In the evening he made the legions file off by the two ends of the ditch, and brought them behind it, where he paſſed the

* *Cæſar* arrived at *Marſeilles* before the end of the month of *April*: (*Ad Att.* x. 10.) and he ſeems to have reached his army in *Spain* before the end of the month of *May*.

whole

whole night under arms. The day after, he carried his entrenchments quite round the camp: And, becauſe materials for a rampart muſt have been fetched from a great diſtance, he contented himſelf for the preſent with a naked ditch; allotting a legion to each ſide of the camp, and keeping the reſt of the troops under arms to cover thoſe employed in the works. The *Pompeian* Generals came down with their troops as far as the bottom of the mountain, and threatened to give battle. But *Cæſar*, truſting to the three legions under arms, and the defence of his ditch, did not call off his workmen; and *Afranius*, not venturing to come farther into the plain, after a ſhort ſtay, wheeled off with his men. The third day *Cæſar* added a rampart to his fortifications, and ſent orders to the cohorts he had left behind, to decamp, and come up to him. Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

Between the city of *Ilerda* and the hill, where *Petreius* and *Afranius* were encamped, there was a plain of about three hundred paces; in the midſt of which was a riſing ground: And *Cæſar* perceived, that, by the means of this poſt, it would be eaſy for him to deprive the enemy of the conveniency of their bridge, and their communication with the city, from whence they furniſhed themſelves with all their ſubſiſtence. In order to get poſſeſſion of it, he drew out three legions, and, having formed them in order of battle, commanded the foremoſt of them to run before and gain the place. *Afranius*, ſeeing his deſign, diſpatched, by a nearer way, the cohorts that were upon guard to the ſame eminence. The Cæſ. de Bel. Civ. Com. lib. i.

fight

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fight was ſharply maintained on both ſides: But *Afranius*'s men, who firſt got poſſeſſion, obliged thoſe of *Cæſar* to give ground; and, being reinforced by freſh ſupplies, put them at laſt to the rout, and forced them to fly for ſhelter to the legions. *Cæſar* aſcribes the advantage which *Afranius*'s troops had over his on this occaſion to their manner of fighting. It was their method to come forward briſkly againſt an enemy, and boldly poſſeſs themſelves of ſome poſt; neither taking care to preſerve their ranks, nor holding it neceſſary to fight in a cloſe compact body; and, if they found themſelves hard preſſed, they thought it no diſhonour to retire. In theſe particulars they followed the example of the *Luſitani* and the other barbarous nations of *Spain*. This manner of fighting, as it was new and unexpected, diſordered *Cæſar*'s men, who, ſeeing the enemy come forward without regard to order, were apprehenſive of being ſurrounded, while they were obliged to maintain their ranks, and not to abandon their enſigns.

Cæſar, contrary to his expectation, finding the conſternation like to ſpread through the whole army, encouraged his men, and, leading on himſelf the ninth legion to the aſſiſtance of thoſe that fled, he ſoon put a ſtop to the vigorous and inſulting purſuit of the enemy, obliged them in their turn to give way, and purſued them to the very walls of *Ilerda*. But the ſoldiers, elated with ſucceſs, and eager to repair the loſs they had ſuſtained, followed the runaways with ſo much impetuoſity, that they were drawn into a diſad-

vantageous place, and found themſelves directly under the hill where the town ſtood; whence, when they endeavoured to retire, the enemy, facing about, charged them vigorouſly from the higher ground. The hill was rough and ſteep on each ſide, and the ſpot, where they ſtood, was ſo narrow, that only three cohorts could be drawn up in front, which could be neither reinforced in flank, nor protected by the cavalry. The enemy's forces increaſed every moment, freſh cohorts being ſent from the camp through the town, to relieve thoſe that were fatigued: And *Cæſar* was obliged to detach alſo ſmall parties to maintain the battle, and bring off the wounded. Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

The fight had laſted five hours, without intermiſſion, when *Cæſar*'s men, preſſed by the multitude of the enemy, and having ſpent their darts, attacked the cohorts on the hill ſword in hand, and, bearing down a few, obliged the reſt to betake themſelves to flight. The purſuit was continued to the very walls of *Ilerda*, and, a part of the enemy taking ſhelter within the town, *Cæſar*'s men had an opportunity of making good their retreat. At the ſame time the cavalry found means to gain the ſummit of the mountain, and, riding between both armies, hindered the enemy from harraſſing the rear. Thus the engagement was attended with various turns of fortune; and both ſides, of conſequence, laid claim to the victory; *Cæſar*'s ſoldiers, becauſe they had bravely maintained themſelves for five hours in a diſadvantageous poſt, and had, at laſt, driven the enemy into the town; and *Afranius*'s ſoldiers, becauſe

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cauſe they had kept poſſeſſion of the hill which had occaſioned the battle. The loſs on both ſides was but inconſiderable for ſo long and ſo fierce a contention. *Cæſar* loſt the firſt Centurion of the *haſtati* of the fourteenth legion, with about ſeventy men: And above ſix hundred were wounded. On the other ſide were ſlain five Centurions and above two hundred ſoldiers. *Afranius*, made ſenſible of the great importance of the diſputed poſt, cauſed the place to be fortified, and placed in it a ſtrong garriſon for its defence.

This engagement was followed, two days after, by an accident, which brought *Cæſar*'s whole army into the greateſt diſtreſs and danger. A violent ſtorm of rain, and the melted ſnow from the mountains, made the *Sicoris* overflow its banks, and break down, in the ſame day, the two bridges which *Fabius* had erected over it. Thus *Cæſar* found himſelf ſhut up in a compaſs of thirty miles, between two rivers, neither of which was fordable. The States that had declared for him could ſupply him with no proviſions: the troops ſent beyond the river to forage could not return to the camp; and the convoys he expected from *Gaul* and *Italy* could not get to him. It was almoſt harveſt-time, and for that reaſon corn was become very ſcarce, and the more ſo, as *Afranius* had carried great quantities of it into *Ilerda*, and the reſt had been conſumed by *Cæſar*'s troops. The cattle, which were the next reſource in the preſent want, had been removed to a diſtance by the neighbouring nations, upon the breaking out of the war. The parties, ſent out to get proviſions

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ſions in the country that lay behind the camp, were perpetually harraſſed by the *Spaniſh* infantry, who, being accuſtomed to paſs the rivers on blown-up ſkins, purſued them every-where.

Cæſar endeavoured to repair his bridges, but to no purpoſe: The river was deep and rapid, and the enemy, ſtationed along the oppoſite bank, ſhowered their darts upon the ſpot where the men attempted to work. While things were in this poſture, a large convoy from *Gaul* arrived on the other bank of the river, at ſome diſtance above *Cæſar*'s camp. It conſiſted of archers from the *Rutheni*, ſome *Gallic* horſe, with many carts and much baggage, and about ſix thouſand men of all ſorts, with their domeſtics and ſlaves, who, being apprehenſive of no danger, kept no order or diſcipline in their march. There were likewiſe along with it many young Noblemen, Senators ſons, and *Roman* Knights, with the Deputies from the States of *Gaul*, and ſome of *Cæſar*'s Lieutenants. *Afranius*, appriſed of their arrival, ſet out in the night with three legions and all his cavalry; and, ſending the horſe before, attacked them, when they leaſt expected it. The *Gallic* ſquadrons, forming themſelves with great expedition, began the fight; and, though few in number, comparatively with the enemy, maintained their ground, and gave the reſt of the convoy time to repair to the neighbouring mountains; whither they alſo retreated, as ſoon as they ſaw the legions advancing towards them. They loſt only two hundred archers, a few troopers, and ſome ſervants and baggage.

This

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About 1 l. 10 s.

This event ſerved to enhance the price of proviſions; a calamity inſeparable from preſent ſcarcity, and the proſpect of future want. Corn was ſold at *fifty denarii* a buſhel: The ſoldiers began to loſe their ſtrength, and, the evil increaſing every moment, *Cæſar* diſmiſſed all the uſeleſs mouths. *Afranius*, on the contrary, abounded in all things: He had large magazines of corn, was continually receiving freſh ſupplies, and had plenty of forage.

Theſe circumſtances were greatly exaggerated by *Afranius* and *Petreius* in their letters to *Rome*, where moſt people concluding, that the war was almoſt at an end, made public congratulations to the relations of the two Generals on their great ſucceſs. Many alſo of the Nobility left *Italy* in order to join *Pompey*; ſome to carry the firſt accounts of this grateful news, others that they might not be ſo late as to ſubject themſelves to the reproach of having waited for the event of things. Among the reſt, *Servius Sulpicius* and *C. Marcellus* probably put to ſea on this occaſion, and, perhaps, *Cicero* himſelf; for intelligence of the battle of *Ilerda*, and of *Cæſar*'s diſtreſs, might very well have reached him before the *eleventh* of *June*.

The joy of *Pompey*'s party was but ſhort. *Cæſar*, ſeeing no poſſibility of repairing the bridges, gave orders for the building ſome of that ſort of veſſels, the uſe whereof he had learned in his *Britiſh* expedition. The keel and ribs of theſe boats were of light wood, and the reſt of oſier covered over with leather. When he had got a ſufficient

ſufficient number, he ſent them by night in waggons to a place twenty-two miles diſtant from his camp. There having embarked a good number of his ſoldiers and carried them over the river, he took poſſeſſion of a hill on the other ſide; threw up a fortification and poſted a legion in it before the enemy thought of obſtructing him: And here, in two days time, he laid a bridge over the *Sicoris*, by which means he recovered his foragers, ſecured the convoy, and opened a paſſage for future ſupplies. Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conf.

The change of fortune was ſudden and great. *Cæſar* being much ſuperior in cavalry, the enemy was now reduced to confine their foraging within the neighbourhood of their camp; and to detach parties for that purpoſe in the night. Six conſiderable States alſo [y] declared themſelves in his favour, and agreed to furniſh him with proviſions. A cohort compoſed from one of them, which ſerved under *Afranius*, deſerted to him upon hearing the reſolution of their countrymen. The other provinces more diſtant, ſeeing the rumour induſtriouſly ſpread of *Pompey*'s march through *Mauritania* quite extinguiſhed, renounced alſo their engagements with *Afranius*, and beſought *Cæſar*'s friendſhip.

The bridge over the *Sicoris* was twenty-two miles from the camp, which obliged the cavalry to take this compaſs, when they went to forage: And *Cæſar*, to remedy this inconveniency, un-

[y] The *Oſcenſes*, *Calagurritani*, *Tarraconenſes*, *Jacetani*, *Auſetani*, and *Illurgavonenſes*.

dertook

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dertook to make the river fordable by turning its water into canals, thirty feet deep. When the work was almoſt completed, *Petreius* and *Afranius*, perceiving that they would be ſoon cut off from their proviſions by a cavalry ſo ſuperior to their own, took the reſolution to carry the war into *Celtiberia*, a province where *Pompey*'s fame was great, and where they expected to make new levies of horſe and foot. They propoſed by taking poſſeſſion of ſome ſtrong poſt to protract the war till winter. In order to execute this plan, they got together all the boats they could on the *Iberus*, and carried them to *Octogeſa*, a town upon that river, about twenty miles from their camp. There they cauſed a bridge of boats to be made; and, having ſent two legions over the *Sicoris* to fortify a camp with a rampart of twelve feet, they prepared to follow with the reſt of their army.

Cæſar, informed of this motion by his ſcouts, laboured day and night at his drains, and lowered the water in the *Sicoris* to that degree that the cavalry could paſs without difficulty; but it ſtill took the infantry up to the ſhoulders, a depth which, joined to the rapidity of the ſtream, ſeemed to render it impaſſable to them. On the other ſide, *Afranius*, ſeeing *Cæſar*'s works in ſuch forwardneſs, and having notice that the bridge over the *Iberus* was perfected, loſt no time, but, leaving two auxiliary cohorts in *Ilerda*, he croſſed the *Sicoris* with all his forces, and joined the two legions he had ſent before. *Cæſar* had no means of ſtopping their march, but by harraſſing them with

with his cavalry; for he could not ſend his foot ſoon enough over his bridge, the diſtance was ſo great. Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

He ordered therefore his horſe to paſs the river, and they ſoon came up with *Afranius*, who had decamped at midnight. At break of day their motions were eaſily deſcried from the hills near the camp. They preſſed extremely the enemy's rear, diſordered their ranks, and obliged them to halt: Then the cohorts facing about forced the cavalry to give ground; who, as ſoon as they began to march, renewed the attack. At this ſight the legionary ſoldiers, running up and down the camp, loudly complained, that the enemy would eſcape, and that the war would be unneceſſarily protracted: And they deſired their officers to aſſure *Cæſar*, that they feared neither danger nor fatigue, and were ready to paſs the river as the horſe had done. *Cæſar*, moved by their alacrity, though he ſaw ſome danger in expoſing his army in a deep and rapid ſtream, yet reſolved to make a trial of the paſſage. Having firſt drawn from every company ſuch as were weak of body, he left them with one legion to guard the camp. Then diſpoſing a double line of cavalry above and below the ford, he carried over all his ſoldiers without the loſs of one man. Thoſe, who were borne down by the violence of the current, were ſaved by the horſe below them. *Cæſar* began the purſuit without delay, marching in three lines; and ſuch was the ardour of the ſoldiers, that, though they were forced to go ſix miles about, and had loſt a great deal of time in paſſing

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paſſing the river, they came up with the enemy at three o'clock in the afternoon.

Afranius and *Petreius*, intimidated by an approach ſo ſudden and unexpected, halted on an eminence, and put their troops in order of battle. *Cæſar* kept his in the plain, being unwilling to hazard an action till his army had recovered their fatigue. But, the moment that the two Generals began again to move on, he followed; and thus forced them to encamp much ſooner than they intended. They took up their quarters in a range of mountains to avoid the inſults of the cavalry; and, having placed parties in all the paſſes to ſtop *Cæſar*'s progreſs, hoped by this means to get off ſafe to the *Iberus*. This, ſays *Cæſar*, was their great object, and what, above all things, they ſhould have endeavoured to effect: But, being fatigued by a long march, and their continual ſkirmiſhes with the horſe, they imprudently deferred it till the next day. *Cæſar* likewiſe encamped on a hill not far from them.

About midnight, however, *Cæſar*'s cavalry, having picked up ſome ſoldiers of the enemy, who had ventured too far from the camp in queſt of water, were informed by them that *Pompey*'s Lieutenants had altered their reſolution, and were decamping in deep ſilence. Immediately he ordered the alarm to be ſounded, and the ſignal given for marching: Which engaged the enemy to delay their retreat, as they would have had greatly the diſadvantage in a nocturnal march, both on account of their heavy baggage, and the ſuperiority of *Cæſar*'s cavalry. Next day, *Petreius*

went

went out with a party of horſe to take a view of the country: And *Decidius Saxa* [z] was detached by *Cæſar* with a ſquadron for the ſame purpoſe. Both made the like report, in their ſeveral camps, that the country for five miles together was level and open, but after that rough and mountainous; and that which ever army firſt got poſſeſſion of the defiles might eaſily prevent the other from approaching. Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

Afranius and *Petreius* called a Council of war to debate whether they ſhould depart that night, or wait till the morning. The greater number were for ſetting out in the dark, in hopes of reaching the defiles before *Cæſar* could have notice of their departure. Others argued againſt the poſſibility of decamping privately: They mentioned "the alarm given in *Cæſar*'s camp "the night before; and obſerved, that the ene-"my's cavalry were continually patrolling in the "night, and had beſet all the ways and paſſes; "that a nocturnal engagement was to be avoid-"ed, becauſe, in a civil war, the ſoldiers were "more apt to liſten to their fears, than to the "obligations of the military oath; that ſhame, "and the preſence of the Tribunes and Centu-"rions, the great inſtruments of obedience and "military duty, could have their proper effect

[z] This *Decidius Saxa* was afterwards advanced by *Cæſar* to be Tribune of the people, at which *Cicero* was much ſcandaliſed. In his 13*th Philippic* he ſays, "How can I omit "this *Decidius Saxa*, a man brought from the fartheſt end of "the world; whom we ſee Tribune of the people, before we "ever ſaw him a citizen."

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"only in the light; and that therefore they ſhould "make their attempt by day; in which caſe, if "they received a diſaſter, or ſmall loſs, yet the "bulk of the army would eſcape, and be able "to poſſeſs themſelves of the poſt in queſtion." Theſe reaſons prevailed, and it was reſolved to ſet out the next morning by break of day.

But *Cæſar* got the ſtart of them, and marched with his legions as ſoon as it was light, taking a conſiderable circuit, and following no particular route: For the direct way to the *Iberus* by *Octogeſa* lay through the enemy's camp. He was obliged therefore to lead his men through deep valleys, and over ſteep rocks, which they could not climb, but by diſencumbering themſelves of their arms, and returning them afterwards to one another. The ſoldiers, however, in the hopes of putting ſpeedily a period to their labours, went on joyfully. As in this march *Cæſar*'s army ſeemed to turn their backs, and purſued at firſt an oppoſite courſe, *Afranius*'s ſoldiers, elated with this appearance, came forth from their camp, and inſulted them on their ſuppoſed flight, imagining that the want of proviſions forced them to return to *Ilerda*. Their Generals applauded themſelves upon the reſolution they had taken of not decamping in the night; and were confirmed in the notion of *Cæſar*'s retreat, when they ſaw that he had neither baggage nor carriages, which made them conclude that the ſcarcity muſt be exceeding great. But when they perceived his men ſoon after turn to the right, and that his advanced guard had already gained the ground beyond their

camp, all immediately ran to arms, and, leaving a few cohorts to guard the baggage, they ſallied out in a body, purſuing their way directly to the *Iberus*. Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

All depended now upon diſpatch. The difficulty of the ways was a great hindrance to *Cæſar*'s troops; but his cavalry in return greatly incommoded the ſoldiers of *Afranius*; who, though he ſhould ſucceed in getting firſt to the defiles, was yet certain of loſing his baggage, and the cohorts which were left to guard it in the camp. But *Cæſar* outmarched him, ſuch was the vigour and alacrity of his men; and, having got into the plain beyond the rocks, formed his legions in order of battle. The two Generals, perceiving the enemy's infantry in front, and being attacked by his cavalry in their rear, halted upon a riſing ground, from whence they detached four Spaniſh cohorts to take poſſeſſion of the higheſt mountain that appeared in ſight; thinking to open to themſelves a way over the hills to *Octogeſa*. The Spaniards, wheeling obliquely to take poſſeſſion of the place, were perceived by *Cæſar*'s cavalry, who, charging them furiouſly, broke them at the firſt onſet, and ſurrounded and cut them to pieces in the view of both armies.

Cæſar had now a moſt favourable opportunity of giving his enemy a total overthrow; and he was ſenſible they could make but a faint reſiſtance under their preſent conſternation, ſurrounded on all ſides as they were by his cavalry, and obliged to fight on an open and even ground. His Officers, gathering round him, earneſtly beg-

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ged that he would not delay the engagement: They repreſented, "that the ſoldiers were eager "for a battle, and that *Afranius*'s army had given "many marks of fear: For they had neither dared "to ſupport their own detachment, nor come "down the hill: And that they had brought all "their Enſigns into one place, where they croud-"ed confuſedly round them, without obſerving "rank or order." They added, "that, if he "thought the enemy too advantageouſly poſted, "he would ſoon have an opportunity of attack-"ing them in another place more favourable, the "want of water laying them under a neceſſity "of changing their camp." But *Cæſar*, having cut them off from all proviſions, was confident that he had it now in his power to reduce them without bloodſhed: And he thought it better to gain the victory by his conduct, than by the force of arms. He therefore retired to a ſmall diſtance, to give *Afranius* an opportunity to regain his camp: And then, placing troops in the mountains to guard all the paſſages to the *Iberus*, he lodged himſelf as near as he could to the enemy.

The next day, while *Pompey*'s Lieutenants were in Council debating what meaſures they ſhould follow, whether to return to *Ilerda*, or march to *Tarraco*, notice was given them, that *Cæſar*'s cavalry had fallen upon the parties ſent out in queſt of water, and preſſed them hard. Upon this intelligence, which called for all their attention, they immediately formed ſeveral corps of horſe and foot intermixed with legionary cohorts, and began to throw up a rampart from the camp

to

to the place where they watered. *Afranius* and *Petreius* divided this work between them, and went in perſon to direct it. Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

In the mean time, the ſoldiers of the two armies had an opportunity of conferring together; and thoſe who belonged to *Afranius* and *Petreius* thanked *Cæſar*'s troops for the generoſity they had ſhewed in ſparing them the day before, and teſtified their concern at being obliged to fight with their countrymen and relations. They then inquired, if they could truſt to *Cæſar*'s clemency, and even promiſed to join him, if the lives of *Petreius* and *Afranius* were granted them: And they ſent ſome of their principal Officers to treat with *Cæſar*. Theſe preliminaries being ſettled, the ſoldiers of both armies went to one another's tents, and a great number of Centurions and military Tribunes came to pay their court to *Cæſar*, and to beg his protection. The Spaniſh Chiefs, who had been ſummoned to attend upon *Afranius*, and were detained in the camp as hoſtages, followed their example. Things were carried to ſuch a length, that *Afranius*'s ſon, a young man, treated with *Cæſar*, by the mediation of *Sulpicius*, for his own and his father's preſervation. The joy was general; the *Afranians* thought themſelves happy to have eſcaped ſuch imminent danger; and the *Cæſarians* to have brought to a happy concluſion ſo important an enterpriſe without ſtriking a blow. *Cæſar*, in the judgment of all, was upon the point of reaping the fruits of his clemency, and all unanimouſly applauded his late conduct,

Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

Afranius, informed of what was tranſacting, quitted the work he was engaged in, and returned to the camp, not at all diſturbed, and prepared for all events: But *Petreius* diſcovered a very different ſpirit. He armed his ſlaves, and, joining to them a prætorian cohort and ſome Spaniſh cavalry, he flew to the rampart, and broke off the conferences of the ſoldiers, drove *Cæſar*'s men out of the camp, and put all of them he could find to the ſword. Thoſe of them who had an opportunity to rally, wrapping their cloaks round their left arms, drew their ſwords; and, truſting to the nearneſs of their camp, defended themſelves till they gradually retreated to the advanced guard, who ſcreened them from any further purſuit.

Then *Petreius* went through the whole camp, begging the troops, with tears in his eyes, to have pity on him and on *Pompey* their General, and not to deliver them up to the cruel vengeance of their enemies. The ſoldiers followed him to the head-quarters; and there he propoſed to them to bind themſelves by a new oath, not to abandon their Commanders, nor to act ſeparately, but with concert and unanimity for the public good. He himſelf took the oath firſt, then tendered it to *Afranius*, then to the military Tribunes and Centurions; and, laſtly, to all the companies of the army. At the ſame time an order was iſſued, that all who had any of *Cæſar*'s troops in their tents ſhould produce them, in order that they might be put to death in the ſight of the whole army. A few obeyed; but the

the greateſt part, deteſting this bloody decree, carefully concealed thoſe who were under their protection, and procured them means to eſcape in the night. However, the terror impreſſed upon them by their Generals, the ſeverity ſhewn in puniſhing, and the new oath they had been obliged to take, defeated, for the preſent, all hopes of a ſurrender, and reduced the war to its former ſtate. *Cæſar*, on his ſide, ordered diligent ſearch to be made after the *Afranians* who had remained in his camp, and carefully ſent them back. Some Officers choſe to ſtay with him; and theſe he afterwards treated with great diſtinction, promoting them to higher ranks, and honouring ſuch of them as were *Roman* Knights with the office of military Tribune. Y. R. 704. Bef. Ch. 48. 403 Conſ.

The army of *Afranius* had now no forage, and could not water but with much difficulty. The legionary ſoldiers, who had been ordered to take with them two and twenty days proviſion, had ſome corn remaining: But the Spaniſh infantry and auxiliary troops had none; and, having no opportunity of ſupplying themſelves, they deſerted in great numbers to *Cæſar*. In this extremity, the expedient of returning to *Ilerda* appeared the ſafeſt, as they had ſtill ſome proviſions in that city; and there they propoſed to conſult concerning the future management of the war. *Tarraco* was at a greater diſtance, and they would of conſequence be expoſed to greater hazards in the way. This reſolution being taken, they decamped; and *Cæſar* followed, ſending his cavalry before, which perpetually

Y.R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

harraſſed the rear of the enemy. The manner of fighting was thus: Some light-armed cohorts formed the rear-guard of *Afranius*'s army; and theſe, where the ground was even, halted from time to time, and made head againſt the cavalry. When they fell in with an eminence, the very nature of the ground furniſhed them with the means of defending themſelves; becauſe thoſe who were foremoſt could protect thoſe who followed. When they came, however, to a deſcent, the van could give no aſſiſtance to the rear, and the cavalry annoyed them with their darts. To avoid this inconveniency, the legions halted, and, driving back the cavalry a good way, ran down the hill precipitately, and traverſed the valley until they came to the oppoſite eminence. Their cavalry, which ſhould have been of great uſe in this retreat, and of which they had a conſiderable number, were ſo terrified by their ill ſucceſs in former engagements, that they had been placed in the midſt of the army, in order to be defended by the infantry; and, if any of them dared to ſtraggle out of this ſituation, they were immediately taken by *Cæſar*'s horſe.

During theſe perpetual ſkirmiſhes, in which the *Afranians* were often obliged to ſtop to diſengage the rear, their march could not but be very ſlow. After advancing four miles, finding themſelves hard preſſed by the cavalry, they halted on an eminence, and drew a line before them, as if they meant to encamp; but did not unload their baggage: And when they ſaw that *Cæſar* had marked out his camp, pitched his tents, and

ſent

ſent his cavalry to forage, they ſuddenly, towards noon, reſumed their march, hoping to be rid of the cavalry for ſome time. *Cæſar*, leaving a few cohorts to guard his baggage, followed with his legions, and ſent orders for his cavalry to return with all ſpeed. The cavalry obſerved his orders, and, coming up with the enemy before the cloſe of day, fell upon their rear with ſuch impetuoſity that it was almoſt put to the rout. A great number of ſoldiers, and ſome Centurions, loſt their lives. At the ſame time *Cæſar* appearing with his whole army, the enemy were threatened with a total overthrow, as they could neither continue their march, nor look out for a proper place for a camp. They were forced to halt in a very diſadvantageous ground, and at a diſtance from water. *Cæſar*, conſtant in his purpoſe, did not offer to attack them, but kept all his troops under arms to be in readineſs to purſue, if they ſhould attempt to eſcape either in the day or night. *Pompey*'s Lieutenants, ſenſible of the diſadvantage of their ſituation, employed the whole night in throwing up intrenchments, and in diſpoſing their camp with an oppoſite front to *Cæſar*'s army. The next day they continued at their works, and laboured from ſunriſe to the evening. But the farther they extended their lines in order to better their poſition, the farther they removed from water: And thus, to avoid one inconveniency, they fell into a greater. *Cæſar*, who wanted to oblige them to capitulate, by reducing them to extreme neceſſity, drew lines round their camp; and by this method

Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

thod he offered an obſtruction to any ſallies or eruptions which they might make. The ſcarcity of forage, and the view of performing their march with the greater expedition, ſoon induced them to kill all the beaſts of burden which they could not feed: And two days were waſted in forming and executing this reſolution. But, on the third, *Afranius* and *Petreius*, ſeeing *Cæſar*'s works very much advanced, and being apprehenſive of the conſequences, drew all their forces out of the camp, and formed them in order of battle. *Cæſar*, aware of the hurt it might do his reputation, if, contrary to the inclination of his troops, and the general expectation, he ſtill continued to decline an engagement, called in his workmen, aſſembled his cavalry, and put his army in a condition to receive them. He reſolved, however, to remain upon the defenſive; and the rather, becauſe the diſtance between the two camps was ſo ſmall, being only two thouſand feet, that, ſhould he put the enemy to the rout, he could not flatter himſelf with the hopes of a complete victory.

Afranius's troops were ranged in a double line, conſiſting of five legions: The *Spaniſh* cohorts, which uſed to be ſtationed in the wings, formed the body of reſerve. *Cæſar*'s legions were drawn up in three lines: The firſt conſiſted of twenty cohorts, four out of each of his legions; the ſecond of fifteen cohorts, three out of each legion; and the third of the ſame number. The archers and ſlingers were diſpoſed in the middle, and the cavalry in the two wings. The army being

being drawn up in this manner, each General kept firm to his reſolution; *Cæſar*, not to engage unleſs forced to it; and *Afranius* to prevent the progreſs of *Cæſar*'s works. In this poſture they continued till ſun-ſet, when both armies returned to their ſeveral camps. The next day *Cæſar* propoſed to finiſh his lines; and *Pompey*'s Lieutenants endeavoured to find a fordable place in the *Sicoris*: But *Cæſar* had taken his meaſures againſt this attempt, and had ſent his light-armed *Germans* with part of his cavalry over the river, and poſted bodies of troops along the banks at a ſmall diſtance from one another. Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

The two Generals, having now no hope left, and being in want of wood, water, and corn, they demanded a parley, and begged that it might be in ſome place out of the ſight of the ſoldiers. *Cæſar* conſented to an interview, but the latter part of their requeſt was denied them: And *Afranius*, having firſt given his ſon for an hoſtage, met *Cæſar* in the preſence of both armies. He addreſſed him to this effect, with all poſſible marks of ſubmiſſion: "that it was no "juſt matter of blame, either in him or his ſol-"diers, to have preſerved their fidelity to their "General *Pompey*; but that they had now ſuffi-"ciently acquitted themſelves of their duty, and "ſuffered enough in his cauſe by the want of all "kinds of neceſſaries: That, like wild beaſts "caught in a toil, they were deprived of the "moſt common enjoyments; having their bo-"dies oppreſſed with want, and their minds "overwhelmed with ignominy; and that there-

fore

Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

" fore they acknowledged themſelves to be van-
" quiſhed, and beſought and conjured him not
" to make a rigorous uſe of his victory, but to
" ſpare the lives of his unhappy countrymen."
Cæſar replied, " that *Afranius*, of all men, had
" the leaſt reaſon to complain of his preſent un-
" fortunate ſituation, and the leaſt pretenſions
" to any favour; for that every one elſe had
" performed their duty: *He himſelf*, in declining
" to attack his army, though favoured by the
" advantages of time and place, in order that
" the way might be open to an accommodation:
" *His army*, in returning unhurt the men that
" were in their power, after injuries received,
" and the maſſacre of their comrades: And
" even *Afranius's own troops*, in endeavouring to
" conclude a peace whereon the common ſafety
" depended. That thus, when all orders had
" ſhewn an inclination to treat, *Afranius* and *Pe-*
" *treius* alone had oppoſed the ſteps to an accom-
" modation; refuſing an interview, and barba-
" rouſly murdering thoſe whom the faith of a
" conference had inticed into their camp. That
" it had therefore happened to them, as it often
" happens to men of obſtinacy and arrogance;
" and they were forced to have recourſe to
" prayers, and earneſtly to ſollicit the ſame
" terms which they had rejected with ſcorn.
" That he would not, however, take advantage
" of their preſent ſubmiſſion, or the favourable
" circumſtances he was in, to inſiſt upon any
" thing tending to the increaſe of his power:
" And that he only requeſted they would diſ-

band

Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

" band thoſe troops which had been ſo long kept
" on foot againſt him: For with what other
" view (he ſaid) had ſix legions been ſent into
" *Spain*; a ſeventh levied there; ſo many pow-
" erful navies equipped; and ſo many able and
" experienced Officers ſent over? That ſuch
" mighty preparations could not be meant againſt
" *Spain*, or to ſupply the want of a province,
" which, having enjoyed a long peace, had no
" occaſion for ſuch extraordinary forces: That
" their real end was his deſtruction; to effect
" which, a new ſpecies of power had been in-
" troduced into the Commonwealth; and that,
" on this account, the ſame man had been ap-
" pointed to command in *Italy* at the gates of
" *Rome*, and to hold for ſo many years, though
" abſent, the government of the two moſt po-
" tent provinces of the Republic. That, for
" this reaſon alone, the Magiſtrates had been
" ſtripped of their prerogatives, the Conſuls and
" Prætors not being ſuffered, as had been al-
" ways the cuſtom, to take the different pro-
" vinces at the expiration of their offices; and
" particular Governors were appointed by the
" choice and management of a faction. That,
" for this reaſon alone, he had been denied that
" juſtice which had never been refuſed to any
" General before him; and was not allowed to
" diſband his army, and to return home with
" honour; or, at leaſt, without ignominy, after
" having ſucceſsfully ſerved the public. That
" all theſe injuries he had hitherto borne, and
" ſtill reſolved to bear with patience; that it

" was

Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

"was not now his deſign to take from *Afra-*
"*nius* his ſoldiers, and to enliſt them in his own
"ſervice, which it would be eaſy for him to
"do; and that he only meant to prevent their
"being employed againſt him. That, there-
"fore, *Afranius* muſt quit *Spain*, and diſband his
"forces; that this was his determined reſolu-
"tion: And that theſe were the only terms of
"peace he would grant."

Theſe conditions were very agreeable to *Afra-nius*'s ſoldiers; who, inſtead of being puniſhed, as they feared, were, in ſome ſort, rewarded by the diſcharge procured them. They plainly ſhewed their ſatisfaction: For, while the place and time of their diſmiſſion were under debate between *Cæſar* and *Afranius*, they ſignified by their geſtures and cries from the rampart, that they deſired to be immediately diſbanded. After ſome diſcuſſion, it was determined that thoſe who had houſes and poſſeſſions in *Spain* ſhould be diſcharged upon the ſpot, and the reſt, when they arrived at the *Varus*, a river between *Gaul* and *Italy*. And *Cæſar* declared, that no perſon ſhould be injured or forced into his ſervice: And that all thoſe who had loſt any thing during the war ſhould be indemnified. He alſo engaged to furniſh them with corn till they got to the *Varus*. By this generous behaviour, he acquired the confidence of *Pompey*'s army to ſuch a degree, that he became the arbiter of all their diſputes, either among themſelves, or with their Commanders: And when they were ready to mutiny about their pay, which *Petreius* and *A-*

The *Var.*

franius

franius affirmed not to be yet due, the matter was referred to him, and he determined it to the equal ſatisfaction of both parties. One third of the army was disbanded during the two days they continued in their camp: The reſt ſet out for the *Varus*, two of *Cæſar*'s legions marching before, and the others following after, and encamping near them. *Q. Fuſius Calenus*, one of *Cæſar*'s Lieutenants, preſided over the march; and, when he arrived at the *Varus*, diſbanded them; but the greateſt part of them came over voluntarily to *Cæſar*: The two Generals went to find out *Pompey*. Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

Thus did *Cæſar*, within forty days from his arrival in *Spain*, with five legions, and ſome auxiliary *Gauls*, reduce an army of five legions of veterans, eighty cohorts of *Spaniards*, and five thouſand horſe: And now many reaſons called upon him to return into *Italy*; but he did not think it adviſeable to leave *Spain*, till he had ſubjected the whole country to his obedience. *M. Varro* commanded two legions in further *Spain*, to which he had added thirty auxiliary cohorts: And he had formed great magazines of corn, not only for his own uſe, but with a view alſo of ſupplying *Marſeilles*, and the army under *Afranius* and *Petreius*. The *Gaditani* had been ordered to furniſh him with ten ſhips of war, and more had been built at *Hiſpalis*. He had put all his proviſions into *Gades*, and had conveyed thither all the money and ornaments which he had found in the temple of *Hercules*: And, to guard this town, he gave it a garriſon of ſix cohorts, under Cæſ. de Bell. Civ. Com. l. i. The people of Cadiz. Seville. Cadiz.

Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

under the command of *C. Gallonius*, a Roman Knight. This Commander had ſpoken upon every occaſion with contempt of *Cæſar*'s forces, and had frequently declared from his tribunal, that *Cæſar* had been worſted, and that his ſoldiers had gone over to *Afranius*. By theſe arts, he had ſtruck ſuch a terror into the *Roman* citizens who reſided in his province, that he engaged them to promiſe him one hundred and ninety thouſand ſeſterces, twenty thouſand weight of ſilver, with one hundred and twenty thouſand buſhels of wheat. The States well affected to *Cæſar* he loaded with heavy impoſitions, and quartered ſoldiers upon them: He harraſſed private men whom he thought averſe to his cauſe with arbitrary judgments: He confiſcated the eſtates of many, whom he accuſed of having ſpoken againſt what he called the *Commonwealth*: And he obliged the whole province to take an oath of fidelity to himſelf and *Pompey*. *Cæſar*, who ſeems to give an account of this General's [t] behaviour with a particular reſentment, tells us, that in the beginning of the civil war, while his affairs went on ſucceſsfully in *Italy*, *Varro* had affected to ſpeak of him with great regard, and in a moſt friendly manner, ſaying, "that indeed "he was under particular obligations to *Pompey*, "who had made him his Lieutenant, but at "the ſame time was greatly indebted to *Cæſar*: "That he was not ignorant of the duty of an

[t] He was probably the learned *Varro*, who had alſo ſerved under *Pompey* in the war againſt the pirates.

officer

" officer employed by his General in an office " of truſt; but that he likewiſe knew his own " weakneſs, and the attachment of the whole " province to *Cæſar.*" When he underſtood, however, that *Cæſar* was ſtopped by the ſiege of *Marſeilles*; that *Afranius* and *Petreius* had executed the junction of their troops, which they had conſiderably increaſed; and that all hither *Spain* had unanimouſly declared to ſupport them; he changed his behaviour and ſpeech. *Varro*, therefore, having committed ſo many acts of hoſtility, reſolved to perſiſt in his meaſures, and prepare for war: And, being ſenſible that the whole province was in *Cæſar*'s intereſt, he determined to ſhut himſelf up in *Gades*, where all his proviſions and ſhipping lay; hoping, by the ſtrength of the town, which is an iſland ſurrounded by the ſea, and with the help of his fleet, to draw out the war into length. Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

Cæſar ſent againſt him *Q. Caſſius*, Tribune of the people, with two legions; and he himſelf ſet out by great journeys at the head of ſix hundred horſe, for *Corduba*, whither he ſummoned the Magiſtrates of the different States. All obeyed: Every city ſent its Deputies, nor was there a *Roman* citizen of any note who did not repair to him. The Senate of *Corduba* ſhut their gates againſt *Varro*, ſtationed guards and centinels along the walls, and detained two cohorts, called *Colonicæ*, which were accidentally marching that way, that they might ſerve to protect the town. At the ſame time, the people Cordovæ.

Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

of *Carmona* drove out of their city, which is the moſt conſiderable in the whole province, three cohorts which *Varro* had left there, and ſhut their gates againſt them.

The apparent affection of the province for *Cæſar* determined *Varro* to make all poſſible diſpatch to reach *Gades* before his march could be intercepted. But he had advanced but a little way, when he received letters, informing him, "That, as ſoon as *Cæſar*'s edict was "known, the principal men of the town had "conſpired with the Tribunes of the garriſon "to drive out *Gallonius*, and deliver up the city "and iſland to *Cæſar*; that, this agreement be-"ing made, they had warned *Gallonius* to retire "of his own accord; threatening, if he refuſed "to comply voluntarily, to force him to it: "And that this Commander, terrified by ſo "general a revolt, had thought proper to leave "*Gades*." Upon this intelligence, one of the legions, called *Vernacula*, took up their enſigns in *Varro*'s preſence, quitted the camp, and marched directly to *Hiſpalis*, where they ſat down in the market-place, without committing the leaſt act of violence; a circumſtance which ſo wrought upon the *Roman* citizens reſiding in the town, that every one was deſirous of accommodating them in their houſes. *Varro*, aſtoniſhed and confounded at theſe proceedings, turned back with deſign to reach *Italica*, but was informed that its gates were ſhut. At laſt, finding himſelf ſurrounded on all ſides, and the ways every-

every-where beſet, he wrote to *Cæſar*, that he was ready to reſign the legion under his command to whomſoever he would appoint to receive it. *Cæſar* ſent *Sextus Cæſar* to take the command; and *Varro*, having delivered up the legion accordingly, came to him at *Corduba*: Where, after giving an account of the ſtate of the province, he faithfully reſigned all the public money he had in his hands, and informed him of the quantity of corn and ſhipping he had prepared. Y.R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

Cæſar, in the Aſſembly of the States at *Corduba*, having returned thanks to all thoſe who had declared in his favour, remitted the tribute impoſed by *Varro* upon the *Roman* citizens; reſtored their eſtates to thoſe who had been deprived of them for ſpeaking freely their thoughts; diſtributed rewards to a great many in public and private; gave all hopes to receive the like favours hereafter; and, after a ſtay of two days, went to *Gades*; where he reſtored to the temple of *Hercules* all the treaſures and ornaments it had been ſpoiled of, and ſoon after procured this city the freedom of *Rome*. And, having committed the government of the province to *Q. Caſſius*, with the command of four legions, he embarked for *Terraco*, on board the fleet which *Varro* had obliged the *Gaditani* to equip. There he found the Deputies of all *nether Spain*; and having, in like manner as at *Corduba*, thanked and rewarded them, both publicly and privately, he went by land to *Narbonne*, and ſo to the ſiege of *Marſeilles*.

CHAP. V.

The ſiege of Marſeilles. Caius Antonius *and* Dolabella, Cæſar's *Lieutenants, in* Illyricum, *are defeated by* M. Octavius *and* Scribonius Libo. Curio's *unfortunate expedition into* Africa.

Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

WHILE *Cæſar* was employed in reducing *Spain*, *C. Trebonius* and *D. Brutus* had carried on the ſiege of *Marſeilles* with great vigour; and the inhabitants had bravely defended themſelves. The town of *Marſeilles* was formerly waſhed by the ſea on three ſides: It could be approached by land only on the fourth; and the citadel, being very ſtrong by nature, becauſe of a deep valley that ran before it, required a long and difficult ſiege. [i] It was of great importance to the beſieged to command the ſea: And, to beat off *Brutus's* fleet, they equipped ſeventeen gallies. To theſe they added a great number of ſmaller veſſels, filled with archers and the mountaineers whom they had engaged in their ſervice; and, on board of which, *Domitius* put alſo his own domeſtics whom he had brought with him from *Italy*. With this force they ſailed out to give battle to

Cæſ. de Bell. Civ. Com. lib. i.

[i] From this deſcription it appears, ſays *M. D'Anville*, that the town did not then ſtand upon the ſame extent of ground as now: It only covered a triangle formed on one ſide by the port, and on the other by the coaſt of the great ſea: Whereas now it is built round the port. *Notice de l'Ancienne Gaul, p.* 440.

Brutus, who lay at anchor at an iſland over-againſt the town. His fleet was much inferior to that of the *Maſſilians* in the number of ſhips; but *Cæſar* had manned it with his beſt ſoldiers, choſen out of all the legions, and headed by Centurions of diſtinguiſhed bravery; and he had provided it with hooks and grappling irons, and offenſive weapons of all ſorts. Upon the firſt notice of the approach of the enemy, *Brutus* ſtood out to ſea. The conflict was ſharp and vigorous; for the mountaineers, a hardy race, habituated to arms, and trained up to war, yielded little in point of valour to the *Romans*. *Domitius*'s vaſſals were animated with the hopes of liberty; and, fighting under the eye of their maſter, behaved gallantly. The townſmen confided in the nimbleneſs of their ſhips and the ſkill of their pilots, and employed all their art to elude the ſhock of *Brutus*'s veſſels, and to baffle all their attempts. The enemy extended their line of battle in order to ſurround his fleet, or attack his ſhips ſingly with a number of theirs, or in running along ſide, to ſweep away a range of oars. When they were compelled to come to a cloſer engagement, they relied wholly on the bravery of their mountaineers and the *Italian* peaſants. *Brutus*'s fleet was but indifferently provided with rowers and pilots, who had been haſtily taken out of ſome merchant-ſhips, and knew not ſo much as the names of the tackle. They were incommoded too by the weight and lumpiſhneſs of

Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

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their veſſels, which, being built with too much expedition and of unſeaſoned timber, were not ſo ready at tacking about. When an opportunity however offered of coming to cloſe fight, they would boldly get between two of the enemy's ſhips; and, grappling them with their hooks, charge them on each ſide, board them, and cut to pieces the mountaineers and peaſants who defended them. In this manner, they ſunk part of the *Maſſilian* veſſels, took ſome, with all the men on board, and drove the reſt into the haven.

Cæſ. de Bell. Civ. Com. lib. ii.

This loſs was repaired with all poſſible expedition. The *Maſſilians* drew out of their docks, and rigged as many old ſhips as they had loſt; they alſo prepared a number of fiſhing barks, which they filled with archers and engines; and thus they were in readineſs to ſail upon the firſt occaſion. *Pompey*, who was ſenſible of what importance it was to keep *Cæſar* employed in theſe parts, ſent *L. Naſidius* to the ſuccour of *Marſeilles*, with a fleet of ſixteen ſhips, ſome of which were very ſtrong, and armed with beaks of braſs. This fleet paſſed the ſtreights of *Sicily* unknown to *Curio*, and, in their way, put in at *Meſſana*, where their unexpected arrival cauſed ſo great a terror, that the town was deſerted by the Senate and the principal inhabitants: And *Naſidius*, entering the harbour without any oppoſition, drew out one of the galleys, which he joined to his fleet. The *Maſſilians*, informed of his arrival, ſailed out a ſecond time to try their for-

Meſſina.

fortune, and rendezvouſed at *Taurentum*, a caſtle belonging to the town, where *Naſidius* lay with his whole ſquadron. Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

Brutus went to fight them with his fleet, which he had conſiderably increaſed by ſix ſhips which he had taken in the late action. The battle was maintained on both ſides with determined courage. The *Maſſilians* had put on board their ſhips the choice of their youth, and the moſt conſiderable men of the city; who were all convinced, that on the iſſue of that day's engagement depended the ſafety and preſervation of their country. But *Naſidius* was of no ſervice to them: He left them during the engagement, and retired without hurt to the coaſt of *Spain*. *Brutus* obtained a ſecond victory, having ſunk five, and taken four of the enemy's ſhips.

Taurenti, on the right ſide of the bay of *Ciotat*.

Theſe diſaſters at ſea diſheartened not the inhabitants of the town: They continued to defend themſelves by land againſt *Trebonius* with great courage. This Commander had attacked them in two places; on the ſide of the port where the docks were; and on the ſide towards the ſea, near the mouth of the *Rhone*: And, having been furniſhed from all parts of the province with a great number of workmen and carriages, and with wood and other materials, he had greatly advanced his works. But ſo well was the town ſtored with all engines neceſſary for its defence, that no mantelets of ozier were ſufficient to withſtand their violence. Their

V. R. 794. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

Baliſtæ ſhot wooden beams, twelve feet in length, and armed with iron, with ſuch force, that, after they had pierced four rows of hurdles, they entered a conſiderable way into the earth. To reſiſt the violence of theſe machines, the beſiegers were obliged to roof their galleries with pieces of wood of a feet in thickneſs, ſtrongly compacted together. Under this cover the materials neceſſary for raiſing the mount or terras, which was to be oppoſed to the town wall, were conveyed; and a tortoiſe, ſixty feet long, compoſed of ſtrong beams, and every thing neceſſary to defend it againſt fire and ſtones, was carried before to level the ground. But, in ſpight of all endeavours, and the greatneſs of the works employed againſt them, the height of their wall and towers, and the multitude of their machines, retarded the approaches of the beſiegers. Beſides, the mountaineers made frequent ſallies, which greatly annoyed the workmen.

The Legionaries, who had the charge of the works on the right, perceived that a tower of brick, built at a little diſtance from the walls, would be of great ſervice to ſhelter them from the frequent ſallies of the enemy. At firſt they made it very low and ſmall; and it ſerved chiefly as a place of retreat, when they were repulſed. But they ſoon perceived that it would be of much more uſe if it were raiſed to a greater height. This they effected in the following manner: The tower was of a ſquare

form,

form, thirty feet every way, allowing for the thickneſs of the walls, which was five feet. When it was raiſed to the height of one ſtory, they laid a floor over it, the extremities of whoſe beams were concealed in the thickneſs of the wall, that they might not, by appearing on the outſide, be liable to be ſet on fire. Then the wall was continued directly upwards as far as their mantelets would permit: And two beams were laid acroſs each other, the ends of which almoſt reached the angles of the wall. Theſe were for ſupporting the floor, which was to ſerve as a roof to the tower. Over theſe beams they placed the joiſts of the roof, and covered them with planks. Theſe joiſts projected a little beyond the wall, in order to ſuſpend from them what might be neceſſary to ſhelter the workmen. This floor they paved with tiles and mortar, to render it proof againſt fire; and it had beſides a covering of mattreſſes to break the force of the darts and ſtones which might be thrown againſt it by the enemy. At the ſame time, they hung from the beams of this roof, that projected beyond the wall, curtains, made of ſtrong cables, woven to the depth of four feet, and which went round the three ſides of the tower which were expoſed to the engines; having formerly experienced, that this kind of cover was impenetrable to any dart or engine whatever. When the roof with its curtains was thus prepared, they removed the mantelets, and elevated the roof from the firſt ſtory as far as the curtains would permit. Then, ſecure from

Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

all

Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

all inſult, they laboured at the brick wall: And, when they had raiſed it to the height of a ſecond ſtory, they again ſcrewed up the roof; and, under its defence, and of the curtains hanging from it, they continued the work, and laid the interjacent floors. In this manner they proceeded till they had completed ſix ſtories, leaving always holes in convenient places from which they could play their engines.

When, by means of this tower, they thought they had ſufficiently provided for the ſecurity of the works around it, they undertook to build a moveable gallery, ſixty feet long, of timber two feet in thickneſs, to extend from their brick tower to the walls of the town. The gallery they conſtructed in this manner: Two beams of equal length were firſt laid upon the ground at the diſtance of four feet from one another: And upon theſe were erected pillars, five feet high, joined at the top by pieces of wood deſigned to ſupport the roof of the gallery. Over theſe were placed rafters two feet ſquare, faſtened ſtrongly with nails and plates of iron. The upper part of the roof was compoſed of ſquare laths, four inches thick, to bear the weight of the tiles that were to be laid upon them; and a covering of hides was thrown over it to hinder the cement from being waſhed away by ſpouts of water. Over all were laid ſtrong mattreſſes to ſcreen the hides from fire and ſtones. This work was finiſhed cloſe by the brick fortreſs, under cover of four mantelets, and immediately carried forward upon

upon rollers, till it unexpectedly reached the very tower of the enemy. Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

The beſieged, aſtoniſhed at ſo threatening and unlooked for a machine, puſhed forward with levers the largeſt ſtones they could find, and tumbled them upon it. But the ſtrength of the wood reſiſted their weight and violence, ſo that they fell to the ground without doing any hurt. Obſerving this, they poured down barrels of burning pitch and other combuſtible matter. But theſe likewiſe rolled along the roof without damage, and, falling to the ground, were thruſt away from the works with forks and long poles. Meanwhile the ſoldiers, under the protection of this gallery, were endeavouring to undermine the enemy's fortreſs; the gallery itſelf was defended by the brick tower, whence the engines played without intermiſſion, inſomuch that the enemy driven from their battlements, were at laſt obliged to abandon their defence. By degrees the tower being undermined, part of it fell down, and the reſt was ſo ſhaken that it could not ſtand long.

The *Maſſilians* diſmayed, and dreading the plunder and devaſtation of their city, came out in the habit of ſupplicants, and beſought the compaſſion of the army and Generals, earneſtly requeſting that all further operations ſhould be ſuſpended till *Cæſar*'s arrival. They told them, "that, their tower being deſtroyed, they were "ſenſible the city could hold out no longer; "and therefore meant not to defend it. That, "in the mean time, no prejudice could ariſe to

V. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conf.

"the beſiegers from a ſhort reſpite, becauſe, "if they refuſed to ſubmit upon *Cæſar*'s coming, "he would have it in his power to treat them as "he pleaſed." They added, "that, if the whole "tower ſhould be broken down, it would be im- "poſſible to hinder the ſoldiers from yielding "to the deſire of plunder, by breaking into and "pillaging the town." *Cæſar* had earneſtly recommended to *Trebonius*, by letter, to prevent, if poſſible, the city's being taken by ſtorm, leſt the ſoldiers, irritated by its obſtinate reſiſtance, ſhould put all the youth to the ſword, which they threatened to do. The requeſt of the *Maſſilians* was therefore complied with, though the ſoldiers murmured at the delay of a conqueſt which they looked upon as eaſy and certain.

But the *Maſſilians* were inſincere, and aimed at nothing in all this, but to find a time and opportunity to deceive the *Romans*, and put in practice the perfidious deſign they had formed. For, after a few days, they ſuddenly ſallied from the town, and, the wind being favourable, they ſet fire to the enemy's works. The flame, in a moment, ſpread itſelf on all ſides, and the terraſs, the mantelets, the tortoiſe, and the tower, with its machines, were entirely conſumed, before it was poſſible to diſcover whence the diſaſter aroſe. The *Romans* ran immediately to their arms, every one taking what came firſt to his hands; and flew from the camp to their works, where they attacked the enemy with great fierceneſs, but their ardour was checked by the arrows and darts poured in upon them from the

town,

town. The beſieged, now ſecure under their walls, deſtroyed without difficulty the brick tower, and the gallery connected with it. Next day, being favoured by the ſame wind, they attacked, with ſtill greater aſſurance, another tower and terraſs of the other attack. But *Cæſar*'s Lieutenant, grown wiſe by his late misfortune, had made all neceſſary preparations for their defence: So that the enemy, after loſing many men, were obliged to retreat into the city without effecting their purpoſe. Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

Trebonius immediately reſolved to repair his loſs, and he was warmly ſeconded by his ſoldiers, who were greatly provoked to ſee their credulity had been abuſed, and that they were the jeſt of a perfidious enemy. All the wood in the neighbourhood of *Marſeilles* had been already cut down: They were therefore obliged to raiſe a terraſs of a new kind, and ſuch as hiſtory no where mentions before that time. They erected two walls of brick, each ſix feet thick, and of the ſame diſtance from each other with thoſe of the former terraſs. Over theſe they laid a covering which was ſupported by beams laid acroſs: And, to make it firm, they placed pillars underneath between the walls. Hurdles, with brick and earth intermixed, ſerved to make it proof againſt fire. The ſoldiers, thus ſheltered over head, on the right and left by the walls, and before by mantelets, brought without danger the neceſſary materials for carrying on the works: And, by the eagerneſs with which they laboured, ſoon completed

Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

pleted them; leaving doors at convenient places, from which they might ſally out upon occaſion.

Cæſar de Bell. Civ. Com. lib. ii.

The townſmen ſeeing that the *Romans* had repaired in a few days what they imagined muſt have coſt them the labour of many months; that there was no hope left either of deceiving them, or ſallying out upon them with ſucceſs; that all the approaches to the city by land might in like manner be ſhut up by a wall and towers, ſo as to render it impoſſible for them to appear upon their battlements; that they could neither diſcharge their javelins to any effect, nor make uſe of their engines, in which their principal hope lay; and that they were now reduced to the neceſſity of fighting upon equal terms; they were forced to have recourſe again to the ſame conditions of truce they had ſo ill deſerved before; and, on *Cæſar*'s arrival, having no proſpect of relief, they ſurrendered at diſcretion. *Domitius*, ſome days before, took the opportunity of a ſtorm to ſail out of the harbour with three veſſels. They were chaced by *Brutus*'s ſhips, which kept conſtantly at anchor in the road, or before the port: And two of the three were obliged to return back, but that, which carried *Domitius*, made its eſcape. *Cæſar* ſpared the town, he ſays, more in regard to its antiquity and reputation, than to any real merit it could plead. He obliged the citizens, however, to deliver up their arms, machines, and ſhips of war, to ſurrender all the money in their treaſury, and to receive a garriſon of two legions. The reſt of his army he

he ſent into *Italy*, and he himſelf ſet out for *Rome*. [k] Y.R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

Cæſar's arms were not equally ſucceſsful when conducted by his Lieutenants. Fortune, ſays *Florus*, ventured to do ſomething in *Illyricum* and *Africa* againſt the abſent General: But it was as if ſhe meant, by ſome dark ſhades of adverſity, to heighten the ſplendor of his own exploits. We have but few particulars of what paſſed in *Illyricum*, *Cæſar*'s account being loſt. We may gather from the hiſtorians, particularly *Florus*, that *Dolabella* and *Antonius* were ſuddenly ſurrounded by a ſuperior number of men from *Pompey*'s fleets, commanded by *M. Octavius* and *Scribonius Libo*: And that *C. Antonius* was obliged, for want of proviſions, to ſurrender himſelf priſoner, with fifteen cohorts, in the iſland of *Corcyra*, off the coaſt of *Dalmatia*. An expreſſion of *Cæſar* informs us, that the loſs of the army was occaſioned by the perfidy of *Pulcio*, one of his officers. Some of the troops attempted to eſcape in ſmall flat-bottomed boats; but were ſtopped by a contrivance of the *Cilician* marines in *Pompey*'s fleet. Theſe had formed nets made of twiſted ropes and chains, and extended them from rock to rock under water. However, of three boats, two got off by the working of the ſea, but the third, filled with ſoldiers from a town beyond the *Po* called *Opitergium*, could not Oderzo.

[k] *Pompey* and the Senate in his camp, to reward, in ſome manner, the fidelity of the town of *Marſeilles*, gave the rights and privileges of a free city to *Phocæa* in *Ionia*, which was the mother-town of *Marſeilles*. *Dio*.

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Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

be diſengaged. It was ſurrounded on all ſides: And the ſoldiers, after having defended themſelves for a whole day, choſe, in the night, at the inſtigation of one of their officers, to turn their ſwords againſt one another, and mutually kill themſelves to the laſt man, rather than ſurrender to the enemy.

The cauſe of *Cæſar*'s loſs in *Africa* was the raſhneſs of *Curio*. This Commander, who had conceived the higheſt contempt for the troops headed by *Attius Varus*, ſailed from *Sicily* into *Africa*, with only two of the four legions, which had been put under his command by *Cæſar*, and five hundred horſe. *Varus*, after the loſs of his cohorts at *Auximum*, had fled into *Africa*; which he had governed ſome years before, after the expiration of his prætorſhip. There, by his knowledge of the people and country, he levied two legions, and took the command of the province with the conſent of the natives. *Tubero*, who had been named by the *Pompeians* to this command, arriving ſome time after with his fleet before *Utica*, was forbid the town and harbour: Nor could he even obtain leave for his ſon to land, who was ſick on board his fleet: And he was obliged to weigh anchor and return to *Pompey*. *Curio*, after two days and three nights ſailing, landed at a place called *Aquilaria*, twenty-two miles diſtant from *Clupea*; where *L. Cæſar*, the ſon, was waiting for him with ten gallies, which *Varus* had repaired at *Utica* and put under his command. But *L. Cæſar*, terrified at the number of ſhips *Curio* brought with him, ſtood in

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for the coaſt; where, running his galley on ſhore, he left her, and went by land to *Adrumetum*, a town poſſeſſed by *C. Conſidius Longus*, with a garriſon of one legion. To this place likewiſe the reſt of his fleet repaired. *M. Rufus*, the Quæſtor, who commanded for *Curio* twelve ſhips, towed the galley off the ſtrand, and returned with the fleet to *Curio*. Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

Curio ordered him to ſail directly for *Utica*; whither he followed with his land-army. After a march of two days, he arrived at the river *Bagradas*, where he left *C. Caninius Rebilus* with the legions, and advanced before with the cavalry to take a view of the ſpot called the *Cornelian* camp, becauſe the firſt *Scipio Africanus* had encamped there. The ſituation was judged to be very advantageous. It was a high rock jutting out into the ſea, ſteep and rough on both ſides, but with an eaſy deſcent where it fronts *Utica*. It lay little more than a mile from that town, in a direct line: But as there was a fountain about half-way, which overflowed the plain and formed a moraſs, it was neceſſary to take a compaſs of ſix miles in marching to *Utica*. When he had taken a view of this poſt, he went and examined *Varus*'s camp.

It was covered by the town of *Utica* itſelf on one ſide, and on the other by a kind of theatre that ſtood without the walls: And, the works round this theatre taking up a great extent of ground, they rendered the approach to the camp extremely difficult. While he was taking his ſurvey, he ſaw all the roads crouded with peo-

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ple, who were carrying their valuable effects into the city: And he detached his cavalry to plunder them. At the ſame time *Varus* ordered ſix hundred *Numidian* horſe, with four hundred foot, to their aſſiſtance. The *Numidians*, unable to ſtand the firſt ſhock, retreated immediately to their camp with the loſs of one hundred and twenty men. Mean while the port of *Utica* was deſerted by all the merchant-ſhips that were there to the number of two hundred, in obedience to a proclamation *Curio* had publiſhed, in which he threatened to treat them as enemies, if they did not inſtantly repair to the *Cornelian* camp. By this means the army was at once plentifully ſupplied with every commodity: And *Curio*, upon his return to the camp at *Bagradas*, was ſaluted *Imperator* by the joint acclamations of the ſoldiers.

Next day, he led his army towards *Utica*, and encamped not far from the town: But, before he had made his intrenchments, he was informed by ſome parties of horſe ſtationed near the camp, that a powerful body of infantry and cavalry had been ſent by *Juba*, King of *Mauritania*, to its ſuccour, and were marching towards it. At the ſame time was ſeen a cloud of duſt, and ſoon after the enemy's van was in view. This King inherited from his father an affection for *Pompey*, and he perſonally hated *Curio*, who, during his tribuneſhip, had propoſed a law to deprive him of his kingdom. *Curio* immediately ſent the cavalry to ſuſtain their firſt charge and keep them in play: And he haſtened to form the legions

in

in order of battle. The horſe engaged according to his orders, and with ſuch ſucceſs, that, before the legions could be drawn up, the whole body of the King's troops, which marched without order or apprehenſion of danger, falling into confuſion, betook themſelves to flight. The cavalry, wheeling nimbly along the ſhore, found means to eſcape with little loſs into the town: But great numbers of the infantry were cut to pieces. Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

The night following two Centurions of the nation of the *Marſi*, with twenty-two ſoldiers, deſerted from *Curio*, and went over to *Attius Varus*. Theſe men aſſured him, that the whole army was extremely averſe to *Curio*, and would infallibly revolt, if he would but ſhew himſelf, and come to a conference with them. *Varus* accordingly drew out his legions the next day: *Curio* did the ſame: And both armies ſtood facing one another in order of battle, with a ſmall valley between them. *Sextus Quinctilius Varus*, who had been made priſoner at *Corfinium*, where he performed the office of Quæſtor to *Domitius*, and had been diſmiſſed by *Cæſar*, was now in *Attius*'s camp: And *Curio* had brought over the very ſame legions which had revolted from him and his General. He took occaſion, from this circumſtance, to try to debauch *Curio*'s army, "and began with putting the ſoldiers in mind "of their former oath to *Domitius* and to him- "ſelf: He exhorted them not to bear arms a- "gainſt the old companions of their fortune, "who had ſhared with them all the hazards of

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" the ſame ſiege; nor fight in defence of a party " which could not call them but by the ignomi- " nious name of deſerters." To theſe conſide- rations he added offers of a liberal recompence, if they would follow his fortune, and that of *Attius*. *Curio*'s ſoldiers returned no anſwer, nor made any declaration of their ſentiments: But an uncommon panic ſpread itſelf ſuddenly among them, and the reflections, which they communicated to one another, ſerved only to increaſe it.

Curio ſummoned a Council of war to deliberate on the proper remedies for this evil. Some of the officers propoſed to attack at all hazards *Varus*'s camp, and deemed this the beſt expedient to free the ſoldiers of their alarms. " It " was better, they ſaid, to truſt to valour, and " try the fortune of a battle, than to ſee them- " ſelves abandoned by their men, and delivered " up to the barbarity of the enemy." Others were for retiring during the night to the *Cornelian* camp, where they might at leiſure cure the minds of the ſoldiers: And whence, in caſe of a diſaſter, they could with more ſafety and eaſe retire into *Sicily* by the means and under the protection of their fleet. *Curio* was averſe to both theſe meaſures: The one, he thought, argued cowardice; the other an unjuſtifiable temerity. " With what hope, ſaid he, can we attack a " camp fortified by nature and art, and what " advantage can we draw from an attempt " whence we ſhall be obliged to retire with loſs? " Does not ſucceſs always ſecure to a General the " affection of his troops, whereas ill fortune is

" al-

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" always followed with contempt and hatred? " To change our camp would have the appear- " ance of an ignominious flight, and might alie- " nate from us the minds of the army: The " dutiful ought not to know that we diſtruſt " them; nor the diſaffected that we fear them, " becauſe our apprehenſions would only aug- " ment the preſumption of the one, and abate " the zeal of the other. But if what is reported " of the diſcontent of the army be true, which " I am yet unwilling to believe, we ought, for " that reaſon, rather to hide and diſſemble our " fears, than, by an unſeaſonable diſcovery of " them, to add ſtrength to the evil, and give " courage to the enemy. It is propoſed to " march away at midnight; this would only fur- " niſh a fairer occaſion to the ill-affected to exe- " cute their purpoſe. For fear and ſhame are " powerful reſtraints by day, but night entirely " diveſts them of their force. In fine, I own, " that I am not ſo daring as to attack a camp " without hopes of ſucceſs; nor ſo blinded by " fear as to be at a loſs what meaſures to purſue. " It is my opinion that we ought to try every " thing, rather than follow either of theſe ſchemes; " and I doubt not but, by your counſel, to fall " upon ſome ſafe and honourable expedient, " that will be attended with ſucceſs."

Then, aſſembling the ſoldiers, he reminded them of the great obligations *Cæſar* had to them: " It was you that gave the example of " ſubmiſſion at *Corfinium*, and all the municipal " towns followed it; it was you that obliged

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" *Pompey* to quit *Italy*, without being forced to " it by the loſs of a battle. Can you therefore " make any doubt but that he hates you, or " that *Cæſar* ranks you among his beſt friends; " particularly, when you ſee he has committed " my ſafety to your care, and entruſted you with " the protection of *Sicily* and *Afriea*, without " which he cannot hold *Italy*. You are now in " the preſence of thoſe who exhort you to aban- " don us: And indeed what can be more de- " ſirable to them, than at the ſame time to cir- " cumvent us, and fix upon you the ſtain of an " infamous crime? What worſe opinion could an " enraged enemy conceive of you, than to ſup- " poſe you capable of betraying thoſe who own " themſelves indebted to you for all their ſuc- " ceſs; and of throwing yourſelves into the " power of a party, who conſider you as the " authors of all their misfortunes? Are you " ſtrangers to *Cæſar*'s exploits in *Spain?* He has " defeated two armies, overcome two Generals, " and brought two provinces under ſubjection: " And all this within forty days after he came " in ſight of the enemy. Is it likely that thoſe, " who with forces unbroken could not ſtand " their ground, will be able to reſiſt, now that " they have received ſuch conſiderable loſſes? " And will you, who followed *Cæſar* before for- " tune declared in his favour, now return to the " vanquiſhed, and loſe the reward of your ſer- " vices? They charge you with having aban- " doned and betrayed them, contrary to the faith " of oaths: But did you deſert *Domitius*, or *Do-*

" *mi-*

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" *mitius* his ſoldiers? Were you not ready to
" have endured the laſt extremities, whilſt he
" privately endeavoured to eſcape? Were you
" not betrayed by him, and ſaved by *Cæſar*'s
" mercy? And how can the oath any longer ob-
" lige you, when he to whom you ſwore, laying
" down the enſigns of his office and authority,
" became a private perſon, and ſurrendered him-
" ſelf a captive to another? But perhaps, though
" you approve of *Cæſar*'s cauſe, you diſlike your
" General. I ſhall not inſiſt on the obligations
" you have to me: They are much inferior to
" my own deſire and your deſerts: But you are
" not ignorant that the rewards of military ſer-
" vice come not till after the concluſion of the
" war, and, I believe, you little doubt what
" will be the iſſue of the preſent one. Yet why
" ſhould I decline taking notice of the diligence I
" have uſed, the progreſs I have already made,
" and the good fortune that has hitherto atten-
" ded me? Have I not landed my army ſafe in
" *Africa* without the loſs of a ſingle ſhip; diſ-
" perſed the enemy's fleet; worſted their ca-
" valry; forced two hundred of their merchant-
" ſhips to quit the port of *Utica* and join me; and
" reduced them to a ſituation where it is im-
" poſſible for them to receive any ſupplies either
" by land or ſea? Can you think of deſerting
" a cauſe headed by ſuch leaders and attended
" with ſuch ſucceſs, to return to thoſe who ig-
" nominiouſly delivered up *Corfinium*, fled from
" *Italy*, ſurrendered *Spain*, and have already ſuf-
" fered ſuch loſſes in this *African* war? For my

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" part, I deſired no greater name than *Cæſar*'s " ſoldier; you have thought fit to give me that " of *Imperator*; which I am ready this moment " to reſign, if you repent of having done me " that honour. Give me again my former " name, that it may not be ſaid, that I was " honoured, to be covered afterwards with " greater ignominy."

This ſpeech had its proper effect: The ſoldiers often interrupted him to expreſs their grief at his ſuſpecting their fidelity: And, when he retired, they all gathered round him, begging him to lead them to battle, and make a trial of their zeal and bravery. This behaviour of the troops entirely ſatisfied the officers, and, with the conſent of them all, *Curio* determined to take the firſt occaſion to engage the enemy. Accordingly, he drew out his men the next day, and *Attius Varus* did the ſame. The valley between the two armies, though not very large, was of difficult aſcent: And each army waited till the other ſhould venture to paſs it, that they might engage with the greater advantage. At length all the cavalry of *Varus*'s left wing, together with the light-armed foot, deſcended into it. Upon this, *Curio* immediately detached his horſe with two cohorts, to engage them: And the enemy, unable to ſuſtain the firſt onſet, returned with full ſpeed to their main body; leaving the light-armed foot behind, who were ſurrounded and cut to pieces in ſight of *Varus*'s whole army. In that inſtant *Caninius Rebilus*, (one of *Cæſar*'s Lieutenants, who had diſtinguiſhed himſelf in the *Gallic*

war, and whom *Curio* had choſen for his Counſellor on account of his military capacity) cried out to his General: "Why do yon delay ſeiz-"ing the favourable moment? You ſee the e-"nemy is ſtruck with terror." *Curio* made no anſwer; only he deſired his ſoldiers to remember what they had promiſed the day before: And, advancing himſelf before the reſt, commanded them to follow him. The aſcent on the other ſide of the valley was ſo ſteep, that the foremoſt could not get up but with the aſſiſtance of thoſe that came after. The enemy, however, were ſo frightened with the rout and ſlaughter of their men, that they made no reſiſtance: And, before a dart was thrown, the whole army turned their backs, and fled to their camp, imagining themſelves already ſurrounded by the victorious cavalry. Of *Varus*'s army, about ſix hundred were killed; and a thouſand were wounded at the gates of the camp, where the throng was ſo great, that many were cruſhed to death. *Curio* loſt but one man, by name *Fabius Pelignus*, a Centurion of the loweſt rank in his army: As this man was purſuing the runaways, he called with a loud voice to *Varus*, who, hearing himſelf named ſeveral times, and taking him to be an officer of his own army, turned, and ſtood ſtill, demanding who he was, and what he wanted. *Fabius* then aimed a blow at his ſhoulder, which was uncovered, and would have certainly killed him, if he had not been immediately ſurrounded and put to death.

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Varus

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Varus, ſeeing his army under the greateſt conſternation, and that many of the men had deſerted the camp to take refuge in the town, brought all the reſt at midnight within the walls: And *Curio* the next day began a line of circumvallation, reſolving to lay ſiege to the place. *Utica* was filled with a great number of inhabitants, whom a long peace had rendered quite unfit for war, and, having formerly received many favours from *Cæſar*, ſtood well-affected to his cauſe. The Magiſtrates were ſo terrified with the bad ſucceſs they had met with, that they talked openly of ſurrendering; and begged of *Varus* not to ruin them with his obſtinacy. But meſſengers from King *Juba*, came while this affair was in agitation, who made them alter their reſolution. They brought the news that the King was himſelf coming to their aſſiſtance, at the head of a numerous army, and would ſoon appear. *Curio* received the ſame intelligence: But for ſome time, thro' too great a confidence in his good fortune, would give no credit to it. The news of *Cæſar*'s ſucceſs in *Spain* being now publicly known in *Africa*, he could not be perſuaded that *Juba* would dare to attempt any thing againſt him. But, being at laſt convinced by repeated accounts, that the King with all his forces was already arrived within twenty-five miles of *Utica*, he quitted his works, and retired to the *Cornelian* camp. It was conveniently placed near the ſea, was well fortified by art and nature, was plentifully ſtored with water and ſalt, and the coun-

country around was covered with trees, and abounded with corn: Here, therefore, he reſolved to wait the arrival of the forces which he had left in *Sicily*. Y.R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conf.

Curio, however, did not long abide by this prudent reſolution: Some deſerters bringing him an account that *Juba* had been obliged to return home to defend the borders of his kingdom, and compoſe the broils among the *Leptitani*, and had only ſent forward *Sabura* with a few troops; he too haſtily gave credit to this report: And, hurried away by his natural impetuoſity, determined to march towards the enemy. He ſent, in the beginning of the night, all his cavalry towards their camp, which was upon the river *Bagradas*: And he himſelf marched with the reſt of the forces about three in the morning, leaving only five cohorts to guard his baggage. After a march of ſix miles he was met by his cavalry, who, having travelled all the night, had ſurpriſed *Sabura*'s camp, killed a great number of his men, and made ſome priſoners. *Curio* aſked theſe, who commanded at *Bagradas*? They anſwered, *Sabura*. Upon this, without making any further enquiries, he turned to the ſoldiers next to him, and ſaid: "Do you not ſee that the report of the priſoners "correſponds exactly with the intelligence given "by the deſerters? *Juba* is not with the army. "It muſt conſiſt but of a few troops, ſince "they were not able to withſtand the charge "of a ſmall body of horſe. Let us haſten then "to obtain victory, booty, and glory." The ardour

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ardour of the army was equal to that of their General. On they marched precipitately, that they might come as ſoon as poſſible upon a frighted enemy. The horſe were ordered to follow, but, fatigued with their late march, they halted, ſome in one place and ſome in another. *Juba* was only ſix miles behind *Sabura*, and, having notice of the laſt night's engagement, he detached to his aſſiſtance two thouſand *Spaniſh* and *Gallic* horſe, of his ordinary guard, with that part of the infantry on which he chiefly relied. He followed leiſurely with the reſt of the troops, and about forty elephants; ſuſpecting that *Curio* had ſent his cavalry before, and was not far off with his army. *Sabura*, having drawn up his horſe and foot, ordered them to give ground upon the enemy's attack. *Curio*, deceived by this behaviour, and not doubting but the enemy were preparing to fly, drew his army down into the plain from the higher ground. At length, having advanced a conſiderable way, he halted to give his men breath, who had now marched upwards of ſixteen miles. That moment *Sabura* ſounded the charge, led on his men in order of battle, and went from rank to rank to animate them: But he ſuffered the cavalry only to come to blows, keeping the infantry at a ſmall diſtance, but in good order. *Curio* was not wanting on his part; he exhorted his men to place all their hopes in their valour: Nor did the foot, though wearied with their march, or the cavalry, though few in number, and exhauſted with the duty they had already done, be-

betray any ſymptoms of fear. Of the latter there were only two hundred, the reſt having halted by the way; yet, wherever they charged, they obliged the enemy to give ground: But their horſes were ſo tired that they could not purſue them far. On the other ſide the *Numidian* cavalry began to ſurround the *Roman* army, and to gall them in the rear. Whenever the cohorts iſſued out to charge them, the *Numidians*, being freſh, avoided the attack by their nimbleneſs, and, immediately returning, got behind the *Romans*, and cut them off from the army. Thus it was equally dangerous for them to keep their ground, or to advance to battle. *Sabura*'s forces increaſed continually by the reinforcements ſent by *Juba*: *Curio*'s, diſabled by fatigue, and ſurrounded on all ſides, had no place of ſafety to which they could retire or carry their wounded. Senſible of their extreme diſtreſs, they began to give themſelves up to deſpair. *Curio*, perceiving the ſoldiers were in ſo great a conſternation, as neither to give ear to his commands nor entreaties, gave orders, as the laſt reſource, that they ſhould endeavour to gain the neighbouring hills: But theſe were already poſſeſſed by *Sabura*'s cavalry. Some of the *Romans*, attempting to eſcape by flight, were killed by the enemy's horſe: Others, ſeeing it uſeleſs to make any efforts to ſave their lives, threw themſelves upon the ground. While affairs were in this deſperate condition, *Cn. Domitius*, Commander of the cavalry, having only a few of his followers left, adviſed *Curio* to ſave himſelf

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U. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

ſelf by retreating to the camp, and promiſed not to forſake him. But *Curio* could not think of ſurviving the loſs of his army; and continued fighting bravely till he was killed: A few of the cavalry eſcaped: And thoſe of them who had ſtaid behind to refreſh themſelves, perceiving at a diſtance the rout of the army, retired with precipitation to the camp. Every man of the infantry was cut to pieces.

When the total overthrow and deſtruction of the army was known in the camp, *M. Ruſus*, the Quæſtor, who commanded there, intreated his men not to loſe their courage. They inſiſted, however, to be tranſported to *Sicily*: And he ordered the Maſters of the ſhips to have them in readineſs at night along the ſhore. But ſuch was the general conſternation, that ſome cried out that *Juba* was arrived with his troops: Others that *Varus* approached with his legions, the duſt of whoſe march they pretended to diſcern: And many declared that the enemy's fleet would be upon them in an inſtant. Confounded by their fears, they conſulted every man his own preſervation. Thoſe who had embarked hoiſted ſail immediately, and their flight drew the tranſports after them. A few only of the boats would obey *Rufus*'s orders: But the ſtrand was ſo crouded, and every one ſo eager to get on board before the reſt, that ſome of theſe veſſels were ſunk, and others were afraid to come nearer the ſhore. It thus happened that a ſmall number of ſoldiers only got ſafe to *Sicily*. Thoſe who remained, having ſent their Centu-

rions

rions that night as deputies to *Varus*, ſurrendered. Theſe *Juba* claimed as his property the next day, commanded the greateſt part to be put to the ſword, and ſent the reſt into *Numidia*. In vain did *Varus* intercede for them, and complain of this breach of faith: He durſt not make any reſiſtance. The haughty King made his entrance into the city attended by a great number of Senators: And, after regulating every thing according to his pleaſure, returned triumphant with all his forces into his own kingdom.

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CHAP. VI.

Cæſar *is created Dictator: He returns to* Rome, *where he holds the Aſſembly for the election of Magiſtrates, and ſettles the affairs of the city. He follows* Pompey *into* Greece. *The diſturbances raiſed by* Cœlius *and* Milo *are quieted. The famous campaign between* Cæſar *and* Pompey *before* Dyrrhachium *and in* Theſſaly. *The battle of* Pharſalia. Pompey's *flight and death. The diſperſion of his followers.*

M. Æmilius Lepidus, to whoſe care, as Prætor, *Cæſar* had committed the government of the city in his abſence, obtained, after the reduction of *Pompey*'s army in *Spain*, an ordinance of the people for creating a Dictator; and, purſuant to it, he named *Cæſar* to that office[1]. *Cæſar* received the news of his election

[1] Some nations, as the *Syro-Macedonians*, reckoned from this epocha the years of the *Cæſars*, or Roman Emperors. See *Uſher*'s *Annals*, *ad an.* 3956.

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Suet. in Cæſ. Dio.

on his arrival at *Marſeilles*, but did not immediately ſet out for *Rome*. He ſpent the remainder of the year in *Gaul* and in the North of *Italy*, to ſtrengthen his army, and give directions for the ſecurity of the provinces which he was about to leave. It was in this interval that the ninth legion mutinied at *Placentia*, and demanded its diſmiſſion. This was the firſt event of the kind that had ever befallen him. They ſaid that they were worn out by labour, and deſerved to have at laſt ſome reſt: But their diſcontent proceeded from *Cæſar*'s conduct ſince the commencement of the civil war, and particularly at the ſiege of *Marſeilles*, where, notwithſtanding the perfidious behaviour of the inhabitants, and the many provocations they had given him, he would not ſuffer them to be plundered. He brought this legion back to its duty, not by any mean compliance, but by his authority and reſolution. After reproaching them with their ingratitude and folly, he told them, "that he "had no occaſion for their ſervice, and that he "ſhould never want ſoldiers to ſhare his proſ-"perity and triumphs: And that, before he diſ-"banded them, he would puniſh their crime, "and order them to be decimated." Theſe words broke the ſpirit of the mutineers: They threw themſelves at his feet and begged for pardon: And all their officers interceded for them. *Cæſar* was for ſome time inexorable; but at laſt, abating of his ſeverity, he ordered them to deliver up to him an hundred and twenty of the moſt guilty; of theſe twenty were appointed

pointed by lot for execution; and the officers managed it ſo that the lots fell on the moſt inſolent. After this execution the ſoldiers were obliged to renew their intreaties for leave to continue in his ſervice. Y. R. 704. Bef. Chr. 48. 403 Conſ.

On his arrival at *Rome*, he held the Comitia for the election of Magiſtrates, and was himſelf appointed Conſul with *P. Servilius Iſauricus*. Of the Prætors, the moſt remarkable were *C. Trebonius*, whom *Cæſar* appointed Prætor of the city, and *M. Cælius*, who had the department of foreign affairs. It was the univerſal belief, and the wiſh of many in *Cæſar*'s party, that there would be a general abolition of all debts. In conſequence of this, the public credit was at a ſtand over all *Italy*, every one refuſing to pay what he owed. But *Cæſar* put an end to this uncertainty, by decreeing that arbiters ſhould be appointed to make an eſtimate of the poſſeſſions of all debtors, and to convey them in payment to their creditors, at the price they bore before the war. *Suetonius* adds, that he allowed the debtors to deduct from the principal what they had paid for intereſt. *Dio Caſſius* ſays, that the creditors loſt by this regulation a fourth of their due: And that, as many were ſuſpected of concealing great ſums of money, an ordinance was publiſhed, forbidding any body to keep above ſixty thouſand ſeſterces. This extraordinary ordinance has no other voucher beſides *Dio*. Cæſ. de Bell. Civ. Com. lib. i. Dio. Suet. in Cæſ. 4841.

Many of thoſe who had been tried and condemned for bribery, while *Pompey* kept his legions in the city, reſorted to him in the begin-

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ning of the war; and, that he might not be charged with ingratitude towards theſe men, nor accuſed of invading the prerogatives of the people, he now cauſed them to be reſtored in a legal manner by a law propounded to the people by the Prætors and Tribunes. The pretext was, that they had been condemned at a time when *Pompey* had influenced the Judges. *Milo*, alone, ſeems to have been excepted from this general amneſty: He had made, perhaps, no advances to gain *Cæſar*'s favour; who might have, beſides, many other reaſons to be diſſatisfied with the enemy and murderer of his friend *Clodius*: He reſtored, at the ſame time, the ſons of the proſcribed to the rights of *Roman* citizens, from which they had been hitherto excluded by the cruelty of *Sylla*, and the injuſtice of the *ariſtocratic* faction. Having made theſe regulations, and celebrated the *Latin* feſtivals, he abdicated the Dictatorſhip, after holding it but *eleven days*, and immediately ſet out for *Brunduſium*, where he arrived before the end of *December*: And, on the *1ſt* of *January*,[1] he entered upon his office of Conſul in that city.

Y. R. 705. Bef. Chr. 47. 404 Conſ.

C. Julius Cæsar, II.
P. Servilius Vatia Isauricus, } Conſuls.

Pompey, having had a whole year to make his preparations, undiſturbed by wars, and free from the interruption of an enemy, had gathered a mighty fleet from *Aſia*, the *Cyclades*, *Corcyra*,

[1] The *11th* of *October*, according to *Uſher*; but, really, the *25th* of *November*.

Athens,

Athens, *Pontus*, *Bithynia*, *Syria*, *Cilicia*, *Phœnicia*, and *Ægypt*: To all which places he had ſent orders for the building of ſhips upon the firſt breaking out of the civil war; being perſuaded, that he who was maſter of the ſea would certainly be ſuperior alſo at land;[m] and he had exacted great ſums of money from the people of *Aſia* and *Syria*, from the Kings, Tetrarchs, Dynaſties, and free States of *Achaia*, and from all the corporations of the provinces ſubject to his command. He had got together *nine legions of Roman citizens*; five he had brought with him from *Italy*; one had been ſent him from *Sicily*, conſiſting wholly of veterans, and called *Gemella*, becauſe compoſed of two; another, partly from *Crete*, and partly from *Macedonia*, of veteran ſoldiers likewiſe; who, having been diſbanded by former Generals, had ſettled in thoſe parts; and two more from *Aſia*, levied there by *Lentulus*. Beſides all theſe, he had troops from *Theſſaly*, *Bœotia*, *Achaia*, and *Epirus*: Which, together with the ſoldiers of *C. Antonius*, who had been obliged to ſurrender in *Illyricum*, he diſtributed among the legions by way of recruits. He expected alſo two legions which *Scipio* commanded in *Syria*. He had three thouſand archers from *Crete*, *Lacedæmon*, *Pontus*, and other provinces; ſix cohorts of ſlingers, and two of mercenaries. His cavalry amounted to ſeven thouſand; ſix hundred of which came to him from

Y. R. 705. Bef. Chr. 47. 404 Con.

Cæſ. de Civ. Com. lib. iii.

[m] Pompeii omne conſilium Themiſtocleum eſt. Exiſtimat enim, qui mare teneat, eum neceſſe rerum potiri. *Ad Att.* x. 8.

Y. R. 705. Bef. Chr. 47. 404 Conſ.

Galatia, under *Dejotarus*; five hundred from *Cappadocia*, under *Ariobarzanes*; the like number from *Thrace*, ſent by *Cotus*, under the command of his ſon *Sadalis*; two hundred from *Macedonia*, under *Raſcipolis*, an Officer of diſtinction; five hundred from *Alexandria*, conſiſting of *Gauls* and *Germans*, left there by *Gabinius* to ſerve as a guard to King *Ptolemy*, and now brought over by young *Pompey* in his fleet, together with eight hundred of his own domeſtics: *Caſtor* and *Donilaus* furniſhed him with three hundred; the firſt of theſe came himſelf in perſon, the ſecond ſent his ſon; and two hundred, moſt of them archers, were ſent by *Antiochus Comagenus*, who lay under the greateſt obligations to *Pompey*. He had likewiſe a great number of *Dardanians* and *Beſſians*, with others from *Macedonia*, *Theſſaly*, and the adjoining States, who completed his cavalry, and were partly volunteers, and partly mercenaries. To ſubſiſt this mighty army, he had taken care to amaſs vaſt quantities of corn from *Theſſaly*, *Aſia*, *Ægypt*, *Crete*, *Cyrene*, and other countries; and he reſolved to quarter his troops during the winter at *Dyrrhacchium*, *Apollonia*, and the other maritime towns, to prevent *Cæſar*'s paſſing the ſea; for which reaſon, he ordered alſo his fleet to cruiſe perpetually along the coaſts. Young *Pompey* commanded the *Egyptian* ſquadron; *D. Lælius* and *C. Triarius*, the *Aſiatic*; *C. Caſſius*, the *Syrian*; *C. Marcellus* and *C. Coponius*, the *Rhodian*; and *Scribonius Libo* and *M. Octavius*, the *Liburnian* and *Achaian*: But the chief authority

was

was given to *M. Bibulus*, who was High-admiral. *Plutarch* tells us, that *Pompey* had at firſt deſtined *Cato* to this important command, and had even made him a promiſe of it: But that he afterwards changed his mind, leſt that rigid republican, veſted with ſo much power, ſhould become troubleſome to him after the defeat of *Cæſar*, and compel him to diſband his ſoldiers, in order to reſtore the liberty of the Commonwealth. Y. R. 705. Bef. Chr. 47. 404 Conſ. In Cat.

Before the end of the year, while *Cæſar* was holding the Aſſemblies of the people in *Rome* for the election of Magiſtrates, the Conſuls aſſembled at *Theſſalonica* all the Senators who had followed *Pompey*, to the number of two hundred. There, after conſecrating a place with augural ceremonies, they declared themſelves the true *Roman* Senate; and enacted, that all thoſe who were then *Conſuls*, *Prætors*, and *Quæſtors*, ſhould retain their authority, and continue in the exerciſe of their ſeveral offices, under the names of *Proconſuls*, *Proprætors*, and *Proquæſtors*. *Pompey* they declared *Generaliſſimo* of the Republic: And honours and thanks were decreed to the Kings and nations who favoured their cauſe; and, in particular, young *Ptolemy*, King of *Egypt*, was confirmed in the poſſeſſion of his crown, in excluſion of his ſiſter, the famous *Cleopatra*, though ſhe had an undoubted title by the will of *Ptolemy Auletes*, their common father, who had left the ſucceſſion to his eldeſt ſon and eldeſt daughter jointly. Plut. in Pomp. Dio. Lucan. l. v.

A. R. 705. Bef. Chr. 47. 404 Conſ.

Cæſar found at *Brunduſium* twelve legions, and all his cavalry: But his legions were far from being complete. They had been conſiderably weakened by the *Gallic* war, by their long march from *Spain*, and by a general ſickneſs, which had lately prevailed among them, during the autumn in the unhealthful climate of *Apulia*. Yet, the want of ſhips alone hindered him, he ſays, from putting a ſpeedy end to the war. For, notwithſtanding his orders to build and aſſemble as many ſhips as poſſible, he had ſcarcely a ſufficient number to embark twenty thouſand men; who, in the preſent ſtate of his army, formed ſeven legions and ſix hundred horſe. On his arrival at *Brunduſium*, he harangued his troops, and told them, "that, as they were now upon "the point of ſeeing an end of all their toils and "dangers, they ſhould make no difficulty to "leave their ſervants and baggage in *Italy*, in "order that they might embark with leſs con-"fuſion, and in greater numbers; placing all "their hopes in victory, and in the generoſity of "their General." The whole army having loudly teſtified their aſſent, he embarked with ſeven legions on the 4*th* of *January*, and arrived the next day at the *Ceraunian* mountains, on the coaſt of *Epirus*; where, having found a tolerable harbour, he landed his troops at a place called *Pharſalus*. *Lucretius Veſpillo* and *Minutius Rufus* were then at *Oricum*, with eighteen *Aſiatic* ſhips; and *Bibulus* had one hundred and ten at *Corcyra*: But the firſt durſt not hazard an engagement, though *Cæſar* had for his convoy

Cæſ. de Bell. Civ. Com. lib. iii.

no

Y. R. 705. Bef. Chr. 47. 404 Conſ.

no more than ten gallies, only four of which had decks; and *Bibulus* had not time to aſſemble his men and get his ſhips in order. For no account of *Cæſar*'s approach had reached theſe parts, till his fleet was ſeen from the continent. *Cæſar* ſent the fleet back the ſame night to *Brunduſium* to bring over the reſt of his forces. *Fuſius Calenus* had the charge of this expedition, with orders to uſe the utmoſt diſpatch; but, ſetting ſail too late, he loſt the benefit of the wind, and fell in with the enemy. For *Bibulus*, hearing at *Corcyra* of *Cæſar*'s arrival, forthwith put to ſea, in hopes of intercepting ſome of the tranſports: And, meeting the fleet as it returned empty, took about thirty ſhips, which he burnt, with all that were on board. He imagined, by this example, to deter the reſt of the troops from attempting the paſſage. [n] He then ſtationed his fleet along the coaſt from *Salona* to *Oricum*, and remained himſelf on board, notwithſtanding the rigour of the ſeaſon; declining no fatigue nor danger, ſo that he might intercept *Cæſar*'s ſupplies.

Cæſar, following the plan he had at firſt adopted, ſent *Vibullius Rufus* (the ſame he had made

[n] *Plutarch in Pomp.* tells us, that in a Council of war, in which *Cato* preſided, a decree was paſſed, *that no Roman citizen ſhould be put to death but in battle, and that they ſhould not plunder any city which was ſubject to the Roman Empire:* And that ſuch moderation gained the affections of all people to *Pompey*'s cauſe. *Cæſar* followed this rule, notwithſtanding the greateſt provocations: But, on *Pompey*'s ſide, *Cato*'s decree was very little regarded, and I doubt whether it was ever made.

Y. R. 705. Bef. Chr. 47. 404 Conſ.

priſoner at *Corfinium*, and afterwards in *Spain*) to *Pompey*, to treat of peace. He thought this man the propereſt perſon he could employ, as he had been twice indebted to him for his life, and was alſo much eſteemed by *Pompey*, whom he had ſerved with great zeal and fidelity in the quality of chief engineer. He was commiſſioned to repreſent to *Pompey*, "that it was now time "to put an end to their quarrel, and not obſti- "nately expoſe themſelves any more to the pre- "carious events of fortune: That the loſſes they "had already ſuſtained ought to fill them with "juſt apprehenſions of the future: That *Pompey* "had been forced to abandon *Italy*, had loſt "*Sicily* and *Sardinia*, the two *Spains*, with about "an hundred and thirty cohorts of *Roman* citi- "zens. That he himſelf had been a conſidera- "ble ſufferer by the death of *Curio*, the deſtruc- "tion of the *African* army, and the ſurrender "of his forces under *C. Antonius* at *Corcyra*. "That it was therefore incumbent on them to "ſhew ſome regard to the ſinking ſtate of the "Commonwealth, and that the preſent moment "was the moſt favourable; becauſe, not having "yet tried one another's ſtrength, and conſider- "ing themſelves as equals, there was the more "likelihood of their coming to an agreement, "upon moderate terms: Whereas, if one of "them once got the leaſt advantage, he would "exact every thing from the other, and give up "nothing himſelf. That, as hitherto, they had "been unable to ſettle the conditions of peace, "they ought to refer them to the Senate and

"people

" people of *Rome*; and, in the mean time, both " ſwear to diſband their armies in three days " time. That a propoſition of this nature ſhould " be equally agreeable to all; ſince the two Com- " manders, diveſted of their ſtrength, would " find themſelves under a neceſſity of ſubmit- " ting to the decree of the Senate and people. " In fine, that to give *Pompey* a proof of his rea- " dineſs to perform theſe propoſals, he would " give immediate orders for the diſcharge of " all his forces, both in garriſon and in the " field." *Vibullius*, having received theſe in- ſtructions, haſtened to *Pompey*'s camp with all di- ligence, frequently changing horſes, and poſting day and night; but he was more ſollicitous to give him early notice of *Cæſar*'s arrival, and the condition of his army, than to execute the com- miſſion he was charged with. *Pompey* was in *Candavia*, on his way through *Macedonia*, to his winter quarters at *Apollonia* and *Dyrrhacchium*: And, ſurpriſed and diſturbed at news ſo unex- pected, he haſtened his march, that he might prevent the loſs of the ſea coaſts. Y. R. 705. Bef. Chr. 47. 404 Conſ.

Cæſar, the very day he landed, brought his troops before *Oricum*, where *L. Torquatus* at- tempted to defend himſelf with a garriſon of Greeks, called *Parthinians*: But they, refuſing to fight againſt the Conſul of *Rome*, and the in- habitants being entirely in the ſame ſentiments, he ſurrendered. Thence *Cæſar* marched to *A- pollonia*, whoſe citizens being alſo well affected towards him, *L. Staberius*, who commanded for *Pompey*, privately left the place: And the inha- Cæſ. de Bell. Civ. Com. l. iii.

Y. R. 705. Bef. Chr. 47. 404 Conf.

bitants ſent their Deputies to him, and received him into the town. The *Bullidenſes*, *Amantiani*, with the neighbouring nations, and all *Epirus*, followed their example, and ſent ambaſſadors to *Cæſar* to receive his commands. This rapid progreſs made *Pompey* march day and night to reach *Dyrrhacchium*: And, when he drew near to that place, a falſe report, that *Cæſar* was not far off, threw the whole army into ſuch conſternation, that many abandoned their colours and arms, and the march in general was continued in ſo diſorderly a manner, that it had all the appearance of a precipitate flight. They had not even recovered their conſternation when they had reached *Dyrrhacchium*, and were about to intrench themſelves under its walls: Which *Labienus* perceiving, he advanced, in the ſight of all the ſoldiers, and ſolemnly ſwore never to abandon his General, but to ſhare whatever fortune ſhould befal him. All the other officers, and the whole army, took the ſame oath. *Cæſar*, finding that he was prevented in his deſign upon *Dyrrhacchium*, purſued his march more leiſurely, and encamped on the river *Apſus*, in the territory of the *Apollonians*, that he might be able to protect the poſſeſſions of a State, which had declared warmly in his favour. Here he reſolved to wait the arrival of the reſt of his troops. *Pompey* did the like; and, having encamped on the other ſide of the ſame river, aſſembled there all his legions and auxiliaries.

Salona, a town in *Dalmatia*, where *Spalatro* now ſtands, ſuſtained a memorable ſiege about this

this time againſt *M. Octavius*, Admiral of the *Liburnian* and *Achaian* fleets under *Bibulus*. It was built upon a hill, and advantageouſly ſituated for defence; but, as the fortifications were very inconſiderable, the *Roman* citizens reſiding there immediately ſurrounded the place with wooden towers; and, finding themſelves too few to reſiſt the attacks of the enemy, after many of them had been killed or diſabled, they, in their laſt extremity, gave arms and liberty to their ſlaves, and the women gave their hair to make cords for the engines. *Octavius*, to conquer their obſtinacy, blocked up the town on all ſides with five different camps, reſolving to harraſs them with continual attacks. The brave *Salonians* dreaded nothing but the want of corn; and, on *Cæſar*'s arrival on the coaſt of *Epirus*, they ſent to him to beg a ſupply. The ſiege had continued for ſome time; and, the beſiegers not keeping a ſtrict watch, they all ſallied out at midday, leaving, for a ſhew, their wives and children on the walls, and attacked the neareſt quarters of *Octavius*. Having forced theſe, they ran to the next, and ſo ſucceſſively to all the five camps; and, driving the enemy with great ſlaughter from every poſt, they compelled them to take refuge in their ſhips. *Octavius*, as winter approached, and his loſs had been conſiderable, retired to *Dyrrhacchium*, and joined *Pompey*.

Y. R. 705. Bef. Chr. 47. 404 Con.

Calenus was charged, as we have related above, to bring over to *Brunduſium* the reſt of the forces; and, having embarked according to his inſtructions, he put to ſea: But he had not ſailed very

Cæſ. de Bell. Civ. Com. lib. iii.

Y. R. 705. Bef. Chr. 47. 404 Conſ.

ry far, when he met with an advice-boat from *Cæſar*, informing him, that every part of the coaſt was guarded, and he returned back into the harbour. One ſhip, which was not under his command, continued its route, and fell in at *Oricum* with the fleet of *Bibulus*, who put all on board to death, not ſparing even the freedmen, children, or ſlaves. The troops under *Calenus*, had it not been for *Cæſar*'s diſpatches, would have met with the ſame fate. If *Bibulus* thus deprived *Cæſar* of all ſupplies by ſea, he was in like manner greatly incommoded by *Cæſar* at land: Who, having diſpoſed parties all along the coaſt, hindered him from getting either water or wood, or any thing elſe, except from the iſland of *Corcyra*; and, by this means, he was ſometimes reduced to great difficulties. Notwithſtanding therefore his high ſpirit, he condeſcended to let *Libo* enter upon parley with two of *Cæſar*'s Lieutenants, *M. Acilius* and *Statius Murcus*, who guarded *Oricum*, and the ſea coaſts: And theſe, believing the propoſals made to them to be ſerious, did not ſcruple to grant a truce.

Cæſar was then at *Buthrotum*, a town over-againſt *Corcyra*, whither he had gone with one legion to reduce ſome of the more diſtant States, and to get a ſupply of corn. Upon the firſt information of this tranſaction, he haſtened back to *Oricum*, and invited *Libo* and *Bibulus* to a conference. *Libo* appeared, and made the following apology and declaration on the part of *Bibulus*; "that, being naturally haſty, and bear-"ing a perſonal grudge to *Cæſar*, contracted during

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" during the time of his quæſtorſhip and edile-
" ſhip, he had declined the interview, leſt his
" preſence might be an obſtacle to the ſucceſs
" of ſo deſirable a deſign. That *Pompey* was,
" and ever had been inclined to lay down his
" arms, and terminate their differences by an
" accommodation; but, as yet, had not ſent
" him ſufficient powers to treat; which, how-
" ever, he doubted not ſoon to receive, as the
" Council or Senate had intruſted him with the
" whole adminiſtration of the war. That if
" *Cæſar*, therefore, would make known his de-
" mands, they would be ſent to *Pompey*, who
" would ſoon come to a reſolution upon the
" matter: And, in the mean time, he deſired
" that the truce might continue, and both par-
" ties abſtain from acts of hoſtility, till an an-
" ſwer could be obtained." *Cæſar*, on his ſide,
" demanded leave to ſend Ambaſſadors to *Pom-*
" *pey*, and required that *Libo* and *Bibulus* would
" anſwer for their return, or undertake to con-
" vey them in ſafety. With regard to the truce,
" he ſaid, that ſuch were the preſent circum-
" ſtances of the war, that their fleet kept back
" his ſupplies and tranſports, and his forces de-
" prived them of all acceſs to the ſhore and other
" conveniencies. That, if they expected any
" abatement on his part, they muſt likewiſe
" abate in their conſtant guard at ſea along the
" coaſt; and that, while they perſiſted in their
" vigilance, he would not remit his attention
" and watchfulneſs. He added, however, that,
" though they could not agree on this point, the

" treaty

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"treaty might ſtill proceed." *Libo* declined receiving *Cæſar*'s Ambaſſadors, or anſwering for their ſafe return, and choſe to refer the whole matter to *Pompey:* Yet inſiſted on the truce, which *Cæſar* conſtantly rejected; perceiving, that his only aim was to extricate the fleet from its preſent diſtreſs. *Bibulus* ſoon after died on ſhipboard: He had contracted a dangerous illneſs by cold and perpetual fatigue; and, as he could not have proper aſſiſtance at ſea, and would not be prevailed upon to quit his poſt, he ſunk under the violence of his diſtemper. Nobody ſucceeded him as Admiral: Each ſquadron was governed independently of the reſt by its particular Commander, under the general direction of *Pompey.*

Vibullius at laſt thought proper to deliver to *Pompey*, in the preſence of *Libo*, *L. Lucceius*, and *Theophanes*, his moſt intimate Counſellors, the commiſſion he had from *Cæſar.* But ſcarce had he begun to ſpeak, when *Pompey* interrupted him, and ordered him to proceed no farther: *What*, ſaid he, *is my life and country to me, if I ſhall ſeem to be beholden for them to Cæſar? And will it be believed that I am not indebted to him for them, if he by an accommodation reſtores me to Italy?* *Cæſar* affirms that this ſpeech of *Pompey* was reported to him after the concluſion of the war by thoſe that were preſent. He aſſures us alſo, that, notwithſtanding *Vibullius* brought him no anſwer back to his meſſage, and *Libo* refuſed to conduct his Ambaſſadors to *Pompey*, yet he tried every other method to obtain peace. As the two camps

were

were ſeparated only by the river *Apſus*, the ſoldiers had frequent diſcourſe among themſelves, and committed no acts of hoſtility on theſe occaſions. *Cæſar* laid hold on this circumſtance, and ordered *Vatinius* to addreſs himſelf to the officers and ſoldiers, and demand publicly and frequently, in the moſt ſerious and earneſt manner, "Whether "it might not be permitted to citizens to ſend "Deputies to their fellow-citizens to treat about "peace: That this was never denied even to fu- "gitives and robbers, and ought much leſs to be "oppoſed, when the deſign was to prevent a civil "war, and the effuſion of *Roman* blood." He was heard with great ſilence by both armies, and received this anſwer: "That *Varro* would next "day appear at an interview; whither *Cæſar*'s "Deputies might come in perfect ſecurity, and "make known their demands." The hour of meeting was likewiſe ſettled; and multitudes flocked to the place, elated with the higheſt expectations. *Labienus*, advancing from the croud, began in a low voice to confer with *Vatinius*, as if to adjuſt the articles of the treaty: But their diſcourſe was ſoon interrupted by a flight of darts which came pouring in upon all ſides. *Vatinius* eſcaped unhurt, by means of the ſoldiers, who ran to cover him with their ſhields: But *Cornelius Balbus*, *M. Photius*, *L. Tiburtus*, Centurions, and ſome private men, were wounded. The brutal *Labienus*, then raiſing his voice, cried out aloud: *Leave off prating any more of peace: For none you ſhall have, till you have brought us* CÆSAR'S *head.* This declaration, ſo extraordinary, is of a piece

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with the whole behaviour of that deſerter, and correſponds alſo very well with the haughty and cruel conduct of the whole party.

Cæſ. de Bel. Civ. Com. l. iii.

While the two rival Generals lay during the winter on each ſide of the river *Apſus*, great commotions were raiſed in *Rome* and in ſome parts of *Italy* by *M. Cælius* and the famous *Milo*. The firſt, who was Prætor at *Rome* for foreign affairs, having met with ſome diſappointments; or diſobliged becauſe *Cæſar* had given the more important charge of the city to his collegue *C. Trebonius*; or not reliſhing the law *Cæſar* had made in regard to the debtors, which might not anſwer his views; he engaged in the moſt raſh and unjuſtifiable attempts. He had the boldneſs to undertake the cauſe of the debtors, and, on his entrance into office, ordered his tribunal to be fixed near that of *Trebonius*, declaring that he would receive the complaints of ſuch as ſhould appeal to him, in regard to the eſtimation of eſtates, and payments made in conſequence of *Cæſar*'s late regulation. But the law itſelf was ſo juſt, and *Trebonius*'s judgments ſo moderate, that no pretence of appeal could be found. This Magiſtrate admitted of every reaſonable plea, taking into conſideration the poverty of the debtors, their perſonal loſſes, the hardneſs of the times, and the difficulty of bringing their effects to ſale: And no one was ſo diveſted of honeſty and ſhame, as to own themſelves in debt, and yet pretend to keep their eſtates entire. Thus this firſt attempt of *Cælius* proved unſucceſsful. His whole ſeverity, therefore, was pointed now againſt thoſe

to

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to whom the inheritances of the debtors were adjudged: And, having once embarked in the affair, that he might not ſeem to have engaged himſelf to no purpoſe in an unjuſtifiable cauſe, he propoſed a law by which he allowed the debtors ſix years for the diſcharge of their debts, which they were to clear at equal payments without intereſt °. But the Conſul *Servilius* and the reſt of the Magiſtrates oppoſed unanimouſly the project; nor was it received by the people with the favour he expected: And he dropped the affair. This diſappointment only ſerved to render him more furious; and now, determined to keep no meaſures, he propoſed two other laws, which he foreſaw would more effectually inflame the people; the one "to exempt all the tenants of *Rome* from "paying rent;" the other, "for a general abo-"lition of debts." Theſe laws took with the multitude; and *Cælius* at their head attacked *Trebonius* in his tribunal, drove him thence, and wounded ſome perſons about him. The Conſul *Servilius* complained to the Senate of his riotous behaviour, and *Cælius*, by a decree of the houſe, was interdicted the functions of his charge. In virtue of this decree the bills of his laws were torn down, admittance was refuſed him into the Senate, his chair of office was broke, and he him-

° This place in *Cæſar* is corrupted, and the Commentators can make nothing of it. The ſenſe above is according to *Manutius*'s interpretation. Others ſay that *Cælius*'s law gave the debtors three years to acquit themſelves, in ſix payments, one every ſix months: Others, that it allowed but eighteen months, or one year and ſix months.

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ſelf was driven from his tribunal, whence he was going to harangue the people. It was doubtleſs in theſe circumſtances that he wrote the following letter to *Cicero*, which I inſert, becauſe it clearly indicates the character of the man.

M. Coelius to Cicero.

Ep. Fam. viii. 17. Melm. vi. 7. l. viii.

"WAS it for this that I followed *Cæſar* into "*Spain?* Why was I not rather at *Formiæ*, that "I might have accompanied you to *Pompey?* "But I was infatuated: And it was my averſion "to *Appius*, together with my friendſhip for *Cu-*"*rio*, that gradually drew me into this curſed "cauſe. Nor were you entirely unacceſſory to "my error: For, when I called upon you that "night I ſet out for *Ariminum*, why did you for-"get the friend, when you were glorioufly act-"ing the patriot; and not diſſuade me from the "purpoſe of my journey, at the ſame time that "you commiſſioned me to urge *Cæſar* to pacific "meaſures? Not that I have the leaſt doubt of "his ſucceſs: But, believe me, perdition itſelf "were preferable to being a witneſs of the in-"ſufferable behaviour of theſe his partiſans. "They have rendered themſelves ſo generally "odious, that we ſhould long ſince have been "driven out of *Rome*, were it not for the appre-"henſion which people have conceived of the "cruelty of your party. There is not at this "juncture any order of citizens, or even a ſingle "man in *Rome*, except a few raſcally uſurers, "who does not wiſh well to *Pompey*; and I have

"brought

" brought over to your cauſe, not only thoſe " among the plebeian families who were in the " intereſt of *Cæſar*, but the whole populace in " general. But you will aſk, perhaps, what can " this avail us now? Wait the event, my friend: " I will render you victorious in ſpite of your- " ſelves.* For ſurely a profound lethargy has " locked up all the ſenſes of your party: as they " do not yet ſeem ſenſible how open we lie to " an attack, and how little capable we are of " making any conſiderable oppoſition. It is by " no means from an intereſted motive that I offer " my aſſiſtance, but merely in reſentment of the " unworthy uſage I have received; and reſent- " ment is a paſſion which uſually carries me, you " know, the greateſt lengths:——But what are " you doing on the other ſide the water? Are " you imprudently waiting to give the enemy " battle? What *Pompey*'s forces may be, I know " not: But *Cæſar*'s, I am ſure, are accuſtomed " to action, and enured to all the hardſhips of " the moſt ſevere campaigns. Farewell."

A. R. 705. Bef. Chr. 47. 704 Conſ.

Cælius had privately written to his old friend *Milo*, to engage him to come into *Italy*, and join him with the remains of the gladiators, which he had bought for his public ſhews, and to make war on his enemy *Clodius*. *Milo*, exaſperated by the treatment he had met with from *Cæſar*, who had not reſtored him with the other exiles, inſtantly obeyed the ſummons, and began to gather troops all over *Italy*. For that purpoſe he

Cæſ. de Bel. Civ. Com. lib. iii.

* Irritavi in me Catonem.

Y. R. 705. Bef. Chr. 47. 404 Conſ.

diſpatched letters to all the colonies and free towns, intimating, that what he did was in conſequence of *Pompey*'s authority, who had ſent him his orders by *Bibulus*. He alſo endeavoured to draw to him the debtors, whoſe favour *Cælius* had gained by his project for a general abolition of debts. But he met with no ſucceſs, and all he could accompliſh was to ſet ſome ſlaves at liberty. With theſe, and his gladiators, he had the hardineſs to lay ſiege to *Coſa*,[p] in the territory of *Thurium*; where *Q. Pædius* commanded with a garriſon of one legion; and there he was killed by a ſtone from a machine on the walls. *Cælius*, when he underſtood that *Milo* was in the country of *Thurium*, ſet out from *Rome*, under the pretence of carrying his complaints to *Cæſar*, but with a view of putting himſelf at the head of a number of partiſans he had in the ſouth of *Italy*. At *Caſilinum*, he heard that his enſigns and arms were ſeized at *Capua*; that his partiſans were diſcovered at *Naples*; and that he was looked upon as a public enemy. Finding, therefore, that his project was defeated, and apprehenſive of his ſafety, he gave out, on leaving *Caſilinum*, that he was gone to *Cæſar*; but, turning from the high road, he went privately acroſs the country to *Thurium*: where, notwithſtanding the unhappy end of *Milo*, he endeavoured to debauch the inhabitants, and corrupt, by promiſes of money,

[p] *Velleius Paterculus* calls the place *Compſa*: —— *Compſam in Hirtinis oppugnans, ictuſque lapide, tum P. Clodio, tum patriæ, quam armis petebat pœnas dedit; vir inquies, et ultra ſortem temerarius. Lib.* ii. *c.* 68.

ſome

Y. R. 705. Bef. Chr. 47. 404 Conf.

ſome *Spaniſh* and *Gallic* horſe, who had been left to garriſon the place. Theſe were deaf to his ſollicitations, and ſlew him. [q] Thus, ſays *Cæſar*, theſe dangerous beginnings, which, by reaſon of the multiplicity of affairs wherewith the Magiſtrates were diſtracted, and the tickliſh ſituation of the times, threatened great revolutions, and alarmed all *Italy*, were brought to a ſafe and ſpeedy iſſue.

Cæſ. de Bell. Civ. Com. l. iii.

The armies of *Pompey* and *Cæſar* were ſtill in the ſame ſituation. The great object of the two Generals was the army left at *Brunduſium*: Which *Cæſar* now expected with great impatience; and whoſe paſſage *Pompey* was greatly intereſted to prevent. He ordered *Libo*, with the fleet under his command, conſiſting of fifty ſhips, to ſail to *Brunduſium*, and poſſeſs himſelf of an iſland that lay before the harbour, judging it of more importance to ſecure a poſt, by which the enemy's tranſports muſt neceſſarily paſs, than to guard all the havens and ports on the other ſide. As his arrival was unexpected, he ſurpriſed and

[q] The reader is perfectly acquainted with the characters of theſe two men, from what has been related of their behaviour: We have in *Seneca* this anecdote concerning the temper of *Cælius*: *Cælium oratorem fuiſſe iracundiſſimum conſtat; cum quo, ut aiunt, cœnabat in cubiculo lectæ patientiæ cliens: Sed difficile erat illi in copulam conjecto, rixam ejus cum quo hærebat, effugere. Optimum judicavit quicquid dixiſſet ſequi, et ſecundas agere. Non tulit Cælius aſſentientem, ſed exclamavit: Dic aliquid contra, ut duo ſimus.* *Velleius Paterculus*, ii. 68, gives him the preference to *Curio*, both in eloquence and courage: *M. Cælius vir eloquio animoque Curioni ſimillimus, ſed in utroque perfectior—.*

Y. R. 705. Bef. Chr. 47. 49 Conſ.

burnt ſome tranſports, and carried off a veſſel laden with corn: And the conſternation was ſo great upon the coaſt, that, having landed ſome foot, with a party of archers in the night, he drove before him the cavalry that were upon guard. Elated with this, he ſent word to *Pompey*, that he might draw the reſt of the navy on ſhore, and order them to be careened: For that he alone, with his ſquadron, would undertake to cut off *Cæſar*'s ſupplies. But *Antony*, who commanded in *Brunduſium*, ſoon found means to diſlodge him. He ordered ſixty boats belonging to the fleet to be covered with hurdles and galleries; and, having filled them with choſen ſoldiers, diſpoſed them along the ſhore. To allure the enemy, he ſent two three-benched gallies to the mouth of the harbour, as if with no other view than to exerciſe the rowers; and *Libo*, ſeeing them advance boldly, and hoping he might be able to intercept them, detached five four-banked gallies for that purpoſe. At their approach, *Antony*'s gallies rowed back, and were inconſiderately purſued too far by the *Pompeians:* For now the boats, ſtationed along the coaſt, on a ſignal given, came pouring upon them from all parts; and, on the firſt charge, took one of the four-benched gallies, and forced the reſt to ſave themſelves by flight. *Antony*, alſo, by poſting the cavalry all along the coaſt, effectually prevented the enemy from watering; and thus *Libo* was put to the ſhameful neceſſity of quitting the blockade.

Several months had now paſt, and the winter was almoſt over; yet the paſſage of *Cæſar*'s troops

was

was not effected, and was every day more hazardous. *Pompey* was continually reproaching his Admirals for their neglect in relation to *Cæſar*'s firſt paſſage, and exhorting them to make amends for it, by preventing the ſupplies from coming over. His ſea-officers exerted themſelves therefore, and were ever on the watch. *Cæſar*, on his ſide, could not but think that *Antony* and *Calenus* had loſt ſome opportunities, the wind having ſtood often fair for them: And he ſent them peremptory orders to ſail with the firſt wind that offered for the coaſt of *Apollonia*; which, having few havens, was not ſo cloſely beſet by the enemy. Y. R. 705. Bef. Chr. 47. 404 Conſ.

All the hiſtorians, *Suetonius*, *Plutarch*, *Appian*, *Florus*, and *Dio*, tell us, that ſuch was *Cæſar*'s impatience at this time, that he reſolved to go and fetch his troops himſelf; and, in the diſguiſe of a ſlave, went on board a fiſherman's bark at the mouth of the river *Apſus*, with a deſign to croſs over to *Brunduſium*. The maſter of the boat rowed off, it is ſaid, with his men, but the wind riſing made the water ſo very rough, that it ſeemed impoſſible to him to get out to ſea, and he ordered his men to return back. Upon this, *Cæſar* diſcovered himſelf: *Fear nothing*, ſaid he, *thou carrieſt Cæſar and his fortune.* The mariners, encouraged and awed by his preſence, made freſh endeavours, and got out to ſea; but the waves ran ſo high, and the danger was ſo imminent, that he permitted them to return to land. Lucan. l. v.

Cæſar's ſoldiers, informed of what had paſt, ran to meet him in great multitudes, and told him, with much tenderneſs and affection, *that*

Y. R. 705. Bef. Chr. 47. 404 Conſ.

he had greatly reflected upon their courage by going in queſt of new forces, when they were ſure to conquer alone, as long as they acted under his direction.

The preſſing orders he had ſent for his ſoldiers, who were ſufficiently eager of themſelves to croſs the ſea, determined *Antony* and *Calenus* to ſail with a ſouth wind, which was not the moſt favourable for their paſſage. They made for the coaſt of *Apollonia*, but were driven before *Dyrrhacchium:* Whence, being deſcried by *Coponius*, he chaced them with ſixteen *Rhodian* gallies, and, the wind abating, the fleet had almoſt fallen into his hands. A briſk gale, however, ariſing, they made their way, and put into the port of *Nymphæum*, about three miles beyond *Liſſus*. There they would have been in the greateſt danger from the ſouth wind, which had continued two days without intermiſſion; but they were ſcarcely entered the port, when the wind changed to ſouth-weſt. To this favourable circumſtance they owed their ſafety. The fleet of *Coponius* was driven by the violence of the ſtorm againſt the ſhore, and daſhed to pieces. The greateſt part of the ſoldiers and mariners periſhed among the rocks; a few only were taken up by *Antony*'s ſoldiers; and theſe were afterwards ſent by *Cæſar* to their ſeveral homes. There were two, however, of the tranſports, which, unable to keep up with the reſt, were overtaken by the night, and, not knowing where the fleet had put in, caſt anchor over againſt *Liſſus*. *Otacilius Craſſus*, who commanded in that place, ſent out ſome boats and ſmall veſſels to attack them, and to promiſe

promiſe them quarter, if they ſubmitted. One of theſe veſſels carried two hundred and twenty new-raiſed ſoldiers; the other leſs than two hundred veterans: And, on this occaſion, appeared, ſays *Cæſar*, what reſource there is in valour, in the moſt imminent dangers. The new levies, frighted at the number of their enemies, and fatigued with ſea-ſickneſs, ſurrendered on promiſe of their lives; but were cruelly ſlain, as ſoon as they came before *Otacilius*. The veterans, on the contrary, though they had both the ſtorm and a leaky veſſel to ſtruggle with, abated nothing of their wonted bravery; they ſpun out the time till night, under the pretence of treating, and then obliged their pilot to run the veſſel on ſhore; where they found an advantageous poſt. At day-break, *Otacilius* ſent againſt them about four hundred horſe; but they defended themſelves with great bravery; and, having ſlain ſome of the enemy, rejoined without loſs the reſt of the troops. The Roman citizens inhabiting *Liſſus*, to whom *Cæſar* had formerly made a grant of the town, after having fortified it with great care, were entirely in their patron's intereſt; and *Otacilius*, who well knew it, and dreaded the conſequences of a revolt, quitted the place at this time, and fled to *Pompey*. As ſoon as he was gone, the inhabitants opened their gates to *Antony*, and furniſhed him with every thing he ſtood in need of. *Antony*, after landing his troops, which conſiſted of three veteran legions, one new-raiſed, and eight hundred horſe, ſent the moſt of the tranſports back again to *Brunduſium*, to bring over the

Y. R. 705. Bef. Chr. 47. 404 Conf.

Y. R. 705. Bef. Chr. 47. 494 Conſ.

the reſt of the foot and cavalry, and retained only a few of *Gallic* ſtructure, that, if *Pompey*, imagining *Italy* to be deſtitute of troops, ſhould attempt to return thither, as was commonly rumoured, *Cæſar* might be able, in ſome meaſure, to follow him.

On the firſt news of *Antony*'s landing, which the two Generals received about the ſame time, they both ſet out from their camps on the *Apſus*; *Cæſar* to join him as ſoon as poſſible; *Pompey* to hinder the junction, and, if poſſible, to draw *Antony* into an ambuſcade. *Cæſar*, who had the river to croſs, was obliged to fetch a compaſs, that he might reach a ford. But *Pompey*, having nothing to obſtruct his march, advanced by great journeys againſt *Antony*; and, underſtanding that he was not far off, he poſted his troops on an advantageous ground, ordering them to keep within their camp, and light no fires, that his approach might not be perceived. *Antony*, however, was appriſed of it by the people of the country, and kept cloſe for one day within his intrenchments; the next he was joined by *Cæſar*; and then *Pompey* retired to *Aſparagium*, a town belonging to the *Dyrrhachians*. *Cæſar* followed him, and, after a march of three days, during which he made himſelf maſter of the capital town of the *Parthinians*, he came in ſight of the enemy's camp, and pitched his own at a ſmall diſtance from it.

The next day he drew out all his forces and offered *Pompey* battle. But *Pompey* ſtirred not, and from that moment *Cæſar* perceived that he muſt take other meaſures.

The

The day after *Cæſar* ſet out for *Dyrrhachium*, taking a long circuit, and through narrow and difficult ways, hoping thereby either to oblige *Pompey* to follow him thither, or to cut off his communication with the town, where he had laid up his proviſions and magazines of war. In this laſt deſign he ſucceeded. For *Pompey*, ſeeing him ſet out another way, imagined he had been obliged to remove for want of proviſions, and did not raiſe his camp till the next day, when he was informed by his ſcouts whither *Cæſar* directed his courſe. He, however, hoped to reach *Dyrrhachium* before him, by taking a nearer way: And though *Cæſar* gave his ſoldiers but little reſt, and made them march with the greateſt celerity, yet, when he arrived in the morning at *Dyrrhachium*, *Pompey*'s van began to appear at a diſtance. *Cæſar* intrenched himſelf without delay: And *Pompey* ſeized a hill called *Petra*, where there was a tolerable harbour, ſheltered from ſome winds. Here he ordered a part of his fleet to attend him and proviſions to be brought to him from *Aſia*, and the other provinces ſubject to his command. And *Cæſar*, apprehending, on his ſide, that the war would run into length, ſent his officers into *Epirus* and all the adjoining countries, where proviſions could be picked up.

Y. R. 705. Bef. Chr. 47. 404 Conſ.

In this ſituation of the two armies, *Cæſar* formed a project, which the nature of the country ſuggeſted. All round *Pompey*'s camp, at a ſmall diſtance from each other, were high and ſteep hills. He took poſſeſſion of theſe, and built forts upon them; reſolving, as the nature of the ground

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ground would allow, to draw lines of communication from one fort to another, and thus incloſe *Pompey* within a circumvallation. By this means *Pompey*'s cavalry, which was very ſtrong, would no longer be troubleſome to his convoys; they themſelves would be diſtreſſed for forage; and *Pompey*'s reputation would greatly ſuffer, when it was reported every-where, that he had ſuffered himſelf to be impriſoned by *Cæſar*'s works, and durſt not hazard a battle to ſet himſelf at liberty. *Pompey*, who was determined neither to quit *Dyrrhachium* and the ſea, nor to give battle, contented himſelf with obſtructing *Cæſar*'s works, and giving his men as much trouble as he poſſibly could. For this end he extended his army, taking in a great many hills, and a large circuit of country. He raiſed twenty-four forts, and, in imitation of *Cæſar*, drew lines between them, which took in a circumference of fifteen miles, in which were arable and paſture lands to feed his horſes and beaſts of burden: And his works were perfected before *Cæſar*'s, as he had more hands to employ, and a narrower circuit to incloſe. When *Cæſar* endeavoured to gain any place near his works, he failed not to detach parties of archers and ſlingers, who galled his men in ſuch a manner, that they were obliged to furniſh themſelves with tunics made of ſackcloth or wool, or thick leather. Both parties diſputed every poſt with the greateſt obſtinacy. *Cæſar*'s purpoſe was to incloſe *Pompey* in as narrow a compaſs as poſſible: And *Pompey*'s buſineſs was to extend himſelf in order to weaken his enemy by dividing his forces.

forces. In one engagement *Cæſar*'s ninth legion was in ſuch imminent danger, that *Pompey* ventured to declare publicly, *that he conſented to be accounted no General, if Cæſar's men got off without conſiderable loſs.* This legion had taken poſſeſſion of a hill, which they began to fortify: And *Pompey* ſeized on that which was oppoſite to it, and from thence ſent his archers and ſlingers with a ſtrong detachment of light-armed troops to attack them. He played, at the ſame time, his engines upon them. *Cæſar* ſoon perceived it to be impoſſible to make any fortification there, while he was ſo briſkly attacked, and reſolved to draw off the legion; but, as he was to make his retreat by the ſteep part of the hill, it proved a buſineſs very nice and dangerous. For the *Pompeians*, as ſoon as they obſerved *Cæſar*'s men to retire, preſſed on the more fiercely, not doubting but their retreat was the effect of the terror they had impreſſed upon them. *Cæſar* therefore ordered his men to ſtand their ground, and he formed a paliſado with hurdles on the ridge of the hill, and dug a ditch behind it. Then he made the legionaries file off, while ſome light-armed troops, poſted on their flanks, protected them, and repulſed the enemy, with flights of darts and ſtones. But they had no ſooner got behind the ditch, than the *Pompeians*, coming up to the hurdles, threw them into the ditch in ſuch heaps, at convenient diſtances, as to make to themſelves ſo many bridges: And, with great outcries and fierce menaces, they went pouring down the hill upon their enemies. *Cæſar*, ſenſible

Y. R. 705. Bef. Chr. 47. 404 Conſ.

Y. R. 705. Bef. Chr. 47. 464 Conſ.

ſible both of the dangerous ſituation of his men, and of the diſhonour attending a retreat, which had all the appearance of a flight, ordered *Antony*, who commanded that legion, to encourage his men, and bravely fall upon the purſuers: Which they did in ſuch cloſe order and ſo briſkly, that, notwithſtanding the diſadvantage of the ground, they routed the *Pompeians*; who, while they endeavoured to eſcape, were not a little incommoded by the ditch and hurdles which had been deſigned to prevent their purſuit. *Cæſar*, ſeeing there was nothing now to fear from the enemy's return, having killed a great number of them, and loſt only five of his own men, retired leiſurely, and, after incloſing ſome other hills, completed his circumvallation. It was a very extraordinary attempt for a General with an inferior army, which wanted bread, and was obliged to make uſe of a root called *chara*, pounded and kneaded with milk, to undertake the ſurrounding of an army much ſuperior in number, and which abounded in every kind of proviſion and ammunition. Nothing certainly could ſhew ſo much the ſuperiority of both the General and the army, than that they could dare to form ſuch a plan, and had the induſtry and courage to go through with it. Such indeed was the ſpirit of this army, that, when their enemies reproached them with the famine they endured, they anſwered their inſults in no other manner than by throwing among them their black loaves; glorying in their want, and declaring that they would eat the bark of trees ſooner than ſuffer them to eſcape; a behaviour

haviour which ſtruck *Pompey* with aſtoniſhment, and made him order the loaves of *chara* to be carefully picked up, and concealed as much as poſſible from his ſoldiery; ſaying, *he never thought to have had to do with wild beaſts.* Y. R. 705. Bef. Chr. 47. 404 Conf. Plut. in Pomp.

This event had fully the effect which *Cæſar* had intended: It raiſed his credit all over the empire, and diminiſhed that of his rival. Nobody doubted but that *Pompey* would draw off his troops into his ſhips, and remove the war to ſome diſtant place: And, upon this, *Dolabella* wrote the following letter to *Cicero*, who was in *Pompey*'s camp.

Dolabella to Cicero.

"I SHALL rejoice to hear you are well; "as I have the ſatisfaction to inform you, that "both *Tullia* and myſelf are perfectly ſo. *Teren-* "*tia*, indeed, has been ſomewhat indiſpoſed; "but is now, I am aſſured, perfectly recovered. "As to the reſt of the family, they are all of "them in the ſtate you wiſh. Ep. Fam. ii. 9. Melm. vii. 19.

"It would be doing me great injuſtice to ſuſ- "pect, that I have at any time adviſed you to "join with me in the cauſe of *Cæſar*, or at leaſt "to ſtand neuter, more with a view to the ad- "vantage of my own party than of your intereſt. "But, now that fortune has declared on our "ſide, it is impoſſible I ſhould be ſuppoſed to "recommend this alternative for any other rea- "ſon, but becauſe the duty I owe you will not "ſuffer me to be ſilent. Whether my advice,

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" therefore, ſhall meet with your approbation, or " not, you will at leaſt be ſo juſt as to believe, " that it proceeds, my dear *Cicero*, from an honeſt " intention, and from an heart moſt ſincerely de- " ſirous of your welfare.

" You ſee that neither the name of *Pompey* " *the Great*, nor the credit of his former illuſtrious " actions, nor the advantages he ſo frequently " boaſted of having Kings and nations in the " number of his clients, have any thing availed " him. On the contrary, he has ſuffered a diſ- " grace which never, perhaps, attended any other " *Roman* General. For, after having been driven " out of *Italy*, and having loſt both the *Spains*, to- " gether with a veteran army, he is now inveſted " on all ſides in ſuch a manner, that he cannot " execute what Generals of the loweſt capacity " have often performed: He cannot even make " an honourable retreat. You will conſider well, " agreeably to your uſual prudence, what hopes " can poſſibly remain either to him or to your- " ſelf: And the reſult will evidently point out " the meaſures which are the moſt expedient for " you to purſue. If *Pompey* extricates himſelf " from this danger, in which he is involved, and " takes refuge in his fleet, I intreat you to con- " ſult your own intereſt in preference to that of " any other man. You have fully ſatisfied your " duty, your friendſhip, and your engagements " to that party, which you eſpouſed in the re- " public. What then remains for us but to ſit " down quietly under the Republic as it now " ſubſiſts, rather than, by vainly contending for

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" the old conſtitution, to be abſolutely deprived " of both? If *Pompey*, therefore, ſhould be dri- " ven from his preſent poſt, and obliged to re- " treat ſtill farther; I conjure you, my dear *Ci-* " *cero*, to withdraw to *Athens*, or to any other " city unconcerned in the war. If you ſhould " comply with this advice, I beg you would give " me notice, that I may fly to embrace you, if " by any means it ſhould be in my power. Such " is our General's natural generoſity, that you " will find it eaſy to obtain from him any ho- " nourable conditions you ſhall demand: And " I am perſuaded that my ſollicitations will have " no inconſiderable weight for this purpoſe [r]."

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But the war ſoon after took a very different turn, and *Pompey*, inſtead of making his eſcape, forced *Cæſar*, by an unexpected defeat, to retire towards *Macedonia*. *Pompey*, incloſed as he was, began ſoon to ſuffer great inconveniencies from the want of water and forage. For *Cæſar* had not only turned the courſe of all the rivers and brooks which ran into the ſea, but he had alſo taken the precaution to turn the current of the

Cæſ. de Bell. Civ. Com. lib. iii.

[r] *Velleius Paterculus* informs us, that *Cæſar* ſtill continued to ſollicit the Chiefs of *Pompey*'s party, and that *Cornelius Balbus*, at the peril of his life, entered privately *Pompey*'s camp, ſeveral times, to gain the late Conſul *Lentulus*, his benefactor, who was wavering in his mind: *Tum Balbus Cornelius, excedente humanam fidem temeritate, ingreſſus caſtra hoſtium ſæpiuſque cum Lentulo collocutus, conſule dubitante quanti ſe venderet, illis incrementis fecit viam, quibus Hiſpanus in triumphum & pontificatum aſſurgeret, fieretque ex privato conſularis.* L. ii. *c.* 51.

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waters which, after a ſtorm of rain, would fall from the mountains. This obliged the enemy to ſink wells in the low and marſhy grounds, which, lying at a conſiderable diſtance from ſome parts of the army, and being ſoon dried up by the heat, greatly increaſed the daily labour of the ſoldiers. As for forage, after conſuming what was within the lines, they could have none but by ſea, which not coming in ſufficient quantities, the horſes and cattle died in great numbers. It was therefore time for *Pompey* to make the moſt vigorous efforts to force *Cæſar*'s lines and ſet himſelf at liberty; and he made uſe of every ſtratagem to diſtreſs and fatigue his enemies. In the night he ſent his archers wherever it appeared, by the fires, that their guards were, who, after pouring a flight of arrows upon them, retired inſtantly to their lines; ſo that *Cæſar*'s men were obliged to have fires in one place, and keep guard in another. After ſeveral particular aſſaults, the two armies were engaged in ſix different actions at once; in three near *Dyrrhachium*, and in three about the lines. We have loſt the particulars of theſe ſeveral engagements, *Cæſar*'s commentaries being imperfect in this place. We gather from him, however, that the principal attack was at a fort garriſoned by a ſingle cohort, commanded by the brave *Scæva*, who kept his ground for ſeveral hours againſt four legions, till *P. Sylla* brought to his aſſiſtance, by *Cæſar*'s orders, two legions from the camp. The *Pompeians* were then repulſed; but they found it no eaſy matter to make good their retreat. Having

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advanced to the ſummit of a hill, they had reaſon to fear *Cæſar*'s men would charge them in their deſcent; and *Pompey*, to ſuſtain them, immediately took poſſeſſion of an eminence out of the reach of the engines of the fort, where he threw up an intrenchment and brought more forces. But *Sylla*, who was intruſted with the care of the camp, ſatisfied to have diſengaged his own men, had no intention to hazard a general battle, which might have been attended with ill conſequences, and would have looked like arrogating the part of a General; and, checking the ardour of his ſoldiers, he brought them off from the purſuit. It was, however, generally believed, that, if he had purſued the enemy briſkly, that day might have put an end to the war. "But his conduct, ſays *Cæſar*, cannot "juſtly be cenſured: For there is a wide dif-"ference between a Lieutenant and a Gene-"ral: The one is bound to act according to in-"ſtructions; the other, free from reſtraint, is at "liberty to lay hold of all advantages." In theſe ſix engagements *Cæſar* loſt no more than twenty men, whereas *Pompey* had above two thouſand of his legionaries killed, and ſeveral volunteers and Centurions. In the fort, however, not a ſoldier came off without a wound, and four Centurions loſt their eyes. It appeared that thirty thouſand arrows had been ſhot into it; and *Scæva* ſhewed two-and-thirty holes in his buckler. *Cæſar*, to reward ſuch heroiſm, preſented him with two hundred thouſand aſſes, and advanced him from the eighth rank of

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Captains to the firſt. He alſo diſtributed military rewards to the officers and ſoldiers of the whole cohort, and aſſigned them, beſides, double pay and a double allowance of corn. *Pompey* laboured all night at his fortifications, raiſed redoubts the following days, and, having carried his works fifteen feet high, covered all that part of his camp with mantelets. He ſtaid there five days, and, taking advantage of a very dark night, he walled up the gates of this new camp, rendered all the avenues impracticable, and, drawing out all his troops in great ſilence, at midnight, returned to his former works.

Cæſ. de Bell. Civ. Com. l. iii.

Cæſar, after this ſucceſs, drew up his army every day to inſult *Pompey*, offering him battle; and, to provoke him to accept it, he advanced ſo near to his camp, that his van was within engine-ſhot of the ramparts. *Pompey* alſo drew out his legions, but poſted them in ſuch a manner that his third line touched the rampart, and the whole army lay under cover of the weapons diſcharged from thence: And in this ſituation *Cæſar* did not think proper to attack him. *Pompey*, induced by the ſcarcity of forage, had ſent his horſe to *Dyrrhachium*; but there *Cæſar* ſoon laid them under the ſame conſtraint as in the camp: For, by drawing a line with forts round the town, he alſo effectually blocked it up. They therefore returned again by ſea to the camp, where, having no forage but what was imported from *Corcyra* and *Acarnania*, the horſes were often fed with leaves of trees and the roots of green reeds bruiſed. At laſt, all expedients for their

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ſubſiſtence failing, *Pompey* reſolved to ſet himſelf at liberty, if poſſible: And, in the execution of his deſign, he was greatly aſſiſted by the counſels of two officers in *Cæſar*'s cavalry, named *Roſcillus* and *Ægus*, who, at this time, deſerted to him. They were *Allobrogians*, the ſons of *Abducillus*, who had long held the chief ſway in his ſtate, and, being men of ſingular bravery, who had done *Cæſar* eminent ſervice in the wars of *Gaul*, he had greatly diſtinguiſhed them, by raiſing them to the higheſt offices in their own country, and to a ſtate of great wealth. Theſe men, preſuming on *Cæſar*'s friendſhip, uſed their troopers ill, defrauded them of their pay, giving falſe muſters, and ſecreted all the plunder for their own uſe; a behaviour which alienated from them not only the minds of the *Gallic* cavalry, but of the whole army, with whom they had been in high eſteem: And a general complaint was made againſt them. *Cæſar*, not thinking it a proper time for animadverſion, and regarding them greatly on account of their valour, declined all public notice of the affair, and only reprimanded them in private; admoniſhing them to expect every thing from his friendſhip, and to ground their future hopes on the experience of what he had already done for them. This rebuke, however, diſguſted them greatly: And ſhame, a conſciouſneſs of guilt, and the fear, perhaps, of having entirely loſt *Cæſar*'s favour, made them reſolve to try their fortune elſewhere, and to look out for new friendſhips. Having

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ing imparted their deſign to a few of their clients, whom they judged to be fit inſtruments for the execution of it, they firſt attempted to murder *C. Voluſenus*, General of the cavalry, that, by ſo ſignal a piece of ſervice, they might the more effectually recommend themſelves to *Pompey*. But, finding that deſign attended with great hazard, and that no favourable opportunity offered for putting it in execution, they borrowed all the money they could, under pretence of reimburſing the troops and making reſtitution, and, having bought up a great number of horſes, went over to *Pompey*, with thoſe they had made privy to their counſels. As they were perſons of noble birth, liberally educated, came with a great train of horſes and ſervants, had been highly honoured by *Cæſar*, and were univerſally eſteemed on account of their bravery, *Pompey* received them with great diſtinction, and oſtentatiouſly carried them over all his camp, triumphing in this new and unexpected acquiſition. For till then neither trooper nor foot-ſoldier had deſerted to him, whereas ſcarce a day paſſed without ſome deſerting from his army, eſpecially among the levies in *Epirus* and *Greece*. The two brothers being well acquainted with the condition of *Cæſar*'s camp and fortifications, where the defects of the lines lay, the particular times for every ſervice, diſtances of places, ſtrength and vigilance of the guards, with the temper and character of the officers who commanded in every poſt, made an exact report of all to *Pompey*.

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Upon this intelligence, having already formed the deſign of forcing *Cæſar*'s lines, he ordered the ſoldiers to make coverings of oſier for their helmets, and provide themſelves with faſcines for filling up the trenches. This done, he embarked by night in boats a great number of light-armed troops and archers, with the faſcines; and, having drawn together ſixty cohorts from the greater camp and the forts, he led them towards that part of the enemy's line which lay neareſt the ſea, and was the fartheſt diſtant from their head-quarters. The boats and all the gallies that lay at *Dyrrhachium*, filled with men and faſcines, were ordered to the ſame ſpot. The place, which *Pompey* deſigned to attack, was commanded by *Lentulus Marcellinus*, Quæſtor, whoſe health being infirm, *Fulvius Poſthumus* was to aſſiſt him; and it was defended by a ditch fifteen feet broad, with a rampart towards *Pompey*'s lines, ten feet high and of equal thickneſs. Behind this, at the diſtance of ſix hundred feet, was another rampart, ſomewhat lower than the former, and fronting the contrary way, deſigned as a defence againſt an attack from the ſea. But the line that was to join the two ramparts, and run along the ſea-ſhore, was not yet completed: And this, *Pompey* being informed of, it was of fatal conſequence to *Cæſar*. *Pompey*'s ſixty cohorts approached at break of day towards *Cæſar*'s line, and, by their ſudden appearance, greatly ſurpriſed the cohort of the ninth legion upon guard. They planted

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their ſcaling-ladders againſt the inward rampart, and, plying thoſe who defended it with darts and engines, ſpread a general terror over all that part of the works, which was ſtill increaſed by the multitude of archers that poured flights of arrows on all ſides. In this extremity, the only refuge of *Cæſar*'s men was to ply the enemy with ſtones; but theſe were prevented from doing much execution by the oſiers with which the *Pompeians* had bound their helmets. At the ſame time the troops that came by ſea aſſailed the exterior rampart, and, ſoon diſcovering the defect in the lines, landed their men between the two ramparts, where the line of communication towards the ſea remained unfiniſhed; and thus, attacking in the rear the ſoldiers that defended them, they obliged them to withdraw from both.

Marcellinus, appriſed of this diſorder, detached ſome cohorts to ſuſtain the flying troops: But, as the rout was become general, they could neither perſuade them to rally, nor were able themſelves to withſtand the enemy's charge. The more ſupplies he ſent, the greater confuſion was created, and the means of eſcape became more difficult. In this action the Eagle-bearer of the ninth legion, finding himſelf dangerouſly wounded, and that his ſtrength began to fail, called to ſome troopers who paſſed by, and ſaid: *I have carefully preſerved, to the laſt moment of my life, this Eagle, with which I have been intruſted; and, now that I am dying,*

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dying, I return it to CÆSAR *with the ſame fidelity: Carry it to him, I beſeech you, nor ſuffer his arms to experience, in loſing it, an ignominy with which they have been hitherto unacquainted.* Thus the Eagle was preſerved, but all the Centurions, except one, of the firſt cohort were killed. The *Pompeians*, now bearing down all before them, approached the quarters of *Marcellinus*, when *M. Antony*, who commanded in the neareſt forts, was ſeen deſcending, with twelve cohorts, from the higher grounds. His arrival put a ſtop to the enemy's progreſs: And ſoon after *Cæſar* came up in perſon with more troops, being informed of the attack by the ſmoke of the forts, the uſual ſignal on theſe occaſions. He perceived that *Pompey* had forced the lines, and had lodged himſelf on a ſpot from whence he could freely forage, and which allowed him a communication with the ſea, and, altering intirely the project he had formed of incloſing him, he encamped as near to him as he could.

Cæſ. de Bell. Civ. Com. l. iii.

An eagerneſs to repair this loſs was like to be the cauſe of his total ruin. No ſooner were the intrenchments of his new camp finiſhed, than he was informed by his ſcouts, that a certain number of the enemy's cohorts, which appeared to them to be a complete legion, were retired behind a wood, and ſeemed to be on their march to an old camp, which had been ſucceſſively occupied and abandoned by *Cæſar* and *Pompey*. This camp bordered upon a wood, and was about four hundred paces from the ſea: It had been

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been formed by *Cæſar*'s ninth legion, when they were ſent to oppoſe a body of *Pompey*'s troops. Upon their removing to a greater diſtance, *Pompey* had taken poſſeſſion of it, and, intending to lodge in it ſeveral legions, ſurrounded it with more extenſive intrenchments, incloſing a ſmall camp within one of a larger circumference. He likewiſe carried an intrenchment from the left angle of his camp to the river through the ſpace of about four hundred ſpaces, which enabled him to water freely and without danger: But all theſe works he had thought proper to abandon. Hither the ſcouts reported they ſaw the ſtandard of a legion carried, which was alſo confirmed by thoſe who were ſtationed in the higher forts. The place was about five hundred paces from *Pompey*'s new camp, and *Cæſar* hoped, that, if he could get to the old camp, unperceived by *Pompey*, he would be able to ſurpriſe the legion and cut it off. He ſet out therefore as privately as poſſible with thirty-three cohorts, in which number was the ninth legion, that had lately loſt ſo many of its Centurions and ſoldiers: And, taking a circuit, arrived before *Pompey* had notice of his deſign. Though the intrenchments were ſtrong, yet, charging the enemy briſkly with his left wing, where he commanded in perſon, he quickly drove them from the rampart: But they continued ſome time to defend the gates, which were ſecured by a barricade; and here *T. Pulcio*, formerly an officer in *Cæſar*'s army, and who had betrayed *C. Antonius*, gave ſignal

nal proofs of his valour. At length *Cæſar*'s men prevailed, cut down the barricade, broke into the greater camp, and purſued the legion into the inward and leſſer one. But Fortune, ſays *Cæſar*, which often effects mighty changes from trifling cauſes, and whoſe influence is never greater than in war, ſhewed its power on this occaſion. For the cohorts of *Cæſar*'s right wing, unacquainted with the ſituation of the camp, and miſtaking the rampart which led to the river for one of its ſides, marched on that way in queſt of a gate; but, perceiving their error, they got over the rampart and were followed by all the cavalry. This delay ſaved the enemy: For *Pompey*, having notice of what paſſed, brought up a legion and a large body of horſe to ſuſtain his party; which, being ſeen advancing by both ſides, quickly changed the face of affairs. *Pompey*'s legion, encouraged by his ſuccour, bravely defended themſelves, and ſtood their ground: On the other hand *Cæſar*'s cavalry, who had entered by a narrow breach in the rampart, foreſeeing that a retreat would be extremely difficult, made off immediately. The right wing which had no communication with the left, obſerving the conſternation of the cavalry, and fearing they ſhould be overpowered within the camp, retired the ſame way they had entered; and many, to avoid being engaged in the narrow paſſes, threw themſelves into the ditch; where, the firſt ranks being trodden to death, their bodies afforded an eaſy paſſage for thoſe

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thoſe that followed. The left wing, who, from the rampart whence they had driven the enemy, ſaw *Pompey* advancing againſt them, and their own men flying, fearing to be entangled in the defiles, as they had the enemy upon them both within and without the camp, began alſo to retreat. Nothing was to be ſeen but conſternation and diſorder; and all *Cæſar*'s efforts to rally his men were fruitleſs. If he ſeized any of them, they ſtruggled till they got away: If he laid hold of their colours, they left them in his hands: Not a man could be prevailed upon to face about. In this calamity, what ſaved the army, ſays *Cæſar*, from entire deſtruction was, that *Pompey*, apprehending an ambuſcade (probably becauſe the ſucceſs was beyond his hopes, as a little before he had ſeen his men worſted and put to flight) durſt not for ſome time approach the intrenchments, and that his cavalry were retarded in the purſuit by the narrowneſs of the ways and the difficulty of paſſing the forts which *Cæſar*'s ſoldiers were maſters of. In theſe two actions *Cæſar* loſt nine hundred and ſixty ſoldiers, thirty officers, and ſeveral Knights of note: Moſt of whom died without wounds, being trodden to death in the ditch, or on the banks of the river. He loſt alſo thirty-three colours. The priſoners were delivered up to *Labienus*, at his requeſt; and this deſerter, brutal and cruel as uſual, diverted himſelf with inſulting them in their calamity; and, after aſking them ſarcaſtically, whether it was common

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for priſoners to run away, he cauſed them all to be put to death. Y. R. 705. Bef. Chr. 47. 404 Conſ.

Pompey was ſaluted *Imperator* upon this occaſion; a title which he bore ever after: But, neither in his letters nor his conſular enſigns, did he think proper to aſſume the laurel. His party was ſo elated with this ſucceſs, that they thought the war at an end, and proclaimed everywhere their victory with great exaggerations[a]. *Cæſar*, ſeeing all his projects diſconcerted, called his troops from the ſeveral forts into his camp, where, having aſſembled them, he ſaid, "that "they ought not to be any wiſe diſcouraged at "what had happened, but ſhould put, in the "balance with their preſent loſs, their many

[a] *Cicero* does not appear to have been in the ſame humour. We have a letter from him to *Atticus*, written at this time from *Dyrrhachium*, which is as follows: "You "complain of not hearing from me, but I have nothing to "ſend you that is worth your notice: For I abſolutely diſ"approve of every thing that is done, and every thing "that happens here. I wiſh I had rather conferred with "you, at a certain time, than correſponded by letters. "I defend you here with our party as well as I am able, and "ſo does *Celer*. I have hitherto declined all employment, "and the rather, becauſe I ſaw none in which I could "act conſiſtently with my character and ſituation.

"You aſk me what news: You may know from *Iſido*"*rus* what has lately happened: What remains to be done "doth not ſeem more difficult.——My anxieties prey upon "me ſo much, that I am reduced to a very low ſtate of "health: When I am ſomewhat recovered, I ſhall join our "General, who is now very ſanguine in his hopes. Our "friend *Brutus* acts in this cauſe with great ſpirit. This "is all I can ſay to you conſiſtently with prudence. Adieu." *Ad Att.* xi. 4.

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"ſucceſsful engagements; and ſhould conſider "how Fortune had hitherto befriended them "in the reduction of *Italy*, which they had ef- "fected without bloodſhed; in the conqueſt of "the two *Spains*, though defended by warlike "troops under the conduct of ſkilful and ex- "perienced Leaders; in the ſubjection of *Epi- "rus* and the neighbouring provinces, whence "they had been ſupplied with proviſions; and "in their paſſing ſafe over the ſea when the "enemy covered it with their fleets, and were "poſſeſt of all the havens and coaſts. If they "were not ſucceſsful in every thing, they muſt "endeavour, he ſaid, by prudence, to over- "come the diſappointments of Fortune; and "attribute their late diſaſter to the caprice "of that goddeſs, rather than to any fault on "their ſide: For that he had led them on ſuc- "ceſsfully, and had forced the enemy's camp; "and, if ſome ſudden conſternation, the miſ- "taking their way, or any other miſhap, had "ſnatched a certain victory out of their hands, "they ought to exert their utmoſt endeavours "to repair the diſgrace: Which would turn "their misfortunes to a benefit, as it had hap- "pened at *Gergovia*, where thoſe, who had "been ſeized with a dread of the enemy, ſoon "after earneſtly urged him to lead them to bat- "tle." This artful ſpeech was followed by the diſgrace of ſome Standard-bearers, who were reduced to the rank of private ſoldiers: But there was little occaſion for ſeverity; for the whole

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whole army was ſo grieved at their loſs, and ſo deſirous of expunging the ſtain their glory had received, that it was ſcarcely requiſite for the officers to remind them of their duty. They begged with one voice to be led to the enemy, and ſome of the more conſiderable Commanders entreated *Cæſar* to venture a battle; but he did not think it prudent to expoſe in the field, againſt an enemy elated with ſucceſs, troops that had been juſt worſted, and in whom deep impreſſions might remain of their late fright. He therefore reſolved to change his camp, and the whole plan of the war, and to give them time to recover themſelves. As ſoon as night approached, he ſent all the ſick and wounded, with the baggage to *Apollonia*, under the guard of one legion, ordering them not to ſtop till they had reached the place: And at three in the morning he made all his forces, except two legions, file out of the ſeveral gates of the camp, and follow the ſame route that the baggage had taken. Soon after, that his march might not have the appearance of a flight, and be known to the enemy as late as poſſible, he ordered the uſual ſignal of decamping to be given, and, ſetting out with the reſt of the troops, loſt ſight of the camp in a moment. *Pompey*, informed of his retreat, prepared to follow him without delay, and ſent his cavalry to harraſs and retard his rear-guard: But *Cæſar*, having no baggage, marched with ſuch expedition, that they did not come up with him till he had reached

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reached the river *Genuſus.* He ſent his horſe with ſome light-armed troops againſt them, who charged with ſuch vigour, that they turned their backs and returned to *Pompey*, leaving a conſiderable number of their men dead upon the field. *Cæſar*, having croſſed the *Genuſus* and made a day's march, took up his quarters in his old camp at *Aſparagium*; where he gave ſtrict orders to the ſoldiers not to ſtroll without the rampart, and charged the cavalry, which he ſent out, as it were to forage, to return without delay by the *Decuman* gate, which was the moſt remote from the enemy. *Pompey* alſo took up his quarters in the camp he had formerly made, where the works being entire, and the ſoldiers having nothing to do, ſome made long excurſions in queſt of wood and forage, and others, who had come almoſt without any baggage, having ſet out on a ſudden, enticed by the nearneſs of their former camp, laid down their arms in their tents, and went to fetch what they had left behind. This diſperſion rendered them unable to continue the purſuit, as *Cæſar* had foreſeen; and about noon he gave the ſignal for decamping, and, by doubling that day's march, gained eight miles upon *Pompey*. The following days he ſet out at three every morning, and *Pompey*, after attempting for three days to overtake him, gave over the purſuit on the fourth, and began to think of other meaſures.

Both Generals had at this time armies in *Macedonia*. *Cæſar*, when he was joined by *M. Antony*

tony with the troops from *Italy*, received a deputation from *Theſſaly* and *Ætolia*, with aſſurances of ſubmiſſion from all the States in thoſe parts, on condition that he would ſend troops to defend them. He had accordingly diſpatched *L. Caſſius Longinus* into *Theſſaly* with a legion of new levies and two hundred horſe; and *C. Calviſius Sabinus* into *Ætolia* with five cohorts: Deſiring them, as theſe provinces lay neareſt his camp, to provide him with corn. The latter was well received by the *Ætolians*, and, having driven out the enemy's garriſon from *Calydon* and *Neupactum*, poſſeſſed himſelf of the whole country. In *Theſſaly*, there were two factions: *Egereſetus*, a man of years and of eſtabliſhed credit, favoured *Pompey*: *Petreius*, a young Nobleman, exerted his whole influence in behalf of *Cæſar*. About the ſame time, *Cn. Domitius Calvinus* was ordered into *Macedonia*, with the eleventh and twelfth legions and five hundred horſe: Whither he had been alſo invited by *Menedemus*, a principal man of the country, who aſſured him of the general affection of the inhabitants. *Pompey*, on his ſide, ſent meſſengers to *Scipio* in *Syria*, to haſten his march, and come and join him with the legions under his command. *Cæſar* gives us a ſtrange account of this Proconſul's behaviour in his province, which correſponds, however, very well with the reſt of his life. He tells us, that, after receiving ſome affronts and checks from the barbarous people of mount *Amanus*, he aſſumed the title of *Imperator*; that he exacted great ſums of money from the neigh-

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bouring States and Princes; obliged the Farmers of the revenue to pay the two years taxes which lay in their hands, and advance a third by way of loan; and ſent orders to the whole province for levying cavalry. In his progreſs through *Aſia Minor*, he found the natives in the greateſt terror on account of the *Parthians*; and his ſoldiers declared, that, though they were ready to ſerve againſt a public enemy, they were not diſpoſed to act againſt the Conſul and their fellow-citizens. But, to ſtifle their diſcontents, he not only made them conſiderable preſents, but quartered them in *Pergamus*, and other rich towns, and gave up the whole country to their diſcretion. Heavy exactions, nevertheleſs, were made upon the province, and various new pretences deviſed to ſerve as a ground for them. Freedmen and ſlaves were ſubjected to a capitation tax: Impoſts were laid on pillars and doors of houſes: Corn, ſoldiers, mariners, arms, engines, carriages, in a word, every thing that had a name, furniſhed a ſufficient handle for extorting money: Governors were appointed not only over towns, but over villages and caſtles; and he that acted with the greateſt rigour and cruelty was accounted the worthieſt man, and the beſt citizen. The province ſwarmed with Lictors, Overſeers, and Collectors, who, beſides the ſums impoſed by public authority, exacted money likewiſe on their own account; colouring their iniquitous demands with a pretence that they had been expelled their country and native homes, and were in want of

every thing. Add to all theſe calamities immoderate uſury, an evil inſeparable from ſuch exorbitant exactions; for, when ſums are called for beyond what a country is able to furniſh, they are obliged to apply for a delay, which, at any intereſt, is ſtill accounted a favour. Thus the debts of the province increaſed immenſely theſe two years. *Scipio* had given orders to ſeize all the treaſure of the temple of *Diana* at *Epheſus*, with all the ſtatues of that goddeſs, when he received letters from *Pompey*, to lay aſide all other concerns, and advance to him. *Joſephus* relates, that, while he was in *Syria*, he beheaded *Alexander*, Prince of the *Jews*, under the frivolous pretext of his having formerly occaſioned ſome diſturbances in *Judæa*: but in truth, becauſe he favoured *Cæſar*'s cauſe, like his unfortunate father, *Ariſtobulus*, who had been poiſoned a little before by *Pompey*'s partiſans, for the ſame reaſon.

Y. R. 703. Bef. Chr. 47. 404 Conſ.

Joſ. Ant. xiv. 13 & 15.

On *Scipio*'s arrival in *Macedonia*, he found there *Domitius*, and advanced towards him by great marches; but, being come within twenty miles of him, he ſuddenly changed his route, and, leaving *M. Favonius* at the river *Haliacmon*, which ſeparates *Macedonia* from *Theſſaly*, with eight cohorts, to guard the baggage, and there to raiſe a fort, he turned off in queſt of *Caſſius Longinus*, and marched ſo expeditiouſly that he was actually arrived before *Caſſius* had notice of his approach. At the ſame time King *Cotus*'s cavalry came pouring upon *Caſſius*'s camp, who, knowing that *Scipio* was not far

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diſtant, believed the cavalry to be his, and retired, in a fright, to the mountains that begirt *Theſſaly*, and thence directed his courſe towards *Ambracia*. *Scipio*, when he was preparing to follow him, was called back by *Favonius*, who informed him that *Domitius* was marching towards him, and that it would be impoſſible for him to defend his poſt. Marching, therefore, day and night without intermiſſion, he arrived ſo opportunely, that his advanced guards and the duſt of *Domitius*'s army were deſcried at the ſame time. Thus *Domitius*'s care preſerved *Caſſius*, and *Scipio*'s diligence *Favonius*. Theſe two Generals kept one another in play, during the blockade of *Dyrrhachium*, without coming to any deciſive engagement. During which time, alſo, *Calenus*, taking the command of *Caſſius*'s and *Calviſius*'s troops, penetrated into *Achaia*, where *Delphos*, *Thebes*, and *Orchomenus* ſubmitted to him: But he was ſtopped in his conqueſt by a Lieutenant of *Pompey*, *Rutilius Lupus*, who kept him out of the *Peloponneſus*.

Cæſar, from *Apollonia*, where he ſtaid but to provide for his wounded, pay his army, and garriſon the towns in his intereſt, ſet out to join *Domitius Calvinus*. He perceived, that, if *Pompey* followed him, he muſt leave the ſea and the ammunition and proviſion he had treaſured up at *Dyrrhachium*, and be reduced to engage him on equal terms; and, if *Pompey* paſſed into *Italy*, he purpoſed to join *Domitius* and march to its defence, by the coaſt of *Illyricum*: In fine, if *Pompey* ſhould fall upon *Apollonia* and *Oricum*,

and

and endeavour to exclude him from the ſea-coaſt, he intended to attack *Scipio*, and thereby force *Pompey* to come to his aſſiſtance. *Cæſar*, therefore, had diſpatched couriers to *Calvinus* to acquaint him with his deſigns, and with orders how to act; and, having left four cohorts at *Apollonia*, one at *Liſſus*, and three at *Oricum*, marched through *Epirus* and *Acarnania*. *Pompey*, on his ſide, penetrating into *Cæſar*'s views, made what haſte he could to join *Scipio*, that, if *Cæſar* ſhould march that way, he might prevent his being overpowered: But ſhould he ſtill keep near the ſea, becauſe of the legions and cavalry he expected from *Italy*, in that event he purpoſed to fall upon *Calvinus* with all his forces. Both Generals, therefore, marched with the greateſt expedition, as well to afford timely relief to their friends, as not to miſs the opportunity of diſtreſſing their enemies. *Cæſar*, however, had been forced to turn off to *Apollonia*, and *Pompey*, taking the direct way through *Candavia*, arrived firſt in *Macedonia*: And Fortune had almoſt thrown *Domitius* into his hands. For *Cæſar*'s late defeat, which the *Pompeians* greatly exaggerated in their letters, having induced ſeveral States to throw off their allegiance, his couriers to *Domitius* were intercepted; and this General, having conſumed all the proviſions near his camp, had quitted it at this time, and was upon his march to *Heraclea Sentica*, a town of the *Candavians*. What ſaved him was, that his ſcouts met accidentally with ſome *Allobrogians*, ſervants of *Ægus* and *Roſcil-*

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lus, who, either from ancient familiarity or from a motive of vain-glory, informed them of all that had paſſed, and of *Pompey*'s approach: Which news being immediately carried to *Calvinus*, who was not above four hours march from the enemy, he inſtantly turned off, and joined *Cæſar* at *Æginium*, a town on the borders of *Theſſaly*.

From *Æginium* *Cæſar* marched with all his forces to *Gomphi*, the firſt town of *Theſſaly* on the ſide of *Epirus*. A few months before, the inhabitants of their own accord had ſent him a deputation, to petition for a garriſon, and make him an offer of what their country produced; But now *Androſthenes*, Prætor of *Theſſaly*, chuſing rather to be the companion of *Pompey*'s good fortune than a partner with *Cæſar* in his adverſity, ordered all the people, whether free or ſlaves, to aſſemble in the town, and, having ſhut the gates againſt *Cæſar*, ſent letters to *Scipio* and *Pompey* to come to his aſſiſtance, intimating, that the town was ſtrong enough to hold out if they uſed diſpatch, but was by no means in a condition to ſuſtain a long ſiege. *Scipio* was then at *Lariſſa*, and *Pompey* had not yet entered *Theſſaly*. *Cæſar*, after fortifying his camp and preparing every thing for a ſudden attack, called his ſoldiers together, and repreſented to them, "of what conſequence it was to make "them ſelves maſters of an opulent city, abounding in all ſorts of commodities, and, by the "terror of whoſe puniſhment, other States "would be awed into ſubmiſſion: And this "muſt

" muſt be done before any ſuccours could ar- " rive." His ſoldiers having ſhewed an uncommon ardour, he led them on to the aſſault at three in the afternoon, and was maſter of it before ſun-ſet. After giving it up to be plundered by his ſoldiers, he marched on to *Metropolis*, where he arrived before the inhabitants were appriſed of the diſaſter of their neighbours. The *Metropolitans* propoſed at firſt to ſtand upon their defence, but, being made acquainted with the fate of *Gomphi*, they opened their gates, and *Cæſar* ſuffered no harm to be done them. The other States of *Theſſaly*, obſerving the different fates of theſe two cities, readily ſubmitted; except *Lariſſa*, which was awed by *Scipio*'s legions. *Cæſar* now reſolved to encamp, and wait for *Pompey*. For this purpoſe he pitched upon a convenient ſpot near a town called *Pharſalus:* And the adjacent country being good, and covered with corn, which was now almoſt ripe [t], he thought it a proper ſituation for

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[t] This circumſtance determines nearly the time of the *Julian* year when *Cæſar* ſat down in *Theſſaly*, and that of the battle of *Pharſalia*, which was about a month after: And, as we know the day of the *Roman* year when this ſaid battle was fought, it ſerves to determine the relation of the *Roman* with the *Julian* year. In a diſcourſe of M. *de la Nauze*, printed in the 26th vol. of the *Memoires de Litterature*, of the Royal Academy of *Paris*, we find the following note: " M. l'Abbe *Belley* a depuis communiquè, à l' au " teur de ce memoire, l' extrait ſuivant d' une lettre écrite " à M. *Pellerin* par M. *de Clairambault*, Conſul de France " a *Salonique*, en date du 4 *Janvier*, 1755; *Suivant les infor-* " *mations*

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for the theatre of war, and for determining his quarrel with his rival.

Pompey came ſoon into *Theſſaly*, and, joining *Scipio*'s legions with his own in one camp, he firſt thanked his own men for their late important ſervices, and then exhorted *Scipio*'s troops to claim their ſhare of the booty to which his late victory had intitled them. He divided all the honours of command with *Scipio*, ordering a prætorian tent to be prepared for him, and the trumpets to attend him. This increaſe of ſtrength, by the union of two powerful armies, raiſed to ſuch a height the preſumption of his followers, and their aſſurance of victory, that now all delays were conſidered in no other light, than as an odious hindrance of their return into *Italy:* Inſomuch that, if *Pompey* on any occaſion acted with ſlowneſs and circumſpection, they complained, "that he induſtriouſly protracted the war, which could eaſily be brought "to a concluſion in one day, in the view of gratifying his ambition for command, and keeping in his dependence ſuch a number of conſular and prætorian Senators." They began to contend with one another about the dignities and prieſthoods of the State, and diſpoſed of the conſulſhip for ſeveral years. They even ſued for the houſes and eſtates of thoſe who followed

"*mations que j'ai demandées en* THESSALIE, *& ſuivant ce que* "*m' en on rapporté ici les gens de ce pays-la, la moiſſon s'y fait* "*dans le mois de Juin*; *& du côté de* LARISSA *& de* Tricala, "*c' eſt dès les primiers jours de Juin*; *& du côté de* Jannina "*& des environs, ce n' eſt que du* 15 *au* 20 *du même mois.*"

Cæſar's

Cæſar's party: And a warm debate aroſe in Council, whether *L. Hirrus*, whom *Pompey* had ſent Ambaſſador to the *Parthians*, ſhould be allowed, in the next election for Prætors, to ſtand a candidate for that office in his abſence. His friends implored *Pompey* to make good the promiſe he had made him at his departure, and not ſuffer him to be deceived by depending on his honour; while ſuch as aſpired to this office complained publicly that a promiſe ſhould be made to any one candidate, when all were embarked in the ſame cauſe, and ſhared the like dangers. Great was the competition, and not without perſonal abuſe between *Lentulus Spinther*, *L. Domitius*, and *Scipio*, about the High-prieſthood, with which *Cæſar* was inveſted; the firſt pleading his age, the ſecond his dignity, and intereſt in the city, the third his alliance with *Pompey*. *Attius Rufus* impeached *Afranius* before his General, charging him with being the cauſe of the loſs of the army in *Spain*. *L. Domitius* moved in Council, that, after *Cæſar*'s deſtruction, a commiſſion of the Senators in *Pompey*'s camp ſhould be impowered to pronounce judgment upon thoſe who had either ſtaid in *Italy*, or, after removing to countries under *Pompey*'s command, had taken no ſhare in the war; and that three billets ſhould be given to theſe judges, one for acquittal, one for condemnation, and a third for a pecuniary fine. Thus every one's thoughts were employed on the honours and profit he was to ſhare, or the vengeance he hoped to inflict upon his enemies: But no one conſidered by what me-

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methods the victory was to be obtained, looking now upon *Cæſar* as a certain and eaſy conqueſt. This account of the behaviour of the *Pompeian* Chiefs is not only given by *Cæſar*, but by all the other hiſtorians; and well might *Cicero* conceive the greateſt diſguſt for the company he was engaged with [u]. There is one circumſtance ſug-

[u] We have *Cicero*'s account of things in a letter to *M. Marius*, written in the year 707: "I reſolved to ſacrifice all "conſiderations of perſonal ſafety to the dictates of my ho- "nour: And accordingly I joined *Pompey* in *Greece*. But "I no ſooner arrived in his army, than I had occaſion to re- "pent of my reſolution; not ſo much from the danger to "which I was myſelf expoſed, as from the many capital "faultsI diſcovered among them: In the firſt place, *Pom- "pey*'s forces were neither very conſiderable in point of num- "bers," [at the battle of *Pharſalia*, they were more than double of thoſe of *Cæſar*] "nor by any means compoſed of "warlike troops; and, in the next place, excepting *Pom- "pey* himſelf, and a few others of the principal Leaders, they "carried on the war with ſuch a ſpirit of rapaciouſneſs, and "breathed ſuch principles of cruelty in their converſation, "that I could not think even upon our ſucceſs without "horror. To this I muſt add, that ſome of our moſt dig- "nified men were deeply involved in debt; and, in ſhort, "there was nothing good among them but their cauſe. "Thus, deſpairing of ſucceſs, I adviſed (what indeed I had "always recommended) that propoſals of accommodation "ſhould be offered to *Cæſar*; and, when I found *Pompey* "utterly averſe to all meaſures of that kind, I endeavoured "to perſuade him at leaſt to avoid a general battle. This laſt "advice he ſeemed ſometimes inclined to follow; and, pro- "bably, would have followed, if a certain engagement, in "which his troops behaved bravely, and he gained the vic- "tory, had not given him too great a confidence in them. "From that moment, all the ſkill and conduct of this great "man ſeem to have forſaken him: And he acted ſo little "like

ſuggeſted to us by *Cicero* which had the greateſt influence in determining *Pompey*'s conduct at this time, his ſuperſtitious regard to *omens, and the admonitions of diviners*; to which *his nature was ſtrongly addicted.* The Haruſpices were all on his ſide, and flattered him with every thing that was proſperous; and, beſides thoſe in his own camp, the whole fraternity of them at *Rome* were ſending him perpetual accounts of the fortunate and auſpicious ſignifications which they had obſerved in the entrails of their victims [x]. Y. R. 705. Bef. Chr. 47. 404 Cenſ.

The two armies were now in ſight of each other; and *Cæſar*, having provided for the ſubſiſtence of his troops, and given them ſome days reſt, thought it time to make a trial how *Pompey* ſtood affected to a general engagement. Accordingly, he drew out all his forces in order of Cæſ. de Bell. Civ. Com. lib. iii.

" like a General, that, with a raw and unexperienced army," [he had at *Pharſalia* 11 legions of *Roman* citizens, of which 8 were made up of veterans] " he imprudently gave battle " to the moſt brave and martial legions. The conſequence " was, that he ſuffered a moſt ſhameful defeat; and, aban- " doning his camp to *Cæſar*, he was obliged to run away un- " accompanied even with a ſingle attendant." *Ad. Fam.* vii. 3. *Melm.* viii. 1. It is certain, therefore, that *Pompey* was not driven, as *Dr. Middleton* puts it, by a ſenſe of ſhame, and againſt his judgment, to the experiment of a deciſive action: *Pompeius, longe diverſa aliis ſuadentibus (quorum plerique hortabantur, ut in Italiam tranſmitteret: Alii, ut bellum traheret, quod dignatione partium in dies ipſis magis proſperum fieret) uſus impetu ſuo hoſtem ſecutus eſt. Vell. Pat.* l. ii. c. 52.

[x] Hoc civili bello, Dii immortales!—quæ nobis in Græciam Româ reſponſa Haruſpicum miſſa ſunt? quæ dicta Pompeio?—etenim ille admodum extis et oſtentis movebatur. *De Div.* ii 24.

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battle, but firſt near his camp, and at a good diſtance from *Pompey*'s; and each day he drew nearer and nearer to him; inſpiring his men by this conduct with freſh courage, and a contempt of an army that dared not to leave the heights where they were incamped. His cavalry being much inferior in number to thoſe of the enemy, he followed a method he had formerly put in practice with ſucceſs to ſtrengthen them. He ſingled out the ſtouteſt and nimbleſt of his foot ſoldiers, and accuſtomed them to fight within the ranks of the horſe; who were thereby ſo much emboldened, that, though but a thouſand in number, they would upon occaſion ſuſtain the charge of *Pompey*'s ſeven thouſand; and in one ſkirmiſh they had actually the advantage, and killed *Ægus*, one of the *Allobrogian* brothers.

Pompey, who was come to *Pharſalia* with a firm reſolution to give battle, drew up his army at the foot of the mountain, upon which his camp ſtood; preſuming, that ſuch was *Cæſar*'s eagerneſs and temerity, that he would venture to fight him in that diſadvantageous ſituation. This *Cæſar* would in no manner conſent to; and, deſpairing to draw his adverſary to battle on equal terms, he determined to move his camp, and to be always upon the march; in hopes, that, by frequently ſhifting his ground, he might the better be ſupplied with proviſions, harraſs his enemy leſs uſed to fatigue, and find an opportunity of forcing them to a general action. But, juſt as the order for marching was given, *Cæſar* perceived that *Pompey* had quitted his intrench-

trenchments, and advanced farther than uſual with his army in array, on a ſpot where he could engage them without diſadvantage: And, turning to his ſoldiers, "let us no longer, ſaid he, "think of marching; now is the time for "fighting, ſo long wiſhed for; let us, there- "fore, arm ourſelves with courage, and not "miſs ſo favourable an opportunity." Upon this, he immediately drew out his forces. *Pompey*'s real deſign was to draw on a battle: He had taken his reſolution, and, in a Council of war held two days before, he had declared, "that *Cæſar*'s army would be defeated before "the infantry came to engage." And when ſome expreſſed their ſurpriſe at this ſpeech: "I "know, ſaid he, that what I promiſe appears "almoſt incredible; but hear the reaſons on "which I ground my confidence, that you may "advance to battle with the greater aſſurance. "I have engaged the cavalry to promiſe, that, "as ſoon as the armies draw near, they ſhall fall "upon *Cæſar*'s right wing; and, taking it in "flank and rear, force it to recoil in confuſion "upon the main body, and thus throw the "whole army into diſorder before we have "launched a dart. In this manner we ſhall ob- "tain a complete victory without expoſing the "legions to any peril; nor can there be any "difficulty in the deſign, ſince we are ſo much "ſuperior to them in cavalry." He warned "them at the ſame time "to be in readineſs for "battle; and that, ſince permiſſion to fight the "enemy, which they had ſo often demanded,

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"was

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"was now granted them, to anſwer by their va-
"lour the expectation every one had conceived
"of them." *Labienus* highly applauded this
"ſcheme; and, expreſſing the greateſt con-
tempt for *Cæſar*'s army, which he aſſured them
was almoſt intirely made up of new levies,
raiſed in *Ciſalpine Gaul*, and eſpecially in the colo-
nies beyond the *Po*, he took an oath, which he
proffered to all thoſe that were preſent, never to
return again to their camp, unleſs victorious. Af-
ter theſe ſolemn engagements, they ſeparated,
full of joy and expectation, aſſuring themſelves
of victory; and relying intirely on the ability of
their General, who, in an affair of that impor-
tance, would promiſe nothing, they were confi-
dent, without a certainty of ſucceſs.

The two armies were drawn up in the fol-
lowing manner: *Pompey*, placed in his left wing,
where he deſigned to command in perſon, the
two legions taken from *Cæſar* in the beginning
of the quarrel by a decree of the Senate. *Scipio*
was in the center, with the legions he had brought
out of *Syria*; and the *Cilician* legion, joined to
the *Spaniſh* cohorts brought over by *Afranius*,
formed the right wing. Theſe *Pompey* eſteemed
his beſt troops. The reſt of his forces he diſtri-
buted between the wings and the main body.
He had in all forty-five thouſand men, beſides
two cohorts of volunteers, who had ſerved under
him in his former wars; and who, out of affec-
tion to their old General, though their legal time
was expired, flocked to his ſtandard on this oc-
caſion, and were diſperſed by him in different

quar-

quarters of his army. His other ſeven cohorts were left to guard the camp and the adjoining forts. The *Enipeus* covered his right wing; and, on that account, he placed all the horſe with the archers and ſlingers in the left. *Cæſar*, obſerving his ancient cuſtom, placed the tenth legion in the right, and the ninth in the left wing; and, as this laſt was conſiderably weakened by the ſeveral actions at *Dyrrhachium*, he joined the eighth to it in ſuch a manner, that they formed as it were but one legion, and had orders mutually to ſuccour each other. His whole army amounted to fourſcore cohorts, making in all twenty-two thouſand men; beſides two cohorts left to guard the camp. *Domitius Calvinus* was in the center, *M. Antony* in the left wing, and *P. Sylla* in the right. *Cæſar* himſelf took his poſt oppoſite to *Pompey*, at the head of the tenth legion; and, as he had obſerved that the diſpoſition of the enemy was contrived to out-flank his right wing, to obviate that inconveniency, he made a draught of ſix cohorts from his rear line, formed them into a ſeparate body, and oppoſed them to *Pompey*'s horſe, inſtructing them in the part they were to act, and admoniſhing them, that the ſucceſs of that day would depend chiefly on their courage. At the ſame time he charged the whole army, and particularly the third line, not to advance to battle without orders; which, when he ſaw it proper, he would give by making the uſual ſignal. In his harangue to them before the battle, after reminding them of the many favours received at his

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his hands, he chiefly inſiſted "on the injuſtice "and obſtinacy of his enemies, who had forced "him to enter upon this war, and to proſe- "cute it againſt his will. They themſelves, "he told them, had been witneſſes of his ear- "neſt endeavours after peace, and that he had "left nothing unattempted to avoid waſting the "blood of his ſoldiers, and to ſpare the Com- "monwealth the loſs of her armies." After his ſpeech, obſerving the ardour of his ſoldiers for the fight, he ordered the trumpets to ſound the charge. Among the ſoldiers in *Cæſar*'s army was one *Craſtinus*, a man of diſtinguiſhed courage, who, the year before, had been firſt Centurion of the tenth legion. This brave officer, as ſoon as the ſignal was given, called out to thoſe next him, "Follow me, you that were formerly under "my command, and acquit yourſelves of the "duty you owe to your General. This one "battle will reſtore him to his proper dignity, "and us to the enjoyment of our freedom." At the ſame, turning to *Cæſar*, "General, ſays he, "this day you ſhall be ſatisfied with my beha- "viour; and, whether I live or die, I will de- "ſerve your commendations." So ſaying, he marched up to the enemy, and began the at- tack with an hundred and twenty ſelect men, who followed him.

Between the two armies there was ſpace e- nough for them to move forwards upon one ano- ther, and form a ſhock, as is uſual: But *Pompey* had given his troops orders to keep their ground, that *Cæſar*'s troops might have all the way to make.

make. In this, he is ſaid to have been directed by the advice of *Triarius*, that the enemy's ranks might be diſordered, and the ſoldiers put out of breath, by having ſo far to run. It was alſo thought, that the enemy's javelins would have leſs effect upon his troops at reſt, than if they ſprung forward to meet them. "But herein, ſays "*Cæſar*, he ſeems to have acted contrary to reaſon; "becauſe there is a certain alacrity and ardour of "mind naturally planted in every man, which is "inflamed by the deſire of fighting, and which "an able General, far from repreſſing, will, by all "the methods he can deviſe, foment and che-"riſh: Nor was it a vain inſtitution of our an-"ceſtors, that the trumpets ſhould ſound on eve-"ry ſide; and that the whole army ſhould raiſe "a ſhout, in order to animate the courage of "their own men, and ſtrike a terror into the "enemy." However, *Cæſar*'s ſoldiers entirely defeated *Pompey*'s hopes by their good diſcipline and experience: For, perceiving the enemy did not ſtir, they halted of their own accord, in the midſt of their career; and, having taken a moment's breath, put themſelves a ſecond time in motion, marched up in good order, flung their javelins, and then, as *Cæſar* had ordered, betook themſelves to their ſwords. Nor did *Pompey*'s men act with leſs preſence of mind; for they bravely ſuſtained their attack; and, having launched their javelins, immediately had alſo recourſe to their ſwords. At this inſtant, *Pompey*'s horſe, ſupported by the archers and ſlingers, attacked *Cæſar*'s; and, having compelled them

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to give ground, began to extend themſelves in order to flank the infantry. Whereupon *Cæſar* gave the ſignal to the ſix cohorts, who fell on *Pompey*'s cavalry with ſuch fury, that they not only drove them from the field of battle, but even forced them to take refuge in the mountains. It is reported by ſome hiſtorians, that *Cæſar* ordered his ſoldiers to aim at the faces of the enemy; and that this contrivance ſerved much to diſorder the nice and effeminate Knights, who could not bear the thoughts of being diſfigured. He himſelf, however, has not mentioned this ſtratagem. The archers and ſlingers, deprived of the protection of the horſe, were ſoon cut to pieces. The ſame cohorts, having thus driven the cavalry entirely out of the field, turned upon the enemy's left wing, and began to charge it in the rear. *Cæſar* at the ſame time brought up his third line, which had not been engaged. The left wing of the enemy, thus attacked in front by freſh troops, and in the rear by the victorious cohorts, made but a faint reſiſtance, and fled to their camp. *Pompey*, upon ſeeing that part of his army, on which he chiefly depended, put into diſorder, deſpaired of being able to reſtore the battle, had retired from the field to wait the event in his tent. *Cæſar*, tho' the battle laſted till noon, and the weather was exceſſively hot, yet, encouraging his ſoldiers, led them on, notwithſtanding their fatigue, to attack the intrenchments of the vanquiſhed. The camp was bravely defended by the cohorts left for its guard, and particularly by a body of *Thracians* and

Florus, lib. iv. c. 2.

and other barbarians. The ſoldiers who had fled from the battle were in too great a conſternation to think of any thing but of making their eſcape. Theſe freſh troops were overpowered however, driven from the rampart, and forced to fly to the neighbouring mountains. Y. R. 705. Bef. Chr. 47. 404 Conſ.

Pompey, perceiving that all was loſt, and that his intrenchments were forced, quitting his military dreſs for a habit more ſuitable to his ill fortune, mounted his horſe, and, withdrawing by the Decuman gate, rode full ſpeed to *Lariſſa*. He would not enter the town, though invited by the citizens, that he might not expoſe them to the reſentment of *Cæſar*: But, having called for what he wanted, he adviſed them to ſubmit to the conqueror. Thence, continuing his flight day and night, without intermiſſion, he arrived on the ſea-ſide with thirty horſe, and went on board a ſhip of burden; often complaining "that he "had been ſo far deceived in his opinion of his "followers, as to ſee thoſe very men, from whom "he expected victory, the firſt to fly, and betray "him to his enemies." His camp ſhewed how little he and his followers dreamed of the iſſue of that day. The tents of the Grandees were adorned with branches of myrtle, and ſhaded with ivy; the tables were found covered, the ſide-boards loaded with plate; and, in a word, every thing gave proofs of the higheſt luxury, and the greateſt aſſurance of victory. Dio.

Cæſar, not thinking his victory yet complete, earneſtly intreated his ſoldiers to form a line of circumvallation round the mountain, whither a

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part of the conquered army had retired. But the *Pompeians* quickly abandoned a poſt which for want of water was not tenable, and endeavoured to reach the city of *Lariſſa*: Whereupon *Cæſar*, dividing his army, left one part to guard *Pompey*'s camp, ſent back another to his own, and, with four legions, taking a nearer road than that by which the enemy paſſed, he found means to intercept them, and after ſix miles march drew up in order of battle. However, the vanquiſhed troops once more found protection from a mountain, at the foot of which ran a rivulet. Though *Cæſar*'s men were greatly fatigued by fighting the whole day, yet before night they flung up ſome works which were ſufficient to prevent the enemy from having any communication with the rivulet: Who, by this ſtep, being cut off from all hopes of relief, or of making good their retreat, ſent Deputies to treat of a ſurrendry. Affairs continued in this ſituation all that night, and ſome Senators took the occaſion to make their eſcape. At break of day they came down into the plain, and delivered up their arms; humbly imploring *Cæſar*'s goodneſs, and ſuing for mercy. He not only granted them readily their lives, but ſpoke to them with the greateſt humanity, and gave ſtrict orders that nothing ſhould be taken from them. He then ſent for the legions that had paſſed the night in the camp, to relieve thoſe he had employed in the purſuit: And, being determined to follow *Pompey*, he began his march, and arrived the ſame day at *Lariſſa*. Thus *Cæſar*,

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ſar, by his admirable ſkill, and the indefatigable induſtry of his ſoldiers, obtained the moſt complete and important victory. According to his own account, he loſt but two hundred men [y], with thirty Centurions. To the body of *Craſtinus*, who had been killed in the beginning of the engagement, he ordered particular honours to be paid. On *Pompey*'s ſide there fell fifteen thouſand; of whom the greateſt number were ſervants, and thoſe who guarded the tents; only ſix thouſand ſoldiers were killed, ten Senators and forty Knights. Upwards of twenty-four thouſand were made priſoners; for the cohorts that garriſoned the forts ſurrendered to *Sylla*. One hundred and eighty colours and nine eagles were taken. *L. Domitius Ahenobarbus*, that mortal enemy to *Cæſar*, was overtaken in his flight, and put to death. [z] *Dio* relates, that *Cæſar* cauſed all thoſe to be ſlain, who, having been once pardoned, had a ſecond time carried arms againſt him. But this circumſtance may well be doubted, ſince all the hiſtorians are unanimous in extolling his clemency both in the battle, and after it. [a] As ſoon as he ſaw his enemies de-

Plut. in Pomp.

[y] *Plutarch* and *Appian* ſay twelve hundred.

[z] *Cicero, Philip.* ii. *c.* 29, accuſes *Antony* of having killed *Domitius*, and ſome others whom *Cæſar* probably would have ſpared: *Fueras in acie Pharſalica anteſignanus: L. Domitium, nobiliſſimum et clariſſimum virum, occideras: Multos, qui de prælio effugerant, quos Cæſar, ut nonnullos, fortaſſe ſervaſſet, crudeliſſime perſecutus trucidaras.* He commanded, probably, the forces ſent after the runaways.

[a] Illud notandum eſt: Ut primum *C. Cæſar* inclinatam vidit Pompeianorum aciem: Neque prius, neque antiquius quid-

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feated, he cried to his ſoldiers *to ſpare the blood of their fellow-citizens.* Upon viewing the field of battle, he ſaid with a ſigh: *They have forced me to this ſad neceſſity. Cæſar muſt have ſought the aſſiſtance of his ſoldiers, or muſt have periſhed.* He generouſly pardoned all thoſe he had made priſoners: And *Pliny* and *Seneca* have obſerved that, having found in *Pompey*'s tent a great many letters from ſeveral great men, in which, undoubtedly, they had expreſſed in the warmeſt manner their zeal for his party, he inſtantly gave orders to burn them. "Although," ſays the laſt of theſe writers, "he was perfectly moderate in his anger, yet he rather choſe to put "it out of his power to reſent ſuch injuries, "and thought that the moſt obliging manner "of pardoning was to be ignorant of the nature "of the offence." *Dio* himſelf tells us, that he pardoned all the Kings and States who had aſſiſted *Pompey*, and demanded nothing more of them than a ſum of money; and, conſidering, adds the hiſtorian, that he himſelf was little known to them, and that they were under many and great obligations to *Pompey*, he had more regard for thoſe who had appeared in arms, than for the others who had deſerted their benefactor. To the *Athenians*, who ſent Deputies to

Suet. in Cæſ.

Pliny, l. vii. c. 25. Sen. de Ira, ii. 23.

quidquam habuit, quam omnes partes (militari et verbo et conſuetudine utar) dimitteret. Proh Dii immortales, quod hujus voluntatis erga Brutum ſuæ poſtea vir tam mitis pretium tulit! Nihil illa victoria mirabilius, magnificentius, clarius fuit; quando neminem, niſi acie conſumptum, civem patria deſideravit. *Vell. Pat.* l. ii. c. 52.

him

him to ſollicit their pardon, he granted it, with this reproach: "How long, having merited "death by your degeneracy, will you owe your "ſafety to the glory of your anceſtors?" Y. R. 705. Bef. Chr. 47. 404 Conſ.

This famous battle was fought on the *9th of Auguſt*, [b] as appears by an inſcription produced by the learned *Muratori*; a circumſtance unknown in *Lucan*'s time.

[b] The *9th of Auguſt* of the *Roman* year, according to Primate *Uſher*, correſponded with the *6th of June* of the *Julian*; but the battle, I ſhould think, was fought later in the year. *Cæſar* encamped in the plains of *Pharſalia*, when the corn was almoſt ripe, *quæ prope jam matura erat:* It was therefore in the end of *May*, or beginning of *June*, of the *Julian* year. *Pompey* followed him a few days after, *paucis poſt diebus*, but was in no haſte to give him battle. *Cæſar* had time to exerciſe his troops, to teach his light-armed ſoldiers to fight among the cavalry, and to raiſe the ſpirit and courage of his men, by ſending them daily to offer battle to the enemy, *continentibus diebus*. There were ſeveral ſkirmiſhes between parties detached from the two armies. *Appian* and *Lucan* both tell us, that, before the battle, *Cæſar*'s troops had been ſent out to gather corn: And, in fine, *Cæſar* deſpairing to draw *Pompey* to an engagement, was preparing to march to another place; and one of his reaſons was, the better to ſupply his army with proviſions. So that we cannot allow leſs than a month between *Cæſar*'s arrival in *Theſſaly* and the battle. Now, the harveſt in that country, as has been remarked above, does not come on before the beginning of *June* at *Lariſſa*, and the *15th* or *20th* at *Jannina*. The *9th* of *Auguſt*, of the *Roman* year, muſt, therefore, have correſponded with the end, or *29th* of *June* of the *Julian* year: And thus the battle was given a few days after the harveſt; which agrees with *Plutarch*, who tells us, that it was fought in the greateſt heat of ſummer; and with *Suetonius*, who ſays, that *Cæſar* beſieged *Pompey* four months at *Dyrrhachium*, which he did not begin

Cæſar de Bell. Civ. Com. lib. iii.

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The news of *Pompey*'s defeat was brought to *Dyrrhachium* by *Labienus*, who eſcaped thither with the *Gallic* and *German* horſe. *Cato* had been left Governor of the town with fifteen cohorts, and with him were *Cicero*, the learned *Varro*, and ſome other Senators. They all, immediately, in the greateſt conſternation, got on board the ſhips in the port with their troops, and repaired to the iſland of *Corcyra*, which was the general rendezvous of *Pompey*'s followers. *D. Lælius* brought there his fleet from before *Brunduſium*, where he was attempting to block up the port: *C. Caſſius*, who had juſt burned two of *Cæſar*'s fleets, one of thirty-five ſail at *Meſſana*, commanded by *M. Pomponius*, and another at *Vibo*, under the orders of *P. Sulpitius*, conſiſting of five gallies, arrived there with the *Syrian*, *Phœnician*, and *Cilician* ſquadrons from *Sicily*; and thither alſo *Octavius* brought the ſhips under his command. Young *Pompey* and *Coponius* had been deſerted by their forces, and arrived without them. Here a general Council was held, and we are told by *Plutarch*, that *Cato* offered the command of his cohorts to *Cicero*, as the ſuperior in dignity; and that, upon his refuſal and declaration, that he would join no longer in the war, young *Pompey* was ſo enraged, that he drew his ſword, and would have killed him, if *Cato* had not interpoſed [c]. There was

Inſcrip. tom. 1. p. 150 and 305.

Cæſar de Bell. Civ. Com. lib. iii.

Plut. in Cat. et Cic.

begin to do till the end of winter, when *Antony* brought him the remainder of his army.

[c] It appears, that *Cicero* had at this time great reaſon to complain of his party. "I cannot" ſays he to *Atticus*, "with-

was no ſcheme agreed upon, and all diſperſed themſelves ſeverally, as their hopes and inclinations led them. *Cicero* went ſtraight to *Brunduſium*, committing himſelf to the mercy of the conqueror. Many retired into *Achaia*, to wait there the farther iſſue of things, and take ſuch methods as fortune offered. *M. Marcellus* went to *Mytilene*: *Cæcilius Baſſus*, a Roman Knight, who acted a conſiderable part after *Cæſar*'s death, and *Libo*, hid themſelves in *Tyre*. *Scipio*, *Labienus*, and many others, who had acted more violently againſt *Cæſar*, reſolved at all events to renew the war, and ſailed for *Africa*, to join *Varus* and King *Juba*. *Octavius* ſailed with the *Liburnian* fleet to *Illyricum*, where he made war, as ſhall be related hereafter, with various fortune. Young *Pompey* and *Cato* followed the unfortunate General. *C. Caſſius* ſailed to *Cilicia*, where he waited *Cæſar*'s arrival in a bay at the mouth of the river *Cydnus*, and there delivered up his fleet.[4] *Plutarch* tells us, that *M. Brutus*, ſeeing

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"out the deepeſt ſorrow, inform you what bitter, what heavy, what extraordinary motives have forced me to yield "rather to a ſudden impulſe of paſſion, than the counſel of "my reaſon: Theſe motives are ſuch, that they have induced me to act as you ſee." *Ad Att.* x. 5. In a letter to *Terentia*, he makes the ſame complaint. *Ep. Fam.* xiv. 12. *Melm.* vii. 23. "May the joy you expreſs at my ſafe arrival in *Italy* be never interrupted! but my mind was "ſo much diſcompoſed by thoſe atrocious injuries I had received, that I have taken a ſtep, I fear, which may be attended with great difficulties."

[4] *Cicero*, *Philip.* ii. 11, tells us, that he lay there in wait for *Cæſar*, with a reſolution to deſtroy him; which he would have

Y. R. 705. Bef. Chr. 47. 704 Conſ.

ſeeing *Pompey*'s camp forced, ſtole out of one of the gates, and hid himſelf in a moraſs covered with

have effected, if *Cæſar* had not landed on the oppoſite ſhore, where he was not expected, and had not determined to land. This, however, it is thought, is a weak apology for *Caſſius*; and the real motives of his conduct at this time are explained to us in a letter of *Cicero* to him, written in the year 706. *Ep. Fam.* xv. 15. *Melm.* vii. 36. "It was the hope, that peace would be reſtored to our country, and the abhorrence "of ſpilling the blood of our fellow-citizens, that equally "induced both you and myſelf to decline an obſtinate per- "ſeverance in the civil war. But, though theſe ſentiments "were common to us both, yet, as I am conſidered as having "been the firſt to inſpire you with them, it is more my part, "perhaps, to render you ſatisfied with having adopted them, "than it is yours to perform the ſame friendly office to- "wards me. But, to ſay the truth, (and it is a circumſtance "upon which I frequently reflect) *we mutually convinced each "other*, in the free converſations we held upon this ſubject, "that a ſingle battle, if it ſhould not wholly determine our "cauſe, ought to be the limits however of our particular op- "poſition. And theſe ſentiments have never ſeriouſly been "condemned by any, but by thoſe alone who think it more "eligible that our conſtitution ſhould be totally deſtroyed, "than in any degree impaired. But my opinion was far "otherwiſe: For I had no views to gratify by its extinction, "and had much to hope from its remains. As to the con- "ſequences which have ſince enſued, they lay far beyond "the reach of human diſcernment; and the wonder is, not "ſo much how they eſcaped our penetration, as how it was "poſſible they ſhould have happened. I muſt confeſs, my "own opinion always was, that the battle of *Pharſalia* would "be deciſive; and I imagined that the victors would act with "a regard to the common preſervation of all, and the van- "quiſhed to their own. But both the one and the other, I "was well aware, depended on the expedition with which "conquerors would purſue their ſucceſs. And, had they "purſued immediately, thoſe who have ſince carried the war

"into

with reeds; from whence, having got ſafe in the night to *Lariſſa*, he wrote immediately to *Cæſar*, who Y. R. 705. Bef. Chr. 47. 404 Conſ.

"into *Africa*, would have experienced (and experienced "too, if I do not flatter myſelf, by my interceſſion *) the "ſame clemency with which the reſt of our party have been "treated, who retired into *Aſia* and *Achaia*. But the cri- "tical opportunity (that ſeaſon ſo important in all tranſac- "tions, and eſpecially in a civil war) was unhappily loſt: "And, a whole year intervening, it raiſed the ſpirits of ſome "of our party to hope they might recover the victory; and "rendered others ſo deſperate as not to dread the reverſe. "Fortune, however, muſt be anſwerable for the whole train "of evils which this delay has produced. For who could "have imagined, either that the *Alexandrine* war could have "been drawn out to ſo great a length, or that the paltry "*Pharnaces* could have ſtruck ſuch a terror throughout *Aſia*. "But, though we both acted by the ſame meaſures, our pre- "ſent ſituations, however, are extremely different. *The "ſcheme which you thought proper to execute has given you ad- "miſſion into* Cæſar's *councils*, and opened a proſpect to you "of his future purpoſes:" [this ſcheme muſt be the deſertion of the *Pompeian* party, and the ſurrendry of the fleet to *Cæſar*] "an advantage, moſt certainly, that muſt ſpare you all the "uneaſineſs which attends a ſtate of doubt and ſuſpence. "Whereas, for myſelf, as I imagined that *Cæſar* would, im- "mediately after the battle of *Pharſalia*, have returned into "*Italy*, I haſtened thither, in order to encourage and improve "that pacific diſpoſition which he had diſcovered, by his ge- "neroſity to ſo many of his illuſtrious enemies: By which "means, I have ever ſince been ſeparated from him by an "immenſe diſtance. Here, in truth, I ſit, the ſad witneſs "of thoſe complaints that are poured forth in *Rome*, and "throughout all *Italy*: Complaints which both you and I, "according to our reſpective powers, might contribute ſome- "what

* It appears, by this flow of ſpirits, that this letter was written after *Cicero* had been comforted by *Cæſar*, and his terrors diſpelled by the aſſurance of his pardon, in the kindeſt terms: And what follows ſhews it to have been penned before *Cæſar*'s return into *Italy*.

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who not only forgave him, but treated him with the greateſt affection. Even before the battle *Cæſar* had given particular orders, not to kill him on any account; and to make him priſoner, in caſe he was willing to ſurrender: but, if he refuſed, to let him go.

Cæſ. de Bell. Civ. Com. lib. iii.

Pompey ſailed firſt to *Amphipolis*, where he iſſued a proclamation, enjoining all the youth of the province, whether *Greeks* or *Romans*, to join him in arms: This he did, either with a deſign to keep footing in *Macedonia*, or to conceal his real intention of retreating much further. He lay one night at anchor, ſending to his friends in the town, and raiſing all the money he poſſibly could: But, being informed of *Cæſar*'s approach, he departed, and ſailed for *Mitylene*, where he had left his wife *Cornelia*[c]. Here he was

" what to remove, if *Cæſar* were preſent to ſupport us. I in-
" treat you, then, to communicate to me, agreeably to your
" wonted friendſhip, all you obſerve and think concerning
" the preſent ſtate of affairs: In a word, that you would in-
" form me what we are to expect, and how you would adviſe
" me to act. Be aſſured I ſhall lay great ſtreſs upon your
" ſentiments: And, had I wiſely followed thoſe you gave me
" in your firſt letter from *Luceria*, I might, without difficul-
" ty, have ſtill preſerved my dignities."

[c] *Plutarch in Pomp.* is very diffuſe in deſcribing this Lady's diſappointment and inexpreſſible grief: She bitterly complained of her ill deſtiny, which allied her to *Craſſus* firſt, and afterwards to *Pompey*, only to cauſe the ruin of two illuſtrious families. The ſame writer tells us, that the Stoic philoſopher *Cratippus* came to pay his compliments in *Mitylene* to *Pompey*, and that *Pompey* could not refrain from complaining to him of the diſpenſations of Providence. The phi-

" loſopher

was detained two days by the badneſs of the weather, and, having increaſed his fleet with a few gallies, he ſailed to *Cilicia*[f], and thence to *Cyprus*. In this iſland he had intelligence that the people of *Antioch* and the *Roman* citizens, who traded there, had, with joint conſent, ſeized the caſtle, and ſent Deputies to ſuch of his followers as had taken refuge in the neighbouring places, not to approach that town. *L. Lentulus*, the late Conſul, *P. Lentulus Spinther*, and ſome of the other principal men of his party, had been refuſed admittance into the iſland of *Rhodes*, and had been ordered to withdraw immediately. Theſe accounts made him lay aſide his deſign of going into *Syria*; and ſeizing the money in the public bank, and borrowing as much more as he could of his friends; providing great quantities of braſs for military uſes, and raiſing two thouſand ſoldiers; he ſet ſail for *Peluſium*, to implore the aſſiſtance of *Ptolemy*, King of *Egypt*. This Prince, yet in his minority, was there at the head of a conſiderable ar-

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loſopher declined, through politeneſs and humanity, to enter upon the ſubject: But he might have anſwered, ſays *Plutarch*, "that the diſturbed ſtate of *Rome* required now an abſolute monarchy, as a neceſſary remedy to the public diſorders." And he might have added, "By what proof may we be induced to believe, that, if the victory had been yours, you would have made a better uſe of it than *Cæſar*?"

[f] *Plutarch in Pomp.* ſays, that it was deliberated among his followers, ſince no province of the empire could afford them protection, to what foreign power it was moſt expedient to repair: That *Pompey* was ſtrongly inclined to take refuge in *Parthia*; that others adviſed him to put himſelf under the protection of *Juba*; but that *Theophanes* determined him to go to *Egypt*. See *Lucan*, l. viii.

my,

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my, making war againſt his ſiſter *Cleopatra*, whom he had expelled the throne, to which by her father's will ſhe had an equal right with him. *Pompey* ſent to demand his protection, and a ſafe retreat in *Alexandria*, in conſideration of the friendſhip that had ſubſiſted between him and his father. The meſſengers, after diſcharging their commiſſion, began to converſe freely with the King's troops, many of whom had ſerved formerly under *Pompey*, and had been left in *Egypt* by *Gabinius*; and they exhorted them not to deſpiſe their old General in his adverſe fortune. The King's Miniſters, who, during his minority, had the adminiſtration in their hands, either out of fear, as they afterwards pretended, that *Pompey* ſhould debauch the army, and thereby make himſelf maſter of *Alexandria* and all *Egypt*, or deſpiſing his low condition, gave a favourable reception to the Deputies in public, and invited *Pompey* to court: But diſpatched, at the ſame time *Achillas*, Captain of the King's guards, and *Septimius*, a military Tribune, with ſecret orders to murder him before he came into the King's preſence[g]. They put off from the ſhore in a ſmall

Plut. in Pomp. Appian. Dio.

[g] *Plutarch in Pomp.* tells us, that one *Theodotus*, Preceptor to the King, ſeeing the Council divided in their opinions concerning the reception it was proper to give *Pompey*, ſome adviſing to receive him with honour, others to order him away immediately, he maintained, "that both propoſals "were equally dangerous: That to admit *Pompey* was making "him their maſter, and drawing upon themſelves the reſent-"ment of *Cæſar*: And, by not receiving him, they offend-"ed the one without obliging the other. That therefore "the

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ſmall bark, with a few guards, and made towards *Pompey*'s ſhip. When on board, they accoſted him with an air of frankneſs, and invited him into the boat. *Pompey*, after taking leave of *Cornelia*, ordered two Centurions, one of his freedmen named *Philip*, and a ſlave, to enter the boat with him; and, as *Achillas* gave him his hand to aſſiſt him in coming out of the ſhip, he turned to his wife, and repeated two verſes of *Sophocles*, ſignifying, *that whoever goes to the Court of a King becomes a ſlave from that moment.* During the paſſage from the ſhip to land, nobody ſpoke to him a ſingle word, or ſhewed the leaſt mark of friendſhip or reſpect; *Pompey* broke the ſilence, and, looking *Septimius* in the face, "methinks, "ſaid he, I remember you to have formerly "ſerved under me." *Septimius* gave only a nod with his head, without uttering a word, or denoting the leaſt civility. Whereupon *Pompey* took out a ſpeech which he had prepared in *Greek* for the *Egyptian* King, and began to read it. In this manner they came near the land; and, when *Pompey* roſe to go out, *Septimius* ſtabbed him in the back, and was immediately ſeconded by *Achillas*. *Pompey*, without making any reſiſtance, or ſaying a word, covered his head with his robe, and reſigned to fate. At this ſad ſight, *Cornelia* and her attendants weighed anchor and made off to ſea. His murderers cut off his

"the only expedient left was to let him land, and then kill "him, which would be doing *Cæſar* a good ſervice, and rid- "ding themſelves of all apprehenſions on *Pompey*'s account; "*becauſe*, ſaid he, *dead dogs do not bite.*"

head,

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head, leaving the body on the ſhore. His freedman *Philip* ſtayed by it, and, while he was gathering up ſome pieces of a broken boat for a pile, he was thus accoſted by an old ſoldier, who had ſerved under *Pompey*: *Who art thou, that art making theſe ſad preparations for the funeral of Pompey the Great?* *Philip* anſwered him, *one of his freedmen.* *Thou ſhalt not*, replied he, *have all this honour to thyſelf: Let me partake in an action ſo juſt and ſacred. It will pleaſe me, amidſt the miſeries of my exile, to have touched the body, and aſſiſted at the funeral of the greateſt and nobleſt ſoldier* ROME *ever produced.* In this manner were the laſt rites performed to *Pompey* [h]. His aſhes, according to *Plutarch*, were carefully collected, and carried to *Cornelia*, who depoſited them in a vault in his

[h] This is *Plutarch*'s ſtory; who does not tell us what became of the two Centurions and the ſlave *Pompey* took into the boat with him. *Lucan* relates that the body was flung over-board into the ſea, and dragged out from thence in the night, and burnt by one *Cordus*, who had been *Pompey*'s Quæſtor in *Cyprus*. *Aurelius Victor de Vir Illuſtr.* calls him *Servius Codrus.*

" Now 'gan the glitt'ring ſtars to fade away,
" Before the roſy promiſe of the day,
" When the pale youth th' unfiniſh'd rites forſook,
" And to the covert of his cave betook.
" Ah! why thus raſhly would thy fears diſclaim
" That only deed which muſt record thy name."

Lucan, b. viii. v. 1065.

Aurelius Victor and *Lucan* ſay, that upon his tomb was inſcribed: *Hic ſitus eſt Magnus Pompeius.* And *Appian* has given us a *Greek* inſcription to this purpoſe: *How poor a tomb covers the man who had ſo many temples erected to his honour!*

Alban

Alban villa[i]. The *Egyptians*, however, afterwards raiſed a monument to him on the place, and adorned it with figures of braſs, which, having been defaced by time, and buried almoſt in ſand and rubbiſh, was ſought out and reſtored by the Emperor *Adrian*. Y. R. 705. Bef. Chr. 47. 404 Conſ.

Such was the end of *Pompey the Great*, on the 28*th* of *April*, in the 58th year of his age. It did not ſurpriſe *Cicero*, as we find by the ſhort reflection that he makes upon it. "As to *Pompey*'s "end, ſays he, I never had any doubt about it: "For the loſt and deſperate ſtate of his affairs "had ſo poſſeſſed the minds of all the Kings and "States abroad, that, whitherſoever he went, I "took it for granted that this would be his Middl. p. 132. Ad Att. xi. 6.

[i] Every circumſtance relating to the end of this great man is uncertain, except what we have in *Cæſar*'s brief account. *Lucan* ſuppoſes that *Pompey*'s aſhes remained in *Egypt*:

"And thou, oh *Rome!* by whoſe forgetful hand
"Altars and temples rear'd to tyrants ſtand,
"Canſt thou neglect to call thy hero home,
"And leave his ghoſt in baniſhment to roam?
"What tho' the victor's frown, and thy baſe fear
"Bad thee, at firſt, the pious taſk forbear;
"Yet now, at leaſt, oh! let him now return,
"And reſt with honour in a *Roman* urn.
"Nor let miſtaken ſuperſtition dread,
"On ſuch occaſions, to diſturb the dead:
"Oh! would commanding *Rome* my hand employ,
"This impious taſk ſhould be perform'd with joy.
"How would I fly to tear him from that tomb,
"And bear his aſhes in my boſom home!"

B. viii. l. 1140.

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" fate [k]." How happy had it been for him to have died in that ſickneſs, when all *Italy* was putting

[k] *Cicero* adds, *I cannot, however, help grieving at it; for I knew him to be an honeſt, grave, and worthy man: Hominem enim integrum, et caſtum, et gravem cognovi.* " This, ſays " Dr. *Middleton*, was the ſhort and true character of the " man from one who perfectly knew him; not heightened " as we ſometimes find it by the ſhining colours of his elo- " quence, nor depreſſed by the darker ſtrokes of his reſent- " ment." Yet the ſame ingenious writer has thought proper to draw more at large the character of a man who was *Cicero*'s God upon earth, and indeed the above *ſhort* and *true* character is but a ſcanty panegyric for one in *Pompey*'s high ſtation: And, as this hiſtory includes a ſort of critical examination of the life of *Cicero*, we will not ſcruple to preſent the reader with it, together with ſome ſhort obſervations:

" *Pompey* had early acquired the ſurname of *Great*, by that " ſort of merit, which, from the conſtitution of the Repub- " lic, neceſſarily made him *great*; a fame and ſucceſs in war " ſuperior to what *Rome* had ever known in the moſt cele- " brated of her Generals." [The ſurname of *Great*, according to *Plutarch*, was a compliment of *Sylla*, after the good ſervices *Pompey* had done him in *Italy*, *Sicily*, and *Africa*. Tho' young *Pompey* had been bred to war in the camp of his father, a man of great military capacity, and had ſhewn his talents in the ſupport of *Sylla*'s party, he had not yet properly *acquired* or merited that ſurname by a ſucceſs in war, *ſuperior to what Rome had ever known*. *Livy* or his abbreviator, ſays, that this ſurname was given him after his victories in *Aſia*.] " He had triumphed at three ſeveral times " over the three different parts of the known world, *Europe*, " *Aſia*, *Africa*; and, by his victories, had almoſt doubled " the extent, as well as the revenues of the *Roman* dominion; " for, as he declared to the people, on his return from the " *Mithridatic* war, *he had found* the leſſer *Aſia the boundary*, " *but left it the middle of their empire.*" [If *Pompey* made this declaration, he was guilty of an unpardonable gaſconade, for he

putting up vows and prayers for his ſafety? Or, if he had fallen by the chance of war on the plains Y. R. 705. Bef. Chr. 47. 404 Conſ.

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he added to the *Roman* empire only *Pontus*, *Bithynia*, and *Syria*: But, if he did not double the revenues of the Commonwealth, he greatly multiplied his own; for he received every month from *Ariobarzanes*, King of *Cappadocia*, alone, above 6393 l. which was almoſt all that poor King could raiſe. See *Ad Att.* vi. 1.] "He was ſix years older than *Cæſar*; "and, while *Cæſar*, immerſed in pleaſures, oppreſſed with "debts, and ſuſpected by all honeſt men, was hardly able "to ſhew his head, *Pompey* was flouriſhing in the height of "power and glory, and by the conſent of all parties placed "at the head of the Republic." [This is not a fair repreſentation of the fortunes of theſe two men: *Pompey* was raiſed to all his power and wealth *againſt the will of the Senate*; who was ever envious and jealous of him: And *Cæſar* not only dared to ſhew his head, but was ever ſo much the darling of the city, that he carried every thing he ſtood for, by almoſt the unanimous votes of the people, notwithſtanding the oppoſition of the ſame Senate.] "This was the poſt "that his ambition ſeemed to aim at, to be the firſt man in "*Rome*; the Leader, not the *tyrant of his country*: For he "more than once had it in his power to have made himſelf "the maſter of it without any riſk, if his virtue, or his "phlegm, at leaſt, had not reſtrained him." [This is a "groundleſs aſſertion. *Pompey*, after the *Sertorian* war, kept his army in *Italy*; and ſo did *Craſſus* to check him; till they both diſbanded their troops by agreement: Neither of them dared *then* to act the tyrant. After the *Mithridatic* war, the oppoſition *Cæſar* and *Metellus*, who openly courted *Pompey*, met with, plainly ſhewed how jealous the city was of *Pompey*'s power: And that ſame jealouſy prevailed after his arrival, notwithſtanding all the favour and credit his victories had procured him. He could not depend upon his army in an enterpriſe againſt his country, when he had no motive of revenge to ſtimulate them with, nor indeed any other that he could avow with common decency. *Cæſar* and *Craſſus* were willing to aſſociate with him againſt the *ariſtocracy*, but not

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plains of *Pharſalia*, in the defence of his country's liberty, he had died ſtill glorious, though unfor-

to become his ſervants.] "But he lived in a perpetual ex- "pectation of receiving, from the gift of the people, what "he did not care to ſeize by force, and, by fomenting the "diſorders of the city, hoped to drive them to the neceſſity "of creating him Dictator. It is an obſervation of all the "hiſtorians, that, while *Cæſar* made no difference of power, "*whether it was conferred or uſurped; whether over thoſe who* "*loved, or thoſe who feared him*; *Pompey* ſeemed to value none "but what was *offered*; *nor to have any deſire to govern, but* "*with the good-will of the governed.*" [*Velleius*, ii 29, ſays indeed of *Pompey*, *Potentiæ quæ honoris cauſa ad eum deferretur, non ut ab eo occuparetur, cupidiſſimus:* But I do not ſee any difference between *Pompey* and *Cæſar* in this reſpect. As long as power was offered to *Pompey*, he did not undertake to ſeize it by an armed force; neither did *Cæſar*; but no ſooner did *Pompey* foreſee that *Cæſar* would become his equal, than he armed, illegally, the whole empire, to preſerve his own ſuperior power: And this is allowed by the ſame hiſtorian: *Civis in toga, niſi uti vereretur, ne quem haberet parem, modeſtiſſimus.* A power, maintained all along by the moſt open and ſcandalous bribery, cannot be deemed a power offered by the good-will of the governed: And a man who employs ſuch means, in defiance of the laws, cannot, with any propriety, be called a man of integrity, *Virum integrum cognovi.*] "What leiſure he found from his wars he employ- "ed in the ſtudy of polite letters, and eſpecially of eloquence, "*in which he would have acquired great fame, if his genius had* "*not drawn him to the more dazzling glory of arms.* Yet he "pleaded ſeveral cauſes with applauſe, in the defence of his "friends and clients; and ſome of them in conjunction with "*Cicero.* His language was copious and elevated; his ſenti- "ments juſt; his voice ſweet; his action noble and full of "dignity. But his talents were better formed for arms than "the gown; for though in both he obſerved the ſame diſ- "cipline; a perpetual modeſty, temperance, and gravity of "outward behaviour; yet, in the licence of camps, the exam-

"ple

unfortunate; but, as if he had been reſerved for an example of the inſtability of human greatneſs, he, Y.R. 705. Bef. Chr. 47. 404 Conf.

" ple was more rare and ſtriking. His perſon was extremely " graceful, and imprinting reſpect; yet with an air of re- " ſerve and haughtineſs, which became the General better " than the citizen. His parts were plauſible rather than great; " ſpecious rather than penetrating; and his views of politics " but narrow; for his chief inſtrument of governing was *diſ-* " *ſimulation*; yet he had not always the art to conceal his " real ſentiments. As he was a better ſoldier than a ſtateſ- " man, ſo what he gained in the camp he uſually loſt in the " city; and, though adored when abroad, was often affronted " and mortified at home; till the imprudent oppoſition of " the Senate drove him to that alliance with *Craſſus* and *Cæ-* " *ſar*, which proved fatal both to himſelf and to the Repub- " lic. He took in theſe two not as the *partners*, but the *mi-* " *niſters* rather of his power;" [They had more intereſt in the city than he, and he could not compaſs his ends without their aſſiſtance: They were therefore neceſſary allies, not miniſters of his power.] " That, by giving them ſome ſhare " with him, he might make his own authority uncontroul- " able: He had no reaſon to apprehend that they could " ever prove his rivals; ſince neither of them had any cre- " dit or character of that kind, which alone could raiſe them " above the laws; a ſuperior fame and experience in war, " *with the militia of the empire at their devotion*: All this was " purely his own; till, by cheriſhing *Cæſar*, and throwing " into his hands the only things which he wanted, *arms and* " *military command*, he made him at laſt too ſtrong for him- " ſelf, and never began to fear him till it was too late:" [That *Pompey* helped *Cæſar*, during the triumvirate, will be eaſily granted, but that he owed all to *Pompey* is not true: And *Pompey* was at leaſt as much indebted to *Cæſar*, as *Cæſar* to him. Would *Pompey* have condeſcended to marry the daughter of the man whom he ſuſpected to have debauched his wife *Mucia*, the mother of *Cnæus* and *Sextus Pompey*, and whom for this reaſon, during the civil war, he uſed to call *Ægiſthus*, if his alliance had not been deemed abſolutely neceſſary to ſup-

port

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he, who a few days before commanded Kings and Conſuls, and all the nobleſt of *Rome*, was ſen-

port his credit: And indeed he could never have ſupported himſelf in that long reign of his during the *Gallic* war without *Cæſar*'s intereſt. This is evident from the whole hiſtory of the times.] "*Cicero* warmly diſſuaded both his union and his "breach with *Cæſar*;" [So *Cicero* ſays in his ſecond *Philippic*; but his letters ſhew that he greatly approved of the breach between *Cæſar* and *Pompey*, till the proſpect was darkened, and the civil war was ready to break out with great advantage on *Cæſar*'s ſide. If *Cicero* did not approve of their union at firſt, he cemented it afterwards, and was very ſubſervient to the confederate Chiefs. See his apologetic letter, cited Vol. iii. p. 509.] "And, after the rupture, as warmly "ſtill, the thought of giving him battle: If any of theſe "counſels had been followed, *Pompey* had preſerved his life "and honour, and the Republic its liberty." [*Pace opus eſt: Ex victoria cum multa mala, tum certè tyrannus exiſtet. Ad Att.* vii. 5. *Depugna inquis, potius, quam ſervias: Ut quid? Si victus eris, proſcribare? Si viceris, tamen ſervias? Ad Att.* vii. 7. *Hoc Cnæus noſter cum antea nunquam, tum in hac cauſa minimè cogitavit; beata et honeſta civitas ut eſſet. Dominatio quæſita ab utroque eſt.——Genus illud Sullani regni jampridem appetitur,* [*a Pompeio*] *multis, qui unà ſunt, cupientibus. Ad Att.* viii. 11. It appears then that *Cicero* was not of Dr. *Middleton*'s opinion. He thought alſo that *Pompey*'s victory would have been a very cruel one: *Tanta erat in illis crudelitas, ut non nominatim, ſed generatim proſcriptio eſſet informata; ut jam omnium judicio conſtitutum eſſet, omnium veſtrum bona prædam eſſe illius victoriæ; veſtrum planè dico: Nunquam enim de te ipſo, niſi crudeliſſimè, cogitatum eſt. Ad Att.* xi. 6.] "But he was "urged to his fate by a natural ſuperſtition, and attention to "thoſe vain auguries with which he was flattered by all the "Haruſpices: He had ſeen the ſame temper in *Marius* and "*Sylla*, and obſerved the happy effects of it: But they aſ"ſumed it only out of policy, he out of principle. They "uſed to animate their ſoldiers, when they had found a pro"bable opportunity of fighting; but he, againſt all prudence

"and

ſentenced to die by a Council of ſlaves; murdered by a baſe deſerter; caſt out naked and headleſs on the *Egyptian* ſtrand; and, when *the whole earth*, as *Velleius* ſays, *had ſcarce been ſufficient for his victories, could not find a ſpot upon it for a grave* [1]. Y.R. 705. Bef. Chr. 47. 404 Conſ.

Lentulus, the late Conſul, landed in *Egypt* a few days after his General, and was immediately ſeized and put to death. *Plutarch*, or the author whom he copied, to make his ſtory more intereſting, ſuppoſes that *Lentulus* landed juſt upon the ſpot where the body of *Pompey* had been burned the day before; and, ſeeing a little pile which yet ſmoked, broke out into theſe

" and probability, was encouraged by it to fight to his own " ruin." [I ſhould think that *Pompey* was not altogether ſo credulous as Dr. *Middleton* makes him. *Cicero*, in his Letters, and *Cæſar*, in his Commentaries, aſſign other reaſons for *Pompey*'s confidence, as we have ſeen above: And theſe reaſons influenced not only *Pompey*, but *Labienus* and all the Generals in his army, whom we cannot ſuppoſe to have been all addicted, in a great degree, to ſuperſtition.

[1] Qui ſi ante biennium quam ad arma itum eſt, perfectis muneribus theatri et aliorum operum quæ ei circumdedit graviſſima tentatus valetudine deceſſiſſet in *Campania* (quo quidem tempore univerſa Italia vota pro ſalute ejus, primo omnium civium ſuſcepit) defuiſſet fortunæ deſtruendi ejus locus; et quam apud ſuperos habuerat magnitudinem, illibatam detuliſſet ad inferos. *Vell. Pat.* ii. 48. Princeps Romani nominis, imperio arbitrioque Ægyptii mancipii, jugulatus eſt. Hic poſt tres conſulatus et totidem triumphos, domitumque terrarum orbem, ſanctiſſimi ac præſtantiſſimi viri, in id evecti ſuper quod adſcendi non poteſt, duodeſexageſimum annum agentis, pridiè natalem ipſius, vitæ fuit exitus: In tantum in illo viro à ſe diſcordante fortuna, ut cui modo ad victoriam terra defuerat, deeſſet ad ſepulturam. *Id.* ii. 53.

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words, "Who is the wretch to whom are paid "theſe laſt offices? Perhaps, alas! it is you, "great *Pompey!*" *Lentulus Spinther* is ſaid to have found in *Egypt* the ſame fate.

Cato, conjecturing that *Pompey* had retired to *Egypt* or *Lybia*, took that way. He firſt ſailed from *Corcyra* to *Patræ*, where he picked up *Fauſtus Sylla*, *Petreius*, and ſome other fugitives. Then, doubling the cape of *Malea*, and coaſting the iſle of *Crete*, he came to *Palinurus*, a promontory of the *Cyrenaïca*: Whence he marched to *Cyrene*, which opened its gates to him. Here he was met by *Cornelia* and *Sextus Pompeius*, *Pompey*'s youngeſt ſon: Who had firſt fled to *Cyprus*, but, finding themſelves too near *Egypt*, and fearing leſt they ſhould meet with *Cæſar*, ſteered towards the Weſt, and put in at the ſame place to which *Cato* had brought the fleet. The news of *Pompey*'s death occaſioned a freſh diviſion among his fugitive friends: Many who were attached perſonally to him, and had held out in hopes of ſeeing him again at their head, determined to have recourſe to the Conqueror's clemency. *Cornelia* returned to *Italy*, well knowing that ſhe had nothing to apprehend from *Cæſar*. *Cato*, with *Pompey*'s two ſons, remained in *Africa* and marched by land to join *Varus* and *Juba*: And we ſhall ſee immediately how they renewed the war, and expoſed the Conqueror to new fatigues and dangers.

Dio. l. xlii.

Liv. 112.

CHAP.

ÆGYPTVS ANTIQVA.

LIBYA



LIBYCI MONTES

Pſamius mons Herodoto

LIBYCA PA

CATADVPI

Are locus vbi Aethiopum præſidium Pſelcis

Taconpſos altera Pliny

Metacompſos

Meridies

Taconpſos vicus qui et Ibatice

Hierasycaminos

Crophi Mophi montes

Dodecaſchoenos Ptolemeo locus et Herodoto: apud quem eum designari puto, qui inter Catarracten minorem est et Philen insulam.

Syene Ceraſtæ

Catadupi gens vel scopuli: quos Seneca Nili venas appellari dicit: ubi Catarractes minor Ptolemei inter Crophi et Mophimontes nimirum

TABENNAM hanc insulam posterioribus temporibus appellatum credo Inde Tabennesiotas monachos vocant primitivæ ecclesiæ scriptores: quorum olim hic ingens multitudo.

Abaton petra

Phile

ELEPHANTINA Insula in qua Nilometrium: et Cryphides tem plum

Catarractes minor

Elephantis

Contrasiene

Nilus Flu.

THEBAIDIS REG

Tathiris vicus

Pampanis vicus

THINITIS Nom.

This

Alydus

Phthontis vicus

Contra Thmuim

Apollinis magna civitas quæ Apollo Superior Antonino

LATOPOLITES Nomus Latopolis sive Latorum vrb

HERMONTHITES nom

Aphroditos Crocodilorum Hermonthis

Memnonium

MEMNON Nomus Sacer mons

Papa

Acanthon lucus Apollinis sacer

TENTYRITIS Nomus

Tentira

Bonus

Diospolis i. Jovis civitas parva

Ptolemais Hermij Thebaidis maxima vrb.

Aphrod

Nea

Thoenis

OMBITES Nomus

Ombi Ambos Antonio

Thumis

Contra Apollinis

Contra Ombos

Contra latum

Chumis

Typhium

Elithyas, quæ Leucothea Pliny

THEBAE RVM sive DIOSPOLITIS Nomus.

Thebæ, et Diospolis, i. Jovis civitas magna

Syringe

Isidis sacra insula

Typhonia hic describitur a Strabone

Cene

Chenobascia Canobasium Ant.

Lepidotum

Chemnis i. Panopolis Antonin

COPTITES Nom

Coptos Indicarum Arabicorumque merciũm emporium

PANOPOLITES Nomus qui et CHEMNITES

Apollinis parva civitas

Quae et AEGYPTVS SVI

ARA

Aristonis

Campasi

BICA

Phoenicon Nicenon Hydreuma Pliny videtur

Porphirite

Jovis

Aphroditum

Didyme

Porphyrites mons Ptolemæo tamquam minio rubens vt tradit Agatarchides

Basanites lapis mons

Hydreuma Apollinis

Phalacrium

Niger lapis mons

ARABES GNEBADEI

Cabalsum

ARABES ADEI

ARABES AZAREI

TISEBARICA REGIO

AETHIOPIAE SVB AEGYPTO PARS

ARABAEGYPTY ICHTHY

Tadnos fons

Coenon Hydreuma Anton. Novum Plunio.

Hydreuma vetus Troglodyticum

Philatere an Aennum Pliny

Aiax mons

Smaragdis mons vbi smaragdi gemmæ reperiuntur vt refert Heliodorus.

Acabe mons

Ophiodes i. vbi topasius lapis

Pentadactylus mons

Berenice

Nochasia

Leucos Portus i. Albus

Stenæ Deire et Malonnesi insulæ

Lapis ara

Baxium prom.

ARABICI SINVS

SVPH nominant: BRAC

58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

23 24 25 26 27

28 29 30 31

EVXINVS

Amisus
Amasia
Comana
Thermodon Fl.
Iris Fl.
Halys Fl.
Nicopolis
Zela
ARMENIA MINOR
ARMENIA MAJOR
CAPPA
Mazaca
Melas Fl.
Comana
DOCIA
Taurus M.
Tarsus
Issus
MESOPOTAMIA
CYPRVS
Antiochia
Comagene
Euphrates Fl.
Palmyra
Arabia Deserta
Tyrus
Ptolemais
Iturea
Alexandria
Pelusium
Delta
Mare Rubrum
ARABIA PETRAEA
BELLORUM ALEXANDRINI ET PONTICI CONSPECTUS

Pednopum
Climax
Ogdamus mons
Cally pr.
Aspis mons
Paretonium
Pythis prom.
Cally prom.
Catabathmus parvus
Aegypti terminus Straboni
Cyxis portus
Leuce acte
Hermea acra
Phoenicus portus
Prigeus pagus Strab.
Prigeus Ptol.
LIBYAE NOMVS
Pedonia
Antiphrae villa
Eutici Antonino
Zephyrium
Zyges
Glaucon
Leucaspis
Glaucum prom.
Cobij
MAREOTIS Nomus
Caporites
Antiphili
Goniatæ
Monocaminum
AEGYPTIVM
Aenesippa
Phoeuse insulæ duæ
Derris extrema
Pedonia ins.
Pedonius port
MARE, quod et RARETHENIVM, item Chinosseina Strabonis videtur PHARIVM
Vicie pagus
Chersonesus prom.
Canephiris
Didyme insulæ
Taposiris Ptol.
Almyre
Hierax
Taposiris Strab.
Phamotis
TAPOSIRIS Necropolis Antiphr.
Plinthine
NIAS
Aegosiphon
Pallemarius vicus
Climax
GYP
Therme mons
SCITHIACA Regio quæ SCETIS vel Bacchis SCITIS posteri Orib dicta
Myris quod et Moeris stagnum
Moeridis regis sepulchrum
Dionysias
Maria et Maræotis Palus
Pharos
Alexandria
Taposiris parva
Taposiris Magna
Heracleum ostium idem cum Canobico et Naucratico
Bolbitinum ostium quod Bucolicum etiam videtur
Sebennyticum sive Sybenniticum Ostium
Pineptimi Ostium
Diolcos
Diolcos Ostium
Pathmeticum et Phatnicum item Phatniticum ostium
Tanitichie
Mendesium ostium
Taniticum ostium quod Saiticum nonnullis
Peluſiacum ostium
Casium
Gerrhum quod et Adipson
Ostracine
Rhinocorura
Anthedon
Ascalon
Sirbonis palus
Serbonidis eruptio
Pompei sepulcrum
Bitbilum
Tovis
Casius mons
Templum
CASIOTIS REGIO
Nitriotes nom.
Sciathis
MOMEMPHITES nom.
Libaphites nom.
Cellia
Chabrias
Elaeotes nom.
Hieropolis Antonino
Hermopolis Ptolemaeo
TVS
Nitriæ vrbs et mons
ANDROPOLITES Nomus
Nithine
Cinecepolis
Memnonphis
Menelaus
Metelis
Bolbitine
Natho ins.
Andropolis
LEVCOPOLITES Nom.
PHEBETES nom.
Sinopium mons
MEMPHITES Nom.
Letus vel Letopolis
Marbechis
NAVCRATITES Nom.
Prosopolitis
Sais
Butes
Calasa
Nicy que Aclo
Sirph
Mineria
Castra
Cabasitis Nom.
Sebennytes
Tava
XOITES nom.
Xois
Thicopolis
PROSOPITES Nom.
Eudoxi specula
Aphroditopolis vel Aphroditis
Delta
Athribis
PHTHEMBVTIS nom.
Athribiticus Ptol.
Cyna
Psenaco
Onuphis
THMVITES no.
SEBENNITES Nom.
Onuphitis Nom.
Cinospheli
Leontopolis
Sebennitis
TRIPOLITES Busiris Regio
Busiritis Nomus
Busiritici Nomus
Pharbetis
Scenæ veterno runt
PHAPHAETHITES Nom.
Ianis
MENELAITES Nomus
Mendesius Nom.
Pane Physis
Tanis
Thmuis
Heliopolis
Aphroditopolis
Diospolis Parva
Thmuis
Phatnites nom.
Mendes
Nevi Nom.
Tamiatis
Tuchnos
Ba
Phacusa
Thaubasium
Tacasada
Pelusium
Arabiæ paludes Solino Ad Paludes Strabonis
ARABIAE Nom.
Autri Arabes
Magdolus
Taricheæ
SETHARITES Nom.
Penta schoenus
Casiotis
Facidia
Regio
Septentrio
Aphroditopolis
Nea
Heenis
Chemnis
Panopolis
Antonino
Hysopis
Apollinis Anaeris
Hypsele Hysopis Anton.
Phylace Hermu politana
Chusa
Lycopolis
Aphroditopolis Nomus
LYCOPOLITES Nom. LIBYCON Pliny
HERMVPOLITES Nomus
Hermupolis vel Mercury magnia civitas
Oxyrinchus
Ptolemaïs Statio
Assinoe, que et Crocodilorum
Herculis magna civitas
Busiris
Besa
Memphis regia
Piramides
Canthorum vrbs
Tilotes
Acme
Co
Nilus Flu.
HERACLEOPOLITES Nom. Nili civitas
Panser insulæ
Acaris
Antinoia
Hypselio Nomus
Cynopolites Nomus
Hyponon
Muse
Alri
Thimonepsis
Troia
Anagrorum civitas
Aphroditopolites metropolis
APHRODITOPOLITES Nom. qui APHROSOPITES Straboni
Leucothis Dedalitæ gloria
Cercasura vel Cercasorum vrbs
Syros
Baby lon
Seenæ Mandrarum
Hieraconpolis que et Eiythrabolos
HELIOPOLITES Nomus
Phagroriopolites Nom.
Phagroriopolites
Tyra
Gens
Arsinoe que et Cleopatris
Cleopatris
Hero
Daucon portus
Aysma presidium
Arsinoites Nomus
Alabastrina mons
Alabastra
dicta ARABIA
Troicus lapis mons unde pyramides effosse
Amari lacus vel fontes
Clinacis mons
Ticanova
Crocodilopolites Nomus
Crocodilorum civitas
Ceni
Vsui
APSINOITES Nomus
Ilium
HEPTANOMIS Quæ postea
Crocodilorum vrbs
Aphroditopolis
Nea
Heenis
Chemnis
Panopolis Antonino
Hysopis
Apollinis Anaeris
Hypsele Hysopis Anton.
Phylace Hermu politana
Chusa
Lycopolis
Aphroditopolis Nomus
LYCOPOLITES Nom. LIBYCON Pliny
HERMVPOLITES Nomus
Hermupolis vel Mercury magnia civitas
Oxyrinchus
Ptolemaïs Statio
Assinoe, que et Crocodilorum
Herculis magna civitas
Busiris
Besa
Memphis regia
Piramides
Canthorum vrbs
Tilotes
Acme
Co
Nilus Flu.
HERACLEOPOLITES Nom. Nili civitas
Panser insulæ
Acaris
Antinoia
Hypselio Nomus
Cynopolites Nomus
Hyponon
Muse
Alri
Thimonepsis
Troia
Anagrorum civitas
Aphroditopolites metropolis
APHRODITOPOLITES Nom. qui APHROSOPITES Straboni
Heliopolis
Leucothis Dedalitæ gloria
Cercasura vel Cercasorum vrbs
Syros
Baby lon
Seenæ Mandrarum
Hieraconpolis que et Eiythrabolos
HELIOPOLITES Nomus
Phagroriopolites Nom.
Phagroriopolites
Tyra
Gens
Arsinoe que et Cleopatris
Cleopatris
Hero
Daucon portus
Aysma presidium
Arsinoites Nomus
Alabastrina mons
Alabastra
dicta ARABIA
Troicus lapis mons unde pyramides effosse
Amari lacus vel fontes
Clinacis mons
Ticanova
Crocodilopolites Nomus
Crocodilorum civitas
Ceni
Vsui
APSINOITES Nomus
Ilium
HEPTANOMIS Quæ postea
Crocodilorum vrbs
Sinopium mons
MEMPHITES Nom.
Letus vel Letopolis
Marbechis
NAVCRATITES Nom.
Prosopolitis
Sais
Butes
Calasa
Nicy que Aclo
Sirph
Mineria
Castra
Cabasitis Nom.
Sebennytes
Tava
XOITES nom.
Xois
Thicopolis
PROSOPITES Nom.
Eudoxi specula
Aphroditopolis vel Aphroditis
Delta
Athribis
PHTHEMBVTIS nom.
Athribiticus Ptol.
Cyna
Psenaco
Onuphis
THMVITES no.
SEBENNITES Nom.
Onuphitis Nom.
Cinospheli
Leontopolis
Sebennitis
TRIPOLITES Busiris Regio
Busiritis Nomus
Busiritici Nomus
Pharbetis
Scenæ veterno runt
PHAPHAETHITES Nom.
Ianis
MENELAITES Nomus
Mendesius Nom.
Pane Physis
Tanis
Thmuis
Heliopolis
Aphroditopolis
Diospolis Parva
Thmuis
Phatnites nom.
Mendes
Nevi Nom.
Tamiatis
Tuchnos
Ba
Phacusa
Thaubasium
Tacasada
Pelusium
Arabiæ paludes Solino Ad Paludes Strabonis
ARABIAE Nom.
Autri Arabes
Magdolus
Taricheæ
SETHARITES Nom.
Penta schoenus
Casiotis
Facidia
Regio
Septentrio
Aphroditopolis
Nea
Heenis
Chemnis
Panopolis Antonino
Hysopis
Apollinis Anaeris
Hypsele Hysopis Anton.
Phylace Hermu politana
Chusa
Lycopolis
Aphroditopolis Nomus
LYCOPOLITES Nom. LIBYCON Pliny
HERMVPOLITES Nomus
Hermupolis vel Mercury magnia civitas
Oxyrinchus
Ptolemaïs Statio
Assinoe, que et Crocodilorum
Herculis magna civitas
Busiris
Besa
Memphis regia
Piramides
Canthorum vrbs
Tilotes
Acme
Co
Nilus Flu.
HERACLEOPOLITES Nom. Nili civitas
Panser insulæ
Acaris
Antinoia
Hypselio Nomus
Cynopolites Nomus
Hyponon
Muse
Alri
Thimonepsis
Troia
Anagrorum civitas
Aphroditopolites metropolis
APHRODITOPOLITES Nom. qui APHROSOPITES Straboni
Heliopolis
Leucothis Dedalitæ gloria
Cercasura vel Cercasorum vrbs
Syros
Baby lon
Seenæ Mandrarum
Hieraconpolis que et Eiythrabolos
HELIOPOLITES Nomus
Phagroriopolites Nom.
Phagroriopolites
Tyra
Gens
Arsinoe que et Cleopatris
Cleopatris
Hero
Daucon portus
Aysma presidium
Arsinoites Nomus
Alabastrinus

CHAP. VII.

Cæſar *follows* Pompey *into* Egypt. *The* Alexandrian *war. The war againſt* Pharnaces. Illyricum *ſaved by* Vatinius. Cæſar *returns to* Italy. Cicero's *diſquietudes at* Brunduſium *during* Cæſar's *abſence. Cæſar puts an end to the diſturbances raiſed by* Dolabella *in the city: He quells a mutiny in his army, and ſets out for* Africa.

Y. R. 705. Bef. Chr. 47. 404 Conſ.

CÆSAR, ſenſible that all the hopes of the vanquiſhed party were lodged in the perſon of *Pompey*, purſued him with the utmoſt diligence at the head of his cavalry, having firſt given orders to one of his legions to follow. He heard at *Amphipolis*, that *Pompey* had left *Greece*: But, having no ſhips, he was under the neceſſity of marching by land to the ſtreights of the *Helleſpont*, that he might only have that ſhort paſſage by ſea into *Aſia*. Here, while he was croſſing in a ſmall veſſel after his troops, he fell in with a ſquadron of the *Pompeian* fleet, commanded by *Caſſius*, conſiſting, according to *Suetonius*, of ten ſhips of war[m], and which was ſailing to the *Boſphorus*. *Cæſar*, making up to him, ordered him to ſurrender; he obeyed; and, coming on board the little boat, threw himſelf at *Cæſar*'s feet. *Cæſar*, with theſe ſhips, and thoſe he found

Suet. in Cæſ. 63. Dio, l. xlii. App. 482.

[m] *Appian* ſays 70. It may be obſerved, that authors have diſtinguiſhed this *Caſſius* from the *Caſſius* who was one of the conſpirators againſt *Cæſar*.

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Y. R. 705. Bef. Chr. 47. 704 Conſ.

on the coaſt of *Aſia*, continued his route by ſea. At *Epheſus*, he ſaved a ſecond time the treaſure of *Diana*'s temple, which *J. Ampius* was going to plunder for *Pompey*. After a ſhort ſtay in *Aſia*, hearing that *Pompey* had been at *Cyprus*, and thence conjecturing that he had gone for *Egypt*, on account of the intereſt he had in that kingdom, and the advantage it could afford him; he ſailed firſt to *Rhodes*, where, having joined to his fleet the *Rhodian* gallies, he ſet out for *Egypt* with two legions, one of which he had ordered to follow him from *Theſſaly*; the other he had detached from *Fuſius Calenus* in *Achaia*. Theſe two legions did not make up above three thouſand two hundred foot, and eight hundred horſe: But *Cæſar* depended on the reputation of his exploits, and the terror of his name.

Livy, 112. Plut. in Caſ. Dio, l. xlii.

Cæſar, on his arrival at *Alexandria*, was informed of *Pompey*'s death: And, according to ſome authors was preſented by the King's order with the head and ring of his rival [n]. Theſe ſad remains of ſo great a man, with whom he had lived ſo long in the ſtricteſt friendſhip, as the huſband of his beloved *Julia*, and his partner in

[n] *Plutarch in Pomp.* tells us, that *Theodotus*, a Greek rhetorician, one of the King's Counſellors, who had determined the Council to kill *Pompey*, was charged to carry *Cæſar* this preſent, and to compliment him on the ſucceſs of his arms; and that *Brutus*, after *Cæſar*'s death, cauſed him to be executed for it with the moſt cruel torments. *Aurelius Victor*, *de Vir Illuſtr. c.* 77, ſays it was preſented by *Achillas*. *Lucan* ſays,

Dira ſatelles
Colla gerit Magni, Pharia velamine tecta. l. ix.

power,

power, very naturally drew tears from him [o]. He cauſed the head to be burned with the moſt coſtly perfumes, and placed the aſhes in a ſmall temple, which he dedicated to *Nemeſis*, the avenging power of cruel and inhuman deeds. He took up his quarters in the royal palace, where he kept a ſtrict guard: For upon his landing he had been received in a clamorous manner by the garriſon, and he obſerved that the mob appeared diſſatisfied to ſee the faſces carried before him, which they interpreted as a degradation of the royal authority. During ſeveral days diſturbances and tumults happened, and many *Roman* ſoldiers were murdered in different parts of the city. The *Eteſian* winds, which blew at that time, were contrary to any paſſage by ſea from *Alexandria* [p]: And *Cæſar* thinking it belonged to him, as chief of the *Roman* Empire, to take cogniſance of the quarrel between *Ptolemy* and his ſiſter *Cleopatra*, which had broken out into an open war; he began to interfere in this diſpute, not foreſeeing the many difficulties and hazards in which this conduct was to involve him.

Y. R. 705. Bef. Chr. 47. 404 Conſ.

Appian, 448.

Cæſ. de Bell. Civ. Com. l. iii.

Ptolemy Auletes, who died in the year 702, left four children: Two ſons, who were both called *Ptolemy*; and two daughters, the famous *Cleopatra* and *Arſinoë*. According to the eſtabliſhed

[o] *Dio* is poſitive, that theſe tears were counterfeit; and *Lucan* takes occaſion from them to rail bitterly at *Cæſar*. See the end of the ninth book.

[p] The *Eteſian* winds are *northerly winds*, which begin to blow about the ſummer *ſolſtice*, and do not ceaſe till about the end of *Auguſt*.

cuſtom

Y.R. 705. Bef. Chr. 47. 404 Conſ.

cuſtom in the *Ptolemean* family, he had ordered that his eldeſt ſon ſhould marry his eldeſt daughter, and reign with her. For the more certain execution of this his will, he implored the protection of the *Roman* people; and ſent a copy of it by ambaſſadors to *Rome* to be depoſited in the public treaſury; which, however, in the confuſion of the times, had been left with *Pompey*. The original was kept at *Alexandria*. The brother and ſiſter did not live long in harmony: *Cleopatra* was ſeventeen years old, and her brother only thirteen; and ſhe claimed a right to govern her young conſort. On the other hand, the guardians of the young Prince, the chief of whom was the eunuch *Pothinus*, were ambitious to govern under his name and authority. This diviſion had not yet produced an open rupture, when *Pompey*'s eldeſt ſon came to *Alexandria* to demand ſuccours for his father. *Cleopatra* even then is ſaid to have proſtituted her perſon to this young *Roman* to gain *Pompey*'s intereſt: But *Pothinus* ſucceeded better, and obtained at the Senate held at *Theſſalonica* a determination in favour of *Ptolemy*. *Cleopatra* was baniſhed *Egypt*, and forced to retire with her ſiſter *Arſinoë* into *Syria*, where ſhe aſſembled an army, and advanced as far as *Peluſium*. *Ptolemy* marched with his troops to oppoſe her, and the two armies were in ſight of each other near mount *Caſius*, on the borders of *Egypt*, when *Pompey* came there to meet his unhappy fate. Things remained in the ſame ſituation till *Cæſar*'s arrival; and he admoniſhed the contending parties, that it was their duty to remit

Plut. in Ant.

mit their reſpective pretenſions to his determination. They both immediately repaired to him; and *Cleopatra* ſeems to have diſmiſſed her army, for we hear no more mention made of it. We are told by ſome hiſtorians, that, in order to get into *Alexandria*, which was in the poſſeſſion of her enemies, ſhe went on board a ſmall veſſel, and, landing in the evening near the palace, was wrapt up in a bundle of cloaths, and thus carried by one of her attendants into *Cæſar*'s bedchamber. The day after, *Cæſar* ſent for the King, who, being ſtrangely ſurpriſed to ſee his ſiſter with the Conſul of *Rome*, fled from the palace to the market-place, crying out that he was betrayed; and, in the exceſs of his grief and paſſion, tore the diadem from his head. He was ſeized by the *Roman* ſoldiers, and brought back; but this occaſioned a great alarm in the city, and, the people having aſſembled tumultuouſly about the palace, *Cæſar* ſignified to them that his intention was no other than to execute the late King's will, and to declare the brother and ſiſter King and Queen of *Egypt*. *Dio* adds, that he promiſed alſo to give the iſle of *Cyprus*, an ancient appendage of the kingdom of *Egypt*, to the younger *Ptolemy* and *Arſinoë*, his ſiſter: But this circumſtance is very improbable: And the authority of this hiſtorian is not much to be depended on, when unſupported by other teſtimonies.

Y. R. 705. Bef. Chr. 47. 404 Conſ.

Plut. in Cæſ. Flor. l. iv. c. 2. Lucan b. x. Dio l. xlii.

Pothinus, Governor and chief Miniſter to the King, *Cleopatra*'s declared enemy, complained bitterly to his friends, that the King ſhould be

Y. R. 705. Bef. Chr. 47. 404 Conſ.

treated in this manner; and, finding them diſpoſed to ſupport him, he privately ſent for the army at *Peluſium*, and gave the command of it to *Achillas*, the ſame who murdered *Pompey*, and was then Captain of the King's guards. This army was numerous and formidable, and *Cæſar*'s forces were inſufficient to keep the field againſt it. The only courſe therefore left for him was to ſecure the moſt convenient ports of the town, till he was informed of the deſigns of the *Egyptian* General. He admoniſhed the King to ſend ſome perſons of weight to forbid his approach. *Dioſcorides* and *Serapion*, accordingly, who had both been ambaſſadors at *Rome*, and in great credit with *Ptolemy* the father, were deputed to him: But no ſooner did they come into his preſence, than, without giving them a hearing, or inquiring after their meſſage, he ordered them to be ſeized and put to death. One was killed upon the ſpot, and the other, having received a dangerous wound, was carried off for dead by his attendants. Such an enormous behaviour was a warning to *Cæſar*. He took care to ſecure the King's perſon, whoſe name would authoriſe his proceedings, and make *Achillas* and his aſſociates paſs among the people for rebels to their Prince.

Cæſ. de Bell. Civ. Com. lib. iii.

Cæſ. de Bell. Civ. Com. l. iii.

Achillas's army conſiſted of eighteen thouſand foot and two thouſand horſe, all brave and experienced ſoldiers. Many of them were *Romans*, who had been brought into the country by *Gabinius*, when he came to ſettle *Auletes* on the throne; and who, having married and ſettled

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at *Alexandria*, were devoted to the *Ptolemean* intereſt: The others were mercenary troops from *Syria* and *Cilicia*, and fugitive ſlaves, who found protection in *Egypt* by entering into the ſervice. Theſe troops were accuſtomed to give the law to their Sovereign: *Cæſar* tells us, that they had often taken upon them to put to death the King's Miniſters, plunder the rich, inveſt the royal palace, baniſh ſome and ſend for others home, with other liberties of the like nature. This deſcription of the *Alexandrian* militia accounts for the continual changes remarkable in the government of that city. Such will always be the fate of Princes, who chuſe to rely upon a mercenary ſoldiery rather than the affections of their ſubjects. *Achillas*, truſting to the valour of this army, and deſpiſing the handful of men *Cæſar* had brought with him, quickly made himſelf maſter of *Alexandria*, the palace only excepted, where *Cæſar* had fortified himſelf, and which the *Egyptian* General attacked briſkly, though without ſucceſs. The greateſt efforts were made on the ſide of the harbour; Had *Achillas* got poſſeſſion of it and the ſhipping, he might have cut *Cæſar* off from all communication with the ſea, and conſequently from all hopes of receiving ſupplies either of victuals or forces. This made both the *Egyptians* and the *Romans* exert themſelves with incredible vigour. At length *Cæſar* carried his point, and not only burnt all the veſſels in the harbour, which amounted to fifty-five gallies, with twenty-two guard-ſhips, but alſo thoſe that were in the arſenals:

Y. R. 705. Bef. Chr. 47. 404 Conſ.

A.R. 705. Bef. Chr. 47. 404 Conſ.

ſenals: In all one hundred and ten. The flames unfortunately extended themſelves to the *Alexandrian* library: And that valuable monument of the magnificence of the *Ptolemy's*, and of their taſte for learning, was almoſt wholly conſumed [q].

Cæſ. de Bell. Civ. Com. lib. iii.

Cæſar, during the action, tranſported a body of troops into the iſle of *Pharos*, ſo called from a tower of prodigious height and wonderful workmanſhip, built by *Ptolemy Philadelphus*. This iſland lay over-againſt *Alexandria*, and both formed and commanded the port, the entrance on each ſide of it being very narrow. A mole or cauſey, nine hundred paces long, ran through the middle of the port: At the two ends of this mole were two bridges, through the arches of which veſſels could paſs from one ſide of the port to the other. Many *Egyptian* ſea-faring men had built houſes in the *Pharos*, and lived chiefly by pillaging the ſhips that were thrown in upon their coaſt. By getting poſſeſſion of this place, *Cæſar* ſecured the reception of the ſupplies he had ſent for from all ſides. In other quarters of the town the fight was maintained till night with equal advantage, and little loſs, neither party loſing ground. *Cæſar*'s next care was to make fortifications round the King's palace and the theatre adjoining to it, of which he made a kind of citadel: And he thus put it out of the power of the *Alexandrians*

[q] According to *Livy*, cited by *Seneca de tranq. anim. c.* 9. there were in this library four hundred thouſand volumes. According to *Aulus Gellius*, vi. 17, and *Ammianus Marcellinus*, xxiv. 17, ſeven hundred thouſand.

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to force him to a battle againſt his will. He then employed himſelf in incloſing the narroweſt part of the town, which lay between the port and a lake towards the South: By which means he could have proviſion of water and forage. On the other ſide the *Alexandrians* were extremely active and induſtrious in making all ſorts of preparations proper for their own defence, and for forcing *Cæſar*'s quarters. Y. R. 705. Bef. Chr. 47. 404 Conſ.

While theſe works were carrying on, *Cæſar* ordered *Pothinus* to be put to death, having diſcovered a ſecret correſpondence between him and *Achillas*, whom he encouraged to a vigorous proſecution of his enterpriſe. According to *Plutarch*, he had formed a deſign of killing *Cæſar* at table; and the conſpiracy was diſcovered by a ſlave, whoſe exceeding timidity prompting him to be continually upon the watch, and to liſten at every door, he had overheard *Pothinus* and his aſſociates. About the ſame time *Arſinoë*, the youngeſt ſiſter, found means to eſcape from the palace to *Achillas*'s camp, under the conduct of *Ganymed*, her Governor; hoping, in ſuch confuſion, to get into the throne herſelf, in the place of *Cleopatra*. But ſhe ſoon diſagreed with *Achillas*, and they endeavoured to ſupplant one another, and to gain, by bribes and promiſes, the affection of the mercenary ſoldiers. At length *Arſinoë* prevailed, and cauſed *Achillas* to be ſlain: And *Ganymed*, under the name and authority of *Arſinoë*, was veſted with the ſupreme power, and proved not leſs bold and enterpriſing than his predeceſſor. Cæſ. de Bel. Civ. Com. l. iii.

Y. R. 705. Bef. Chr. 47. 404 Conſ.

Alexandria was ſupplied with water from the *Nile:* But, this water being generally muddy and unwholeſome, every houſe was provided with a ciſtern, where it remained till it became fit to be drunk. *Ganymed*, being maſter of that part of the town where the river lay, and conſequently of all the conduits, he undertook to taint all the ciſterns in *Cæſar*'s quarter, by pouring into the aqueducts a great quantity of ſea-water, raiſed by the help of machines: And, at the ſame time, to preſerve his own untainted, the aqueducts on his ſide were ſtopped up. The ciſterns in the neareſt houſes ſoon began to taſte ſalter than uſual, while no change could be obſerved in thoſe that were more remote. However, the ſaltneſs ſoon became general, and the water was every-where unfit for uſe. The *Roman* army, greatly diſcouraged at this unexpected event, began to complain againſt *Cæſar* for not abandoning the place; but he ſoon found means to remove the inconveniency that ſo much alarmed them, by ſinking a great number of wells; and, with little difficulty, obſtructed the laborious attempts of the *Alexandrians*.

Y. R. 706. Bef. Chr. 46. 405 Conſ.

C. Julius Cæsar, Dictator II.
M. Antonius, Mag. Eq.

Hirtius de Bell. Alex.

During theſe tranſactions the thirty-ſeventh legion, compoſed of *Pompey*'s veterans, who had ſurrendered to *Cæſar* after the battle of *Pharſalia*, were driven upon the coaſt of *Africa*, a little above *Alexandria:* where, being detained for ſeveral days by an eaſterly wind, and being preſſed

preſſed for want of water, they ſent to inform him of their arrival and ſituation. *Cæſar*, upon this intelligence, immediately went on board one of the ſhips in the harbour, and ordered the whole fleet to follow, leaving the land-forces to defend the works. Being arrived at a port of the coaſt called *Cherſoneſus*, he ſent ſome mariners on ſhore to fetch water. Theſe venturing too far into the country, for the ſake of plunder, were intercepted by the enemy's horſe, and from them the *Egyptians* heard that *Cæſar* himſelf was on board without any ſoldiers. Upon this information, they thought that Fortune had thrown a fair opportunity in their way of attempting ſomething with ſucceſs. They got together all the ſhips that were in a condition to ſail, and met *Cæſar* on his return, at four in the afternoon. The *Roman* General was very deſirous to avoid an engagement ſo late in the day, which probably would be continued in the dark, when the *Alexandrians* would have the advantage by the knowledge they had of the coaſt; and he would not be able to encourage his men, and be witneſs of their behaviour, a circumſtance upon which he always greatly relied. He therefore drew all his ſhips as near the ſhore as poſſible, where he imagined the enemy would not venture to follow him. But, contrary to his inclination, he was engaged to fight by the temerity of a *Rhodian* galley of the right wing, which ſtood out at a conſiderable diſtance from the reſt, and was immediately attacked by four gallies and ſeveral open barks. *Cæſar*, not to ſuffer the

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diſgrace of ſeeing her ſunk before his eyes, was obliged to advance to her relief. The *Rhodians*, diſtinguiſhed at all times by their valour and experience in naval engagements, exerted themſelves on this occaſion to the utmoſt, and gained a complete victory. One four-benched galley was taken, another was ſunk, a third was diſabled, and the whole fleet would have been deſtroyed, if night had not put a ſtop to the chace. *Cæſar*, after giving this defeat to the enemy, took his tranſports in tow, and returned to *Alexandria*.

Hirt. de Bell. Alex.

The *Alexandrians* were much diſheartened at this bad ſucceſs, and at finding themſelves ſo much outdone by the *Rhodian* mariners. But *Ganymed* raiſed their dejected ſpirits by the ſtrongeſt aſſurances of his being able to fit out, in a very ſhort time, a fleet much ſuperior to that which had been lately defeated. Having gathered all the ſhips ſtationed at the mouth of the *Nile*, for receiving the cuſtoms, he oppoſed again to the *Romans twenty-two four-benched gallies* and *five quinqueremes*, with a great number of open barks. *Cæſar*'s fleet conſiſted in all of nine *Rhodian* gallies, (for, of the ten he had brought with him, one had been ſhipwrecked on the coaſt of *Egypt*) eight from *Pontus*, five from *Lycia*, and twelve from *Aſia*. Of theſe, however, only ten were *quadriremes*, and five *quinqueremes*: The reſt were of an inferior bulk, and for the moſt part without decks. *Cæſar*, notwithſtanding this inferiority of his fleet in number and ſtrength, reſolved to give the enemy battle; and, ſailing round the *Pharos* into that part of the port which

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the *Alexandrians* were maſters of, he drew up his ſhips in the following order. His nine *Rhodian* gallies he placed in his right wing: The eight of *Pontus* in the left; leaving between them a ſpace of four hundred paces to ſerve for the extending and working the veſſels: And the reſt of the fleet he deſtined as a reſerve, and diſpoſed them behind the two wings in ſuch a manner that every ſhip followed that to which ſhe was appointed to give ſuccour. The *Alexandrians*, who came forth with great confidence, had placed their twenty-two *quadriremes* in front: Their other ſhips were arranged behind in a ſecond line: And they had a number of ſmaller veſſels which carried fire and burning weapons, by which they meant to ſtrike a terror into the *Romans*. This regular diſpoſition did not hold long. Between the two fleets, there were certain flats; and each ſide heſitated which ſhould firſt paſs them: Becauſe, in caſe of any misfortune, they would be a great obſtruction to a retreat; and it was difficult to draw up in order of battle beyond them in the preſence of an enemy. *Euphranor*, the *Rhodian* Admiral, a man of diſtinguiſhed courage and experience, perceiving *Cæſar*'s perplexity, addreſſed him to this effect: "Great General! it appears you are apprehen- "ſive leſt by paſſing theſe ſhallows firſt, you "ſhould be forced to engage, before your whole "fleet is drawn up: We beg of you to put your "confidence in us, and we promiſe to maintain "the fight till the whole fleet gets clear of the "ſhallows. It is greatly diſhonourable and af-

Y. R. 706. Bef. Chr. 46. 405 Conſ.

Y. R. 706. Bef. Chr. 46. 405 Conſ.

" flicting, that the enemy ſhould ſo long continue " in our ſight with that air of triumph." *Cæſar*, encouraging him in his deſign [r], gave the ſignal of battle: And four *Rhodian* ſhips, having paſſed the flats, were immediately aſſailed on all ſides by the *Alexandrians*; but the *Rhodians* worked their veſſels with ſo much ſkill, and diſengaged themſelves with ſo much addreſs, that they never ſuffered any of the enemy's ſhips either to ſtrike their flanks with their beaks, or to run along-ſide of them in order to ſweep away or break their oars: They always found means to oppoſe beak to beak. Thus they maintained the fight till the reſt of the fleet came up: And, art now becoming uſeleſs, the whole ſucceſs depended upon valour. Both ſides fought in ſight of their friends at land; who, laying aſide their work, and all thoughts of attack or defence, gave their whole attention to what was going forward at ſea. The *Romans* riſked more than the *Alexandrians* by this battle: A defeat would have deprived them of all reſource either by ſea or land, and victory would not much better their condition: The *Alexandrians*, on the contrary, if ſucceſs attended them, gained every thing, and though defeated, could ſtill maintain the war. On the ſide of the *Romans*, every thing depended

[r] This brave Admiral was ſoon after ſent out to cruiſe off *Canopus*; an expedition in which he periſhed. He had begun an engagement with ſome *Alexandrian* ſhips, and had ſunk the firſt he attacked; but, purſuing another too far, and, not being ſuſtained by the reſt of the fleet, his galley was ſurrounded and ſhattered to pieces. *Hirt. de Bell. Alex.*

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on the bravery of a few: This *Cæſar* had often before the battle repreſented to his officers and ſoldiers, and they now repeated it to one another. They were animated by the difficulty and importance of their ſituation, and fought with ſuch determined reſolution, that neither the art nor efforts of the *Alexandrians*, nor the multitude of their ſhips and boats, could any ways avail them. In this action the *Romans* ſuſtained not the loſs of one veſſel: But two *Alexandrian* gallies, one of five benches of oars, and another of two, with all the ſoldiers and mariners on board, were taken, and three others were ſunk. The reſt fled towards the town, and took ſhelter under the mole and forts, whither the *Romans* could not purſue them.

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Cæſar, to deprive the enemy of this reſource, reſolved to make himſelf maſter once more of the *mole* and the *iſland*, which had been retaken by the *Egyptians*, while he was employed in the more neceſſary works within the town. For the execution of this deſign, he put into boats and ſmall veſſels ten cohorts, a ſelect body of light-armed infantry, and ſuch of the *Gallic* cavalry as he thought moſt proper for his purpoſe, and ſent them againſt the iſland. He himſelf, at the ſame time, to cauſe a diverſion, attacked it on the other ſide with his fleet. The attack was briſk, and the *Pharians* defended themſelves at firſt with vigour. They annoyed the *Romans* from the tops of their houſes, and gallantly maintained their ground along the ſhore; which was in moſt parts ſteep and craggy, and which, in the places

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of eaſier acceſs, was ſkilfully defended by ſmall boats properly ſtationed for the purpoſe. But when, after examining the approaches and ſhallows, a few of the *Romans* had found means to land, they were followed with ſo much expedition by others, that the *Pharians*, abandoning their ſhips and coaſt, fled into the town. There they might eaſily have defended themſelves; for the buildings were very high, and joined together ſo as to form a ſtrong wall, and the *Romans* had neither ladders, nor any other inſtruments for aſſault: But ſuch was their conſternation, that they dared not to engage from a height of thirty feet; and, throwing themſelves from the mole into the ſea, they endeavoured to gain *Alexandria*, though above eight hundred paces diſtant. Many were ſlain, and ſix hundred were made priſoners in this fight. *Cæſar* gave the plunder of the place to the ſoldiers, and demoliſhed all the houſes. The caſtle, however, at the end of the bridge next the iſland, he fortified and placed a garriſon in it. The other caſtle, which was next the town, was much the ſtrongeſt, and was ſtill held by the *Alexandrians*. This he attacked the next day; becauſe, by getting poſſeſſion of both forts, he would be entirely maſter of the port, and would be able to prevent any ſudden incurſions. By means of the arrows and darts launched from his engines, he quickly forced the garriſon to abandon the place and retire into the town; and, having landed upon the mole three cohorts, which was all that the ſpot could well contain, he diſpoſed the reſt of his troops

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in his ſhips to ſuſtain them. Things being in this forwardneſs, he ordered the arch of the bridge that joined the mole to the town, and through which the *Alexandrians* uſed to ſend their fire-boats againſt his veſſels, to be entirely ſtopped up; and, at the ſame time, he began to raiſe a fortification upon the bridge. The *Alexandrians*, however, brought all the troops they could out of the town before this fortification could be finiſhed, and poſted them in an open area before it; and, having placed alſo a number of tranſports all along the mole, they began to attack the *Romans* by launching their javelins. While *Cæſar*, attentive to what paſſed, was exhorting and directing his troops, a number of rowers and mariners of his fleet, quitting their ſhips, threw themſelves upon the mole, partly out of curioſity, and partly to have ſome ſhare in the action. At firſt, with their ſlings, they forced the enemy's ſhips from the mole, and ſeemed to do great ſervice; but, ſoon after, when a few of the *Alexandrians*, having ventured out upon the mole, attacked them in flank, they fled with precipitation. The *Alexandrians*, encouraged by this ſucceſs, landed in greater numbers, and vigorouſly puſhed the *Romans*, who were now in great confuſion. Thoſe that were in the gallies, perceiving this, removed the ladders, and put off from the mole to prevent the enemy's boarding them. The three cohorts, who were fortifying and defending the bridge at the head of the mole, where they had much buſineſs upon their hands, hearing a clamour behind them, and ſeeing the general

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general rout of their friends, immediately interrupted their work; and, fearing to be ſurrounded, and precluded from a retreat, ran with all ſpeed towards the gallies. Some, getting on board the neareſt veſſels, overloaded and ſunk them; others, making head againſt the enemy, and, uncertain what courſe to take, were cut to pieces: A few, throwing their bucklers over their ſhoulders, ſwam to the ſhips which were at the ſmalleſt diſtance from them. *Cæſar* endeavoured to ſtop his men, and bring them back to the defence of the works; but, finding them giving ground univerſally, he retreated to his own galley; whither ſuch a multitude followed and crouded after him, that it was impoſſible to work her. Foreſeeing, therefore, what muſt happen, he flung himſelf into the ſea, and ſwam to a ſhip that lay at ſome diſtance [s]. Hence, diſpatching boats to

[s] Some ancient writers have finely embelliſhed this ſtory, and *M. Crevier* has extracted from them what is moſt curious in their ſeveral tales: "It is remarkable, that, having ſtripped off his *coat of mail*, (his General's cloke) which would have been an incumbrance to him in ſwimming, *he drew it after him with his teeth*, to prevent its falling into the enemy's hands; and, as he had *ſome papers in his left hand*, he *conſtantly held it above water*, at the ſame time ſwimming with the right, by which means *the papers were not wetted*. However, his *coat of armour* got from him, which proved of ſervice to him: For, being purple, and diſtinguiſhable by the brightneſs of its colour, it ſuſtained all the fury of the enemy's ſhot, at the ſame time that *Cæſar* ſaved himſelf without being obſerved or known. The *Alexandrians* took it, and made it the principal ornament in the trophy they erected on the place of the engagement."

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to ſuccour his men, he preſerved a few. His own galley periſhed, with all that was on board; and he loſt in this action four hundred legionary ſoldiers, and ſomewhat above that number of rowers and ſailors. The *Alexandrians* ſecured the fort by ſtrong works, and a great number of engines; and, having cleared away the ſtones with which *Cæſar* had filled up the arch of the bridge, they had, thereby, a free paſſage into that part of the port where *Cæſar*'s fleet lay. Y. R. 706. Bef. Chr. 46. 405 Conſ.

This misfortune, far from diſcouraging the *Romans*, ſerved only the more to exaſperate them; and they made their enemies ſenſible of the ſpirit and fury that tranſported them, by puſhing on their attacks with greater vigour; inſomuch that their General was more employed in reſtraining their ardour, than in inciting them to action.

The *Alexandrians* who now began to think it would be of great ſervice to them to have their King at their head, ſent Deputies to *Cæſar*, beſeeching him to reſtore him to them, and repreſenting it as the only means to bring about an accommodation. *Cæſar*, perfectly well acquainted with the falſe and perfidious character of the *Alexandrians*, was not to be impoſed upon by this plauſible pretext. He determined, however, to comply with their demands, being ſenſible that the whole hazard was to them and their King;

The authorities for theſe particulars are *Suetonius*, *Florus*, *Plutarch*, *Appian*, and *Dio*. But no authorities can make one believe, that *Cæſar* carried his papers upon the mole of *Alexandria*, or in plunging into the ſea did not wet them. The other circumſtances are equally abſurd.

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for, as to what concerned himſelf, if, at firſt, he thought it might be of ſervice to him to detain the young Prince, in order to prevent a rebellion; now that it was not only broken out, but had been obſtinately maintained for ſeveral months, ſuch a priſoner created him more trouble than real advantage; and he perceived, that it would be more for his honour to make war with the King himſelf, than with *Arſinoë*, and her eunuch *Ganymed*. He therefore, having exhorted *Ptolemy* to put an end to the misfortunes of his country, and to ſave from total ruin its metropolis, took him by the hand to conduct him out of the palace. The young Prince, who was already an adept in the art of diſſimulation, entreated *Cæſar* with tears not to ſend him back; for that he took more pleaſure in his company than in the poſſeſſion of his Crown. *Cæſar* told him, that if ſuch were his real ſentiments, they ſhould quickly ſee one another again. *Ptolemy* took his leave, and had no ſooner regained his liberty, than he carried on the war with ſo much fierceneſs, that the tears he ſhed at parting appeared to be tears of joy. *Cæſar*'s officers and ſoldiers were highly diverted with the event; imagining, that, through his eaſineſs of temper, he had let himſelf be duped by a boy.

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Cæſar, in the beginning of this *Alexandrian* war, had ſent *Mithridates* of *Pergamus*[t], to raiſe troops

[t] This *Mithridates* was probably the ſon of *Mithridates*, King of *Pontus*. His mother, though married, was one of the miſtreſſes of that Monarch. The King of *Pontus* ſhewed a ſin-

troops in *Syria* and *Cilicia*. This General, having acquitted himſelf of the commiſſion with great fidelity and expedition, was now upon the borders of *Egypt* with a numerous army; in which were three thouſand *Jews*, commanded by *Antipater*, father of *Herod*, and Miniſter of *Hircan*, King of *Judea*. *Mithridates* took *Peluſium* by ſtorm the day he arrived before it, notwithſtanding *Achillas* had placed a ſtrong garriſon in it, as it was the key of *Egypt* on the *Syrian* ſide. The ſhorteſt way from *Peluſium* to *Alexandria* was to keep a parallel line with the ſea; but all the country is ſo traverſed by the *Nile* and its canals, that *Mithridates* found the march equally fatiguing and hazardous. This obliged him to march up the river as far as the head or point of the *Delta*, a province of *Egypt*, ſo called from its ſimilitude to the *Greek* letter of that name. There the *Nile* divides itſelf into two great branches. The young King, underſtanding that *Mithridates* approached this place, and knowing he muſt paſs the river, ſent a conſiderable body of troops againſt him to cruſh him, if poſſible, before his junction with *Cæſar*, at leaſt to oppoſe his march. Part of this detachment, which formed the van, made what haſte they could to engage him, that they alone might have all the honour of the victory: But *Mithridates* had intrenched himſelf with great care; and, after keeping ſome time upon the defenſive, he ſallied out upon them

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a ſingular affection for him, gave him a royal education, and for many years kept him at his Court, and in his army.

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from all parts, put a great number of them to the ſword, and diſperſed the reſt. *Cæſar* and the King of *Egypt* had both information of this event, and ſet out at the ſame time to the aſſiſtance of their friends: The King, having a ſhorter cut, and the advantage of the river, got there firſt, but was not able to attempt any thing before *Cæſar*'s arrival, who found no difficulty in joining *Mithridates*. The *Roman* General, ſeeing himſelf now at the head of a powerful army, reſolved to put an end to the war by an aſſault upon the enemy's camp.

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The King had intrenched himſelf in a place well fortified by nature: It was a riſing ground, ſurrounded by a plain; and *three* of its ſides were ſecured by different fences; one adjoined to the *Nile*, the other was ſteep, and of very difficult acceſs, and the third was defended by a moraſs. About ſeven miles from it ran a narrow river, but with very high banks, which diſcharged itſelf into the *Nile*: And, as it lay between the two armies, *Ptolemy* ſent all his cavalry and a ſelect body of light-armed troops to prevent *Cæſar* from paſſing it. The legionary troops, however, found means to get over by throwing acroſs from bank to bank a number of large trees, and ſome *German* cavalry ventured to paſs it by ſwimming where the banks were loweſt. Theſe attacked the detachment from *Ptolemy*'s camp, and with ſuch fury, that very few eſcaped to the King with the news of his enemy's approach. *Cæſar*, willing to ſtrike a terror into the *Alexandrians*, encamped as near to them

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as poſſible; and the next day he attacked a fort which lay at a ſmall diſtance, and which *Ptolemy* had joined to his camp by a line of communication. He employed his whole army in this attack, with a deſign of falling immediately upon the camp itſelf, during the conſternation and diſorder which the loſs of the fort would occaſion. The *Romans* accordingly purſued the garriſon of the fort to the works of the camp; and theſe they attempted to force by the two only approaches by which it ſeemed poſſible to attack them; the one by the plain, the other by a narrow paſs between the camp and the *Nile*: But the former was bravely defended by a numerous body of their beſt troops; and the latter was not only protected from the rampart, but from the river, where a great number of archers and ſlingers made a continual diſcharge from the ſhips ſtationed there. *Cæſar*, obſerving that, though his troops fought with the greateſt ardour, yet they made no progreſs, he ordered a few cohorts, under the command of *Carſulenus*, a brave officer, to wheel round the camp, and to climb up the ſteepeſt ſide of it, which he perceived to be unguarded; the whole army having crouded to the attacks, or giving their whole attention to them. *Carſulenus*, having executed his General's orders, ſoon put an end to the fight, by falling down upon the rear of the enemy. The *Alexandrians* fled on all ſides in the greateſt conſternation, and, endeavouring to eſcape to the ſhips on the *Nile*, threw themſelves over the rampart on that ſide. The King, during the confu-

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confuſion, got on ſhipboard, but the veſſel was overloaded and ſunk by the multitudes which followed him. Such was the end of this perfidious Prince. His body was afterwards found, covered with mud, and known by the golden cuiraſs, which it was cuſtomary for the *Ptolemy's* to wear in battle.

Flor. iv. 2. Oroſ. vi. 16.

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Cæſar marched immediately to *Alexandria*, at the head of his cavalry, by the ſhorteſt way, confident that the inhabitants and troops, left in the town, would not dare to make any reſiſtance. On his approach the whole city came out to meet him in the habit of ſuppliants, preceded by all their Prieſts with the ſacred ſymbols of their religion. The victorious General received their ſubmiſſion with his wonted humanity, and rode triumphant through the enemy's works into his own quarters [u]. Thus *Cæſar*, in a few months, extricated himſelf from a war, in which all manner of difficulties ſeem to have been combined to put his prudence, courage, vigilance and activity to the teſt. In the midſt of winter, and abſolutely unprepared and in want of every thing, he maintained himſelf at land and ſea, within the very walls and port of an artful enemy, ſupplied with every commodity, and who brought againſt him a diſciplined and warlike

[u] It appears by an old marble calendar, cited by *Gruterus*, Inſcript. t. i. p. 133, that *Cæſar* entered *Alexandria*, vi cal. *Ap.* or *27th of March*; which, according to *Uſher*, was the *14th of January* of the *Julian* year; but rather about the middle of *February*; *Suetonius* in Cæſ. 35. ſays the war was carried on in winter, *hyeme anni*.

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army, four times as numerous as that with which he had been forced to begin the war. Y. R. 706. Bef. Chr. 46. 405 Conſ.

He now baniſhed *Arſinoë* the kingdom, and ſettled the crown, in conformity to *Auletes*'s will, upon the only ſurviving ſon and *Cleopatra*: And he left with them the greateſt part of his troops, to ſupport their authority over ſubjects, who, upon his account, were greatly diſaffected to them. It ſeemed alſo for the honour and intereſt of the people of *Rome*, that the *Roman* forces ſhould remain there to protect them, while they continued faithful; and to check them, if they ſhould fall off from their allegiance. *Suetonius* tells us, that what deterred *Cæſar* from reducing *Egypt*, at this time, into a province of the empire, was, that he was apprehenſive, leſt an ambitious Governor, maſter of a country ſo opulent, and of ſuch difficult acceſs, ſhould be tempted to revolt. Others aſcribe it to his love for *Cleopatra*, who, not long after his departure, was delivered of a ſon to him, whom ſhe named *Cæſario*, and whom *Cæſar* is ſaid to have owned[x]. But, whatever paſſion he may be ſuppoſed to have had for *Cleopatra*, it certainly engaged him in no act of injuſtice, and never drew his attention from concerns of greater importance. As ſoon as affairs were ſettled in *Egypt*, and the ſeaſon was open for military operations, he ſet out by land

[x] So *Antony* gave out after *Cæſar*'s death: though *Oppius*, it may be obſerved, thought it worth his while to write a book to confute his teſtimony, and to prove that *Cæſario* was not *Cæſar*'s child.

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for *Syria*, with the ſixth legion, in his way to *Pontus*, where *Pharnaces*, King of the *Boſphorus*, during the *Alexandrian* war, had made a great progreſs, and was likely to give him much uneaſineſs [y].

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This Prince, at the breaking out of the Civil War, thought he had a fair opportunity, while all was in ſuch confuſion, and the *Romans* employed in their mutual deſtruction, to reconquer the dominions of his anceſtors. He began by taking *Phanegoria*, which *Pompey* had declared free: He next ſubdued *Colchis*; then, entering *Pontus*, he made himſelf maſter of *Sinope*, the ancient reſidence of its Kings. Elated by this ſucceſs, he had ſeized upon the *leſſer Armenia*, which belonged to *Dejotarus*, and carried his arms into *Cappadocia*, the kingdom of *Ario-*

[y] "*Cleopatra*'s charms, ſays M. *Crevier*, "muſt have "been very bewitching, ſince they had the power to re- "tard *Cæſar*'s activity. After having confined himſelf nine "months in *Alexandria*, during which time the whole buſi- "neſs of *Rome* and *Italy* was *at a ſtand*, and *whereby* the "vanquiſhed party found means to get ſtrength, and be- "come formidable in *Africa*, *Cæſar*, inſtead of quitting "*Egypt*, with all expedition, to go where honour and the "affairs of ſtate required his preſence, abandoned himſelf "to pleaſure, and paſſed whole nights in feaſts and other "debaucheries with *Cleopatra*: And at laſt ſet out with her "to make a tour round the country. They went on board "a ſhip richly ornamented, and took their courſe up the *Nile*, "attended by *four hundred* veſſels. *Cæſar*'s deſign was to "have gone to *Ethiopia*, but he was prevented by his "army, who began to diſlike his proceedings." *Suetonius*, *Appian*, and *Dio* are cited to confirm theſe particulars; but one has occaſion for a very ſmall ſhare of penetration to perceive their improbability.

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barzanes. *Dejotarus* found affairs in this situation, on his return from *Pharſalia*; and had recourſe to *Domitius Calvinus*, whom *Cæſar* had appointed Commander in thoſe parts. *Domitius* was very ſenſible that the Republic was not leſs intereſted in this war than *Dejotarus* and *Ariobarzanes*, and that it was diſhonourable to the *Roman* people, to *Cæſar*, and to himſelf, to ſuffer the dominions of their friends and allies to be invaded by a foreign Prince: He therefore ſent ambaſſadors to *Pharnaces*, and required of him, "to withdraw immediately out of *Armenia* "and *Cappadocia*, and no longer to inſult the "majeſty of the *Roman* Republic." At the ſame time, to give more weight to his embaſſy, he aſſembled what troops he could, and ordered them to rendezvous at *Comana*. Of the three legions which *Cæſar* had left with him, he had ſent two to *Egypt*, one by ſea, the other with *Mithridates:* The thirty-ſixth alone remained with him. He received, however, two legions from *Dejotarus*, and one had been lately raiſed in *Pontus*. Theſe four legions, with ſome *Cilician* recruits, and two hundred horſe, made up his whole army. *Pharnaces* made anſwer, "that he had quitted *Cappadocia*, and "that the *leſſer Armenia* was his own by the right "of inheritance; but that he would ſubmit to "the deciſion of *Cæſar*." *Domitius*, who underſtood that he had left *Cappadocia* for no other reaſon than becauſe, *Armenia* lying contiguous to his kingdom, he could more eaſily defend it,

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ſent him word, that he had no better right to *Armenia* than to *Cappadocia*, and that he muſt renounce acquiſitions to which his ſword alone had intitled him. *Pharnaces* endeavoured in vain to amuſe him with a negociation, and by ſending Deputies after Deputies with preſents. The *Roman* General advanced to *Nicopolis*, and a battle enſued. In this battle *Dejotarus*'s two legions gave ground on the firſt onſet, the legion raiſed in *Pontus* was cut to pieces, and the legion alone of *Pompey*'s veterans, after ſuſtaining the whole ſhock of the action, retreated in good order with the loſs of only two hundred and fifty men. *Domitius*, aſſembling his ſcattered ſoldiers as well as he could, retired as far as *Aſia*; while the King entered *Pontus* as Conqueror, and committed all kinds of enormities. Affairs were in this ſituation, when *Cæſar* left *Egypt*.

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On his arrival in *Syria*, he received advice from all hands, that every thing was in confuſion at *Rome*; that the conteſts of the Tribunes produced daily ſeditions; that the officers kept up no diſcipline among the ſoldiers; and that his preſence was neceſſary to give the laws their proper authority. However, he thought it neceſſary firſt to regulate the affairs of the Eaſtern provinces, and take vengeance on *Pharnaces*. The Kings and petty Princes in and about *Syria* came from every ſide to wait on him, and were graciouſly received. He confirmed *Hircan* in the high-prieſthood of the *Jews*, notwithſtanding the ſollicitations of *Antigonus*, ſon to *Ariſtobulus*; and

and gave him leave to build the walls of *Jeruſalem*, which *Pompey* had ordered to be pulled down: He likewiſe ſupported *Antipater* in the command he had for a long time exerciſed in *Judæa*, under *Hircan*'s name; which greatly ſtrengthened the authority of that Prince. From *Syria* where he left the command in the hands of *Sextus Cæſar*, a young relation, he ſailed for *Cilicia*: And, having convened the States of that province in *Tarſus*, and ſettled its affairs, he ſet out with the greateſt expedition towards *Pontus*. At *Comana* he conferred the prieſthood of *Bellona* on *Lycomedes* of *Bithynia*, who claimed it in right of his anceſtors, and, according to *Appian*, diſpoſſeſſed *Archelaus*, the ſon of him whom *Pompey* had inveſted with that dignity. On his approaching the frontiers of *Gallogræcia*, he was met by *Dejotarus*, who had not only diveſted himſelf of all marks of royalty, but had taken that of a ſuppliant "to "beg forgiveneſs for having aſſiſted *Pompey*, at "a time when *Cæſar* could give him no protec-"tion: Urging that it was his buſineſs to obey "the Governors who were preſent, without pre-"tending to judge of the diſputes of the *Roman* people." *Cæſar*, who was well acquainted with what zeal and ſpirit he had ſerved againſt him, after ſome reproaches, and refuting his excuſes, reſtored him his royal habit, and commanded him to join him with all his cavalry and troops.

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Pharnaces obſerved the ſame conduct with *Cæſar* as with *Domitius*: He pretended to ſue

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for peace, but was fully reſolved to puſh the war. *Cæſar* ſaw through his deſign: And, tho' his army was very inconſiderable, both as to the number and the quality of his troops, conſiſting only of the ſixth legion (now reduced to one thouſand men) and the remains of *Domitius*'s army, he reſolved to give battle. He advanced therefore within five miles of the enemy. The country where the King was encamped was filled with hills, ſeparated from each other by deep vallies: And, oppoſite to that eminence where *Pharnaces* had intrenched himſelf, was another at the diſtance only of one mile, and there *Cæſar* intended to pitch his camp. With this deſign, having ordered his men to prepare every thing neceſſary for throwing up a rampart, he ſet out in the night to take poſſeſſion of it. *Pharnaces* was greatly ſurpriſed to ſee him there, at ſun-riſing, employed in making his fortifications, and immediately took the reſolution to attack him. The approach was ſo very difficult and dangerous, that *Cæſar* concluded the King's intention was no other than to retard his works by keeping a great number of his men under arms: And, ſhewing therefore his firſt line in order of battle, he commanded the reſt of the army to go on with the works. But the King, encouraged by favourable omens, and by reflecting that in this very place *Triarius* had been overcome by his father *Mithridates*, and having conceived an utter contempt for ſo ſmall an army, made up, for the moſt part, of troops he had al-

already defeated in the field, had determined upon a battle, and to that end began to croſs the valley. *Cæſar* laughed at his fooliſh attempt in crouding his army into ſo narrow a place, where no General in his right ſenſes would have entered; and did not think of calling his ſoldiers from their work. But, ſeeing him puſh on and aſcend the hill, he found himſelf obliged, to his great aſtoniſhment, to poſt his army in order to receive him. An attack ſo ſudden and unexpected cauſed ſome diſorder at firſt, which was increaſed by the chariots armed with ſcythes, which, ſent before the enemy's firſt line, fell in with *Cæſar*'s ranks before they were quite formed: But the multitude of darts, which were launched againſt them, ſoon put a ſtop to their career. The army, which followed them cloſe, began the battle by a ſhout; and the engagement was ſharp and long. At laſt the *Romans*, by the advantage of their ſituation, repulſed the aſſailants: The victory began in the right wing, where the veterans of the ſixth legion were poſted; and, the troops in the center and in the left wing gaining ſoon a like ſuperiority, the whole army of *Pharnaces* was driven precipitately down the hill. In the flight great numbers were ſlain and cruſhed by their own troops, and thoſe who eſcaped were obliged to throw away their arms, ſo that, having croſſed the valley and got to the oppoſite aſcent, they could not face about, nor derive any benefit from the advantage of the ground. The

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Romans purſued them, and, without allowing them to rally, attacked and took their camp. It was during this attack that *Pharnaces* made his eſcape. Almoſt his whole army was deſtroyed or made priſoners. It is reported by *Appian*, that *Cæſar*, aſtoniſhed at the eaſe with which he gained this victory, cried out: *Happy Pompey! ſuch then are the enemies by whoſe defeat you acquired the ſurname of Great:* And in a letter to one of his friends at *Rome*, giving an account of this action, he deſcribed the rapidity of his conqueſt in theſe three words, *Veni, vidi, vici*; *I came, I ſaw, I conquered*[z]. And, when he triumphed afterwards on this occaſion, he cauſed a tablet to be carried in the proceſſion, with theſe very words inſcribed in capitals. *Hirtius* tells us, that no victory ever gave him more joy, as he, at one blow, in ſo critical a conjuncture, put an end to a dangerous war, which he was afraid would detain him a long time from *Rome*, where his preſence was neceſſary. *Pharnaces*, having retired to *Sinope*, was purſued thither by *Domitius*, who forced him to leave the country. In the *Boſphorus*, *Aſander*, whom he had left Regent of his kingdom, had revolted and ſet up for himſelf, during the expedition into *Pontus*; ſo that, when

[z] Rex Pharnaces magis diſcordiæ noſtræ fiducia, quam virtutis ſuæ, infeſto in Cappadociam agmine ruebat: Sed hunc *Cæſar* aggreſſus, uno, et, ut ſic dixerim, non toto prælio, obtrivit; more fulminis, quod uno eodemque momento venit, percuſſit, abſceſſit. Nec vana de ſe prædicatio eſt Cæſaris, ante victum hoſtem eſſe, quam viſum. *Flor. l.* iv. *c.* 2.

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the fugitive King returned home, he found a Rebel in a condition to diſpute with him the poſſeſſion. A battle enſued, in which *Pharnaces* loſt his life. Such was the end of this parricide ſon of the great *Mithridates*. Y. R. 706. Bef. Chr. 46. 405 Conſ.

During the war in *Egypt* and in *Pontus*, *Greece* and *Illyricum* had been pacified by *Calenus* and *Vatinius*. The firſt made himſelf maſter of all *Peloponneſus* without much difficulty. In *Illyricum* the ſtruggle was greater. *Cæſar*, upon his expedition againſt *Pompey*, had left *Q. Cornificius* to command in that province with two legions, and this Lieutenant had kept the Barbarians in ſubjection. After the battle of *Pharſalia*, *Cæſar*, being informed that many of the vanquiſhed party had fled that way, and that *Octavius* had brought the fleet which he commanded upon the coaſt, he ſent orders to *Gabinius*, who was then in *Italy*, to march with the new-raiſed legions to the ſuccour of *Cornificius*. *Gabinius*, imagining that the province was better ſtocked with proviſions than it really was, and depending on the terror impreſſed upon the inhabitants by *Cæſar*'s late victory, marched into *Illyricum* in the middle of winter, and, not finding ſufficient ſubſiſtence in a province already exhauſted, and partly ill-affected, he was obliged to make war upon the inhabitants for proviſions, and to beſiege them in their ſtrong-holds; and, receiving, on theſe occaſions, many checks, he was brought into ſuch contempt, that the people of the country ventured to attack Hirt. de Bell. Alex.

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attack him upon his march to *Salona*, and killed two thouſand of his ſoldiers, thirty-eight Centurions, and four Tribunes. He eſcaped with the remainder to *Salona*, and died there of a diſorder, which the toil of a winter campaign and grief had occaſioned. *Octavius* entered immediately into an alliance with the Barbarians, and would ſoon have reduced the whole country, if *Vatinius* had not flown to its aſſiſtance with the ſame ſpirit he had fought *Cæſar*'s battles in *Rome* at the head of the mob. Neither the ſickneſs he then laboured under, nor the hardſhips of the ſeaſon, ſtopped him. He ſent to *Calenus* for a ſquadron of gallies, but, theſe not coming with that diſpatch the affairs of *Illyricum* required, he faſtened beaks to all the veſſels he found in the port of *Brunduſium*, and, putting on board the veterans whom *Cæſar* had left ſick in thoſe parts, and who had ſince recovered, he ſailed with this ſtout fleet in queſt of *Octavius*. He found him before *Epidaurus*, which he was beſieging both by ſea and land. *Octavius* immediately raiſed the ſiege and retired to *Tauris*, whither *Vatinius*, having joined to his army the garriſon of the place, followed him. The *Pompeian* Admiral, informed of the condition of the enemy's fleet, reſolved to give battle, and, upon their approach, ſailed out of the harbour. *Vatinius*, though part of his ſhips had been diſperſed by a tempeſt, and the enemy was ſuperior both in number and ſtrength of veſſels, gave the ſignal for battle, and

and began it himſelf by driving his quinquereme upon *Octavius*'s four-benched galley, which it ſhocked with ſuch violence, that it loſt its beak. The battle raged with great fury among the reſt of the ſhips, but chiefly round the two Admirals. As the ſhips on each ſide advanced to ſuſtain thoſe that had engaged, a cloſe conflict enſued in a very narrow ſea. Nothing could have happened more favourably for *Vatinius*; for his veterans leaped into the enemy's veſſels, and, forcing them to an equal combat, ſoon maſtered them by their ſuperior valour. *Octavius*'s galley was ſunk; and many others had the ſame fate, or were taken. *Octavius* himſelf got into a boat, which ſinking under the multitude that crouded after him, he ſwam to a neighbouring ſhip; where, being taken up, and night coming on, he ſpread all his ſails and fled towards *Greece*. He thence continued his route for *Africa*, followed by a few that eſcaped out of the battle. *Vatinius* entered the town, whence *Octavius* had ſailed to fight him, without the loſs of one veſſel, and, having refitted both his own ſhips and thoſe taken from the enemy, he ſailed to the iſland of *Iſſa*; whither, he was informed, *Octavius* had retired. Here he was certified of *Octavius*'s motions, and thus, having reſtored peace to *Illyricum*, he returned triumphant with his army and fleet to *Brunduſium*.

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Cæſar, after his victory over *Pharnaces*, was at liberty to return to *Rome*: And, the day after he had obtained it, he ſet out with a guard of light

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light horſe, having ſent home *Dejotarus*'s troops, and ordered the ſixth legion to follow him into *Italy*, there to receive the recompence due to their ſervices. He took his way through *Gallo-græcia* and *Bithynia* into *Aſia*, giving judgments, as he paſſed, in all controverſies of moment, and ſettling the limits and juriſdictions of the ſeveral Kings, Tetrarchs, and States. *Mithridates* of *Pergamus* was appointed to ſucceed *Pharnaces* in the kingdom of the *Boſphorus*, and the tetrarchate of *Gallo-græcia* was added to it, claimed now by *Mithridates*, in right of inheritance, though it had been poſſeſſed for ſome years by *Dejotarus*. *Cicero* tells us, that *Cæſar* had a particular hatred to this Prince, that he alſo exacted large ſums of money from him, and deprived him of *Armenia*, beſtowing it on *Ariobarzanes*. Nor is it difficult to account for his ſeverity to *Dejotarus*. This Prince had been remarkable for his zeal for *Pompey*, and by this means had obtained ſeveral unjuſt grants from the Senate. *Cæſar* ſtaid no where longer than the neceſſity of his affairs required, and, making the greateſt diſpatch, arrived in *Italy* in the month of *September*, much ſooner than was expected.

Cicero, who had been, in a manner, a priſoner at *Brunduſium*, ever ſince the battle of *Pharſalia*, and lived there in perpetual uneaſineſs [a], upon the firſt notice of his landing at *Tarren-*

Middl. p. 827.

[a] "*Cicero* no ſooner returned to *Italy*, than he began to "reflect, that he had been too haſty in coming home before "the

rentum, ſet out on foot to meet him. *Cæſar* no ſooner ſaw him, than he alighted, ran to embrace Y. R. 706. Bef. Chr. 46. 405 Conf.

" the war was determined, and without any invitation from " the conqueror; and, in a time of that general licenſe, had " reaſon to apprehend ſome inſult from the ſoldiers, if he " ventured to appear in public with his *faſces* and *laurel*; " and yet to drop them would be a diminution of that " honour which he had received from the *Roman* people, " and the acknowledgment of a power ſuperior to the " laws: *He condemned himſelf, therefore, for not continuing* " *abroad, in ſome convenient place of retirement, till he had been* " *ſent for*, or things were better ſettled. (*Ad Att.* xi. 6. *and* " 9.) What gave him the greater reaſon to repent of this " ſtep, was *a meſſage that he received from Antony*, who go- " verned all in *Cæſar*'s abſence, and with the ſame chur- " liſh ſpirit, with which he would have held him before in *Italy* " againſt his will, ſeemed now diſpoſed *to drive him out of* " *it*; for he ſent him *the copy of a letter from Cæſar*, in " which *Cæſar* ſignified, *that he had heard that Cato and* " *Metellus were at Rome, and appeared openly there, which* " *might occaſion ſome diſturbance*; *wherefore he ſtrictly injoined,* " *that none ſhould be ſuffered to come to Italy without a ſpecial* " *licenſe from himſelf.* *Antony*, therefore, deſired *Cicero* to ex- " cuſe him, ſince he could not help obeying *Cæſar*'s com- " mands: But *Cicero* ſent *L. Lamia* to aſſure him, that *Cæſar* " had ordered *Dolabella* to write to him to come to *Italy* as " ſoon as he pleaſed; and that he came upon the authority " of *Dolabella*'s letter. So that *Antony*, in the edict which " he publiſhed *to exclude the Pompeians from Italy, excepted* " *Cicero by name*: Which added ſtill to his mortification; " ſince all his deſire was to be connived at only, or tacitly " permitted, without being perſonally diſtinguiſhed from " the reſt of his party." (*Ad Att.* xi. 7.)

" He had ſeveral other grievances of a domeſtic kind, " which concurred alſo to make him unhappy: His bro- " ther *Quintus*, with his ſon, after their eſcape from *Phar-* " *ſalia*, followed *Cæſar* into *Aſia*, to obtain their pardon

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brace him, and walked with him alone, converſing very familiarly for ſeveral furlongs.

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" from him in perſon: And *Quintus*, in order to make his " own peace the more eaſily, reſolved to throw all the blame " upon his brother; and, for that purpoſe, made it the " ſubject of all his letters and ſpeeches to *Cæſar*'s friends, to " rail at him in a manner the moſt inhuman. *Cicero* was in- " formed of this from all quarters, and that young *Quintus*, " who was ſent before towards *Cæſar*, had read an oration " to his friends, which he had prepared to ſpeak to him " againſt his uncle." (*Ad Att.* xi. 8, 9, 10.) *Middl. p.* 128.

Middl. p. 137.

" But what gave him the greateſt uneaſineſs was to be " held ſtill in ſuſpence, in what touched him the moſt " nearly, the caſe of his own ſafety, and of *Cæſar*'s diſpoſition " towards him; for, though all *Cæſar*'s friends aſſured him " *not only of pardon, but of all kind of favour*; yet he had " received no intimation of kindneſs from *Cæſar* himſelf.

Ibid. p. 142.

" To eaſe his mind in this reſpect, ſome of his friends at " *Rome* contrived to ſend him a letter in *Cæſar*'s name, " dated *the 9th of February*, from *Alexandria*, encouraging " him *to lay aſide all gloomy apprehenſions, and expect every* " *thing that was kind and friendly from him*: But it gave " him little ſatisfaction, as he ſuſpected what he afterwards " found to be true, that it was forged by *Balbus* and *Op-* " *pius*, on purpoſe to raiſe his ſpirits, and adminiſter ſome " little comfort to him. All his accounts, however, con- " firmed to him the report of *Cæſar*'s clemency and mode- " ration, and his granting pardon without exception to all " who aſked it; and, with regard to himſelf, *Cæſar ſent* " *Quintus's virulent letters to Balbus, with orders to ſhew* " *them to him*, as a proof of his kindneſs, and diſlike of *Quin-* " *tus*'s perfidy. But *Cicero*'s preſent deſpondency, which in- " terpreted every thing by his fears, *made him ſuſpect Cæſar* " *the more, for refuſing grace to none*; as if ſuch a clemency " muſt needs be affected, *and his revenge deferred only to a ſea-* " *ſon more convenient*; and, as to his brother's letters, he fan- " cied that *Cæſar* did not ſend them to *Italy*, becauſe he con-

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On his arrival at *Rome*, he found the city in the greateſt ferment. He had been created Dictator, after the battle of *Pharſalia*, for the following year; and *Antony*, as his Maſter of Horſe, had governed in his abſence. *Dolabella* had got into the tribunate, which he was no ſooner in- Y. R. 706. Bef. Chr. 46. 405 Conſ. Dio, l. xlii.

" demned them, but to make his preſent miſery and abject " condition the more notorious and deſpicable to every " body." (*Ad Att.* xi. 16, 17, 20, 22.)

" He had fears alſo from another quarter: *Cæſar*'s " enemies had greatly ſtrengthened themſelves in *Africa*, and " it was reported, that they would bring into *Italy* a pow- " erful army before *Cæſar* could return from *Alexandria*. " *Cicero*, in this caſe, was ſure to be treated as a deſerter; " for while *Cæſar* looked upon all men as friends, who did " not act againſt him, and pardoned even enemies, who ſub- " mitted to his power; it was a declared law, on the other " ſide, to conſider all as enemies who were not actually in " their camp: So that *Cicero* had nothing now to wiſh, either " for himſelf, or the Republic, but, in the firſt place, a " peace, of which he had ſtill ſome hopes; or elſe that *Cæ-* " *ſar* might conquer; whoſe victory was like to prove the " more temperate of the two." (*Ad Att.* xi. 6. 12. 19.) Middl. p. 140.

" After a long ſeries of perpetual mortifications, he was " refreſhed at laſt by a very obliging letter from *Cæſar*, who " confirmed to him *the full enjoyment of his ſtate and dignity,* " *and bad him reſume his faſces and ſtyle of Emperor as before.* " *Cæſar*'s mind, adds *Dr. Middleton*, was too great to liſten " to the tales of the brother and nephew," [which, however, contained a great deal of truth] " and, inſtead of approv- " ing their treachery, ſeems to have granted them their " pardon on *Cicero*'s account, rather than their own: So " that *Quintus*, upon the trial of *Cæſar*'s inclination, be- " gan preſently to change his note, and to congratulate with " his brother on *Cæſar*'s affection and eſteem for him." (*Ep. Fam.* xiv. 23. *Pro Ligar.* iii. *Ad Att.* xi. 23.) *Middl.* *p.* 142.

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veſted with, than he revived the laws propoſed the year before by *Cælius*, for an abolition of debts, and to exempt tenants from paying, in the preſent confuſion, any rent to their landlords. We are told, that at firſt he was favoured by *Antony*, who found this project very ſuitable to his own circumſtances; but, having diſcovered an intrigue between his wife *Antonia* and the young Tribune, he put her away, and from that moment ſided with the Senate and two of the Tribunes in oppoſing *Dolabella*. The multitude favoured the ſcheme; the Tribune was obſtinate in the purſuit of it; and, in the abſence of *Antony*, who was obliged to make a tour to appeaſe the mutiny of the veteran legions, the diſorder became extreme. The creditors on one ſide, and the debtors on the other, formed two camps in the city, and alternately attacked each other with fire and ſword. We are told that the *Veſtals*, not thinking themſelves ſafe in their temple, removed from thence with the ſacred relics. *Antony* upon his return was charged by the Senate *to take care the Republic received no detriment*. *Dolabella* grew deſperate; and, having fixed a day for the paſſing of his laws, he barricaded the avenues to the Forum, erected wooden turrets to prevent the approach of any perſon againſt his will, and made ſuch diſpoſitions as are uſual, where a ſiege is to be maintained. *Antony*, on his ſide, brought a number of troops to the Capitol, forced the barriers, broke to pieces the tables on which

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the laws were inſcribed, and, having taken ſome of the ringleaders of this ſedition, he threw them down the *Tarpeian* rock. Notwithſtanding this exertion of Dictatorial and deſpotic power, the troubles continued till *Cæſar*'s arrival. He did not think fit to take notice of any thing done in his abſence by his friends; but, being deſirous to gain the affection of the ſeveral parties, regulated affairs as much as poſſible to every one's ſatisfaction. He refuſed to liſten to the clamours of the people, who demanded the abolition propoſed by their Tribune, telling them, that he was as much incumbered with debts as any one, yet had no deſign of defrauding his creditors. However, beſides the mitigation already granted by him, he farther indulged the debtors *by a diſcharge of all arrears ſince the commencement of the civil war:* And, with regard to the *tenants*, he eaſed the poor citizens by an order, importing, that all, not renting above two thouſand ſeſterces annually in *Rome*, ſhould be exempted from payment of a year's rent, and of a quarter's only in the other parts of *Italy*.

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Suet. in Cæſ. 42.

Dio, l. xlii.

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Q. Fufius Calenus, P. Vatinius, } Conſuls for the three laſt Months of the Year.

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Having thus ſettled the affairs of the city, and made *Vatinius* and *Fufius Calenus* Conſuls for the remaining months of the year, he cauſed himſelf to be created Conſul, and continued in the Dictatorſhip for the year following; taking, for his collegue in the Conſulſhip, and his Maſter of the Horſe, *M. Lepidus*; and he applied himſelf to raiſe

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raiſe the money neceſſary for the expedition to *Africa*, where the progreſs of the *Pompeians* called for his preſence. *Dio* tells us, that, as it had been cuſtomary to preſent crowns of gold and erect ſtatues to victorious Generals, *Cæſar* received under this pretence great ſums from the corporations in *Italy*, and at the ſame time borrowed of them ſtill greater. But the ſale of the eſtates of the contrary faction was probably his chief reſource. *Pompey*'s eſtate, houſes and goods, were ſold at this time, and purchaſed by *Antony*: And it was undoubtedly one way of recompenſing a great number of his followers to make over to them the effects of the vanquiſhed at an under rate. *P. Sylla*, as well as *Antony*, was one of the moſt forward and eager purchaſers.

Dio, l. xlii.

When every thing for his expedition to *Africa* was ready, a violent ſedition broke out among his old legions. They had been very mutinous ever ſince their return to *Italy*, being diſappointed in not receiving immediately the rewards that had been promiſed them, and which they had ſo highly merited; and, when they perceived that *Cæſar* meant to employ them again in a dangerous war, they grew furious. Before *Cæſar*'s return, the twelfth legion had treated their officers with contempt, and pelted with ſtones ſuch of them as had dared to remind them of their duty: And now the tenth, ſo favoured by their General, and ſo much attached hitherto to his perſon, gave the ſignal of revolt, and was followed by the others in *Campania*. *Cæſar* ſent

Suet. in Cæſ. Appian. Dio, l. xlii.

to

to them *Salluſt*, whom he had lately appointed Prætor, and to whom he deſtined the government of *Africa*, with inſtructions to let them know, that, as ſoon as he had put an end to the *African* war, beſides the diſtributions of land and money already due to them, he would add a thouſand denarii to each man as a recompenſe for this laſt campaign. Theſe offers, ſo wide of the ſoldiers expectations, greatly exaſperated them. *Salluſt* was obliged to ſave himſelf by flight; and, in the extremity of their reſentment, they marched to *Rome*, plundering all in their way, and killed ſeveral people of diſtinction. *Cæſar*, under apprehenſions for the city, ordered the gates to be ſhut, and ſent to its defence what troops he had about him: But when he heard of their arrival, and that they had ſat down in the *Campus Martius*, the entreaties of his friends, concerned for his ſafety, could not prevail with him to defer a moment going in perſon to ſpeak with them. He boldly mounted his tribunal, and, with a menacing tone of voice, aſked the ſoldiers, What had brought them thither, and what they wanted? This intrepid and imperious behaviour began to diſconcert them: They were aſhamed to reproach him with having delayed their promiſed rewards, but repreſented that, being worn out by fatigue, and weakened by the wounds they had received in his ſervice, they were in hopes that he would have given them their diſcharge. *I give it you*, replied *Cæſar*; and, after a ſhort ſilence, added, *and, when I ſhall have triumphed with other troops,*

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I nevertheleſs will fulfil my engagements with you. They were thunderſtruck with theſe words; and the Dictator was about to retire, when he was ſtopped by the officers attending him; who conjured him to treat the companions of his victories with leſs coldneſs and ſeverity. He conſented to ſpeak to them once more, and began by addreſſing them with the word *Quirites*, citizens. This expreſſion inſtead of that of *Commilitones*, or *Comrades*, which he commonly uſed, quite overcame them, and brought them back effectually to their duty. They interrupted him, and inſiſted that they were ſtill his ſoldiers, and begged he would conſider them as ſuch, offering to follow him into *Africa*, and every-where elſe[a]. He pardoned them, but ſoon after took the firſt occaſion to puniſh the licentious behaviour and the rapines of ſome of the officers. *C. Avienus*, a military Tribune of the tenth legion, when he ſet out from *Sicily*,

[a] This event has been embelliſhed with many circumſtances which cannot be true. We are told, that the ſoldiers deſired to be *decimated*, and that *Cæſar* refuſed them that honour, telling them, that he would treat them according to their deſerts, and break them: That he continued inflexible towards the tenth legion; who, not being able to obtain their pardon, followed him of their own accord and without orders into *Africa*; where *Cæſar* made indeed uſe of them, but employed them always in hazardous enterpriſes in order to get rid of them: And that after the war, when returned to *Italy*, he deprived the few that remained of one third of their reward in puniſhment of their mutiny. *Dio*, l. xlii. But we ſee that in the battle of *Thapſus*, and afterwards at *Munda*, they had the place of honour as uſual, in the firſt line of the right wing. *Suet. in Cæſ.* 70.

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having filled a ſhip entirely with his own equipage and ſervants, *Cæſar* ſummoned all the military Tribunes and Centurions to appear before his tribunal the next day, and addreſſed them in theſe words: "I could have wiſhed that thoſe, "whoſe inſolence and licentious carriage have "given me cauſe of complaint, had been capa- "ble of amendment, and of making a good uſe "of my clemency. But, ſince they know not "how to keep within bounds, I ſhall make an "example of them according to the law of "arms, that others may be taught a better con- "duct. You, *C. Avienus*, when you was in "*Italy*, inſtigated the *Roman* ſoldiers to mutiny "againſt the Republic; you have been guilty "of rapine in the municipal towns; and you "have never been of any real ſervice, either to "the Commonwealth, or to your General: "Laſtly, in place of ſoldiers, you have crouded "the tranſports with your ſlaves and baggage: "So that, through your fault, the Republic fails "in troops, which at this time are not only "uſeful, but neceſſary. For all theſe reaſons I "break you with ignominy, and order you to "leave *Africa* this very day. In like manner, "I break you, *A. Fonteius*, becauſe you have be- "haved yourſelf as a ſeditious officer, and as "a bad citizen. You, *T. Salienus*, *M. Tiro*, *C.* "*Cluſinas*, have attained the rank of Centurions, "through my indulgence, and not through your "own merit; and, ſince you have been raiſed "to that rank, have neither ſhewn bravery in "war, nor good conduct in peace. Inſtead of

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"behaving according to the rules of modeſty, "your whole ſtudy has been to ſtir up the ſol- "diers againſt your General. I therefore think "you unworthy of continuing Centurions in my "army: I break you, and order you to quit "*Africa* as ſoon as poſſible." Having concluded this ſpeech, he delivered them over to ſome Centurions, with orders to confine them ſeparately on board a ſhip, allowing each of them but one ſingle ſlave: And this ſeems to have been the only puniſhment he inflicted on thoſe ſeditious troops.

CHAP. VIII.

The War of Cæſar *in* Africa *againſt* Scipio, Cato, *and* Juba.

CÆSAR ſet out from *Rome* towards the beginning of *December*; and, paſſing the ſtreights at *Rhegium*, arrived on the 17*th* at *Lilybæum*, the fartheſt point of *Sicily*. It was his deſign to embark immediately, though he had but one legion of new levies, and not quite ſix hundred horſe; and he ordered his tent to be pitched ſo near the ſea-ſide, that the waves flowed quite up to it. This he did to take away all hopes of delay, and keep his men in readineſs at an hour's warning: And, the wind proving contrary, he nevertheleſs ſuffered none of the ſoldiers or mariners to come on ſhore, that he might loſe no opportunity of ſailing. His view was to land and intrench himſelf

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ſelf on the coaſt of *Africa* before his enemies were appriſed of his approach, or could aſſemble their army [b]: And he meant alſo to ſhew an utter contempt of their forces, which were greatly exaggerated both in *Italy* and *Sicily*. While the wind remained contrary, his gallies and tranſports increaſed daily; and, before the 25*th*, he had got together ſix legions, and two thouſand horſe, with the greateſt part of which he ſet ſail, giving ſtrict orders to *Allienus* the Prætor, whom he left to command in *Sicily*, to embark with the utmoſt expedition the remainder of his troops. The wind being favourable, he himſelf, with a few gallies, arrived the fourth day within ſight of *Africa:* But moſt of his tranſports had not kept up with him, nor had he appointed them any place of rendezvous, knowing of no part that was clear of the enemy's forces, and reſolving to land where occaſion offered. He coaſted ſome time along the ſhore, running ſouthward, and leaving *Clypea* and *Neapolis* behind him; and when he came before *Adrumetum*, where the enemy had a garriſon commanded by *C. Conſidius*, *Cn. Piſo* appeared upon the ſhore with the cavalry and about two thouſand

[b] We are told, that this reaſon prevailed with him more than the will of the Gods, declared by the Auſpices: *Cum immolanti aufugiſſet hoſtia, profectionem adverſus Scipionem et Jubam non diſtulit.* *Suet. in Cæſ. c.* 59. *Quid? Ipſe Cæſar cum a ſummo haruſpice moneretur, ne in Africam ante Brumam tranſmitteret, nonne tranſmiſit? Quod ni feciſſet, uno in loco omnes adverſariorum copiæ conveniſſent.* Cic. de Divinat. l. ii. c. 24.

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Moors. Here, notwithſtanding this ſhew of oppoſition, he landed the troops he had with him, which did not exceed three thouſand foot and a hundred and fifty horſe, and encamped before the town, keeping his ſoldiers within their intrenchments, and not ſuffering them to commit any hoſtilities. *L. Plancus*, one of his Lieutenants, diſpatched a meſſenger into the town with a letter, exhorting *Conſidius* to ſurrender: But *Conſidius* ordered him to be ſlain in his preſence, and ſent the letter unopened to *Scipio*, ſaying, he knew no other General of the *Romans*. *Cæſar*, finding himſelf unable to ſtorm the town, after ſtaying before it one night and a day, broke up his camp. As he was drawing off his troops, the garriſon which conſiſted of two legions made a ſally, and, a body of *Juba*'s horſe, whom he had ſent to receive their pay, happening juſt then to come up, they jointly took poſſeſſion of the abandoned camp, and began to harraſs his rear. The legionaries immediately halted, and the cavalry, though few in number, boldly charged the great multitude of the enemy: Thirty *Gallic* horſe are ſaid on this occaſion to have repulſed two thouſand Moors, and driven them quite within the town. *Cæſar* reached *Ruſpina* the ſame day, which was the *1ſt* of *January* [c].

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C. Julius Cæsar, Dictator III.
M. Æmilius Lepidus, Mag. Eq.

[c] According to *Uſher*, the *13th* of *October*; but, more probably, the *5th* of *November* of the *Julian* year.

From

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From *Ruſpina*, *Cæſar* marched towards *Leptis*, a free town, and governed by its own laws. The inhabitants of this place had formerly aſſiſted his enemies, but now they thought proper to ſend Deputies to him, to make offer of their ſubmiſſion and ſervices; and, having placed a guard at its gates, to prevent the ſoldiers from entering it and committing diſorders, he encamped with his army at a ſmall diſtance. Here he was joined by a part of his fleet, by whom he was informed that the reſt, uncertain what courſe to take, had ſteered towards *Utica*. *Cæſar* inſtantly diſpatched ten gallies after them, and the next day, having left ſix cohorts at *Leptis*, he returned with the reſt of his army to *Ruſpina*; where he went on board with ſome of his beſt troops in the evening to the great aſtoniſhment and diſmay of his army. They ſaw themſelves but few in number, moſtly new levies, expoſed upon a foreign coaſt to the mighty forces of a crafty nation, which had an innumerable cavalry; nor had they the leaſt expectation of ſafety from their own conduct, but derived all their hopes from the alacrity and chearfulneſs which appeared in the countenance of their General: For, at no time, had he ſhewed a greater confidence. They ſoon, however, underſtood with what view he intended to put to ſea, when, the next day, they ſaw him return with the reſt of the troops, which his fleet had luckily brought him before he ſet ſail. He was greatly apprehenſive leſt they ſhould fall in with the enemy's

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enemy's fleet, and had reſolved to go out to aſſiſt and direct them.

Hirt. de Bell. Afr.

This junction of his forces was very neceſſary; for *Labienus* was in full march towards him with a conſiderable army of horſe and foot. *Cæſar*, after forming his camp, having advanced only three miles into the country with thirty cohorts to forage, was informed by his ſcouts, and ſome advanced parties of horſe, that the enemy was in view. Upon this intelligence, he ordered his horſe, and a ſmall number of archers which attended them, to advance, and his cohorts to follow and prepare for battle. *Labienus* drew up with a very extended front, conſiſting moſtly of horſe, with whom he intermixed light-armed *Numidians* and archers, and formed them in ſuch cloſe order, that *Cæſar*'s army at a diſtance miſtook them all for infantry; his right and left were ſtrengthened with a numerous cavalry. *Cæſar* was forced to draw up his army alſo in one line, on account of the ſmallneſs of its number; ranging his bowmen in front, and his cavalry in the wings; and he gave them particular inſtructions not to ſuffer themſelves to be ſurrounded. Both armies ſtood ſome time expecting the ſignal: At length, the enemy began to extend themſelves, and to ſpread out upon the hills with a view to ſurround *Cæſar*'s cavalry. The main bodies advancing then to engage, the enemy's horſe, intermixed with the light-armed *Numidians*, ſuddenly ſprung forward from among the legionaries, and threw their darts. Upon this, they retreated with all ſpeed, leaving the legionaries

gionaries to ſuſtain the attack of *Cæſar*'s troops, and ſoon after returned to the charge with freſh vigour. *Cæſar*, perceiving that his ranks were in danger of being broken by this new way of fighting, which enticed his men to purſue the horſe, gave expreſs orders that no ſoldier ſhould advance above four feet beyond the enſigns. But he ſoon found himſelf ſurrounded on all ſides, his cavalry being altogether unable to reſiſt thoſe of the enemy; and, in this perplexity, he formed his whole army into an orb. *Labienus*, to encourage his men, advanced on horſeback to the front of the battle, and, addreſſing *Cæſar*'s legions, upbraided them with their inexperience in war, and their infatuation in following him to their certain deſtruction. One of the ſoldiers anſwered, *that he was no new ſoldier, but a veteran of the tenth legion. Where then is your ſtandard?* ſaid *Labienus*. *You ſhall know me preſently*, anſwered the ſoldier: Then, pulling off his helmet to diſcover himſelf, he launched his dart with all his ſtrength againſt *Labienus*. The dart wounded his horſe in the breaſt, and the veteran called out, *Learn, Labienus, to reſpect a warrior of the tenth legion.* However, the whole army, particularly the new levies, began to be terrified; and, caſting their eyes on *Cæſar*, expected their deliverance from his experience. *Cæſar*, to diſengage himſelf, directed the cohorts of the right and left wings to extend themſelves as much as poſſible, and puſh forward alternately; by which means he broke the enemy's circle at both his wings; and, attacking one part of it now ſeparated

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ted from the other, with almoſt all his forces, eaſily put it to flight; and, with the ſame ſucceſs, having repulſed the other part, he immediately gave orders for the retreat. But *M. Petreius* and *Cn Piſo*, brought up in this moment eleven hundred ſelect *Numidian* horſe, and a conſiderable body of foot; and, this ſuccour recovering the enemy from their terror, they fell again on the rear of the legions. *Cæſar* was forced to order his men to wheel about, and renew the battle; but, perceiving that the enemy ſtill purſued their former plan, and avoided a cloſe engagement, and, conſidering that his horſes, fatigued with their late voyage at ſea and the buſineſs of the day, were unfit for a vigorous and long purſuit, which the approach of night rendered alſo impoſſible, he ordered both horſe and foot to fall at once briſkly upon the enemy, and follow them beyond the next hill, and not to ſtop till they had taken poſſeſſion of it. This ſcheme was immediately executed; and *Cæſar*, having kept that poſt for ſome time, retired ſlowly in order of battle to his camp. The enemy thought proper to do the ſame, having been rudely handled in this laſt attack, in which *Petreius* was alſo dangerouſly wounded, and obliged to quit the field. The battle laſted from eleven till ſun-ſet. *Cæſar* made a great many priſoners, and many deſerters flocked to him after the action, by whom he was informed that *Labienus* brought againſt him ſixteen hundred *Gallic* and *German* horſe, who had ſerved under *Pompey*, with eleven hundred *Numidian* troopers

troopers commanded by *Petreius*, eight thouſand *Numidian* foot, and four times that number of light-armed ſoldiers, with a multitude of archers and ſlingers; and that he had deſigned to have aſtoniſhed *Cæſar*'s raw levies, and few legionaries, with the new and uncommon manner of fighting of his troops; and, after ſurrounding them with his cavalry, to have cut them to pieces, as *Saburra* did *Curio*'s army. He had ſaid in Council, that he would lead ſuch a numerous body of men againſt *Cæſar*'s legions, as ſhould fatigue them with the very ſlaughter, and defeat them even in the very boſom of victory. This is *Hirtius*'s account. The *Greek* hiſtorians tell us, that *Cæſar* had the worſt of it in this day's battle; and it appears from a paſſage in *Valerius Maximus*, that *Labienus* and *Scipio* rewarded their ſoldiers for their bravery; and they alſo probably gave out, that the victory was on their ſide, ſince *Cæſar* retreated to his camp [d].

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Plut. App. Dio.

Val. Max. vii, 14.

Cæſar was alſo informed, that within three days *Scipio* was expected with his forces, which

[d] *Appian*'s account is as follows: *Cæſar*, upon his landing in *Africa*, being informed that *Scipio* was gone to meet King *Juba*, took the opportunity of his abſence, and drew up his army before the enemy's camp. *Labienus*, and *Petreius*, *Scipio*'s Lieutenants, accepted his defiance, and vigorouſly beat back *Cæſar*'s men, driving them before them with contempt, till, *Labienus*'s horſe, wounded in the belly, having thrown him, he was obliged to quit the fight. *Petreius*, who took the command, contenting himſelf with having tried the courage of his ſoldiers, cauſed the retreat to be ſounded, ſaying to thoſe about him, *We muſt not deprive* Scipio, *our General, of the honour of beating* Cæſar.

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conſiſted of eight legions and three thouſand horſe. He therefore fortified his camp and the forts about it with the greateſt care, and threw up two intrenchments; one from *Ruſpina* quite to the ſea, and the other from his camp to the ſea likewiſe, in order to ſecure the communication, and receive his ſupplies without danger. He took out of his fleet a great number of the mariners, *Gauls*, *Rhodians*, and others, of whom he formed companies of light-armed troops to fight, after the example of the enemy, among the cavalry. Having thus ſtrengthened his army, he ſtationed his fleet along the coaſts and iſlands for the ſecurity of his convoys, wrote to *Sicily* and *Sardinia* to preſs for ſupplies of all kinds, and ſent *Salluſt* to ſeize *Cercinna*, an iſland upon the coaſt, where *Scipio* had a magazine of proviſions. But, notwithſtanding what was brought from thence, he found himſelf ſoon in very great ſcarcity, and particularly of forage. He was not maſter of ſix miles in *Africa*, and was obliged to keep within his intrenchments: It was the winter ſeaſon, and navigation was very dangerous; and his ſhips of burden were often taken by the enemy's fleets: The veteran ſoldiers, however, and cavalry, who had been accuſtomed to hardſhips of every kind, were nowiſe diſmayed; and with ſea-weed, waſhed in freſh water, they ſubſiſted the horſes and cattle of the army.

Cn. Pompey ſet out about this time upon a particular expedition. *Cato*, who commanded in *Utica*, never ceaſed exhorting and urging the

youth in words to this effect: "Your father, Y. R. 707. Bef. Chr. 45. 406 Conſ.
"when he was arrived at your age, and ſaw
"the Commonwealth oppreſſed by wicked and
"daring men; and the honeſt party either
"ſlain, or driven by baniſhment from their
"country and relations; inſtigated by mag-
"nanimity and the love of glory, though then
"only a private man, had yet the courage to
"rally the remains of his father's army, and to
"deliver *Italy* and *Rome* from the yoke of ſla-
"very and tyranny under which they groaned.
"He recovered, with amazing diſpatch, *Sicily*,
"*Africa*, *Numidia*, *Mauritania*, and by that
"means gained an illuſtrious and extenſive re-
"putation among all nations, and triumphed
"at three-and-twenty, while but a *Roman*
"Knight. Nor did he enter into the world
"with thoſe advantages which you enjoy; the
"exploits and dignity of his father reflected
"on him no conſiderable luſtre. Do you, dig-
"nified by your deſcent, beſtir yourſelf and
"call together your friends, and vindicate
"your own liberty, that of the Common-
"wealth, and of every good and honeſt man."
Rouſed by the remonſtrances of a man of ſuch gravity, young *Pompey* collected about thirty ſail of ſhips, of which a few were gallies, and, ſailing from *Utica* to *Mauritania*, invaded the kingdom of *Bogud*, who was in alliance with *Cæſar*; but he had little ſucceſs in this attempt. With an army of two thouſand men, compoſed of freedmen and ſlaves, of whom ſome were armed and ſome not, he approached the

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the city of *Aſcurum*, in which the King had a garriſon. The inhabitants ſuffered him to advance to the very walls and gates, and then, ſallying out of a ſudden, they drove him quite back to his ſhips. This defeat determined him to leave that coaſt, and he ſteered directly to the *Balearian* iſlands, and *Spain*, whither he was invited by a party which had declared for him; and there he raiſed a force ſufficient to appear againſt *Cæſar* the following year, and to diſpute with him the *Roman* empire.

Scipio, having left a ſtrong garriſon in *Utica*, under the command of *Cato*, had marched to *Adrumetum*, and, a few days after, joined *Petreius* and *Labienus*, whoſe camp was but three miles diſtant from *Cæſar*'s. *Juba* alſo was advancing at the head of a great body of horſe and foot, when news was brought him that *P. Sitius* * and King *Bogud* had united their forces, entered *Numidia*, and taken *Cirta*, the moſt opulent city of the country, by ſtorm, with two other towns of the *Getulians*, and put all the inhabitants to the ſword. He therefore marched immediately back to hinder the further devaſtation of his territories, leaving only

* *P. Sitius* was a *Roman* Knight, who, having made himſelf obnoxious to the laws, had been obliged to leave *Italy*, and retired into *Africa*. There he got about him a great number of *Italians* and *Spaniards*, of whom he formed a ſmall army, and, in the wars between the petty Princes in *Africa*, he let himſelf out to the beſt bidder: And, it being remarked, that the ſide he eſpouſed always came off victorious, he gained great reputation, and was much courted. He was in alliance with *Bogud*, who favoured *Cæſar*.

thirty

thirty elephants behind him; but, as ſoon as he had put his kingdom in a better poſture of defence, ordering *Saburra* to make head againſt *Sitius*, he returned gain to *Scipio* with three legions, eight hundred horſe, a body of *Numidian* cavalry, thirty elephants more, and a great number of light-armed infantry. Both armies for four months were continually obſerving each other's motions; during which time there happened frequent engagements between detachments from the two camps, in which *Cæſar* had commonly the advantage. *Scipio*, on his arrival, had appeared very deſirous of coming to a general battle, and brought out his troops every day; but *Cæſar* had not collected all his forces, and he was ſenſible from the laſt encounter, in which he had ſo much difficulty to bring off his men, that, having to do with an army ſo ſuperior in number, and commanded by experienced officers, it was neceſſary to uſe the greateſt caution. He therefore kept within his intrenchments, and applied himſelf to gain over to his intereſt the people of the country, and to encourage deſertion in the enemy's camp. He ſucceeded in his intentions; and the *Africans*, in particular, came to him in crouds when they underſtood that he was related to *C. Marius*, for whoſe name they had the greateſt reſpect. The *Pompeians*, at the ſame time, were diligent in diſciplining their elephants; and *Cato* was daily inliſting freedmen, *Africans*, ſlaves, and all that were of age to bear arms, and ſending them to *Scipio*'s camp.

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Y. R. 707. Bef. Chr. 45. 706 Conſ.

When *Cæſar*, however, ſaw all his forces drawn together, and had taught them how to fight with elephants, and with troops who never ſtood their ground, but, after a fierce attack, retreated to return again, he was as deſirous to give battle, as he had been formerly averſe to it. But *Scipio*, in his turn, had changed his ſcheme, and reſolved very prudently to protract the war. On the *fourteenth* of *April*, *Cæſar*, to force him to an engagement, decamping at midnight, marched to *Thapſus*, a ſea-port town of the utmoſt importance to the enemy, and where *Vergilius* commanded with a ſtrong garriſon. The very firſt day after his arrival he began the circumvallation, and ſoon raiſed all the forts neceſſary both for his own ſecurity, and to prevent any ſuccours from entering the town. *Scipio* and *Juba*, to avoid the diſgrace of abandoning *Vergilius* and the *Thapſitani*, who had all along remained firm to their party, followed *Cæſar* without delay, and poſted themſelves in two camps eight miles from *Thapſus*. They attempted firſt to throw troops into the place, but, finding that to be impoſſible, they reſolved to give battle[f]. For this purpoſe *Scipio* approached

[f] *Plutarch in Cat.* tells us, that *Cato* oppoſed this reſolution with the greateſt earneſtneſs, and inſiſted upon protracting the war. But that *Scipio* rejected his advice with diſdain; and, in a letter he ſent him, taxed him with cowardice, and told him that he ought to be ſatisfied with being ſafe in a good city, behind ſtrong walls; and that it was taking too much upon him to diſſuade others from following the dictates of their courage. *Cato*, nettled at the reproach, replied, that, if he would

proached with his army, and began to intrench himſelf about fifteen hundred paces from the ſea. *Cæſar* immediately, leaving two legions to guard his camp, marched all the reſt of his forces with the utmoſt expedition to the place where the enemy was poſted. At the ſame time, he ordered part of his fleet to make as near the ſhore as poſſible towards the enemy's rear, and obſerve the ſignal he ſhould give them; upon which they were to raiſe a ſudden ſhout, that the enemy, alarmed and diſturbed by the noiſe behind them, might be forced to face about. He found *Scipio*'s army in order of battle before the intrenchments, which were not yet perfected, and the elephants were ranged in the two wings. Upon this he drew up his army in three lines: He placed the ſecond and tenth legions in the right wing, the eighth and ninth in the left, and five legions in the center: He covered his flanks with five cohorts poſted oppoſite to the elephants, and diſpoſed the archers and ſlingers in the two wings, and the light-armed troops, which he intermingled with his cavalry. He himſelf, on foot, went from rank to rank to rouſe the courage of the veterans, putting them in mind of their great reputation for bravery; and to exhort the new levies to

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would give him back the troops he had brought, he was ready to march at the head of them into *Italy*, and that it was more for their intereſt ſo to do, than to riſk all in *Africa*. *Plutarch* adds, that he then ſorely repented the having given up the command to a man who was incapable of a prudent conduct in the war, or of any moderation in victory: And indeed *Hirtius* has given us ſeveral inſtances of his cruel diſpoſition.

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emulate the valour of the veterans, and attain the ſame degree of glory. As he ſpoke to his ſoldiers, he obſerved the enemy to be very uneaſy, hurrying from place to place; one while retiring behind the rampart, then coming out again in great tumult and confuſion; and his officers, making the ſame obſervation, begged that he would give the ſignal for battle. While he heſitated whether he ſhould reſtrain the eagerneſs of his troops, a trumpeter in the right wing ſounded, of a ſudden, the charge, and all the cohorts ruſhed forwards. The Centurions ſtrove in vain to keep them back, and *Cæſar*, perceiving that their ardour could not be checked, ſpurred on his horſe and charged the enemy in the center. On the right wing the archers and ſlingers poured ſuch a volley of arrows and ſtones upon the elephants, that theſe animals, which were not perfectly diſciplined, turning upon their own men, trod them down, and ruſhed into the camp through the gates, which were but half finiſhed. The *Mauritanian* horſe followed them; upon which the legions puſhed on to the intrenchments which they ſoon carried; and the greateſt part of the troops that defended them fled to the camp which they had quitted the preceding day. Thither they were followed, and, finding neither General to command them, nor any ſecurity, they made towards *Juba*'s quarters. This being likewiſe forced by the victorious troops, they retired to a hill; where, ſeeing their caſe deſperate, they endeavoured to ſoften their enemies, ſaluting them with the name of brethren:

brethren: But the veterans, tranſported with rage, were not only deaf to their cries, but even killed and wounded ſome perſons of diſtinction of their own army, whom they ſuſpected to wiſh well to the contrary party. Ten thouſand of the enemy were ſlain upon the ſpot: The reſt were diſperſed, and their three camps carried ſword in hand with the loſs of only fifty men killed, and a few wounded. Y. R. 707. Bef. Chr. 45. 406 Conſ.

The garriſon of *Thapſus*, during the battle, had ſallied out of the town with a view either to aſſiſt *Scipio*, or to make their eſcape; but had been beat back by the ſervants and followers of the camp. *Cæſar*, in his return from the battle, ſtopped before the town, and ranged the ſixty elephants he had taken, with their trappings and caſtles, in full view of the place. He was in hopes, by this evidence of his ſucceſs, to induce *Vergilius* to a ſurrendry; and he farther invited him to it by reminding him of his experienced clemency. No anſwer, however, being given, he retired from before the town; but, next day, after returning thanks to the Gods, he aſſembled his army before it, and, in the ſight of the inhabitants, praiſed his ſoldiers from his tribunal, and rewarded them according to their deſerts. Then leaving *C. Rebellius*, one of his Lieutenants, with three legions, to continue the ſiege, he ſent *Cn. Domitius*, with two, to inveſt *Tiſdra*, where *Conſidius* now commanded, and marched himſelf towards *Utica*.

Scipio's cavalry had taken the ſame road in their flight, and, arriving at *Parada*, were re-

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fuſed admittance, the inhabitants being already appriſed of *Cæſar*'s victory. They thereupon forced the gates, and, lighting a great fire in the market-place, threw all the inhabitants they could ſeize into it, without diſtinction of age or ſex, with all their effects: And thence they marched directly to *Utica*. *Cato*, who commanded there, knowing the common people to be well affected towards *Cæſar*, who had formerly procured them great privileges, had turned them out of the town, and obliged them to encamp without the walls under the protection of a ſlight intrenchment, round which he had placed guards. The cavalry attacked firſt this camp, but the people, animated with the news of *Cæſar*'s victory, and enraged at the ill uſage they had met with, repulſed them, though they had no other arms than clubs. Diſappointed in this attempt, they entered the town, and began to ſack it. *Cato*, unable to prevail with them to abſtain from rapine and undertake the defence of the place, gave each of them an hundred ſeſterces, and *Fauſtus Sylla* gave them as many more, to retire in peace: And he marched them into the territories of *Juba*. Many of the other fugitives had by this time arrived at *Utica*, and *Cato*, having aſſembled them with the three hundred *Roman* merchants ſettled in the town, and of whom he had formed a council, he exhorted them to ſet their ſlaves free, and join with him in the neceſſary meaſures for defence; but, finding them averſe to this reſolution, he furniſhed them with ſhips to make their eſcape. He himſelf, having

ſettled

ſettled all his affairs with the utmoſt care, and recommended his children to *L. Cæſar*, his Quæſtor, without the leaſt indication, which might give cauſe of ſuſpicion, or any change in his countenance and behaviour, privately carried a ſword into his chamber, when he went to ſleep, and ſtabbed himſelf with it. The wound, however, not proving mortal, and the noiſe of his fall creating a ſuſpicion, a phyſician, with ſome of his friends, broke into his chamber, and endeavoured to bind it up; which he no ſooner was ſenſible of, than, tearing it open again with his own hands, he expired with undaunted reſolution and preſence of mind. The *Uticans*, though they hated his party, yet, in conſideration of his ſingular integrity, his behaviour, ſo different from that of the other Chiefs, and the wonderful fortifications he had erected to defend their town, interred him honourably. This is the account we find of *Cato*'s conduct and death in the Memoirs concerning the *African* war, and it contains the ſubſtance of *Plutarch*'s longer narrative. As the *Greek* hiſtorian's circumſtantial relation, however, has paſſed hitherto for authentic, and is the ground-work of all the panegyric which has been written upon *Cato*, it might look like partiality, if we ſhould omit it. It is as follows:

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The news of the battle of *Thapſus*, and the utter ruin of *Scipio*'s and *Juba*'s armies, cauſed the greateſt conſternation in *Utica*. *Cato* applied himſelf firſt to quiet the minds of the people, by repreſenting to them, that the reports were great-

Plut. in Cat.

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ly exaggerated; and, as he went from ſtreet to ſtreet, his preſence appeaſed for a time their apprehenſions. His next care was to aſſemble the three hundred *Roman* merchants or bankers, with whom he uſed to conſult, and who had been very ſerviceable to his cauſe: And, after beſtowing due praiſes upon their paſt fidelity and ſervices, he exhorted them above all to a ſtrict union, as the only means by which they could ſupport themſelves, or make themſelves conſidered by the Conqueror. He then told them to conſult together what was proper to be done, and that, if they thought fit to ſubmit to fortune, he would aſcribe their reſolution to neceſſity; but that, if they reſolved to perſiſt in the defence of their liberty, he would be their Leader in ſuch a glorious cauſe. "*Rome*, he ſaid, had often emerged "out of greater difficulties: The Conqueror was "perplexed in many difficult affairs: *Spain* had "revolted to *Pompey*'s ſons: And the *Romans* "would unanimouſly throw off a yoke which "they wore with indignation." His ſpeech had the deſired effect: All appeared zealous for the proſecution of the war, and promiſed to arm themſelves: But a little reflection ſoon cooled their ardour. "Who are we? ſaid they, and "to whom do we refuſe ſubmiſſion? Is not *Cæ-*"*ſar* veſted with the whole authority of the *Ro-*"*man* empire? Does he not command its forces? "Shall we diſpute the poſſeſſion of *Utica* with "him to whom *Pompey* and all his adherents were "forced to abandon *Italy*? And, when the whole "earth ſubmits to his yoke, ſhall we under-

"take

" take the defence of the *Roman* liberty?" They made a declaration of theſe ſentiments to *Cato*, and many of them even formed a deſign of ſeizing the *Roman* Senators, and delivering them up to *Cæſar*, the better to ingratiate themſelves with him. *Cato*, ſenſible that it was impoſſible to keep *Utica*, gave notice of it to *Scipio* and *Juba*; the firſt had eſcaped to his fleet at ſea, and then lay concealed behind a promontory not far from the city; and the other was hid in the neighbouring woods, and had ſent meſſengers to him. The arrival of *Scipio*'s cavalry gave *Cato* freſh hopes, and he went out to meet them, attended by all the *Roman* Senators except *M. Rubrius*, whom he left to watch the motions of the three hundred during his abſence. He addreſſed the Commanders of this body of cavalry, and entreated them not to give themſelves up to a foreign Prince, but to prefer *Cato* to *Juba*, repreſenting to them the diſhonour of ſuch a conduct, and that, by affording a protection to him and the Senators with him, they would provide for their own ſafety in a town ſo well furniſhed with proviſions and every thing neceſſary to hold out a ſiege. The officers replied, they would conſult their troopers, and *Cato* ſat down on an eminence waiting their anſwer. Here *Rubrius* came to him, complaining of the audaciouſneſs of the three hundred, who had revolted, and raiſed a commotion in the city. *Cato* ſent him back to beſeech them to wait his return. The anſwer of the cavalry added to his perplexity. They ſent him word " that they had no inclina-

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" tion

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"tion to ſerve under *Juba*; nor any apprehen-
"ſions of *Cæſar* when under *Cato*'s command:
"But that they would not put their truſt in the
"inhabitants of *Utica*, whom, therefore, he muſt
"conſent to murder, or expel the city, if he
"would make uſe of their aſſiſtance[g]." *Cato*'s anſwer was, "that he would conſult with the "three hundred." Upon his return into the town, he found that theſe men were come to a reſolution of having recourſe to *Cæſar*'s mercy, and explained themſelves pretty clearly on their deſign of delivering up the Senators; and, at the ſame time, notice was given him that the cavalry were making off. *Cato*, fearing leſt the three hundred ſhould immediately execute their threats, when they ſaw themſelves delivered from the cavalry, called for a horſe and rode after them, and by his entreaties, which he accompanied with tears, he with much difficulty prevailed upon them to halt one day; and, having brought them back, poſted them at the gates of the city, and put them in poſſeſſion of the citadel. The three hundred, alarmed at this proceeding, aſſembled, and invited *Cato* to their meeting. The Senators were very earneſt to diſſuade him from putting himſelf into their hands, but he knew that he had nothing to fear from them. They began by making their acknowledgments for the confi-

[g] We are told by *Plutarch*, that *Juba* had propoſed, in the beginning of the war, to deſtroy the city and exterminate the inhabitants, and that *Scipio* had conſented to this maſſacre; but that *Cato* oppoſed it with ſo much vehemence and indignation, that the barbarous project was not carried into execution.

dence

dence he repoſed in them, and gave him the ſtrongeſt aſſurances of their reſpect and of their attachment to his perſon; but told him, that they were not *Cato's*, and could not attain to his exalted ſentiments. They added that they had come to a reſolution to ſend Deputies to *Cæſar* to implore his clemency; but that the firſt and principal object of their ſollicitation ſhould be *Cato's* ſafety, which if they could not obtain, they would fight in his defence to the laſt moment of their lives. *Cato* thanked them for their good-will towards him, approved of their deſign of ſubmitting to *Cæſar*, and adviſed them to loſe no time, but deſired them to make no ſollicitation in his favour. "It is proper, ſaid he, for the van-"quiſhed to have recourſe to prayers, and for "thoſe who have committed faults to ſue for "pardon. As for me, I have been invincible "during the whole courſe of my life, and even "now I am victorious, and triumph over *Cæſar* "by the ſuperiority of juſtice and equity. It is "he that is conquered: This day is he attainted "and convicted by undeniable evidence, not-"withſtanding what he has ſaid to the contrary, "of plotting againſt his country." *Cato*, as he came out from this conference, was informed, that *Cæſar* was on his march with the greateſt part of his forces to beſiege *Utica*. Alas! ſays he, he pays us a compliment we do not deſerve: He takes us for men. Another meſſage was brought him preſently after from *M. Octavius*, who ſent to let him know that he was near *Utica* with two legions, and was ready to join him, but

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but it was neceſſary firſt to ſettle who ſhould have the command in chief. *Cato* returned no anſwer to the meſſage, but, addreſſing himſelf to his friends, "Well, ſays he, ought we to be "ſurpriſed that our affairs have not ſucceed-"ed, ſince, when upon the brink of ruin, we "are contending for the vain honour of com-"mand." His only care now was to haſten the departure of the *Roman* Senators before the cavalry retired; and, having ordered all the gates of the town to be ſhut, except that which led to the port, he appointed ſhips and furniſhed every thing requiſite to thoſe who were to ſail. The cavalry, now looking upon *Utica* as a town of their enemies, had begun to plunder it; but *Cato*, interpoſing, wreſted, out of the hands of thoſe he met firſt, the ſpoils they were carrying off, and the reſt threw away of their own accord what they had ſeized, and departed in ſilence, aſhamed of what they had done. He then called together the citizens of *Utica*, and recommended it to them to act in concert with the three hundred, and ſeek their common ſafety together with them. Having done this, he went to the port and took leave of the Senators who were about to embark. His ſon, however, remained with him, and *Statilius*, a young man remarkable for his hatred to *Cæſar*. He did not inſiſt upon his ſon's departing, but endeavoured to perſuade the other to go with the reſt: And, upon his refuſing to do it, he turned to *Apollonides* and *Demetrius*, two philoſophers who conſtantly attended him; "it is your buſineſs, ſaid he, to

"bend

" bend that ſtubborn ſpirit, and give it a more " uſeful turn." *Cato* then returned to his affairs, and diſpatched buſineſs all that night and the greateſt part of the following day. *L. Cæſar*, being appointed Deputy for the three hundred, begged of *Cato* that he would aſſiſt him in drawing up the ſpeech for the occaſion; and declared, at the ſame time, that he would be alſo mediator for him, and would throw himſelf at the Dictator's feet, and embrace his knees to obtain his pardon. " By no means, replied *Cato*; were I " diſpoſed to owe my life to *Cæſar*, I ſhould my- " ſelf go to him, but I will not be beholden to " the tyrant for any act of his injuſtice: For it " is unjuſt in him to pretend as a maſter to par- " don thoſe over whom he has no lawful power. " But, if you pleaſe, let us conſider what it is " proper to ſay in behalf of the three hundred." They then conferred together on this ſubject, and *Cato* at parting recommended to him his ſon and the reſt of his friends. Theſe being aſſembled at his houſe, among other diſcourſe, he forbad his ſon to take any ſhare in the adminiſtration of public affairs; " for to act as became " him was now impoſſible, and to do otherwiſe " was diſhonourable." Towards evening he went into the bath, and, there calling to mind *Statilius*, he inquired of *Apollonides* whether he had ſucceeded with him; " and is he gone, ſaid " he, without taking leave of us? " No, replied " the philoſopher; I have diſcourſed much with " him, but to no purpoſe: He is reſolute, and " declares that he will ſtay and follow your ex- " ample;"

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"ample." *Cato* ſmiled, and anſwered, "of that "we ſhall ſoon judge." After bathing he ſupped with his friends and the magiſtrates of the city. They ſat late at table, and the converſation was lively: The diſcourſe falling upon this maxim of the Stoics, that *the wiſe man alone is free, and that the vicious are ſlaves*, which *Demetrius*, who was a *Peripatetic*, undertook to confute from the principles of his ſchool, *Cato*, in anſwer, treated the matter very amply, and with ſo much earneſtneſs and vehemence of voice, that he betrayed himſelf, and confirmed the ſuſpicions which his friends had already conceived of his deſign to kill himſelf. When he had done ſpeaking, a melancholy ſilence enſued; and *Cato*, perceiving it, turned the diſcourſe to the preſent ſituation of affairs, expreſſing his concern for thoſe who had been obliged to put to ſea, as well as for thoſe who, having determined to make their eſcape by land, had a dry and ſandy deſart to paſs. After ſupper, the company being diſmiſſed, he walked for ſome time with a few friends, and gave his orders to the officers of the guard; and, going into his chamber, he embraced his ſon and his friends with more than uſual tenderneſs, which farther confirmed the ſuſpicions of the reſolution he had taken. Then, laying himſelf down on his bed, he took up *Plato*'s Dialogue on the Immortality of the Soul. Having read for ſome time, he looked up, and, miſſing his ſword, which his ſon had removed while he was at ſupper, he called a ſlave and aſked who had taken it away; and, receiving no pertinent

pertinent anſwer, he reſumed his reading. Some time after he aſked again for his ſword, and, without ſhewing any impatience, ordered it to be brought to him: But, having read out the book, and finding nobody had brought him his ſword, he called for all his ſervants, fell into a rage, and ſtruck one of them with ſo much violence on the mouth, that he very much hurt his own hand, crying out in a paſſionate manner, *What? do my own ſon and family conſpire to betray me, and deliver me up naked and unarmed to the enemy?* Immediately his ſon and friends ruſhed into the room, and began to lament, and to beſeech him to change his reſolution. *Cato*, raiſing himſelf, and looking fiercely at them, *How long is it*, ſaid he, *ſince I have loſt my ſenſes, and ſince my ſon has become my keeper? Brave and generous ſon, why do you not bind your father's hands, that, when* CÆSAR *comes, he may find me unable to defend myſelf? Do you imagine, that without a ſword I cannot end my life? Cannot I deſtroy myſelf by holding my breath for ſome moments, or by ſtriking my head againſt the wall?* His ſon anſwered with his tears, and retired. *Apollonides* and *Demetrius* remained with him, and to them he addreſſed himſelf in the following words: *Is it to watch over me that you ſit ſilent here? Do you pretend to force a man of my years to live? Or can you bring any reaſon to prove, that it is not baſe and unworthy of Cato to beg his ſafety of an enemy? Or why do you not perſuade me to unlearn what I have been taught, that, rejecting all the opinions I have hitherto defended, I may now by* CÆSAR's *means*

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means grow wiſer, and be yet more obliged to him than for life alone? Not that I have determined any thing concerning myſelf, but I would have it in my power to perform what I ſhall think fit to reſolve upon: And I ſhall not fail to aſk your counſel, when I ſhall have occaſion to act up to the principles which your philoſophy teaches. Go, tell my ſon that he ſhould not compel his father to what he cannot perſuade him. They withdrew, and the ſword was brought by a young ſlave: *Cato* drew it, and, finding the point to be ſharp, *Now*, ſaid he, *I am my own maſter:* And, laying it down, he took up his book again, which, it is reported, he read twice over. After this he ſlept ſo ſoundly, that he was heard to ſnore by thoſe who were near him [h]. About midnight he called two of his freedmen, *Cleanthes*, his phyſician, and *Butas*, whom he chiefly employed in the management of his affairs. The laſt he ſent to the port, to ſee whether all the *Romans* were gone: To the phyſician he gave his hand to be dreſſed, which was ſwelled by the blow he had given his ſlave. This, being an intimation that he intended to live, gave great joy to his family. *Butas* ſoon returned and

[h] There are doubtleſs ſeveral circumſtances in this ſtory which have the appearance of a forgery. It is not probable that a man in ſuch a heat of paſſion, and taken up with the thoughts of putting an end to his life, would ſleep ſo ſoundly. And it is ſtill more ſtrange that he ſhould read twice over *Plato's Phædo*, to confirm himſelf in his deſperate reſolution: For there is not a paſſage in it to encourage ſelf-murder, and many againſt it: Indeed the whole is ſo, and no one, who admires the death of *Socrates*, can ever die like *Cato*.

brought

brought word, that they were all gone except *Craſſus*, who had ſtaid upon ſome buſineſs, but was juſt ready to depart. He added, that the wind was high and the ſea rough. Theſe words drew a ſigh from *Cato*. He ſent *Butas* again to the port to know, whether there might not be ſome one, who, in the hurry of the embarkation, had forgot ſome neceſſary proviſions, and had been obliged to put back to *Utica*. It was now break of day, and *Cato* ſlept yet a little more, till *Butas* returned to tell him, that all was perfectly quiet. He then ordered him to ſhut his door, and he flung himſelf upon his bed, as if he meant to finiſh his night's reſt. But, immediately, he took his ſword, and ſtabbed himſelf a little below his cheſt; yet, not being able to uſe his hand ſo well by reaſon of the ſwelling, the blow did not kill him. It threw him into a convulſion, in which he fell from his bed, and overturned a table near it. The noiſe gave the alarm, and his ſon, and the reſt of the family, entered the room, where they found him weltering in his blood, and his bowels half out of his body. The ſurgeon upon examination found that his inteſtines were not cut, and was preparing to replace them and bind up the wound, when *Cato*, recovering his ſenſes, thruſt the ſurgeon from him, and, tearing out his bowels, immediately expired.

Y. R. 707. Bef. Chr. 45. 406 Conſ.

Thus died, according to his admirers, the famous *Cato*, in the forty-eighth year of his age. "If we conſider his character without prejudice, "ſays a celebrated writer, he was certainly a great "and worthy man; a friend to truth, virtue, li-

Middl. p. 162.

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"berty: Yet, falſely meaſuring all duty by the "abſurd rigour of the *Stoical* rule, he was gene- "rally diſappointed of the end which he ſought "by it, the happineſs both of his public and pri- "vate life [i]. In his private conduct, he was ſe- "vere, moroſe, inexorable; baniſhing all the "ſofter affections, as natural enemies to juſtice, "and as ſuggeſting falſe motives of acting, from "favour, clemency, and compaſſion: In public "affairs he was the ſame [k]; had but one rule of "policy,

[i] What this *Stoical* rule was, we are told in another place, p. 564. "The *Stoics* were the *bigots* or *enthuſiaſts* in phi- "loſophy; who held none to be truly wiſe and good but "themſelves; placed *perfect happineſs in virtue, though ſtript* "*of every other good*; affirmed *all ſins to be equal; all devia-* "*tions from right equally wicked; to kill a dunghill-cock, with-* "*out reaſon, the ſame crime as to kill a parent*; that a wiſe man "could never *forgive*; *never be moved by anger, favour, or* "*pity*; *never be deceived*; *never repent*; *never change his mind.* "With theſe principles, *Cato* entered into public life." Theſe, certainly, were never the practical principles of any man; and, if to live a wiſe man, or to be a true *Stoic*, is to live up to them, *Cato* had no pretenſions to that character. He was often deceived; ſometimes he changed his mind, was very ſubject to envy and anger, and ſometimes was moved by favour. There are many examples of his frailties in the foregoing pages. The account of this pretended rule, by which *Cato* meaſured all duty, is taken from the oration of *Cicero pro Murena*; in which the orator ridicules the *Stoics*, and banters *Cato*, who was the accuſer. *Cato* was ſo far from acknowledging the rule to be his, that he cried out, *What a merry Conſul we have got?* *Cicero* was Conſul when he ſpoke this oration.

[k] This made him *obſtinate*, rather than *conſtant*, *moroſe* inſtead of being *grave*, and *ſour*, when he would be moſt *ſincere*. His humour was not only always overcaſt, but ſome-

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" policy, *to adhere to what was right*, without " regard to times and circumſtances, or even to a " force that *could controul him*[1]: For, inſtead of " managing the power of the Great, ſo as to mi- " tigate the ill, or extract any good from it, he " was urging it always to acts of violence by a " perpetual defiance; ſo that, *with the beſt in-* " *tentions in the world, he often did great harm to* " *the Republic.* This was his general behaviour;

times broke out upon his beſt friends in indecent paſſions! His temper was rather *ſtiff* than *ſteady*; for he was as inflexibly in the wrong as in the right; he withſtood *compaſſion* as reſolutely as *bribery*, and avoided *common decency* as much as *flattery*: He would come into the Forum with nothing but his under garment on, and that looſe; his boſom and feet bare; and in this condition ſit upon the bench when he was Prætor, and paſs ſentence upon thoſe of the firſt quality. *Ptolemy*, King of *Egypt*, being at *Rome*, and deſiring to ſpeak with him, he ſent word, as he was upon the *cloſe-ſtool*, that *he might come to him, if he had any thing to ſay to him.* See his behaviour on his return from the *Cyprian* expedition, and after his loſing the conſulate. This gives a ſuſpicion of his ſetting too great a value upon his actions, and being liable to ſomething of vain-glory. *Adams.*

[1] Nothing is *right* that is not ſo, taking in the conſideration of all circumſtances of time, place, and perſons. But, beſides, did *Cato* make *right* the rule of his conduct, when he oppoſed ſalutary laws, becauſe propoſed by *Cæſar*; when, in puniſhing *Catiline*'s accomplices, he extended, againſt the fundamental laws of the ſtate, the prerogative of the Senate; and when he refuſed to allow *Cæſar* what had been granted him by a law of the people, and a decree of the Senate. Have we not ſeen him a riotous Magiſtrate, violating the privilege of the tribuneſhip in the perſon of one of his collegues, and, from perſonal hatred to *Cæſar*, approving of bribery and corruption at the elections for magiſtracy? *See Vol.* III. *p.* 383, 399.

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" yet, from ſome particular facts, it appears that " his ſtrength of mind was not always impreg- " nable, but had its weak places of pride, am- " bition, and party-zeal; which, when managed " and flattered to a certain point, would betray " him ſometimes into meaſures contrary to his " ordinary rule of right and truth. The laſt act " of his life was agreeable to his nature and phi- " loſophy: When he could no longer be what " he had been; or when the ills of life overba- " lanced the good; which, by the principles of " his ſect, was a juſt cauſe for dying; he put " an end to his life with a ſpirit and reſolution " which would make one imagine that he was " glad to have found an occaſion of dying in his " proper character. On the whole, his life was " rather admirable than amiable; fit to be praiſed " rather than imitated [m]."

L. Cæſar,

[m] It is ſaid, in another place, p. 564, that " after a perpe- " tual courſe of diſappointments and repulſes, finding himſelf " unable to purſue his old way any farther; inſtead of taking " a new one, he was *driven by his philoſophy* to put an end to " his life." We have ſeen above, a King of *Cyprus*, a friend and ally of the *Roman* people, accuſed of no practices, nor ſuſpected of any deſigns againſt the Republic, yet deprived of his kingdom and eſtate by an iniquitous law preferred by *P. Clodius*; and that our *Stoic* philoſopher *Cato* took upon him to execute this unparalleled act of injuſtice, and valued himſelf upon this his *Cyprian* expedition. *Ptolemy*, unable to reſiſt the *Roman* power, and too proud to take up with a private ſtation after he had reigned ſo long, was driven by his *royal philoſophy* to put an end to his life by poiſon. In what is the *Stoic philoſophy* of *Cato* preferable to the royal philoſophy of the *Cyprian Monarch*? What can be alledged to excuſe the one, which does not equally excuſe the other? *Ptolemy*, I ſhould

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L. Cæſar, to procure ſome advantages by *Cato*'s death, aſſembled the people, and in an harangue exhorted

ſhould imagine, was driven to that extremity by injuries much more evidently unjuſt and more affecting than were thoſe which *Cato* complained of. But we are told by *Cicero*, that it was becoming and proper in *Cato* to die in this way; and that otherwiſe he would not have kept up the *decorum of life*, which conſiſts in maintaining a certain likeneſs in all our actions, a certain equality of behaviour: And this, he adds, is grounded upon univerſal and particular nature. "The dif-"ference of particular nature, ſays he, which forms the ſeve-"ral characters of men, is of that force, that one ſometimes "ought to kill himſelf, and yet another in the ſame circum-"ſtances ought not; for was not *Cato*'s caſe the very ſame "with that of thoſe who ſurrendered themſelves to *Cæſar* "in *Africa*? And yet, perhaps, it would have been blame-"able in them to have killed themſelves, becauſe their man-"ners were gentler and eaſier: But, as nature had given *Cato* "an incredible bravery, and he had confirmed this by a per-"petual conſtancy, and had always remained immoveable in "what he had once reſolved and undertaken, it became "him rather to die than ſee the face of the tyrant." But is not this a juſtification of the ſame deſperate behaviour in every wrong-headed, obſtinate, and perverſe man?

The public good, in his own ſenſe of it, required of *Cato*, I ſhould think, to remain in life, and purſue the ruin of the tyrant. In his ſpeech to the three hundred, after the battle of *Thapſus*, did he not tell them, "that, if they continued "firm againſt *Cæſar*, they would thereby avoid his contempt; "and that *Rome* had fallen lower, and emerged from yet "greater dangers." This was as true in regard to him as to them; and, though they had not ſpirit enough to follow his counſel, he ſhould, however, have done himſelf what he exhorted others to do. He might certainly have done good ſervice to his party in *Spain*: And, after *Cæſar*'s death, a great field of action would have opened to him.

Some authors have imputed *Cato*'s death to his hatred to *Cæſar*: And indeed no perſons in the world were more contrary

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exhorted them to throw themſelves upon *Cæſar*'s clemency, from which they had the greateſt reaſon to hope the beſt.

Hirt de Bell. Afric.

Cæſar from *Thapſus* had marched to *Uſceta*, where *Scipio* had laid up a great ſtore of corn and ammunition, and which immediately ſurrendered; He entered alſo *Adrumetum* without oppoſition, where he found *Q. Ligarius* and *C. Conſidius* the ſon, whom he pardoned. In his way to *Utica*, he was met by *L. Cæſar*, who threw himſelf at his feet, and begged for nothing more than that he would grant him his life. He obtained this favour, and it was extended likewiſe to *Cæcina*, *C. Ateius*, *P. Atrius*, *L. Cella*, father and ſon; *M. Eppius*, *M. Aquinius*, to *Cato*'s ſon, and the children of *Damaſippus*. Being informed of *Cato*'s death, *Cæſar* is reported to have broke out into this exclamation: *O Cato! I envy thee the glory of thy death, ſince thou haſt envied me that of ſaving thy life.* On his entering the town, he ſummoned an aſſembly of the people, and thanked them for the affection they had ſhewn to his

Plut. in Cat.

trary in their humours and manners. The oppoſition of temper between two perſons engaged in the ſame place, about the ſame affairs, very naturally gives riſe to enmity; and this, in the preſent caſe, was increaſed by family injuries. *Cæſar*'s intimacy with *Servilia*, *Cato*'s ſiſter, was once the talk of all *Rome*. *Cato* accordingly ſeems to have oppoſed *Cæſar* furiouſly in every thing, right or wrong: And there is no abſurdity in ſuppoſing that the laſt act of his life was directed by that principle, which ſo powerfully influenced him in other parts of his conduct. I do not ſay but that *Cato* died in character, but I think that his death is far from reflecting any luſtre on his life.

cauſe,

cauſe. At the ſame time he cenſured ſeverely and enlarged upon the crime of the three hundred merchants, who had furniſhed *Scipio* and *Varus* with money; but concluded with telling them, that they might ſhew themſelves without fear, as he was determined to grant them their lives, and content himſelf with expoſing their effects to ſale; and that he would give them notice when their goods were to be ſold, and allow them the liberty of redeeming them upon payment of a certain fine. The three hundred who had ſerved his enemies with zeal, and dreaded *Cæſar*'s reſentment, were very well pleaſed with theſe conditions, and begged that he would impoſe a certain ſum in groſs upon them all: And he accordingly amerced them in two hundred millions of ſeſterces [n], to be paid to the Republic at ſix different payments within the ſpace of three years.

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1614583 l. Hirt. de Bell. Afric.

Juba had fled with *Petreius* towards *Zama*, his place of reſidence, which he had ſtrongly fortified in the beginning of the war; but the inhabitants, who were diſſaffected towards him [o], could not be prevailed upon, either by threats or intreaties, to open their gates, or even to deliver to

[n] *Appian* writes, that *Cæſar* put to death all he could find of the three hundred who had formed *Cato*'s Senate. This author muſt have invented a number of facts and circumſtances of facts, which, certainly, no memoirs, how partial ſoever, could have tranſmitted to him.

[o] And they had very good reaſon, if, as *Hirtius* tells us, before he ſet out againſt *Cæſar*, he had raiſed a mighty pile of wood in the market-place, and declared a reſolution, in caſe he did not conquer, to maſſacre all the citizens, and deſtroy their bodies and effects in one general conflagration.

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him his wives and children. They ſent ambaſſadors to *Cæſar*, to ſignify to him this their intention, and to deſire that he would prevent by a ſpeedy ſuccour any attempt the King might make upon their town. At the ſame time *Tiſdra* was abandoned by *Conſidius*, and *Vergilius* ſurrendered *Thapſus*; and the fame of his clemency brought over to *Cæſar*, on his march, all the *Numidian* officers that remained. *Juba*, ſeeing himſelf deſerted on all ſides, and that there was no longer any hope of ſafety, propoſed to *Petreius* an engagement in which they ſhould mutually kill each other. *Petreius* fell firſt, and the King immediately endeavoured to diſpatch himſelf, but was obliged to have recourſe to one of his ſlaves, on whom he prevailed to perform that laſt office. *P. Sitius*, in the mean time, having defeated the army of *Saburra*, and ſlain the General, was marching through *Mauritania* to join *Cæſar*, and chanced to fall in with *Fauſtus* and *Afranius*, who had put themſelves at the head of the party that had plundered *Utica*, and were making their way to *Spain*. This Commander, having notice of their approach, placed himſelf during the night in an ambuſcade, and, attacking them upon their march by break of day, he either killed or made them all priſoners, except a few that eſcaped from the van. *Afranius* and *Fauſtus* were among the priſoners, with their wives and children: And our author ſays, that they were ſlain a few days after, together with *L. Cæſar*, in a mutiny of the ſoldiers. *Dio* and *Florus* report, that they were killed by *Cæſar*'s order, or at his inſtigation; and *Suetonius*

tonius has obſerved, that this was the general belief. And perhaps they had no pretenſions to his mercy. *L. Cæſar* had ſhewn himſelf his implacable enemy on all occaſions, had treated ſeveral of his domeſtics with more than ordinary cruelty, and had ordered the beaſts to be killed which the Conqueror had deſtined for his games in *Rome*: And *Afranius* and *Fauſtus* were taken in their flight to his enemies in *Spain*. But ſince *Cæſar* had laid it down to himſelf as a general law, not to put any citizen to death in cold blood, it is not probable that he made an exception to this rule in the caſe of theſe two and his relation *L. Cæſar*. *Cicero* beſtows this encomium on his clemency, "that the citizens which the Republic loſt were "carried off by the common chance of war, and "not thro' any reſentment of the conqueror [p]". To *Pompeia*, the wife of *Fauſtus*, and her children, he not only granted a pardon, but permitted them the free enjoyment of all their effects. Nor had *Scipio* better ſucceſs in his flight: He had got together twelve gallies, with a deſign to make for the coaſt of *Spain*, but was obliged by ſtreſs of weather to put in at *Hippo*, where *Sitius*'s fleet chanced to be at that time. *Scipio*'s veſſels were moſt of them ſunk; and, when he ſaw that there was no hopes of eſcaping, he ſtabbed himſelf, and in his laſt moments behaved with magnanimity; for when one of *Sitius*'s ſoldiers, who had boarded his ſhip, enquired what

Y. R. 707. Bef. Chr. 45. 706 Conſ.

Florus, iv.

[p] Quos amiſimus cives, eos martis vis perculit, non ira victoriæ. *Cicero* pro Marcello.

was

Y. R. 707. Bef. Chr. 45. 46 Conf.

was become of the General? He answered himself, *the General is safe.*

From *Utica* *Cæsar* marched to *Zama*, where he exposed to sale the goods of King *Juba*, confiscated the estates of the *Roman* citizens settled there, who had joined in the war against him, and converted the kingdom into a *Roman* province. *Sittius*, who had done him such signal service, was put in possession of *Cirta*, formerly the royal city of *Masinissa* and of *Syphax*; and which, from the name of its new inhabitants, was afterwards called *the colony of the Sitians.* When he returned to *Utica*, he, in the like manner, confiscated and sold the effects of all who had the rank of Centurions under *Petreius* and *Juba*; and he fined the several towns that had served his enemies in proportion to their revenue, but suffered none to be plundered by his soldiers. The only distinction he made between the *Romans* who readily submitted after the battle of *Pharsalia*, and those whose obstinacy forced him to conquer them a second time in *Africa*, was, that the first were immediately restored to all their former privileges, and the last remained in exile till after the *Spanish* war, when he granted a general pardon. *Dio* tells us, that he gave the same instance of his moderation after the battle of *Thapsus*, which had done him so much honour after that of *Pharsalia*, in burning all the papers of *Scipio* without reading them. *Sallust*, the historian, was left to govern the new *Roman* province of *Numidia*, where he amassed great wealth, which enabled him, on his return to *Rome*,

Rome, to purchaſe the famous *Salluſtian* gardens in the city, with ſeveral villa's in the country, in which he ſpent the remainder of his life, in a learned and ſplendid retreat from all public buſineſs [q]. Y. R. 707. Bef. Chr. 45. 406 Conſ.

CHAP.

[q] As this is the laſt time we ſhall have occaſion to mention *Salluſt*, it may not be improper to ſubjoin a few particulars concerning him. It appears by all his writings, as well as by the favour ſhewn him by *Cæſar*, that he was of the popular party. In his early youth, as he tells us himſelf, he was carried away by ambition, and ſought preferment. At what time he was made Quæſtor is uncertain; but he was Tribune of the people in 701, when *Pompey* was ſole Conſul; and at firſt acted vigorouſly againſt *Milo*, though he afterwards became more tractable. In 703, he was turned out of the Senate by the Ariſtocratic Cenſor *Appius*, for his immoral life, and notorious debauchery; and, if we believe the anonymous author of an invective againſt him, he left *Rome* to join *Cæſar*. As ſoon as the civil war broke out, he wrote an epiſtle to *Cæſar*, upon the regulation of the Commonwealth; where he vents his ſpleen againſt *Pompey* and the faction of the Nobles, and was, in the year 704, named Quæſtor a ſecond time, and thus recovered his ſeat in the Senate. He ſeems to have written his ſecond epiſtle to *Cæſar* in the year 706, while the Dictator was yet in *Aſia*, who cauſed him to be named Prætor for the following year. *Cæſar* then employed him in the *African* war, and recompenſed his ſervices with the grant of the government of the province. In this government he is accuſed by *Dio* of having exerciſed the moſt flagrant oppreſſions; and *Cæſar*, it is ſaid by this author, gave him expreſs orders to plunder the people, rather than to protect them. This teſtimony of *Dio* is ſupported by the authority of an old grammarian, and of the author of the abovementioned invective, who tell us, that, on his return to *Rome*, he divided his ſpoils with *Cæſar*, who ſcreened him from all proſecution. The riches he had acquired enabled him to paſs the remainder of his days in a learned retreat; and it was then that he wrote the hiſtory of *the conſpiracy of Cataline*, of the Bell. Cat. Aſcon. in Cic. Mil.

war

Y. R. 707. Bef. Chr. 45. 706 Conſ.

war againſt Jugurtha, of *the attempts of Lepidus*, and *the war againſt Sertorius in Spain*; which laſt hiſtory he carried backwards twelve years to the commencement of the *Social* or *Marſic* war. In regard to the private life and character of this hiſtorian, it muſt be remarked, that, as he had reviled the vices of the Nobility with great vehemence, and had thereby created to himſelf many enemies, injurious aſperſions would be thrown out againſt him. We are informed by *Suetonius*, that *Lenæus*, a freedman of *Pompey*, wrote a violent invective againſt him, becauſe, in ſpeaking of his patron *Pompey*, he had ſaid, that, *with a modeſt exterior, he had a ſhameleſs ſoul: Oris probi, animo inverecundo fuiſſe.* *Euſebius* in Chron. ſays, he died in the year 718, four years before the rupture between *Antony* and *Octavius*.

CHAP. IX.

Cæſar *returns to* Rome; *the honours decreed him: His four triumphs; his civil adminiſtration and clemency.*

Hirtius de Bell. Afric.

CÆSAR left *Utica* on the 13*th* of *June*, having put an end to a war of great importance, and attended with extreme difficulty, in little more than five months. He took his way by *Sardinia*, from whence he ſent part of his fleet and legions into *Spain*, under the command of *C. Didius*, his Admiral, and his Lieutenants *Q. Fabius*, and *Q. Pædius*, with orders to obſerve the motions of the ſons of *Pompey*. After a ſhort ſtay in that iſland, he put to ſea on the 29*th*; but, meeting with foul weather in his paſſage, he did not get to *Rome* before the end of *July*.

Dio, l. xliii.

The uncertain event of the *African* war had kept the Senate under ſome reſerve; but they now began to puſh their flattery beyond all bounds

bounds of decency, and decreed more extravagant honours to *Cæſar* than were ever given before to any mortal. It was decreed, that there ſhould be feaſts and rejoicings for forty days, to celebrate his late victory; that, when he triumphed, his chariot ſhould be drawn by four white horſes, as thoſe of *Jupiter* and of the Sun; and that, beſides the ordinary number of Lictors belonging to his offices, he ſhould be preceded by all thoſe of his former dictatorſhips. He was created Dictator for ten years, and Inſpector of Morals for three; his ſtatue was placed in the Capitol oppoſite to that of *Jupiter*, with the globe of the earth under his feet, and with this inſcription, *To Cæſar the Demi-god.* Y. R. 707. Bef. Chr. 45. 406 Conſ.

Ever ſince the commencement of the civil war, he had found no leiſure for celebrating the triumphs, which he had ſo juſtly deſerved. He thought therefore the preſent time the moſt convenient for this purpoſe; and, in one month, he enjoyed four triumphs, which were conducted with a magnificence anſwerable to the wealth of the empire he was maſter of. His firſt triumph was over the *Gauls*; the next over *Ptolemy* and *Egypt*; the third over *Pharnaces* and *Pontus*; and the fourth over King *Juba*. We are told that the apparatus of each of theſe triumphs (by which is meant probably the pedeſtals and frames for the ſtatues, pictures, and other repreſentations) was different; that *citron-wood* was made uſe of in the firſt, *tortoiſe-ſhell* in the ſecond, *acanthus* in the third, and *ivory* in the fourth. In that over the *Gauls*, which was the moſt ſplendid of the four, Suet. 37.

were

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were carried the *Rhine* and the *Rhone*, and the captive ocean repreſented in gold. *Dio* adds a moſt improbable circumſtance, that a multitude of priſoners preceded his chariot, among whom was diſtinguiſhed *Vercingetorix*, the unfortunate Chief of confederate *Gaul*, who had been reſerved upwards of ſix years, to grace his Conqueror's march to the Capitol, and was afterwards thrown into a dungeon, and put to death with other captives. But *Cæſar* never acted with this barbarity againſt his enemies, when in the actual purſuit of conqueſt; and much leſs would he now be guilty of it towards a nation from which he had lately received ſo many ſignal proofs of their attachment to his cauſe and perſon. The axle-tree of the triumphal chariot broke in the way, and he did not arrive at the Capitol till night, which he aſcended by the light of luſtres and flambeaux, carried by forty elephants ranged on the right and left: And the *Greek* hiſtorian, juſt now mentioned, tells us, that, notwithſtanding the divine honours decreed him, he, in a very humble and ſupplicating poſture, and upon his knees, climbed up the ſteps of the *Capitol*. In the triumph over *Egypt* was repreſented the river *Nile*, and the *Pharos* on fire; and the death of *Achillas* and *Pothinus* in two different pictures. *Dio* ſays that *Arſinoë*, *Cleopatra*'s ſiſter, appeared there as a captive, and was afterwards ſet at liberty. This circumſtance, however, is to be found in no other author, and *Hirtius* has informed us, that *Cæſar* baniſhed her the kingdom of *Egypt* before he left *Alexandria*. The triumph

over

over *Pharnaces* had nothing more remarkable than the inſcription, *Veni, vidi, vici*, engraved in capitals on a tablet. In the fourth marched *Juba*'s ſon, a child; who afterwards gained great reputation by his learning, and was reſtored to the kingdom of *Mauritania*[r]. *Appian* ſays, that the money carried in theſe proceſſions as the fruits of his victories, amounted to ſixty-five thouſand talents, beſides two thouſand eight hundred and twenty-two crowns of gold, weighing together

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[r] *Appian* relates, that in theſe triumphs were to be ſeen repreſentations of all the memorable events of the Civil War; and portraits of all the *Romans* of diſtinction, who had loſt their lives in it, *Pompey* only excepted; of *Metellus Scipio*, for example, falling on his own ſword, and of *Cato* tearing out his bowels. But it is certain, that *Cæſar* imitated *Sylla* upon this occaſion, and gave no offence by ſhewing the wounds of his country, and inſulting over the misfortunes of his fellow-citizens: For *Cicero*, who in his eighth *Philippic* mentions the ſpectators concern when they ſaw the city of *Marſeilles* carried in triumph, would not have omitted thoſe other affecting circumſtances. The ſoldiers, on feſtivals of this kind, were allowed the liberty, during the proceſſion, of ſinging verſes, which ſometimes contained the victor's praiſes, but were much oftener ſatyrs on him. *Suetonius* tells us, that they now reproached their General with his debauchery, and revived the ſuſpicion which he had formerly lain under during his ſtay at the Court of *Nicomedes*, King of *Bithynia*; a ſuſpicion which gave him great offence, but which he could never get clear of, notwithſtanding his oath to the contrary. *Suet. in Cæſ.* xlix. 57. *Pliny* ſays that, diſſatisfied with the rewards beſtowed on them, they reproached him with the bad food they had lived upon at *Dyrrhachium*. *Plin.* xix. 8. And *Dio* writes that they all told him with one voice, *If you act the honeſt part* (by reſigning your uſurped power) *you will be puniſhed; but, if you continue to be unjuſt, you may continue to reign over us.* Dio l. xliii.

twenty

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twenty thouſand four hundred and fourteen *Roman* pounds.

Theſe triumphs were followed by rewards to his ſoldiers, and largeſſes to the citizens: To the firſt, beſides land and ſettlements according to their ſervices, he gave each veteran twenty thouſand ſeſterces, double of that ſum to every Centurion, and four times as much to the Tribunes. One hundred and fifty thouſand citizens received from his bounty each ten buſhels of corn, ten pounds of oil, and four hundred ſeſterces in money; and, at the ſame time, the whole body of the people was treated with the greateſt profuſion at twenty-two thouſand tables placed in the ſtreets. To theſe expences *Cæſar* further added public ſpectacles of all ſorts. For the *Circenſian* games, the *Circus* was enlarged on each ſide, and a canal ſunk round it: And ſeveral young men of the greateſt families ran the races in chariots drawn, ſome by four, ſome by two horſes, and ſome on a ſingle horſe. The *Trojan* game was acted by two companies of leſſer and larger boys, children of the nobility. The hunting of wild beaſts was repreſented for five days together; and at laſt a battle was fought by five hundred foot, twenty elephants, and thirty horſe on each ſide; to make room for which the goals were taken away, and in their room two camps pitched oppoſite to one another. Wreſtlers too performed for three days together in a *ſtadium* provided for the purpoſe in the field of *Mars*. A lake was ſunk in the leſſer *Codeta*, in which the people were entertained with the repreſentation

Suet. in Cæſ. 38.

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tion of *Egyptian* and *Tyrian* gallies of two, three, and four benches of oars, and a ſea-fight. He alſo dedicated this year his temple to *Venus Genitrix*; opened his new Forum; and celebrated the funeral obſequies of his daughter *Julia*, *Pompey*'s wife. Y. R. 707. Bef. Chr. 45. 406 Conſ.

Many *Roman* Knights, to make their court to the Dictator, and pleaſe the populace, debaſed themſelves ſo far as to enter the liſts of gladiators. *Furius Leptimus*, a man of a prætorian family, and *Q. Calpenus*, who had been a Senator, fought a prize in the Forum. *Decimus Laberius*, a *Roman* Knight, acted a mimic piece of his own compoſition, in compliance with *Cæſar*'s will; and, being immediately preſented with five hundred thouſand ſeſterces and a gold ring, he went from the ſtage, through the *orcheſtra*, into the ſeats aſſigned for the equeſtrian order[s]. Suet. in Cæſ. 39. 40361.

[s] *Laberius*, to get to his place, was obliged to paſs over the benches of the Senators; and *Cicero*, as he came by him, ſaid to him, *I would make room for you on our benches, if we were not already too much crouded*: meaning to ridicule *Laberius*, and at the ſame time to reflect on the number of new Senators. The Poet made him this ſmart anſwer: *You ſurpriſe me; for you were wont to ſit on two ſtools at once*; a proverbial expreſſion to ſignify a trimmer. It appears that the Knights were greatly diſguſted to ſee one of their body upon the ſtage, and that *Laberius* had conſented to appear there againſt his will. We are told, that, to make ſome amends, and to ſhew a ſpirit more ſuitable to his rank, he inſerted ſome lines, which gave offence to *Cæſar*, and engaged him to award the prize to *Publius Syrus*, *Laberius*'s competitor: *Romans, we are loſing our liberty. He, who is feared by many, has many to fear. Neceſſe eſt multos timeat, quem multi timent.* Macrob. Sat. xi. 3.

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When theſe feſtivals and rejoicings were over, *Cæſar* turned his attention towards matters of ſtate and the adminiſtration of juſtice. He filled up the vacancies in the Senate, advanced ſeveral Commoners to the dignity of Patricians, and enlarged the number of Prætors, Ædiles, Quæſtors, and inferior magiſtrates, reſtoring ſuch as had been diſgraced by the Cenſors, or condemned for bribery in elections. He admitted to the offices of the Republic the ſons of thoſe who had been proſcribed by *Sylla*. He introduced *Gauls* and other foreigners, who had enriched themſelves in his ſervice, into the Senate; and, on this account, he has been greatly cenſured[1]. *Dio* and *Macrobius* tell us, that he increaſed the number of Senators to *nine hundred*, whereas the Houſe formerly did not conſiſt of above ſix hundred: And ſuch an augmentation, we may obſerve, is greatly recommended in a letter to *Cæſar*, attributed to *Salluſt*, the hiſtorian, concerning the regulation of the State. But we have no mention of this matter in any of *Cicero*'s letters, or in any authentic writing; nor of the augmenta-

Suet. in Cæſ. 41.

[1] *Suetonius* c. lxxx. ſays that, on this occaſion, the following advertiſement was ſtuck up in different parts of the city: *Bonum factum. Ne quis Senatori novo curiam monſtrare velit:* "This is to give notice, that perſons are deſired not "to ſhew any of the new Senators the way to the Senate-"houſe." And, according to *Macrobius*, the great increaſe of Senators occaſioned a joke of *Cicero*; who, being applied to by one of his friends for his intereſt to get his ſon-in-law made a Senator in one of the municipal towns: "At *Rome*, "ſaid he, the thing is eaſy: At *Pompeii* it is more diffi-"cult."

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tion of magiſtrates mentioned by *Suetonius*: Though the increaſe of the Senate, if true, implied that of the magiſtrates, that there might be Quæſtors enough to fill up the annual vacancies of the Senate without any particular creation of Senators. We are told, that from this time there were 14 Prætors, and 40 Quæſtors. Y. R. 707. Bef. Chr. 45. 406 Conſ.

The choice of the magiſtrates he ſo divided with the people, that, excepting only the competitors for the conſulſhip, they choſe one half of them, and he the other half: And his way was to recommend ſuch as he had pitched upon, by billets diſperſed through the ſeveral tribes to this effect: *Cæſar, the Dictator, to ſuch a tribe: I recommend to you ſuch and ſuch perſons, that, by the favour of your votes, they may attain to the reſpective honours they ſue for.* We do not, however, find any diviſion of magiſtracies between *Cæſar* and the people in *Cicero*'s letters: It appears, on the contrary, that the Conſuls, Prætors, Ædiles, Tribunes and Quæſtors were all elected according to the uſual forms. Suet. in Cæſ. 41.

He reſtrained the trial of cauſes to two ranks of Judges, thoſe of the Equeſtrian and Senatorian orders, laying aſide the Commiſſioners of the Treaſury, who had before made a third claſs. Dio, l. 43. Suet. in Cæſ. 41.

In the quality of Maſter of Manners, he ſurveyed the people, but not in the uſual method or place. He made the *cenſus* in the ſeveral ſtreets by thoſe called *Domini inſularum*; and he reduced the number of thoſe who received corn from the public, from three hundred and twenty thouſand to one hundred and fifty thouſand. Ibid.

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And, to prevent all riots for the future upon account of the ſurvey, he ordered, that, every year, a choice ſhould be made by lot, by the Prætor, in the room of ſuch as died, out of thoſe who had not been enrolled for the receipt of corn. He reduced the number of the poor citizens, by ſending fourſcore thouſand into colonies beyond ſeas. He enacted, that no freeman of the city above twenty, and under forty, ſhould be allowed to abſent himſelf three years together from *Italy*; that no Senator's ſon ſhould go into foreign parts, unleſs in the retinue of ſome Governor; and that thoſe who had paſture ground ſhould have no leſs than a third part of their ſhepherds free-born. He made all ſuch as practiſed phyſic in *Rome*, and all maſters of liberal arts, free of the city, in order to fix them in it, and invite others to the place. To many, who had ſhewed themſelves zealous in his cauſe, he communicated the like favour: And we have a proof from one of *Cicero*'s letters, that, in beſtowing this privilege, he acted with diſcretion. For, having found that ſome of his friends had abuſed his confidence by expoſing this privilege to ſale, he made a general revocation of ſuch grants, and examined anew the grounds upon which they had been given. He encouraged marriages at the ſame time, and decreed rewards to thoſe who had a numerous offſpring.

Suet. in Cæſ. 42.

Ep. Fam. xiii. 36. Melm. vii. 65.

Dio, l. 43.

Suet. in Cæſ. 42.

He diſappointed the expectation of many in his regulation concerning debts. Several of his followers were in hopes that theſe would be wholly can-

cancelled; a thing, as we have ſeen, that was frequently moved for; but he ordered that the debtors ſhould ſatisfy their creditors, deducting only what intereſt had been paid ſince the commencement of the civil war, by virtue of which order, *Suetonius* ſays, a fourth part of the debt was loſt. Y. R. 707. Bef. Chr. 45. 46 Conſ.

He aboliſhed all companies of artificers but ſuch as were of ancient eſtabliſhment: For the corporations of later inſtitution had been chiefly erected by turbulent magiſtrates, ſuch as *Clodius*, with a view to have in the city ſo many companies to vote, or regiments to fight for them. Suet. in Cæſ. 42.

Luxury being carried to great exceſs in dreſs, furniture, building, eating, and ſepulchral monuments, he revived the ſumptuary laws, and was very deſirous to carry them into execution. He laid duties on the importation of foreign commodities; and the uſe of coaches, jewels, and ſcarlet cloth was allowed only to certain perſons. We are told that he appointed Commiſſioners to inſpect the markets, and ſeize upon all the victuals which were expoſed to ſale contrary to law; and that he ſent officers into private houſes, to take off the tables the prohibited rarities, when he heard of any prevarications in this particular. All this care, however, was to no purpoſe: Luxury ſtill continued to prevail. Ad Att. xiii. 7.

He was indefatigable and very ſtrict in the adminiſtration of juſtice [u]. He inforced the laws

[u] Jus laborioſiſſimè ac ſeveriſſimè dixit. *Suet.* 43.

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againſt crimes by more ſevere puniſhments: And, becauſe the rich were eaſily induced to tranſgreſs, by reaſon of their being only puniſhed with baniſhment, he ſtripped parricides or murderers of their whole eſtates, and other offenders of one half. He turned ſuch as were convicted of bribery out of the Senate; and he diſſolved the marriage of a Senator of prætorian rank, who had married a woman two days after her divorce from a former huſband, tho' there was no ſuſpicion of any former unlawful commerce betwixt them.

Suet. in Cæſ. 43.

Dio, 43. Phil. i. 8.

One of the moſt conſiderable as well as moſt uſeful of his laws was, *that no Prætor ſhould hold any province more than one year, or a Conſul more than two.* This was a regulation that had been often wiſhed for, as *Cicero* ſays, in the beſt times; and what one of the ableſt Dictators of the old Republic had declared to be its chief ſecurity, *not to ſuffer great and arbitrary commands to be of long duration; but to limit them at leaſt in time, if it was not convenient to limit them in power*[x]. *Cæſar* knew by experience that the prolongation of theſe extraordinary commands, and the habit of ruling kingdoms, was the readieſt way not only to inſpire contempt of the laws, but to give a man the power to ſubvert them. He ſecured by this law his own poſſeſſion and power from the attempts of

[x] *Mamercus Æmilius.*—Maximam autem, *ait*, ejus cuſtodiam eſſe, ſi magna imperia diuturna non eſſent; et temporis modus imponeretur, quibus juris imponi non poſſet. *Liv.* iv. 24.

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all future invaders; and, after him, it was the moſt proper to ſecure the liberties of the State, by preventing any other man from doing what *Pompey* and he himſelf had done. Y. R. 707. Bef. Chr. 45. 406 Conſ.

It was at this time alſo, that he ſet himſelf *to reform the calendar*; a work of general benefit to mankind. The *Roman* year, from the old inſtitution of *Numa*, was *lunar*; borrowed from the *Greeks*; among whom it conſiſted of *three hundred and fifty-four days*. *Numa* added one more to them, to make the whole number odd, which was thought the moſt fortunate; and, to fill up the deficiency of his year to the meaſure of the *ſolar* courſe, inſerted likewiſe, or *intercalated*, after the manner of the *Greeks*, an extraordinary month of twenty-two days, every ſecond year, and twenty-three every fourth, between the twenty-third and twenty-fourth day of *February*. If *Numa* had ſtuck to the lunar year of 354 days, by this intercalation his year would have been as regular as that of *Cæſar*, but by, adding his odd day, each year deviated from the *ſolar* one whole day too much: Which irregularity he might eaſily have corrected by ſtriking out of the intercalary month eight days every eighth year. This, however, was not done, and there appears to have been a progreſſion of all the months in the year, relatively to the ſeaſons: And we find, that the Conſuls, and other magiſtrates entered upon their offices in different ages of the Republic, in *January*, in *December*, in *October*, in *July*, and in *March*; though the commencement of their ma-

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giſtracies muſt have been always in the winter-ſeaſon. *Numa* committed the care of theſe intercalations to the College of Prieſts; who, it is commonly aſſerted, partly by a negligent, partly by a ſuperſtitious, but chiefly by an arbitrary abuſe of their power, uſed either to drop or to inſert them, as it was found moſt convenient to themſelves or their friends to make the current year longer or ſhorter. But, when the laſt intercalation was made in the year 701, *Pompey* being ſole Conſul, the firſt of *January* of the following year was very near the winter ſolſtice, and therefore in its right place; and the great confuſion, in the year 707, proceeded from the omiſſion of the intercalary months during ſix ſucceſſive years. *Cæſar* reſolved to put an end to this diſorder for the future, as well as for the preſent, by aboliſhing the ſource of it, the uſe of intercalations; and, inſtead of the *lunar*, to eſtabliſh the *ſolar* year, adjuſted to the exact meaſure of the ſun's revolution in the *zodiac*, or to that period of time in which it returns to the point from which it ſet out: And as this, according to the aſtronomers of that age, was ſuppoſed to be *three hundred and ſixty-five days and ſix hours*, ſo he divided the days into twelve artificial months, and to ſupply the deficiency of ſix hours, by which they fell ſhort of the ſun's complete courſe, he ordered a day to be intercalated every fourth year between the twenty-third and twenty-fourth of *February* [y]. But, to

[y] This day was called *Biſſextus* from its being a repetition or

to make this year begin and end regularly, he was forced to inſert into the current year *two extraordinary months* between *November* and *December*; the one of thirty-three, the other of thirty-four days; beſides (add *Suetonius* and *Cenſorinus*) the ordinary intercalary month of twenty-three days, which fell into it of courſe. But *Dio* is poſitive, that *he added no more than ſixty-ſeven days*: And, though his authority is not deciſive, yet as he ſeems to have examined this point, and there is no probability of there having been any intercalation ſince the beginning of the civil war, ſixty-ſeven days were ſufficient to replace the months in their proper ſeaſons; which *ſixty-ſeven days* were loſt, ſince 701, by the omiſſion of *three intercalations*. All this was effected by the care and ſkill of *Soſigenes*, a celebrated aſtronomer of *Alexandria*, whom *Cæſar* had brought to *Rome* for that purpoſe: And a new calendar was formed upon it by *Flavius*, a Scribe, digeſted according to the order of the *Roman* feſtivals, and the old manner of computing their days by *calends*, *ides*, and *nones*; which was publiſhed and authoriſed by the Dictator's edict not long after his return from *Africa*. This year therefore was the longeſt that *Rome* had ever known, conſiſting of *fourteen months*, or *four hundred and twenty-two days*; and is called *the laſt of the confuſion*, becauſe it introduced the *Julian* or *ſolar* year, with

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Pliny, Hiſt. Nat. xviii. 25.

Macrob. Sat. i. 3.

Dio, 227.

or duplicate of the *ſixth of the calends of March*, which fell always on the twenty-fourth; and hence our *intercalary*, or *Leap-year*, is ſtill called *Biſſextile*. See *Middl.* p. 170.

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the commencement of the enſuing *January*; which continues in uſe to this day in all Chriſtian countries, without any other variation than that of *the old and new ſtyle* [z].

All the regulations mentioned above were not enacted merely by *Cæſar's dictatorial authority*: They were confirmed either by *decrees of the Senate*, or *orders of the People*, according to their nature. Indeed grants to foreign Princes were often made in the name of the Senate, though the affair had not been referred to the Houſe; but this had been practiſed before *Cæſar*'s reign, and theſe jobs had been eſteemed the perquiſites of the Conſuls [a].

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[z] This difference of the *old and new ſtyle* was occaſioned by a regulation made by Pope *Gregory*, A. D. 1582; for it having been obſerved, that the computation of the vernal equinox was fallen back 10 days from the time of the Council of *Nice*, when it was found to be on the 21ſt of *March*; according to which all the feſtivals of the Church were then ſolemnly ſettled; Pope *Gregory*, by the advice of aſtronomers, cauſed ten days to be entirely ſunk and thrown out of the current year, between the 4th and 15th of *October*.

[a] *Ep. Fam.* ix. 15. *Middl.* p. 152. "While I am ſtill at "*Rome*, and attend the Forum, ſays *Cicero*, in a letter to *Papirius Pætus*, the Senate's decrees are all drawn at our "friend's houſe; and, whenever it comes into his head, "my name is ſet down as if preſent at drawing them; ſo "that I hear from *Armenia* and *Syria* of decrees ſaid to be "made at my motion, of which I had never heard a ſylla-"ble at home. Do not take me to be in jeſt, for I aſſure "you, that I have received letters from Kings from the remo-"teſt parts of the earth, to thank me for giving them the "title of King; when, ſo far from knowing that any ſuch "title had been decreed to them, I knew not even that "there

The Dictator diſtinguiſhed himſelf alſo, during his ſtay at *Rome*, by the greateſt acts of clemency and generoſity to his moſt avowed enemies. *M. Marcellus*, who, when Conſul, began the attack upon *Cæſar*, and proſecuted it for three years by his relations, whom he got ſucceſſively into the firſt dignity of the State, retired, after the battle of *Pharſalia*, to *Mitylene*, where he lived in eaſe without making any advances to *Cæſar*, and it was with difficulty he conſented that his friends ſhould ſue for his pardon. In an aſſembly of the Senate, *Piſo*, *Cæſar*'s father-in-law, undertook to broach the affair, and immediately *C. Marcellus*, brother to *Marcus*, threw himſelf at *Cæſar*'s feet; upon which the whole Senate, riſing from their ſeats, ſeconded the requeſt. *Cæſar* complained of the moroſeneſs of *Marcellus*, and made a parallel of his behaviour with that of others towards him, and particularly with that of *S. Sulpicius*, his collegue in the conſulate; but preſently declared, contrary to all their expectations, that, whatever offence he had received from the man, he could refuſe nothing to the interceſſion of the Senate, though he knew that he had many ene-

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"there were any ſuch men in being. What is then to be "done? Why, as long as our *Maſter of Manners* continues "here, I will follow your advice; but, as ſoon as he is "gone, will run away to join you over a plate of muſh "rooms." Was it not a great grievance that *Cæſar* ſhould grant favours, without the privacy of the Senate, to men ſo inſignificant that *Cicero* had never heard of them?

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enemies who had deſigns upon his life [b]. And it was upon this occaſion that *Cicero* delivered that ingenious and eloquent panegyric on *Cæſar*, in which he juſtifies the Dictator's conduct in the civil war, and profeſſes a perſonal affection for him, and zeal for the preſervation of his life, inſomuch that he declares himſelf ready to put himſelf between a pointed dagger and his body [c]. *Mar-*

[b] The whole hiſtory of this tranſaction is related by *Cicero*, in a letter to *Sulpicius*, *Ep. Fam.* iv. 4. *Melm.* ix. 17.

Guthrie, Vol. i. p. 167—171. Middl. p. 167.

[c] "Now proceed I to your heavy charge and gloomy ſuſ-
"picions (ſays *Cicero* to *Cæſar*, in his ſpeech for *Marcel-*
"*lus*) all which ought to be guarded againſt not more by
"you than by every *Roman*, eſpecially by us whom you
"have preſerved: And, though I hope they are groundleſs,
"yet never ſhall I endeavour, by my expreſſions, to ex-
"tenuate them; for your circumſpection is our ſafety; and,
"were I to err on any extreme, it ſhould be that of *too much*
"*caution*, rather than *too little prudence*. But who can be
"ſuch a madman? Is he of your friends? Who can be
"more ſo than they whom, contrary to their own expecta-
"tions, you brought from ruin! Is he of thoſe who fol-
"lowed you to the field? Where is the wretch ſo frantic, as
"not to prefer, even to his own life, the life of the man,
"under whoſe command he has riſen to all that ambition
"could wiſh! But, if your friends enter into no conſpiracy,
"may not your foes? Where are theſe to be found! For
"all, who formerly were ſo, either owed their death to their
"own *ſtubbornneſs*, or their life to your *mercy*. Thus no man
"who ever was your foe is now alive, or, if alive, he is
"now your determined friend.

"Yet, as the mind of man is ſo dark and ſo impenetrable,
"we ought to increaſe your diſtruſt, and, at the ſame time,
"your circumſpection. For, ſhew me the man ſo new to
"the affairs of life, ſuch a novice in this State, ſo unheeding
"either his own or the common ſafety, as not to be ſen-
"ſible, that in your preſervation his own is included, and

"upon

Marcellus, however, did not live to enjoy the benefit of his pardon. He had left *Mitylene* in the Y. R. 707. Bef. Chr. 45. 406 Conſ.

" upon your life depends the life of every *Roman?* For my " part, when I meditate night and day on the accidents of " life, the uncertain enjoyment of health, and the frailty " to which nature is ſubjected; I tremble, I grieve, that " this State, which ought to be eternal, ſhould exiſt in the " breath of one mortal. But if, with human accidents and " doubtful events depending on the natural conſtitution, " treaſon and villainy ſhall co-operate, to me it appears, " that a *God*, were he *willing*, muſt be *unable* to ſave this " country.

" By you, alone, O *Cæſar!* every thing, which you ſee " overthrown and overturned by the unavoidable calamities " of war, is to be replaced: Public juſtice muſt be reſto- " red, public credit muſt be retrieved; the luſts of mankind " ſuppreſſed, the race of mankind propagated, and every " drooping branch of the conſtitution, that now hangs its " head, is to be reared and ſupported by the wholſome ſe- " verity of laws. There is no denying that, in ſo fierce a " civil war, amidſt ſuch a combuſtion of arms and opi- " nions, in every event the State muſt receive a ſhock, by " the beating down ſome of her moſt graceful ornaments " and primeſt bulwarks. For the head of each party, in " the ſtorm of war, was forced on many meaſures which " he would have diſapproved of in the calm of peace. *You* " *alone are the phyſician to bind up theſe bleeding wounds of your* " *country, and every application from any other hand muſt prove* " *ineffectual.*

" With reluctance, therefore, did I hear from your mouth " that ſaying, which diſcovers at once the hero and the phi- " loſopher: *That you had lived long enough either for nature or* " *for glory.* Enough, if you will, for *nature*; nay, I will " add for *glory* too: But ſurely not for the chief purpoſe of " life, *your country!* Give over, therefore, I conjure you, " that philoſophical contempt of death. Do not be a ſage " at the expence of your country: For it has often reached " my ears, that it is commonly in your mouth, *that you*

" *have*

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the beginning of the following year, and was come as far as *Piræus* on his way towards *Rome*; where

" *have lived long enough for yourſelf.* True! if I could ſuppoſe that you lived for yourſelf, and was born for yourſelf alone. But now *that your courage and conduct are connected with the ſafety of* ROMANS, *and the conſtitution of* ROME; ſo far are you from having completed, that you have not yet laid the foundations of thoſe great deſigns you meditate. Thus you limit your life, not by the good of your country, but the intentions of your equity: Yet even that is not enough for the purpoſes of glory; which, wiſe as you are, you muſt own to be the ruling paſſion of your ſoul.

" *Shall I then,* ſay you, *leave behind me but a ſcanty portion of glory?* Yes: to others it would be ſufficient: But to *Cæſar* it is but ſcanty. For what, conſidered by itſelf is great, may prove but little when compared with the degrees to which it may be extended. If this was to be the end of your immortal acts, that, after conquering all your enemies, you ſhould leave the Republic in the condition in which it is now; conſider, I beſeech you, whether your divine virtue would not excite an admiration of you rather than any real glory: For glory is the illuſtrious fame of many and great ſervices either to our friends, our country, or to the whole race of mankind.

" This part, therefore, ſtill remains; there is one act more to be performed by you; to eſtabliſh the Republic again, that you may reap the benefit of it yourſelf in peace and proſperity. When you have paid this debt to your country, and fulfilled the ends of your nature by a ſatiety of living, you may then tell us, if you pleaſe, that *you have lived long enough:* Yet what is it, after all, that we can really call *long*, of which there is an end? For, when that end is once come, all paſt pleaſure is to be reckoned as nothing, ſince no more of it is to be expected. Though your mind, I know, was never content with theſe narrow bounds of life which nature has aſſigned to us, but inflamed always with an ardent love of immortality.

" Nor

where he was killed by *P. Magius Cilo*, his friend and companion; who, though he had been

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"Nor indeed is this to be conſidered as your life, which "is compriſed in this body and breath; but that, that, I "ſay is your life, which is to flouriſh in the memory of all "ages: Which poſterity will cheriſh, and eternity itſelf pro- "pagate. It is to this that you muſt attend; to this that "you muſt form yourſelf: Which has many things already "to admire, yet wants ſomething ſtill, that it may praiſe in "you. Poſterity will be amazed to hear and read of your "commands, provinces; the *Rhine*, the *Ocean*, the *Nile*; "your innumerable battles, incredible victories, infinite mo- "numents, ſplendid triumphs: But, unleſs this city be "eſtabliſhed again by your wiſdom and counſels, your name "indeed will wander far and wide, yet will have no certain "ſeat or place at laſt, where to fix itſelf. There will be alſo, "among thoſe who are yet unborn, the ſame controverſy "that has been among us; when ſome will extol your actions "to the ſkies; others perhaps will find ſomething defective "in them; and that one thing above all, if you ſhould not "extinguiſh this flame of civil war, by reſtoring liberty to "your country: For the one may be looked upon as the effect "of fate, but the other is the certain act of wiſdom.

"Pay a reverence, therefore, to thoſe Judges who will "paſs judgment upon you in ages to come; and with leſs par- "tiality perhaps than we, ſince they will neither be biaſſed by "affection or party, nor prejudiced by hatred or envy to you; "and though this, as ſome falſly imagine, ſhould then have "no relation to you, yet it concerns you certainly, at the "preſent, to act in ſuch a manner, that no oblivion may "ever obſcure the luſtre of your praiſes.

"Various were the inclinations of the citizens, and their "opinions wholly divided: Nor did we differ only in ſenti- "ments and wiſhes, but in arms alſo and camps: The me- "rits of the cauſe were dubious, and the contention be- "tween two celebrated Leaders: Many doubted what was the "beſt; many what was convenient; many what was decent; "ſome alſo what was lawful: The Commonwealth, at

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been Quæſtor, and was of a family which had borne ſome of the public offices, had attached himſelf to the fortunes of *Marcellus*, and followed him through the wars, and in his exile. After having given him two wounds, the one in his ſtomach, the other in his head near the ear, he ſtabbed himſelf with the ſame poniard. As ſoon as the news reached *Rome*, it raiſed a general conſternation: And, from the ſuſpicious nature of the times, all people's thoughts were preſently turned upon *Cæſar*, as if he were pri-

Middl. p. 194.

Id. p. 198.

" length, got over this ruinous, this deſtructive war: Victory " favoured the man whoſe reſentment was not inflamed by " conqueſt, but ſoftened by clemency; the man who did not " condemn to exile, or death, the enemy againſt whom he " was exaſperated. Some quitted their arms; they were for- " ced from others. That citizen is unjuſt and odious, who, " when hoſtilities are laid aſide in the field, retains them " in his boſom; much more juſtifiable is he who lays down " his life in the field of battle, and ſeals with his blood the " cauſe he has embraced.

" But ſince all civil diſcord is now ſubdued by the arms, " or extinguiſhed by the clemency of the victor, let us all " think and act with unanimity. It is, O *Cæſar*, only by " your remaining ſafe and fixed in the ſame principles which " you have heretofore, but more particularly this day ex- " preſſed, that we can be preſerved. Therefore all of us who " wiſh the proſperity of our country, beg and intreat, that you " would provide for your life and ſafety; and all of us, (I ſpeak " for others what I myſelf feel) as you ſuſpect ſome reaſon to " be cautious, *promiſe not only to guard you by day, and watch* " *you by night, but to form, with our own bodies and our own* " *breaſts, the wall of your defence.*"

Though all this was mere compliment in *Cicero*, it might have been ſpoken with great truth and ſincerity; for certain it is, that at this time, no power leſs than that of a Dictator, as *Cæſar* was, could remedy the diſorders of the State.

vately

vately the contriver of it; and, from the wretched fate of ſo illuſtrious a citizen, every man began to think himſelf in danger. *Cicero* was greatly ſhocked at it, and ſeemed to conſider it as the prelude of ſome greater evil to enſue; and *Atticus*, ſignifying his concern upon it, adviſes him to take a more particular care of himſelf, as being the only *conſular Senator* left, who ſtood expoſed to any envy. But *Cæſar*'s friends ſoon cleared him of all ſuſpicion; as indeed the fact itſelf did, when the circumſtances came to be known, and fixed the whole guilt of it on the fury of *Magius*. It was *Cicero*'s conjecture that *Magius*, oppreſſed with debts, and apprehending ſome trouble on that ſcore, at his return to *Rome*, had been urging *Marcellus*, who was his ſponſor for ſome part of them, to furniſh him with money to pay the whole; and, by receiving a denial, was provoked to the madneſs of killing his Patron. Others aſſign a different reaſon, as the rage of jealouſy, and the impatience of ſeeing others more favoured by *Marcellus* than himſelf[d].

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Ad. Att. xiii. 10.

Val. Max. ix. 11.

Soon after the affair of *Marcellus*, *Cicero* had another occaſion of trying both his eloquence and intereſt with *Cæſar* in the cauſe of *Ligarius*; who was now in exile, on account of

[d] *S. Sulpicius*, who, in a letter to *Cicero*, gives the account above, tells him, that the *Athenians* refuſed to grant a place of burial for him within the city, ſaying, that it was forbidden by their religion, and had never been indulged to any man. He was therefore buried without the city in the *Academy*. *Middl. p.* 172. *Ep. Fam.* iv. 12.

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having been in arms againſt *Cæſar* in the *African* war, in which he had borne a conſiderable command. His two brothers, however, had been on *Cæſar*'s ſide; and, being recommended by *Panſa*, and warmly ſupported by *Cicero*, had almoſt prevailed for his pardon; when *Q. Tubero*, who had an old quarrel with him, being deſirous to obſtruct it, and knowing *Cæſar* to be particularly exaſperated againſt all thoſe, who, through an obſtinate averſion to him, had renewed the war in *Africa*, accuſed him, in the uſual forms, of an uncommon zeal and violence in proſecuting that war. *Cæſar* is ſaid to have privately encouraged the proſecution, and ordered the cauſe to be tried in the *Forum*, where he ſat upon it in perſon, ſtrongly prepoſſeſſed againſt the criminal, and determined to lay hold of any plauſible pretence of condemning him: But the force of *Cicero*'s eloquence, exerted with all his ſkill in a cauſe which he had much at heart, got the better of all his prejudices, and extorted a pardon from him againſt his will*. This *Ligarius*, after his re-

Ep. Fam. vi. 14.

Plut. in Cic.

* The merit of this ſpeech, ſays Dr. *Middleton*, is too well known to want to be enlarged upon: Thoſe who read it will find no reaſon to charge *Cicero* with *flattery: But the free ſpirit, which it breathes, in the face of that power to which it was ſuing for mercy, muſt give a great idea of the art of the Speaker, who could deliver ſuch bold truths without offence; as well as of the generoſity of the Judge who heard them not only with patience, but approbation.* Middl. p. 173—175.

" Obſerve, *Cæſar*, ſays he, with what fidelity I plead " *Ligarius*'s cauſe, when I betray even my own by it. O

" that

return, lived in great confidence with *Brutus*, who found him a fit perſon to bear a part in the con-

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" that admirable clemency, worthy to be celebrated by every " kind of praiſe, letters, monuments! *M. Cicero* defends a " criminal before you, by proving him not to have been in " thoſe ſentiments in which he owns himſelf to have been: " Nor does he yet fear your ſecret thoughts, or, while he is " pleading for another, what may occur to you about him- " ſelf. See, I ſay, how little he is afraid of you. See with " what a courage and gaiety of ſpeaking your generoſity " and wiſdom inſpire me. I will raiſe my voice to ſuch a " pitch that the whole *Roman* people may hear me. After " the war was not only begun, *Cæſar*, but, in a great mea- " ſure, finiſhed, when I was driven by no neceſſity, I went, " by choice and judgment, to join myſelf with thoſe who " had taken arms againſt you. Before whom do I ſay " this? Why before him who, though he knew it to be " true, yet reſtored me to the Republic, before he had even " ſeen me; who wrote to me from *Egypt*, that I ſhould be the " ſame man that I had always been; and, when he was the " only Emperor within the dominion of *Rome*, ſuffered me to " be the other; and to hold my laurelled faſces, as long as " I thought them worth holding.—Do you then, *Tubero*, " call *Ligarius*'s conduct *wicked*? For what reaſon, ſince " that cauſe has never yet been called by that name? Some " indeed call it miſtake, others fear; thoſe, who ſpeak more " ſeverely, hope, ambition, hatred, obſtinacy, or, at the worſt, " raſhneſs; but no man beſides you has ever called it wicked- " neſs. For my part, were I to invent a proper and genuine " name for our calamity, I ſhould take it for a kind of fata- " lity, that had poſſeſſed the unwary minds of men; ſo that " none can think it ſtrange that all human counſels were " over-ruled by a divine neceſſity. Call us then, if you " pleaſe, unhappy, *though we can never be ſo under this* " *Conqueror*; but I ſpeak not of us who ſurvive, but of thoſe " who fell: Let them be ambitious; let them be angry; " let them be obſtinate; but let not the guilt of crime, of " fury, of parricide, ever be charged on *Cn. Pompey* and on

" many

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conſpiracy againſt *Cæſar*; but, happening to be taken ill near the time of its execution, when *Brutus* in a viſit to him began to lament, *that he was fallen ſick in a very unlucky hour*; he, preſently raiſing himſelf upon his elbow, and, taking *Brutus* by the hand, replied: Yet ſtill, *Brutus*, if you mean to do any thing worthy of yourſelf, I am well. Nor did he diſappoint *Brutus*'s opinion of him, for we find him afterwards in the liſt of the conſpirators.

Cicero compoſed, at this time, his panegyric upon *Cato*[1], which is loſt: But, from the accounts given of the work by antiquity, it appears, that

" many of thoſe who died with him. When did we ever
" hear any ſuch thing from you, *Cæſar*? Or *what other*
" *view had you in the war but to defend yourſelf from injury?*—
" You conſidered it, from the firſt, not as a war, but a ſeceſ-
" ſion; not an hoſtile, but a civil diſſenſion: Where both
" ſides wiſhed well to the Republic; yet, through a diffe-
" rence, partly of counſels, partly of inclinations, deviated
" from the common good: The dignity of the Leaders was
" almoſt equal; though not, perhaps, of thoſe who fol-
" lowed them; the cauſe was then dubious, ſince there was
" ſomething which one might approve on either ſide; but
" now that muſt needs be thought the beſt, which the Gods
" have favoured; and, after the experience of your cle-
" mency, who can be diſpleaſed with that victory, in which
" no man fell who was not actually in arms."

It would have been difficult for *Cæſar* to have been angry with theſe *bold truths*.

[1] Dr. *Middleton* (p. 160) and Abbé *Mongault* imagine, that *Cicero* had been left a guardian to *Cato*'s ſon, as he was alſo to young *Lucullus*, *Cato*'s nephew. " This teſtimony
" of *Cato*'s friendſhip and judgment of him, ſays the former
" of theſe writers, might induce him the more readily to pay

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that he ſpared no pains to adorn it. *Brutus*, alſo, compoſed and publiſhed a piece on the ſame ſubject. *Cæſar*, far from expreſſing any reſentment, affected to be pleaſed with them; yet declared that he would anſwer *Cicero*'s; and *Hirtius*, in the mean while, drew up a little piece, in the form of a letter to *Cicero*, filled with objections to *Cato*'s character, but with high compliments to *Cicero* himſelf; which *Cicero* took care to make public, and called it a ſpecimen of what *Cæſar*'s work was like to be. *Cæſar*'s anſwer was not publiſhed till the next year, upon his return from *Spain*, after the defeat of *Pompey*'s ſons. It was a laboured invective; anſwering *Cicero*'s book paragraph by paragraph, and accuſing *Cato* with all the art and force of his rhetoric, *as if in a public trial before Judges*; yet with expreſſions of great reſpect towards *Cicero*; whom, for his virtues and abilities, he compared to *Pericles* and *Theramenes* of *Athens*: And in a letter upon it to *Balbus*, which was ſhewn by

Tac. An. iv. 34. Quint. iii. 7. Plut. in

" this honour to his memory. It was a matter, however, of " no ſmall deliberation, in what manner he ought to treat the " ſubject: His friends adviſed him not to be too explicit and " particular in the detail of *Cato*'s praiſes, but to content him- " ſelf with a general encomium, for fear of irritating *Cæſar*, " by puſhing the argument too far. In a letter to *Atticus*, " (xii. 4.) he calls this *an Archimedean problem; but I can-* " *not hit upon any thing*, ſays he, *that thoſe friends of yours* " *will read with pleaſure, or even with patience: Beſides,* " *if I ſhould drop the account of* CATO'*s votes and ſpeeches in* " *the Senate, and of his political conduct in the State, and* " *give a ſlight commendation only of his conſtancy and gravity,* " *even this will be more than they care to bear: But the man* " *can-*

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his order to *Cicero*, he ſaid, *that, by the frequent reading of* CICERO's *Cato, he was grown more copious; but, after he had read* BRUTUS's, *thought himſelf more eloquent.*

Ad Att. xiii. 46. Middl. p. 193.

Brutus, about this time, took a reſolution of putting away his wife *Claudia*, to marry *Porcia*, *Bibulus*'s widow, and his uncle *Cato*'s daughter; a ſtep for which he was much cenſured; ſince *Claudia* had no ſtain upon her character; was nobly born; the ſiſter of *Appius Claudius*; and nearly allied to *Pompey*; ſo that his mother *Servilia*, though *Cato*'s ſiſter, ſeems to have been averſe to the divorce, and ſtrongly in the intereſt of *Claudia* againſt her niece. *Cicero*'s advice upon it was, that, if *Brutus* was reſolved upon the thing, he ſhould do it out of hand, as the beſt way to put an end to people's talking; by ſhewing that it was not done out of levity or complaiſance to the times, but to take the daughter of *Cato*, whoſe name was now highly popular: Which *Brutus* ſoon after complied with, and

" *cannot be praiſed as he deſerves, unleſs it be particularly* " *explained, how he foretold all that has happened to us; how* " *he took arms to prevent its happening; and parted with life* " *rather than ſee it happen.*" " Theſe were the topics, which " he reſolved to diſplay with all his force." And the Doctor thinks, that this work was *a remarkable proof of his being no temporiſer at this time.* But, ſince *Cæſar* and his friends were ſo much pleaſed with the work, it is very evident that they did not find their condemnation in it. His orations for *Marcellus*, for *Ligarius*, and afterwards for *Dejotarus*, may be called, with as good reaſon, *remarkable proofs* of his courage and veracity, whereas they are extraordinary examples of falſeneſs and ſervile adulation. If we examine his private cor-

and made *Porcia* his wife. And *Cicero*, when he ſeparated from *Terentia*, in the beginning of this year, had thoughts of marrying the daughter of *Pompey*. Nothing ſhews better how much they preſumed on *Cæſar*'s mildneſs. He married, however, *Publilia*, a young woman with a great fortune, to whom he was Guardian, to ſatisfy, ſays *Plutarch*, his creditors with her money. This drew upon him a great deal of cenſure; and was certainly an act of the greateſt injuſtice to *Terentia*, who had lived with him upwards of thirty years, and had made him the father of two children extremely dear to him.

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correſpondence at this period, we ſhall find, that he acted a double part; making his court, on the one hand, to *Cæſar*, and paſſing his whole time with *Cæſar*'s friends, of whom he was continually aſking favours; while, on the other hand, he was perpetually complaining of the ſtate of affairs, in the bittereſt and moſt unreaſonable terms, to Republicans, and to *Pompeians* then in exile.—The following letters accordingly will give the reader a moſt ſatisfactory account of his ſentiments and way of life during *Cæſar*'s adminiſtration: And we ſhall accompany them with ſome remarks.

CICERO to PAPIRIUS PÆTUS.

"YOUR letter afforded me a very agreeable inſtance "of your friendſhip, in the concern it expreſſed leſt I ſhould "be uneaſy at the report which had been brought me hither "by *Silius*;" [This man had brought an account from the army in *Africa*, that ſome witticiſms of *Cicero* had been reported to *Cæſar*, which had given him offence] "I was in- "deed before perfectly ſenſible how much you was diſturbed "at this circumſtance, by your care in ſending me duplicates "of a former letter upon the ſame ſubject: And I then re- "turned ſuch an anſwer as I thought would be ſufficient to "abate,

Ep. Fam. ix. 16. Melm. viii. 20.

" abate, at leaſt, if not entirely remove this your generous
" ſollicitude. But ſince I perceive, by your laſt letter, how
" much this affair ſtill dwells upon your mind; let me aſ-
" ſure you, my dear *Pætus*, *that I have employed every ar-*
" *tifice* (for we muſt now, my friend, be armed with cunning,
" as well as prudence) *to conciliate the good graces of the perſons*
" *you mention*: And, if I miſtake not, my endeavours have
" not proved ineffectual. I receive indeed ſo many marks of
" reſpect and eſteem from thoſe who are moſt in *Cæſar*'s fa-
" vour, that I cannot but flatter myſelf they have a true re-
" gard for me. It muſt be confeſſed, at the ſame time, that
" a pretended affection is not eaſily diſcernible from a real
" one, unleſs in ſeaſons of diſtreſs. For adverſity is to
" friendſhip what fire is to gold; the only infallible teſt
" to diſcover the genuine from the counterfeit: as, in all
" other circumſtances, they both bear the ſame common
" ſignatures. I have one ſtrong reaſon however, to perſuade
" me of their ſincerity: as neither their ſituation, nor mine,
" can by any means tempt them to diſſemble with me. As
" to that perſon [*Cæſar*] in whom all power is now cen-
" tered, I am not ſenſible that I have any thing to fear:
" or nothing more, at leaſt, than what ariſes from that ge-
" neral precarious ſtate in which all things muſt ſtand where
" the fence of laws is broken down; and that it is impoſſi-
" ble to pronounce with aſſurance of any event, which de-
" pends wholly upon the will, not to ſay the caprice, of
" another. But this I can with confidence affirm, that I have
" not, in any ſingle inſtance, given him any juſt occaſion to
" take offence: and, in the article you point out, I have been
" particularly cautious. There was a time, it is true, when I
" thought it well became me, by whom *Rome* itſelf was free,
" to ſpeak my ſentiments with freedom: But, now that our
" liberties are no more, I deem it equally agreeable to my
" preſent ſituation not to ſay any thing that may diſguſt ei-
" ther *Cæſar* or his favourites. But, were I to ſuppreſs
" every riſing raillery, that might pique thoſe at whom it is
" directed, I muſt renounce, you know, all my reputation as
" a wit: And, in good earneſt, it is a character upon which
" I do not ſet ſo high a value as to be unwilling to reſign, if
" it were in my power. However, I am in no danger of
" ſuffering in *Cæſar*'s opinion, by being repreſented as the

" au-

" author of any ſarcaſms to which I have no claim: As his
" judgment is much too penetrating ever to be deceived by
" any impoſition of this nature. I remember your brother
" *Servius*, whom I look upon to be one of the moſt learned
" Critics that this age has produced, was ſo converſant in
" the writings of our Poets, and had acquired ſuch an ex-
" cellent and judicious ear, that he could immediately diſ-
" tinguiſh the numbers of *Plautus* from thoſe of any other
" author. Thus *Cæſar*, I am told, when he made his
" large collection of apothegms, conſtantly rejected any piece
" of wit that was brought to him as mine, if it happened to
" be ſpurious: A diſtinction he is much more able to make
" at preſent, as his particular friends paſs almoſt every day
" of their lives in my company. As our converſation gene-
" rally turns upon a variety of ſubjects, I frequently ſtrike out
" thoughts which they look upon as not altogether void,
" perhaps of ſpirit and ingenuity. Now theſe little ſallies of
" pleaſantry, together with the general occurrences of *Rome*,
" are commonly tranſmitted to *Cæſar*, in purſuance of his
" own expreſs directions: So that, if any thing of this kind
" is mentioned by others as coming from me, he always diſ-
" regards it. You ſee then, that the lines you quote, with ſo
" much propriety, from the tragedy of *Oenomaus*, contain a
" caution altogether unneceſſary. For tell me, my friend,
" what jealouſies can I poſſibly create? Or who will look with
" envy upon a man in my humble ſituation? But, granting
" I were in ever ſo enviable a ſtate, yet, let me obſerve, that
" it is the opinion of thoſe philoſophers who alone ſeem to
" have underſtood the true nature of virtue, that a good man
" is anſwerable for nothing farther than his own innocence.
" Now, in this reſpect, I think myſelf doubly irreproach-
" able: In the firſt place, as having recommended ſuch pub-
" lic meaſures as were for the intereſt of the Commonwealth;
" and, in the next, when I found I was not ſufficiently ſup-
" ported to render my counſels effectual, that I did not deem
" it adviſeable to contend farther by arms againſt a ſuperior
" ſtrength. Moſt certainly, therefore, I cannot juſtly be ac-
" cuſed of having failed in the duty of a good citizen. The
" only part, therefore, that now remains for me, is to be
" cautious not to expoſe myſelf, by any indiſcreet word or
" action, to the reſentment of thoſe in power: A part which

" I hold

"I hold likewiſe to be agreeable to the character of true "wiſdom. . . . . But to turn from the ſerious to the jo- "coſe part of your letter.—The ſtrain of pleaſantry you break "into, immediately after having quoted the tragedy of *Omo-* "*mauſ*, puts me in mind of the modern method of intro- "ducing, at the end of thoſe graver dramatic pieces, the "buffoon humour of our low mimes, inſtead of the more de- "licate burleſque of the old *Atellan* farces. Why elſe do "you talk of your paltry polypuſſes, and your mouldy "cheeſe? In pure good-nature, it is true, I formerly ſub- "mitted to ſit down with you to ſuch homely fare: but "more refined company has improved me into a better "taſte: For *Hirtius* and *Dolabella*, let me tell you, are "my Preceptors in the ſcience of the table; As, in return, "they are my diſciples in that of the bar. But I ſuppoſe "you have already heard, that they frequently declaim at my "houſe, and I ſup at theirs."

To the ſame.

Ep. Fam. ix. 18. Melm. viii. 22.

"YOUR very agreeable letter found me wholly diſen- "gaged at my *Tuſculan* villa. I retired hither during the "abſence of my *pupils* [*Hirtius* and *Dolabella*] whom I have "ſent to meet their victorious friend, in order to conciliate "his good graces in my favour. As *Dionyſius*, the tyrant, "after he had been expelled from *Syracuſe*, opened a ſchool, "it is ſaid, at *Corinth*; in the ſame manner, being driven "from my dominions in the Forum, I have erected a ſort of "academy in my own houſe; and I perceive, by your let- "ter, that you approve the ſcheme. I have many reaſons "for approving it too: And, principally, as it affords me, "what is highly expedient in the preſent conjuncture, a "means of eſtabliſhing an intereſt with thoſe in whoſe friend- "ſhip I may find a protection. How far my intentions in "this reſpect may be anſwered, I know not: I can only ſay, "that I have hitherto had no reaſon to prefer the different "meaſures which others of the ſame party with myſelf have "purſued; unleſs, perhaps, it would have been more eli- "gible not to have ſurvived the ruin of our cauſe. It "would ſo, I confeſs, had I died either in the camp, or "in the field: But the former did not happen to be my

"fate;

"fate; and, as to the latter, I was never engaged in any "action. But, the inglorious manner in which *Pompey*, to- "gether with *Scipio*, *Afranius*, and your friend *Lentulus*, "ſeverally loſt their lives, will ſcarcely, I ſuppoſe, be thought "a more deſirable lot. As to *Cato*'s death; it muſt be "acknowledged to have been truly noble: And I can ſtill "follow his example, whenever I ſhall be ſo diſpoſed: Let "me only endeavour, as in truth I do, not to be compelled to "it by the ſame neceſſity: And this, indeed, is my firſt reaſon "for engaging in my preſent ſcheme. My next is, that I find "it an advantage not only to my health, which began to be "impaired by the intermiſſion of exerciſes of this kind, but "alſo to my oratorial talents, if any I ever poſſeſſed; which "would have totally loſt their vigour, if I had not had re- "courſe to this method of keeping them in play. The laſt "benefit I ſhall mention (and the principal one, I dare ſay, "in your eſtimation) is, that it has introduced me to the demo- "liſhing a greater number of more delicious peacocks, than "you have had the devouring of paltry pigeons in all your life. "The truth of it is, whilſt you are humbly ſipping the mea- "gre broths of the ſneaking *Aterius*, I am luxuriouſly rega- "ling myſelf with the ſavoury ſoups of the magnificent *Hir- "tius*. If you have any ſpirit then, fly hither, and learn, "from our elegant bills of fare, how to refine your own. ". . . . To encourage you to do ſo, you ſhall be honoured "with a chair and cuſhion next to mine, and ſit the ſecond "great pedagogue in my celebrated ſchool."

The following letter to his friend NIGIDIUS FIGULUS, who was then in exile, is in amore melancholy ſtrain:

"THOUGH I have been long looking out for an oc- "caſion of writing to you, yet I have not only been unable "to meet with any particular ſubject for that purpoſe, but "find myſelf utterly at a loſs even to furniſh out a common "letter. The calamities of our country have ſpoiled me "for thoſe jocoſe epiſtles, with which, in happier days, I "uſed to entertain my friends: As fortune has rendered me "incapable of writing, or in truth of thinking upon any ſub- "ject of a chearful nature. There remains another ſpecies of "letters of a grave and ſerious caſt, peculiarly adapted to "theſe

Ep. Fam. iv. 13. Melm. ix. 3.

" theſe miſerable times. But as a letter of this kind ought " to contain either ſome promiſe of aſſiſting you to ſurmount " your misfortunes, or ſome arguments to ſupport you under " them; from theſe too I am likewiſe excluded. Sunk, in- " deed, as I am into the ſame abject fortune as yourſelf; " what aſſiſtance can I poſſibly offer you? The truth is, I am " obliged to have recourſe myſelf to the aid of others: And " I have much more reaſon to lament *that I live upon theſe diſ-* " *graceful terms, than to rejoice that I am ſtill in being.* I ſay " not this from any extraordinary injuries which I have ſuf- " fered in my own perſon: As indeed there is nothing which " in the preſent conjuncture, I could wiſh for myſelf, that " *Cæſar* has not voluntarily offered me. *Nevertheleſs the ſor-* " *rows that oppreſs my heart are of ſo ſevere a nature, that I* " *think myſelf guilty of a crime in ſtill continuing to live.* For I " live deprived of many of my moſt intimate friends, whom " death, or thoſe public calamities which have driven them " from their country, have ſeparated from me: As I have " likewiſe loſt, by the ſame means, all thoſe whoſe good-will " I formerly conciliated, when, by your aſſiſtance, I ſucceſs- " fully ſtood forth in defence of the Republic. I have the " unhappineſs, at the ſame time, to be placed in the midſt " of the general wreck and plunder of their fortunes: And " not only have the pain to hear, (but, what is far more af- " fecting) am a ſpectator of the diſſipation of the eſtates " which belonged to thoſe illuſtrious aſſociates, who aſſiſted " me in extinguiſhing the flames of that dangerous conſpi- " racy. In a word, I have the mortification to find myſelf, " utterly diveſted of all credit, authority, and honours in " that Republic, where I once flouriſhed in the full poſſeſ- " ſion of theſe glorious diſtinctions. *Cæſar*, it is true, acts " towards me with the utmoſt generoſity: But his generoſity " cannot reſtore what I have loſt by the general violence and " confuſion of the times. Thus, bereaved of thoſe advan- " tages to which I was habituated by genius, by inclination, " and by cuſtom, I imagine the world is no leſs diſſatisfied " with me than I am with myſelf. Formed indeed as I was " by nature to be perpetually engaged in the nobleſt and " moſt important occupations, I am now deprived of every " means, not only of acting, but thinking to any public

" pur-

" purpoſe. There was a time when my aſſiſtance could have " raiſed the obſcure, and protected even the guilty: But " now I cannot ſo much as ſend a favourable promiſe to " *Nigidius*; to the virtuous and learned *Nigidius*; to the man " who once flouriſhed in the higheſt credit, and who was " always my warmeſt friend! Thus you ſee that I am totally " diſqualified from writing letters to you of this kind.

" The only ſubject, that remains to me then, is to endea- " vour to draw off your mind from its inquietudes, by lay- " ing before you ſuch arguments as may afford you a well- " grounded conſolation. But, if ever any man was peculiarly " qualified to employ the ſtrongeſt reaſonings of this nature, " either for his own uſe, or for that of others, moſt un- " doubtedly it is yourſelf. Such, therefore, as may be drawn " from the refined ſources of philoſophy, I will not pre- " tend to touch; but ſhall leave them entirely to your own " ſuggeſtions. Whatever is worthy of a man of true wiſdom " and fortitude; whatever is agreeable to that character you " have ſuſtained in the world, and to thoſe ſtudies in which " you ſo early excelled; whatever, in ſhort, is expected from " a great and exalted mind in the circumſtances wherein you " are placed, your own reflections will beſt ſupply. I will " only take upon myſelf therefore to inform you of what I " have been able to diſcover from my being ſituated in *Rome*, " and giving a particular attention to every occurrence that " paſſes. I will venture then with confidence to aſſure you " that your preſent troubles (perhaps too I might add, that " thoſe of the Republic itſelf) will not be of long continu- " ance. For, in the firſt place, *Cæſar* ſeems well-inclined " to recall you from exile: And, truſt me, I ſpeak this from " no haſty conjecture. On the contrary, I examine his ſen- " timents and diſpoſition ſo much the more ſtrictly, as I am " leſs biaſſed in his favour by any particular connexions. I " am perſuaded then that the ſingle reaſon for his delaying " to reſtore you is, that he may, with a better grace, refuſe " the ſame favour to others, againſt whom he is more warmly " incenſed. I am ſure, at leaſt, that all his moſt intimate " friends and favourites both think and ſpeak of you highly " to your advantage. In the next place, the populace, or " rather, I ſhould ſay, the whole community in general, are " ſtrongly in your intereſt. And, let me add, that the Re-

" pub-

" public herſelf, whoſe power at preſent, it is true, is cer-
" tainly inconſiderable, but who muſt neceſſarily, however,
" recover ſome degree of credit; the Republic herſelf, believe
" me, will ſoon obtain your reſtoration from thoſe who at this
" time hold her in ſubjection. In this reſpect therefore I
" may venture even to promiſe you ſome aſſiſtance. With
" this view, I ſhall cloſely attach myſelf to *Cæſar*'s favou-
" rites; who are all of them indeed extremely fond of me,
" and ſpend much of their time in my company: As I ſhall
" inſinuate myſelf into an intimacy with *Cæſar*; to which *my*
" *own modeſty* has hitherto proved the ſingle obſtruction. In
" ſhort, I ſhall purſue every probable means of this kind
" (and ſome too that I dare not commit to paper) in order
" to obtain your return. As to other articles of aſſiſtance, I
" am ſenſible there are many who are perfectly well inclined
" to offer you their ſervices; but you may depend upon me
" as the firſt and forwardeſt in that number."

To Curius.

Ep. Fam. vii. 28. Melm. ix. 25.

" THERE was a time when I thought you made a very
" injudicious choice, by preferring a foreign country to your
" own. I imagined that *Rome* (while yet alas! it was *Rome*)
" muſt be far more ſuitable, I will not only ſay than *Patræ*,
" bnt even than the nobleſt city in the *Peloponneſus*, to a man
" of your amiable and elegant turn of mind. But now, on
" the contrary, I look upon your having retired into *Greece*,
" when our affairs were well nigh deſperate, as a ſtrong
" proof of your great penetration: And I conſider your ab-
" ſence not only as a very judicious, but a very happy reſo-
" lution. Yet, why do I call it happy, when it is impoſſi-
" ble that happineſs ſhould be the portion of any man in
" theſe wretched times, who poſſeſſes the leaſt degree of
" ſenſibility? However, that deſirable privilege, which you,
" who were at liberty to leave *Italy*, enjoy by travelling, I
" have procured by another method: And I can, in ſome
" ſort ſay, no leſs than yourſelf, that I live

Where nor the name, nor deeds accurs'd, I hear,
Of Pelops' *impious race*——

" For,

" For, as ſoon as my levee is over, (which is ſomewhat more " frequented than formerly; a Patriot being now looked " upon as a ſight of all others the moſt uncommon *) I ſhut " myſelf up in my library. And it is there, my friend, that " I am employed in compoſitions which you will find, per- " haps, to be animated with all that ſpirit, which you " once ſaid ſo ill agreed with my dejection and deſpair; when " you reproached me at your houſe, for not acting up to the " fortitude that appeared in my writings, I muſt confeſs, I " could not at that time forbear lamenting the wretched fate " of the Republic: To which I was the more tenderly attach- " ed as I had not only been diſtinguiſhed with its honours, " but had greatly aſſiſted it by my ſervices. And even now " that time (which wears out the ſorrows of the weakeſt " minds) together with reaſon (which ought to have the " ſtrongeſt influence for that purpoſe) have jointly contributed " to compoſe my breaſt; yet I ſtill lament to ſee the Com- " monwealth thus fallen, without a hope of ever riſing more! " *There is nothing, however, that can at preſent be juſtly im-* " *puted to him, in whom all power is now veſted: unleſs, per-* " *haps, it be that he has more than he ought.* And, as to " what is paſt, *our fate and our follies have had ſo large a* " *ſhare in all that has happened, that we cannot complain with* " *a good grace.* As little reaſon is there to hope that affairs " will mend. I cannot, therefore, but conclude my letter as " I began it, with admiring your judgment, if it were choice, " or your fortune, if it were chance, which led you from " this unpleaſing ſcene."

The ingenious author of the life of *Cicero*, after having preſented to his reader a few extracts from the foregoing letters, has made the following obſervations: " It is certain " that there was not a man in the Republic, ſo particularly " engaged, both by principle and intereſt, to wiſh well to " its liberty, or who had ſo much to loſe by the ſubverſion of " it, as he: For, as long as it was governed by civil me- " thods, Middl. p. 159.

* A *true Patriot* was a ſight in all ages too uncommon, it muſt be owned, not to have been worth remarking: But whether thoſe who viſited *Cicero*, in order to view ſo ſingular a curioſity, were diſappointed or not, is a queſtion, which does not require great ſagacity to determine.

" thods, and ſtood upon the foundation of its laws, he was " undoubtedly *the firſt citizen in it*; had *the chief influence* " *in the Senate*; *the chief authority with the People*: And, as " all his hopes and fortunes were grounded on the peace of " his country, ſo all his labours and ſtudies were perpetually " applied to the promotion of it. It is no wonder, there- " fore, in the preſent ſituation of the city, oppreſſed by arms " and a tyrannical power, to find him ſo particularly impa- " tient *under the common miſery*, and expreſſing ſo keen a " ſenſe of *the diminution of his dignity*, and *the diſgrace of ſer-* " *ving where he had been uſed to govern.* CÆSAR, on the " other hand, though he knew his temper and principles " to be irreconcileable to his uſurped dominion, yet out of " friendſhip to the man, and a reverence for his character, " was determined to treat him with the greateſt humanity; " and, by all the marks of perſonal favour, to make his life " not only tolerable, but eaſy to him: Yet all that he could " do had no other effect on *Cicero*, than to make him think " and ſpeak ſometimes favourably of the natural clemency " of their maſter; and to entertain ſome hopes from it, " that he would be one day perſuaded to reſtore the public " liberty: But, excluſive of that hope, he never mentions his " government, but as a *real tyranny*, or his perſon in any " other ſtyle, than as *the oppreſſor of his country.*"

Is it not amazing to hear Dr. *Middleton* talk in this ſtrain? Had *Cicero* been *uſed to govern Rome?* *Cicero* ever a ſlave to the Great, the perpetual panegyriſt of the Triumvirs, and their tool to all the purpoſes of their ambition; who was no ſooner abandoned by them, than he fell a ſacrifice to the reſentment of a young rake whom he had offended. " *It is not wonderful that he ſhould expreſs ſo keen a ſenſe of the diminution of his dignity.*" Was there then more *dignity* in his behaviour before the triumvirate, when, contrary to the views of the ariſtocracy, to ingratiate himſelf with *Pompey*, he defended the *Gabinian* and *Manilian* laws? After the triumvirate was formed, who was the promoter of *Cæſar*'s power, but he? Of *Craſſus*'s, that man whom he abhorred, but he? Who was the advocate of all the miſcreants of the State, but he? *Cicero* all his life talked of *his dignity*, and could give a juſt definition of *true dignity*, when he pleaſed; " but

but in his actions certainly he never ſhewed any, if dignity conſiſts in *an upright, open, generous behaviour*, and not in prating to a Senate or a mob right or wrong.—"*He was im-*"*patient under the common miſery.*" But was really the State miſerable under *Cæſar*'s adminiſtration? Did he not reſtore order and peace in a diſtracted government? Did he not immediately ſet about making the moſt ſalutary laws? Was he not ſo intent upon their execution, as to be inclined to delay his expedition into *Parthia*, to give them, by his preſence in the city, a greater force? Did not the people, under his ſhort dominion, taſte all the ſweets of liberty but the name? And did not that empty name, under their own government, tolerate all the outrageous barbarity and injuſtice of the moſt abſolute tyranny? Were *order* and *affluence* no public bleſſings, becauſe they were the gift of *Cæſar*? Did not *Cicero* himſelf enjoy the greateſt eaſe and liberty, and more power, by his intereſt with *Cæſar*, than he ever had in the Republic? And, when we view him in this tranquillity, oppoſed to the late tempeſtuous times he had been toſſed in, was it gratitude in *Cicero* that he ſtill talked of *Cæſar* as the oppreſſor of his country? Or, were the recovered ſweets of life, which *Cicero* was now taſting, all imbittered, becauſe the generoſity of *Cæſar*, had no title to make them ſecure to him? If ſuch indulgence were the effect of *tyranny*, what name ſhould *Cicero* have given to that upright Republic that baniſhed him?

Cibber, p. 202.

But was not *Cæſar* the immediate deſtroyer of the *Roman* liberty? Certainly he was not: "Had *Rome* at the time of the "civil war, been miſtreſs of herſelf, both *Pompey* and *Cæſar* "muſt have equally obeyed her. Though her government "was not legally changed, it was ſo viſibly altered by time "and accidents, that it had then as much the appearance "of an elective monarchy as of a Republic, its ancient liberty "having ſcarce any one privilege left, but that of voting by "the ſword, what ſhould be the name of the man that was "to deſtroy it.—Had not the Republic almoſt conſumed it-"ſelf for want of an uncontrouled Magiſtrate? And was "it better that the whole had periſhed, than that an uncom-"miſſioned power ſhould have preſumed to ſave the remains "of it? Was ſo unaſked a favour an injury, when public vio-"lence was grown too ſtrong for the old laws; had not ne-

Id. p. 198.

" ceſſity, when ſhe had no laws, a right to form new ones for " her own uſe? And what poſſible power, but that of *Cæſar*, " could have aſſiſted that neceſſity to make them? Though " form and order be indiſpenſable in the *quiet* execution of " laws, yet there may be critical ſeaſons or times of danger, " when the breaking through them may be equally neceſſary, " and which the *Roman* Republic, under their happieſt ſettle- " ment, thought it ſometimes adviſeable to comply with; and " in ſuch caſes made a temporary Dictator, *to take care the* " *Commonwealth came to no harm.* Thus, by parity of rea- " ſon, when *Pompey* had, by his intimidating army, made " himſelf little leſs than ſuch a Dictator, had not *Cæſar* juſt " as good a right to diſplace him? So that, whatever title " was wanting to *Cæſar*'s office, his office at leaſt became ne- " ceſſary.——Admitting then that, out of the ruins of this " ſelf-ſubverted Republic, *Cæſar* had for ſome time de- " ſigned to erect a monarchy, what more ſalutary expedi- " ent could, in their preſent diſtractions, be hoped for? " Wherein was his uſurpation a more public grievance, than " in throwing water upon a houſe in flames? Would *Pompey* " have held the imperial hand over them with more gen- " tleneſs than *Cæſar?* This is the only material conſidera- " tion, *ſince without a Maſter Rome could not live.* Now it is " agreed on all ſides, that *Pompey*'s victory would have been " a cruel one; and ſo intent were his followers upon deſtruc- " tion and proſcriptions, that *Cæſar*'s clemency ſtruck them " with amazement, and they could not believe their ſenſes."

But ſhould not *Cæſar* have reſtored the Commonwealth, as *Sylla* did? *Sylla*'s ſettlement was no reſtoration of the pub- lic liberty, or of the true *democratic* government; he changed the conſtitution of the State and made it *ariſtocratic*; which, we are told by politicians is the worſt of governments. This *ariſtocracy* ſubſiſted but a few years; *Pompey* by his conqueſts acquired ſo much wealth, glory, and power, that he became of courſe the Maſter of the Republic; till *Cæſar*, by his conqueſts, glory, and power, became his competitor: Part of the State choſe to adhere to *Pompey*, another part ſided with *Cæſar*. *Cæſar* had ſucceſs, and ſhewed he deſerved it by his moderation and clemency. To have relinquiſhed the ſo- vereign authority would have been to have acted as an e-

nemy,

nemy to his country, ſince, having it in his power to do univerſal good, he would have choſen to have thrown the State into the ſame confuſions and convulſions out of which it had ſo luckily and ſo gently emerged. "And why ſhould we "ſuppoſe a ſoul ſo elevated as *Cæſar*'s could be ignorant of "advantages to be derived from his greatneſs, or could "think that the power of doing univerſal good could have a "joy or glory ſuperior to it?" Did not *Cicero* himſelf encourage him to keep his authority, and lay before him the ſtrongeſt motives for this purpoſe, in his ſpeech for *Marcellus?* And, if *Cæſar* had taken *Cicero* into his council, and flattered his vanity by giving him the appearance of a ſhare in the adminiſtration, who can doubt but he would have had, in our Orator, a zealous panegyriſt of all his actions, who, at the time that he made the complaints which have occaſioned theſe reflections, writes thus to his friend *Aulus Cæcina*, Fam. vi. 6. *Melm.* ix. 34. "I ſhall now, indeed, be enabled to employ "my zeal more effectually than heretofore, *as I make great* "*and daily advances in* CÆSAR's *friendſhip*; not to mention "my intereſt alſo with his favourites, who diſtinguiſh me with the firſt rank in their affection." In the ſame letter he raiſes the hopes of his friend, then in exile, by the conſideration of *Cæſar*'s magnanimous conduct: "I cannot but "obſerve to you, that I have often occaſion to admire the "*juſtice* and *judgment* of *Cæſar*; who never ſpeaks of *Pompey*, "but in terms of the higheſt honour. Should it be ſaid, that, "whatever regard he may ſhew to his memory, he treated his "perſon upon many occaſions with great aſperity: Let it be "remembered, that theſe inſtances cannot reaſonably be imputed to *Cæſar*, but were the natural conſequences of war. "But how favourably has he received many of us, and myſelf in particular, who were engaged in the ſame party? "Has he not appointed *Caſſius* to be his Lieutenant? Has "he not given the government of *Gaul* to *Brutus?* and that "of *Greece* to *Sulpicius?* In a word, highly incenſed as he "was againſt *Marcellus*, has he not in the moſt honourable "manner reſtored him to his friends and to his country?" *Cicero* ſucceeded ſo well in his application to *Cæſar*'s favour, that, the following year, when he had any thing to aſk, he

Cibber, p. 200.

wrote directly to himſelf: And his letters do but ill ſupport what *Dr. Middleton* ſays of his ſhyneſs during *Cæſar*'s adminiſtration.

CHAP. X.

Cæſar's war in Spain *againſt* Pompey's *ſons. The honours decreed him by the Senate. His triumph, and thoſe of his two Lieutenants* Q. Fabius *and* Q. Pedius. Cicero's *grief for the death of his daughter* Tullia. *His writings during his retreat at this time.*

C. Julius Cæsar, Dictator III. Conſul IV. ſine Collega.
M. Æmilius Lepidus, Mag. Equit.

A. R. 708. Bef. Chr. 44. 407 Conſ.

IN the end of the year *Cæſar* was called away in great haſte into *Spain* to oppoſe the attempts of *Pompey*'s ſons. The city was left without *Conſuls* or *Prætors*, under the government of *Lepidus*, General of the Horſe, and ſix Prefects to adminiſter juſtice. The Tribunes and the Ediles were the only Magiſtrates elected in the ordinary form.

Hirt. de Bell. Alex.

After the defeat of *Afranius*, *Cæſar* appointed to the government of *Spain* *Q. Caſſius Longinus*, who was Tribune with *Antony* when the civil war broke out, and fled with him to *Ravenna*. He had been Quæſtor there under *Pompey*, and was well acquainted with the country: But his violence and avarice, during his quæſtorſhip, had rendered him the object of the public hatred; and he had been wounded in an attempt made upon his

his life. Inveſted by *Cæſar* with ſovereign authority, he applied himſelf wholly to gain the hearts of his ſoldiers by largeſſes and a relaxation of military diſcipline, hoping to find in his army a bulwark againſt the reſentment of the people: And, at the ſame time, to ſatisfy the demands of his avarice, he committed all kinds of acts, both of injuſtice and cruelty. This behaviour brought him into contempt even with the miniſters of his violence, and produced a ſecond conſpiracy, which broke out, when, purſuant to *Cæſar*'s orders, he was ſetting out for *Mauritania*, in order to give King *Juba* employment at home, and hinder him from ſending ſuccours to *Pompey*, as he had already done. The conſpirators, who were all of *Italica*, a city founded by the elder *Scipio* in *Bætica*, ſet upon him in open day, and gave him ſeveral wounds; but, none of them proving mortal, he had the ſatisfaction to revenge himſelf on them by tortures and death. The act of the conſpirators was approved by a great part of the army, as well as of the people. Two of the legions, who had formerly ſerved under *Varro*, *Pompey*'s Lieutenant, ſoon ſhewed their diſaffection by an open mutiny; and, their hatred to *Caſſius* reviving their affection for *Pompey*, they declared for him, and engraved his name on their bucklers. Three legions continued faithful to *Longinus*, not through any regard for him, but purely on account of their attachment to *Cæſar*. The city of *Corduba*, where a great many *Romans* were ſettled, deteſted alſo

Y. R. 708. Bef. Chr. 44. 46 Conſ.

Sevilla la veia.

A.R. 708. Bef. Chr. 44. 407 Conſ.

Longinus, but were unwilling to abandon *Cæſar's* intereſt. This commotion might have proved fatal to *Cæſar*, had not the Quæſtor *Marcellus Eſerninus* united all *Longinus*'s enemies under *Cæſar*'s name and authority: Which was effected with more eaſe, as accounts came about this time of the victory at *Pharſalia*. *Longinus* on his ſide had called to his aſſiſtance *Bogud*, King of *Mauritania*, who was in *Cæſar*'s alliance, and their two combined armies waged war for ſome time againſt *Marcellus*, till *Lepidus*, Proconſul in *nether Spain*, coming ſoon after into *Bætica*, with a conſiderable force, *Marcellus* readily conſented to his arbitration. *Longinus* was forced to do the ſame; and, a ſhort time after being informed that *Trebonius*, his ſucceſſor, was arrived in the province, he put immediately to ſea with all his treaſure, and was loſt in a ſtorm in the mouth of the *Iberus*. But, as popular fury does not eaſily ſubſide, this calm was of but ſhort duration. Many, conſcious of their offence, were afraid of *Cæſar*'s reſentment, and were well pleaſed to hear that *Metellus Scipio* had aſſembled a powerful army in *Africa*. They ſent Deputies to him to offer their ſervice and demand his protection; and *Cn. Pompey* was ſent on this occaſion, as has been related above, after he had made a fruitleſs attempt upon the kingdom of *Bogud*. The diſaffected legions did not ſtay for his arrival, but, hearing that he was landed in the *Balearian* iſlands, and was there detained by ſickneſs, they openly declared againſt *Trebonius*, and put themſelves under the conduct of *T. Scapula*, and *Q. Apevius*,

uius, two *Roman* Knights. As ſoon as young *Pompey* recovered his health, he joined his friends; and in a ſhort time got together eleven legions, and drove *Trebonius* out of *Bætica*. His brother *Sextus*, in conjunction with *Labienus* and *Varus*, brought him the remainder of *Scipio*'s fleet, and his land army was greatly ſtrengthened by the fugitives from *Africa*; ſo that he was able to act powerfully both by ſea and land. *Cæſar*, immediately after the defeat of *Scipio* and *Juba*, had ſent *Q. Fabius* and *Q. Pedius* with part of his *African* army, and *Didius* with his fleet, to act againſt the ſons of *Pompey*. This Admiral had engaged with ſucceſs the *Pompeian* fleet commanded by *Varus*, and forced it to take refuge in a port called by *Dio Crantia*, which is probably that of *Carteia*: But the Lieutenants could not make head againſt the enemy in the field; and *Cæſar*'s preſence was neceſſary to prevent the entire reduction of the province.

Y. R. 708. Bef. Chr. 44. 407 Conſ.

Dio, l. xliii.

Cæſar therefore, called upon by the inhabitants that remained faithful to him, and by his own Lieutenants, ſet out before the end of *November*, arrived at *Obulco*, near *Corduba*, in twenty-ſeven days, and ſurpriſed both his friends and enemies by his ſudden appearance among them. *Cn. Pompey* was at this time actually beſieging *Ulia*, the only town of *Bætica*, which held out againſt him. *Cæſar* found means to throw ſome ſuccour into it, and marched himſelf to *Corduba*, where *Sextus Pompey* had locked himſelf up. *Sextus* called away his brother from *Ulia* to his aſſiſtance; but *Cæſar*, by that motion, had only in view to bring

Hirt. de Bell. Hiſp. Dio, l. xliii

Y. R. 708, Bef. Chr. 44. 407 Conf.

about a general and deciſive action. Finding, however, that the two *Pompey's* had taken a fixed reſolution to keep upon the defenſive, he turned off to *Ategua*, the ſtrongeſt fortreſs poſſeſſed by his enemies: And, in the depth of winter, and in the neighbourhood of a powerful army, carried it the 19*th* of *February*, when it ſurrendered at diſcretion. The garriſon had offered to capitulate ſooner, and ſurrender upon terms; but *Cæſar* anſwered, haughtily, "that he was uſed to pre-"ſcribe conditions, not to receive them:" And he treated them, it is probable, with ſeverity; for they had been guilty of great cruelty in cutting the throats of a great number of the inhabitants, who were thought to be in his intereſt, and whoſe bodies were thrown over the walls during the ſiege. *Cn. Pompey*, upon the news of the taking of *Ategua*, treated in the ſame manner, and for the ſame crime, ſeventy-four citizens of a neighbouring town. Acts of the greateſt oppreſſion and inhumanity were committed on both ſides. The two armies, ſhifting continually their ground, in order to find opportunities to harraſs each other, advanced at length into the plains of *Munda*. There, on the 27*th* of *March*, as *Cæſar* was preparing to move his camp, he was informed, that the enemy had been drawn up in order of battle ever ſince mid-night. *Pompey*, dreading the contempt and deſertion of his followers, who were all eager for a battle, had reſolved to fight; and had choſen for that purpoſe an advantageous poſt on an eminence, defended on one ſide by a moraſs, and near the city

of

of *Munda*; which, in caſe of bad ſucceſs, would ſecure his retreat. *Cæſar* drew out his troops in the plain, between the two camps, placing his tenth legion as uſual in the right, and the third and fifth in the left, with the auxiliary troops and cavalry. There he waited a little, to draw the enemy down; but, ſeeing that they had no deſign to quit their poſt, he marched up to them, giving the word *Venus*. The word on *Pompey*'s ſide was *Pietas*, in alluſion to his intention of avenging that day his father's death. When *Cæſar*'s troops came to the extremity of the plain, they halted a while, and *Cæſar* marked out to them how far they might advance with ſafety. This halt raiſed the ſpirit of the *Pompeians*, and encouraged them to advance a little way. At laſt the battle began, with a ſhout on both ſides, and was obſtinate. *Pompey* had not only the advantage of the ground, but the ſuperiority in numbers; and his men were ſo circumſtanced, as to be in a manner under a neceſſity of fighting deſperately; being either ſoldiers, who had before ſerved under *Afranius* and *Varro*, and had paid no regard to the pardon *Cæſar* had granted them, having rebelled againſt *Caſſius*; or ſlaves ſet at liberty, who, if taken priſoners, had nothing to expect but an ignominious puniſhment. At firſt, victory ſeemed to declare againſt *Cæſar*: Not only his new-raiſed troops, but his veterans began to give ground; and, if we believe *Suetonius* and *Florus*, the day was ſo near being loſt, that *Cæſar* was in ſuſpence whether he ſhould not kill himſelf. By all accounts, he

Y. R. 708. Bef. Chr. 44. 407 Conſ.

Y. R. 708. Bef. Chr. 44. 707 Conſ.

he gave himſelf incredible pains: Quitting his horſe, he took up a buckler, and advanced before the firſt ranks, and within ten feet of the enemy [ε], declaring, that he would not move from the ſpot. His example, and the imminent danger he was in rouſed the courage of his ſoldiers, who were aſhamed to abandon ſuch a General; and the tenth legion, that invincible troop, particularly diſtinguiſhed itſelf. But what determined the victory on *Cæſar*'s ſide was the following circumſtance: *Bogud*, King of *Mauritania*, who ſerved in *Cæſar*'s army, undertook, during the action, to attack *Pompey*'s camp: And *Labienus*, perceiving his motion, detached five cohorts to intercept the Moors, and protect it. *Cæſar* immediately cried out aloud, *that the enemy was making off*: And this falſe opinion, ſpreading itſelf inſtantly among the two armies, increaſed the courage of the one, and terrified the other. *Cæſar*'s troops, eſpecially the tenth legion, took this opportunity to preſs the enemy,

ε Nullum unquam atrocius periculoſiuſque a *Cæſare* initum prœlium, adeo ut pluſquam dubio marte, deſcenderet equo, conſiſtenſque ante recedentem ſuorum aciem, increpita prius fortuna, quod ſe in eum ſervaſſet exitum, denunciaret militibus, veſtigio ſe non receſſurum; proinde viderent quem et quo loco imperatorem deſerturi forent. Verecundia magis quam virtute acies reſtitutæ ſunt, a duce quam a milite fortius. *Vel. Patt.* ii. 55. Itaque ablegato equo, ſimilis furenti, primam in aciem *Cæſar* procurrit. Ibi prenſare fugientes, confirmare, per totum denique agmen oculis, manibus, clamore, volitare. Dicitur in illa perturbatione, et de extremis agitaſſe ſecum, et ita manifeſto vultu fuiſſe, quaſi occupare manu mortem vellet. *Flor.* l. iv. c. 2.

whoſe

whoſe ranks began to be in ſome confuſion; and, after a vigorous conteſt, entirely broke and diſcomfited them. Thirty thouſand were killed on *Pompey*'s ſide, among whom were *Labienus* and *Varus*, and three thouſand *Roman* Knights. All the legionary eagles and moſt of the colours were taken, with the faſces carried before the General; and ſeventeen principal Officers were made priſoners. The conqueror loſt a thouſand of his braveſt ſoldiers, and had five hundred wounded. This bloody battle, which was the laſt in the civil war, was fought the ſame day on which *Pompey* the Great had ſet out from *Brunduſium* to go into *Greece*. *Cæſar* is reported to have ſaid, "that, in his other battles, he "fought for victory, in this for his life." The *Romans* of the vanquiſhed party fled, ſome to the camp, ſome to the city of *Munda*, ſome to *Corduba*, and others ſtill farther. The camp was ſoon forced, but the city was in a condition to maintain a ſiege. *Cæſar* that very day inveſted it; and we are told that the ſoldiers heaped together the dead bodies of the enemy to ſerve them inſtead of a rampart, planting in them their javelins and darts by way of paliſades, with the bucklers hanging upon them; and that, to ſtrike the greater terror into the beſieged, they fixed all around the heads of the deceaſed. *Cæſar* left *Fabius* to command the blockade, and marched immediately to *Corduba*, to inveſt *Sextus Pompey*, who was governor of the place. But *Sextus*, upon the firſt intelligence of the entire ruin of his party, after having diſtributed what money

Y. R. 708. Bef. Chr. 44. 707 Conſ.

Plut. Appian.

Hirt. de Bell. Hiſp. Flor. Dio.

Y. R. 708. Bef. Chr. 44. 407 Conf.

ney he had among his troops, left the town about nine at night, under a pretence of going to find out *Cæſar* to treat of an accommodation. *Scapula*, who had been the chief occaſion of the revolt of the province, had eſcaped thither out of the battle, and took upon himſelf the command of the place. When he found, however, that he was beſieged, he aſſembled all his followers; and, ordering a funeral pile to be raiſed, and a magnificent ſupper ſerved up, he put on his richeſt dreſs, and diſtributed his plate and ready money among his domeſtics; and, having ſupped chearfully, and anointed himſelf, he commanded one of his freedmen to diſpatch him, and another to ſet fire to the pile. After his death, a diviſion aroſe among the inhabitants, between thoſe who favoured *Cæſar*, and thoſe in the intereſt of *Pompey*, with ſuch a clamour that it was heard in *Cæſar*'s camp. During the conteſts, ſome companies, compoſed partly of fugitives, partly of ſlaves, made free by *Pompey*, ſurrendered themſelves to *Cæſar*: But the thirteenth legion prepared to defend the place, and with that view poſſeſſed themſelves of the walls and the towers in ſpite of all oppoſition. Upon this, the faction for *Cæſar* ſent deputies to him for aid: And the thirteenth legion, irritated by this proceeding, and chuſing rather to periſh, than to fall into the hands of the conqueror, ſet fire to the city. At this inſtant *Cæſar*'s troops making their way into the town, a battle enſued, in which the greateſt part of the legionaries periſhed, and twelve thouſand of the inhabitants.

Cæſar

Y. R. 708. Bef. Chr. 44. 407 Conſ.

Cæſar now marched towards *Hiſpalis*; but was met on the road by Deputies from the inhabitants, who ſued for their pardon, which he immediately granted. At the ſame time he was aſſured that the citizens were able to defend the town with their own forces, and to preſerve it in his intereſt; but he thought proper to ſend thither his Lieutenant *Caninius*, with ſome troops: And he himſelf encamped at a ſmall diſtance. There was in the town a ſtrong party of *Pompeians*, who, being diſpleaſed to ſee *Cæſar*'s troops received within the walls, deputed ſecretly one *Philo*, a zealous partiſan of *Pompey*, and well known in *Luſitania*, to beg aſſiſtance of *Cecilius Niger*, ſirnamed *the Barbarous*, who lay encamped not far off with a ſtrong army of *Luſitanians*: And *Philo*, returning with a body of theſe towards night, got over the walls, ſurpriſed the centinels and garriſon, ſhut the gates, and undertook to defend the place. *Cæſar* did not think proper to preſs the ſiege, leſt deſpair ſhould prompt the *Luſitanians* to ſet fire to the town: On the contrary, he placed his guards in ſuch a manner as to give them the hopes of making their eſcape, by ſallying out in the night. They took the opportunity, as was foreſeen, and in the ſally ſet fire to the ſhips on the river *Bætis (Guadalquiver;)* and, while *Cæſar*'s men were employed in extinguiſhing the flame, endeavoured to get off; but, being overtaken by the cavalry, the greateſt part of them were cut to pieces. From *Hiſpalis*, *Cæſar* marched to *Aſta*, which ſubmitted, and thence went to *Gades*.

Du-

V. R. 708. Bef. Chr. 44. 407 Conſ.

During the ſiege of *Hiſpalis*, Deputies arrived from *Carteia* [h], with accounts of their having ſecured *Cn. Pompey*; the inhabitants hoping by this ſervice to atone for their former offence, in ſhutting their gates againſt *Cæſar*. *Pompey*, after the battle of *Munda*, attended by a few horſe and foot, had fled to that place, where his fleet lay, and which was about a hundred and ſeventy miles diſtant from *Corduba*. He was at firſt privately attended upon by thoſe of his party, whom he ſecretly made acquainted with his arrival; but, ſeeing that great crouds aſſembled round him, and ſhewed ſome zeal for his ſervice, he began to act more openly. But the faction which declared for him was inferior in point of ſtrength and numbers to that which was in *Cæſar*'s intereſt; and which, thinking to provide for their own ſafety and that of the place, had ſent to him the above-mentioned Deputies. Animoſities within the city were carried to the greateſt extremities; and *Pompey* himſelf, in a tumultuary action which happened, having received ſeveral wounds, did not think proper to ſtay in *Carteia*, but put to ſea with thirty gallies. *Didius*, then at *Gades*, with *Cæſar*'s fleet, hearing of what had paſſed, immediately ſailed in purſuit of them; ſtationing at the ſame time ſome cavalry and infantry along the coaſt to prevent *Pom-*

[h] A ſea-port town, in *Hiſpania Bætica*, which ſome geographers have placed at the mouth of the *Bætis*, but is commonly ſuppoſed to have been ſituated in the ſtreights of *Gibraltar*.

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pey's retreat by land. *Pompey* had departed with so much precipitation, that he had not taken in a ſufficient proviſion of water. This obliging him to ſtop in his way, *Didius* came up with him after four days ſailing, and while the greateſt part of the ſoldiers and mariners were employed aſhore, he took ſome of his ſhips, and burnt the reſt. The unfortunate and wounded General, attended by a few followers, fled, in this extremity, with what expedition he could, to a place of ſtrength, which happened to be at no great diſtance, and where he hoped to conceal himſelf. Being diſcovered, however, by a *Luſitanian*, he was ſoon ſurrounded by the troops ſent after him by *Didius*: And, unable to defend himſelf in this poſt, he fled to another which was more tenable, the approach to it being extremely difficult. *Didius*'s troops, purſued him alſo to this retreat, and, after ſeveral fruitleſs attempts to ſtorm it, determined to lay ſiege to it in form, and began to draw their lines, and to form a terraſs. *Pompey*, ſeeing that he would ſoon be blocked up, betook himſelf again to flight; and, in this eſcape, having been forſaken by his few attendants, he hid himſelf in a cave, where he was diſcovered, and put to death. His head was brought to *Cæſar*, on the *12th of April*, as he was ſetting out from *Gades* to return to *Hiſpalis*. This was the end of the elder *Pompey*; who, though he had ſhewed great abilities for command, was yet unregretted by many of his party,

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party, on account of his violent and cruel diſpoſitions[1].

Didius, who had rendered *Cæſar* this ſervice, did not live to receive his recompenſe. Proud of his ſucceſs, and confident that all hoſtilities were over, he hauled ſome of his ſhips aſhore to be refitted, and retired himſelf to a neighbouring fort; where he ſoon found himſelf inveſted by a ſtrong body of *Luſitanians*, formed of ſeveral par-

[1] "*Sextus Pompey*, ſays *Cicero* to *Atticus*, has withdrawn "himſelf from *Corduba* into *hither Spain*: *Cnæus* is alſo fled, "but I do not know whither, nor in truth do I care." In a letter to *Torquatus*, a *Pompeian* in exile, he ſays, "the "world is every day more and more perſuaded, that, although "there may be ſome little difference in the cauſe of the con- "tending parties, there will be ſcarce any in the conſequence "of their ſucceſs. As to one of them indeed, we have "already in ſome ſort experienced his diſpoſition; and, as "to the other, we are all of us ſufficiently ſenſible how "much is to be dreaded from an incenſed conqueror." *Ep. Fam.* vi. 4. *Melm.* x. 16. "May I periſh, ſays *Caſſius* to "*Cicero*, if I be not ſollicitous about the event of things in "*Spain*; as I would much rather keep our old and clement "maſter, than try a new and cruel one. You know *what "a fool Cnæus is, and how he takes cruelty for a virtue:* And "yet he is ſenſible how much he has been the object of our "ridicule. I fear therefore he would be apt to treat us "ſomewhat roughly, and return our jokes with the point "of his ſword." He adds: "If you have any value for me "then, you will not fail to let me know whatever will hap- "pen. *Ah! my friend, how do I wiſh I were appriſed, whe- "ther you read this with an eaſy or an anxious mind. For, by "that ſingle circumſtance, I ſhould be determined what mea- "ſures are proper for me to purſue*; quam velim ſcire, utrum "iſta ſollicito animo, an ſoluto legas! ſciam enim eodem "tempore, quid me facere oporteat." *Ep. Fam.* xv. 19. *Melm.* x. 22. Theſe words ſeem to prove that he was then agitating in his mind what he executed the following year.

ties

ties which had fled that way from *Munda*. He made daily ſallies upon them to check their inſolence; and this gave them an opportunity of projecting an ambuſcade, in which they ſucceeded ſo well as to deſtroy him, with almoſt all his followers; a few only having eſcaped by ſwimming to the gallies at ſea. Y. R. 708. Bef. Chr. 44. 407 Conſ.

Munda was at laſt taken, after a ſiege of three weeks, and all *Bætica* ſubmitted to the conqueror. The force of the *Pompeians* was now entirely broken. Even *Sextus Pompey*, the only remaining hope of his family and party, was reduced to the neceſſity of concealing himſelf in the mountains of *Celtiberia*[k]. The ſucceſs of *Cæſar* was complete; and, while he continued in *Spain* during the ſummer, he not only employed himſelf in providing for the future peace and

[k] *Cæſar* paid *Cicero* the compliment of ſending him an account of his ſucceſs with his own hand. At the ſame time young *Quintus Cicero*, who made the campaign along with *Cæſar*, thinking to pleaſe his company, and to make his fortunes the better among them, began to play over his old game, and to abuſe his uncle again in all places. *Cicero*, in his account of it to *Atticus*, ſays, "there is nothing new, "but *Hirtius* has been quarrelling, in my defence, with our "nephew *Quintus*, who takes all occaſions of ſaying every "thing bad of me, and eſpecially at public feaſts; and, "when he has done with me, falls next upon his father: "He is thought to ſay nothing ſo credible, as that *we are* "*both irreconcileable to Cæſar; that Cæſar ſhould truſt neither* "*of us; and even beware of me.* This would be terrible, did "I not ſee that our King is perſuaded that I have no ſpirit "left. *Ad Att.* xiii. 37.

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ſettlement of the province[1], but found leiſure to draw up his anſwer to *Cicero*'s *Cato*.

Middl. p. 198.

During his abſence there appeared a bold impoſtor, who began to make a great noiſe and figure in *Italy*, by aſſuming the name, and pretending to be the grandſon of *Caius Marius*; and ſeveral of the colonies and municipal towns, particularly thoſe where the veteran ſoldiers were ſettled, acknowledged him for their patron. He wrote a pathetic letter to *Cicero*, to juſtify his claim and deſcent, and to implore his protection againſt the enemies of his family; "conjuring him by "their relation; by the poem which he had for-"merly written in praiſe of *Marius*; by the "eloquence of *L. Craſſus*, his mother's father, "whom he had likewiſe celebrated, that he "would undertake the defence of his cauſe." *Cicero* (who, if he had really been the ſon of *C. Marius*, would have been his diſtant relation, his grandfather having married *Marius*'s aunt) anſwered him very gravely, "That he could not "want a patron, when his kinſman *Cæſar*, ſo ex-"cellent and generous a man, was now maſter of "all; yet, that he alſo ſhould be ready to favour

Ad Att. xii. 49.

[1] *Dio* tells us, that he committed great extortions, plundered the very temples, and particularly that of *Hercules*, at *Gades*, whoſe treaſures he applied to his own uſe. But it is not probable that the needy *Pompeians* left much to plunder, or that *Cæſar* would ſeize, when he did not want it, treaſure which his enemy had ſpared in his utmoſt diſtreſs. The ſame author relates, that the States, who had remained faithful to him, yet paid for the freedom of the city, and the privileges which he granted them.

"him."

" him." But *Cæſar*, at his return, knowing him to be a cheat, baniſhed him out of *Italy*; ſince, inſtead of being what he pretended to be, he was found to be only a farrier, whoſe true name was *Herophilus*. Y. R. 708. Bef. Chr. 44. 407 Conſ. Val. Max. ix. 15.

While *Cæſar* remained in *Spain*, *Antony* ſet forward from *Italy*, to pay his compliments to him there, or to meet him at leaſt on the road in his return towards *Rome*; but, when he had made about half the journey, he met with ſome diſpatches, which obliged him to return back in all haſte to *Rome*. This raiſed a new alarm in the city; and eſpecially among the *Pompeians*, who were afraid that *Cæſar*, having now ſubdued all oppoſition, was reſolved, after the example of former conquerors, to take his revenge in cool blood on all his adverſaries; and had ſent *Antony* back as the propereſt inſtrument to execute ſome orders of that ſort. *Cicero* himſelf had the ſame ſuſpicion, and was much ſurpriſed at *Antony*'s ſudden return, till *Balbus* and *Oppius* eaſed him of his apprehenſions, by ſending him an account of the true reaſon of it: Which, contrary to expectation, gave no uneaſineſs to any body, but *Antony* himſelf. *Antony* had bought *Pompey*'s houſes in *Rome*, and the neighbourhood, with all their rich furniture, at *Cæſar*'s auction, ſoon after his return from *Egypt*; but, truſting to his intereſt with *Cæſar*, never dream:t of being obliged to pay for them. *Cæſar*, however, had ſent peremptory orders to *L. Plancus*, the Prætor, to require immediate payment of *Antony*, or to levy the money upon his ſureties, according to the Middl. p. 211.

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tenor of their bond. This was the cauſe of his quick return, to prevent that diſgrace, and to find ſome means of complying with *Cæſar*'s commands. *Cicero* tells us, in his invective againſt *Antony*, that it provoked him to ſuch a degree, that, in the height of his reſentment, he is ſaid to have entered into a deſign of taking away *Cæſar*'s life; of which *Cæſar* himſelf complained openly in the Senate.

Philipp. ii. 29.

Cæſar returned to *Rome* before the end of *Auguſt*, and ſeems to have paſſed the greateſt part of the month of *September* at *Lavicanum*, his country-ſeat; where he made his will on the 13*th*, which he committed to the care of the eldeſt of the Veſtals. During his reſidence in this place, every thing was prepared for a moſt ſplendid triumph for his victory over *Pompey*'s ſons, as over a foreign enemy; and it was celebrated on the 1*ſt* of *October* [m]. It was followed by two public dinners with

Middl. p. 213.

[m] We are told that the people, inſtead of admiring and applauding this triumph, as he expected, were ſullen and ſilent; conſidering it, as it really was, a triumph over themſelves; purchaſed by the loſs of their liberty and the deſtruction of the beſt and nobleſt families of the Republic: And that they had before given the ſame proof of their diſcontent at the *Circenſian games*; where *Cæſar*'s ſtatue, by a decree of the Senate, was carried in proceſſion along with thoſe of the gods; for they gave none of their uſual acclamations to their favourite deities as they paſſed, leſt they ſhould be thought to give them to *Cæſar*. *Atticus* ſent an account of this triumph to *Cicero*, who ſays in anſwer to him, "*Your* "*letter* was agreeable, though the ſhew was ſo ſad:—The "people, however, behaved bravely, who would *not clap* "*even the goddeſs Victory*, for the ſake of ſo bad a neighbour." But, if *Cæſar* committed any irregularity in this triumph o-

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with plenty of the moſt eſteemed and coſtly wines of *Chios* and *Falernum*. He now proclaimed a general amneſty, and it was probably on this occaſion that a temple was built to *Clemency*, where his ſtatue was placed near to that of the goddeſs, joining hands with her. He alſo diveſted himſelf of the conſulſhip and conferred it upon *Q. Fabius Maximus* and *C. Trebonius* for the remaining months of the year. The Conſul *Fabius* and *Q. Pedius*, who, in quality of *Cæſar*'s Lieutenants, had reduced ſome parts of *Spain*, were allowed alſo the honour of a triumph, though there had been no example of inferior officers partaking of the honours of the General under whoſe auſpices they had ſerved. The triumph of *Fabius* was celebrated on the 13*th* of *October*, and that of *Pedius* on the 12*th* of *December*. But the magnificence of *Cæſar*'s made theſe appear contemptible; for their models of the conquered towns, which were always a part of the ſhew, being made only of wood, whereas *Cæſar*'s were of ſilver or ivory, *Chryſippus* merrily called them the caſes only of *Cæſar*'s towns.

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Dio, l. 44.

The Senate now accumulated upon *Cæſar* all the titles that flattery could invent. He was declared *Imperator* or *Emperor* in a ſenſe that conferred upon him the command of all the forces of

ver *Pompey*'s ſons and the *Spaniards*, he was engaged to it by the Senate, who voted, for the victory a *ſupplication* of fifty days, though the Conqueror had writ no public letter to *Rome* on his ſucceſs: The *triumph* was the neceſſary conſequence of the *ſupplication*.

Y. R. 708. Bef. Chr. 44. 707 Conſ.

the Republic; perpetual and ſole Maſter of Manners, and with this office the management of all the revenues: He was ſtyled the *Father* and *Deliverer* of *his country*, and a temple was raiſed to *Liberty*, becauſe he had procured it to the *Roman* people. His perſon was declared ſacred, like thoſe of the Tribunes; and the month *Quintilis* was called *Julius*, becauſe he was born in it. He was allowed the privilege of wearing conſtantly a crown of laurel, and on feſtival days the triumphal robe; of having a diſtinct ſeat in all public ſhews; a golden chair in the Senate-houſe and in the Forum; a ſtatue in all the towns, and in all the temples of the city; two in the Roſtra, one of which had a *civic* crown, becauſe he was the *Saviour* of the people; and the other had an *obſidional* crown, becauſe he was the Saviour of his country; one in the temple of *Quirinus* with this inſcription, *To the invincible god*; and one in the Capitol with thoſe of the ancient Kings. He was allowed to hang up the *opima ſpolia* in the temple of *Jupiter Feretrius*, that no feature of *Romulus* ſhould be wanting in him: And, in the *Circenſian* games, his image in ivory was ordered to be carried in a chariot in the ſame manner as thoſe of the gods. This was not all; he had a *pulvinar*, or bed of ſtate in the temples, on which his image was laid; temples were erected to him; he was called *Jupiter Latialis*; and a *new* fraternity of *Luperci* was inſtituted to his honour, and called by his name; of which *Antony* was the head, and *Q. Cicero*, the ſon, one of the mem-

bers[n]; an honour which none of the immortal gods enjoyed, beſides *Mars* and his ſon *Quirinus*, the founders of the State. Many, however, of theſe pretended honours we only hear of in *Appian* and *Dio*; and I cannot but think that theſe *Greek* Hiſtorians, who were grown accuſtomed to the extravagant appellations given to the ſubſequent Emperors, imagined that they had alſo been beſtowed on the firſt of them. The laſt of theſe writers has likewiſe informed us, that ſome of the Senators voted, that this god, this *Jupiter Latialis*, ſhould take to himſelf as many wives as he pleaſed, and whom he pleaſed; and that the Tribune *Helvius Cinna* had actually prepared a law to this effect. From this circumſtance, ſo falſe and ridiculous, it may be gathered what degree of credit ſhould be given to this hiſtorian. In the profuſion of honours conferred on *Cæſar*, both his friends, it is ſaid, and enemies eagerly concurred; the firſt out of zeal for his glory, and a ſpirit of adulation; the latter to load him with public envy, and bring him into contempt: And, indeed it appears, from a letter of *Antony* to *Octavius*, that *Cicero* uſed to boaſt, "that they had impoſed upon *Cæſar*, and ruin-"ed him by this ſhew of reſpect for his perſon."

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[n] There had been hitherto but two fraternities of *Luperci*, called *Fabiani* and *Quintiliani*. The *Luperci Julii* were inſtituted the year before, after the *African* war. Vide *Ad Att.* xii. 5. *Cicero* very much diſapproved of his nephew's conduct, but the father was pleaſed with it: *Quintus pater quartùm vel potiùs milleſimùm nihil ſapit, qui lætetur Luperco filio et Statio, ut cernat duplici dedecore cumulatam domum.*

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On the laſt day of *December*, *Fabius* having died ſuddenly in the morning, *C. Caninius Rebilus* was named by *Cæſar* to the vacancy at one in the afternoon; whoſe office was to continue only through the remaining part of that day *. *Cæſar* had had ſo many creatures and dependents who expected the honour of the conſulſhip from him, as

Middl. p. 219.

* This wanton profanation of the ſovereign dignity of the empire raiſed a general indignation in the city; and a conſulate ſo ridiculous gave birth to much raillery and many jokes, which are tranſmitted to us by the ancients (*Macrob.* Sat. ii. 3. *Dio*, p. 236.); of which *Cicero*, who was the chief author of them, gives us the following ſpecimen, in his account of the fact: "I no longer, ſays he in a letter to *Curi-*

Ep. Fam. vii. 30.

"*us*, either adviſe or deſire you to come home to us, but want "to fly ſomewhere myſelf, where I may hear neither the name, "nor the acts of theſe ſons of *Pelops*. It is incredible how "meanly I think of myſelf for being preſent at theſe tran-"ſactions. You had ſurely an early foreſight of what was "coming on, when you ran away from this place; for, "though it be vexatious to hear ſuch things, yet that is more "tolerable than to ſee them. It is well that you were not "in the field, when, at ſeven in the morning, as they were "proceeding to an election of *Quæſtors*, the chair of *Q.* "*Maximus*, whom they called Conſul, was ſet in its place; "but, his death being immediately proclaimed, it was re-"moved; and *Cæſar*, though he had taken the auſpices "for an aſſembly of the *tribes*, changed it into an aſſembly "of the *centuries*; and, at one in the afternoon, declared a "new Conſul who was to govern till one the next morn-"ing. I would have you to know, therefore, *that, whilſt* "CANINIUS *was Conſul, nobody dined; and that there was* "*no crime committed in his conſulſhip, for he was ſo wonderfully* "*vigilant that, through his whole adminiſtration, he never ſo* "*much as ſlept*. Theſe things ſeem ridiculous to you, who "are abſent; but, were you to ſee them, you would hard-"ly refrain from tears. What, if I ſhould tell you the reſt? "for there are numberleſs facts of the ſame kind; which

"I could

as the reward of their ſervices, that it was impoſſible to oblige them all in a regular way, ſo that he was forced to contrive the expedient of ſplitting it, as it were, into parcels; and conferring it for a few months, or weeks, or even days, as it happened to ſuit his convenience: And, as the thing itſelf was now but a name, without any real power, it was of little moment for what term it was granted; ſince the ſhorteſt gave the ſame privilege with the longeſt, and a man, once declared Conſul, ever after enjoyed the rank and character of a *conſular Senator*. Y. R. 708. Bef. Chr. 44. 407 Conſ.

He now granted a general pardon to all thoſe who had borne arms againſt him; replaced the ſtatues of *Sylla* and *Pompey*, which had been thrown down, and, diſbanding his *Spaniſh* guard, threw himſelf intirely upon the affections of his citizens. And it was probably on this occaſion that a temple to *New Concord*, mentioned by *Dio*, was built, in imitation of that of *Camillus*; and a feſtival for the reſtoration of peace and harmony in the Republic ordered to be celebrated every year. Dio, l. 44.

" I could never have borne, I had not taken refuge in the port " of philoſophy with our friend *Atticus*, the companion and " partner of my ſtudies." *Suetonius* in *Cæſ.* p. 80. tells us, that the people themſelves would not acknowledge a three months Conſul: For, when, upon *Fabius*'s entrance into the theatre, his officers, according to cuſtom, proclaimed his preſence, and ordered the people *to make way for the Conſul*, the whole aſſembly cried out, *he is no Conſul*. I cannot ſee what injury *Cæſar* either did the State, or particular perſons, by making over to others an office, or the title of an office, which the Senate had named him to for his life.

Cicero's

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Middl. p. 180.

Cicero's daughter, *Tullia*, died in the beginning of this year, in child bed, to the inexpreſſible grief of her father. She was about two and thirty years old at the time of her death; and, by the few hints which are left of her character, appears to have been an excellent and admirable woman. She was moſt affectionately and piouſly obſervant of her father; and, to the uſual graces of her ſex, having added the more ſolid accompliſhments of knowledge and polite letters, was qualified to be the companion, as well as the delight, of his old-age; and was juſtly eſteemed not only as one of the *beſt*, but the moſt *learned*, of the *Roman* Ladies. It is not ſtrange, therefore, that the loſs of ſuch a daughter, in the prime of her life, and in the moſt comfortleſs ſeaſon of his own, ſhould affect him with all that grief, which the greateſt calamity could imprint on a temper *naturally timid* and *deſponding*. His friends were very officious in making their compliments of condolence, and in adminiſtering arguments of comfort to him. Among the reſt, *Cæſar* himſelf, in the hurry of his affairs in *Spain*, wrote him a letter on this occaſion, dated from *Hiſpalis*, the laſt of *April* [p]. Their remonſtrances, however, had

[p] The following letter of *S. Sulpicius* is thought to be a maſterpiece of the conſolatory kind; for which reaſon, and becauſe *Sulpicius* has acted a conſiderable part in this hiſtory, we ſhall inſert it here, to bring the reader more acquainted with the talents of this conſular Senator, whom *Cicero* in his letters often treats with much contempt:

"I was exceedingly concerned, as, indeed, I ought to "be, to hear of the death of your daughter *Tullia*; which I "looked

had but little effect upon him; all the relief that he found was from reading and writing; and he

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" looked upon as an affliction common to us both. If I had " been with you, I would have made it my buſineſs to con- " vince you, what a real ſhare I take in your grief; though " that kind of conſolation is but wretched and lamentable, " as it is to be performed by friends and relations, who are " overwhelmed with grief, and cannot enter upon their taſk " without tears, and ſeem to want comfort rather themſelves, " than to be in a condition to adminiſter it to others. I reſolv- " ed, therefore, to write to you, in ſhort, what occurred " upon it to my own mind; not that I imagined, that " the ſame things would not occur alſo to you, but that the " force of your grief might poſſibly hinder your attention " to them. What reaſon is there then to diſturb yourſelf ſo " immoderately on this melancholy occaſion? Conſider how " fortune has already treated us; how it has deprived us " of what ought to be as dear to us as our children; our " country, credit, dignity, honours. After ſo miſerable a " loſs as this, what addition can it poſſibly make to our " grief, to ſuffer one misfortune more? Or how can a mind, " after being exerciſed in ſuch trials, not grow callous, and " think every thing elſe of inferior value? But is it for your " daughter's ſake, that you grieve? Yet, how often muſt " you neceſſarily reflect, as I myſelf frequently do, that " thoſe cannot be ſaid to be hardly dealt with, whoſe lot it " has been, in theſe times, without ſuffering any affliction, " to exchange life for death. For what is there in our pre- " ſent circumſtances that could give her any great invitation " to live? What buſineſs? What hopes? What proſpect " of comfort before her? Was it to paſs her days in the " married ſtate, with ſome young man of the firſt quality? " (for you, I know, on the account of your dignity, might " have choſen what ſon-in-law you pleaſed out of all our " youth, to whoſe fidelity you might ſafely have truſted her.) " Was it then for the ſake of bearing children, whom ſhe " might have had the pleaſure to ſee flouriſhing afterwards, " in the enjoyment of their paternal fortunes, and riſing,

" gra-

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he drew up at this time a treatiſe of conſolation for himſelf, from which he profeſſes to have recei-

" gradually, to all the honours of the ſtate, and uſing the " liberty to which they were born, in the protection of " their friends and clients? But what is there of all this, " which was not taken away, before it was even given to her? " But it is an evil, you'll ſay, to loſe our children.—It is ſo; " yet, it is much greater to ſuffer what we now endure. I " cannot help mentioning one thing, which has given me no " ſmall comfort, and may help alſo perhaps to mitigate your " grief. On my return from *Aſia*, as I was ſailing from " *Ægina* towards *Megara*, I began to contemplate the pro- " ſpect of the countries around me: *Ægina* was behind, " *Megara* before me; *Piræus* on the right; *Corinth* on the " left; all which towns, once famous and flouriſhing, now " lie overturned, and buried in their ruins: Upon this ſight, " I could not but think preſently within myſelf, alas! how " do we poor mortals fret and vex ourſelves, if any of our " friends happen to die, or to be killed, whoſe life is yet ſo " ſhort, when the carcaſſes of ſo many noble cities lie here " expoſed to me in one view? Why wilt thou not then com- " mand thyſelf, *Servius*, and remember, that thou art born " a man? Believe me, I was not a little confirmed by this " contemplation: Try the force of it therefore if you pleaſe, " upon yourſelf; and imagine the ſame proſpect before " your own eyes. But to come nearer home; when you con- " ſider how many of our greateſt men have periſhed lately at " once; what deſtruction has been made in the empire; what " havock in all the provinces; how can you be ſo much ſhock- " ed to be deprived of the fleeting breath of one little wo- " man? Who, if ſhe had not died at this time, muſt ne- " ceſſarily have died a few years after, ſince that was the " condition of her being born. But recall your mind from " reflections of this kind to the conſideration of yourſelf, and " think rather on what becomes your character and dignity: " That your daughter lived as long as life was worth " enjoying, as long as the Republic ſtood; had ſeen her fa- " ther Prætor, Conſul, Augur; been married to the no- " bleſt

received his greateſt comfort. The deſign of it was not only to relieve his own mind, but to conſecrate the virtues and memory of *Tullia* to all

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" bleſt of our youth; had taſted every good in life; and, " when the Republic fell, then quitted it: What ground is " there then, either for you, or her, to complain of for- " tune on this account? In ſhort, do not forget that you " are *Cicero*; one, who has been always uſed to give ad- " vice and preſcribe to others; nor imitate thoſe paul- " try phyſicians, who pretend to cure other people's diſea- " ſes, yet are not able to cure their own; but ſuggeſt ra- " ther to yourſelf the ſame leſſon, which you would give in " the ſame caſe. There is no grief ſo great, which length of " time will not alleviate: But it would be ſhameful in you " to wait for that time, and not to prevent it by your wiſdom; " beſides, if there be any ſenſe in the dead, ſuch was her love " and piety to you, that ſhe muſt be concerned to ſee how " much you afflict yourſelf. Give this therefore to the de- " ceaſed; give it to your friends; give it to your country; " that it may have the benefit of your aſſiſtance and advice, " whenever there ſhall be occaſion: Laſtly, ſince fortune has " now made it neceſſary to us to accommodate ourſelves to " our preſent ſituation, do not give any one a handle to " think, that you are not ſo much bewailing your daughter, " as the ſtate of the times, and the victory of certain perſons. " I am aſhamed to write any more, leſt I ſhould ſeem " to diſtruſt your prudence, and will add therefore but one " thing farther, and conclude: We have ſometimes ſeen " you bear proſperity nobly, with great honour and applauſe " to yourſelf; let us now ſee that you can bear adverſity " with the ſame moderation, and without thinking it a " greater burthen than you ought to do; leſt, in the num- " ber of all your other virtues, this one, at laſt, be thought " to be wanting. As to myſelf, when I underſtand that " your mind is grown more calm and compoſed, I will ſend " you word how all things go on here, and what is the ſtate " of the province. Adieu." *Ep. Fam.* iv. 5. *Middleton*, 183.

poſ-

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poſterity: Nor did his fondneſs for her ſtop here, but ſuggeſted the project of a more effectual conſecration, *by building a temple to her*, and erecting her into a ſort of *a deity*. In his letters to *Atticus*, we find the ſtrongeſt expreſſions of his reſolution and impatience to ſee this deſign executed. Yet, after all his zeal, or pretended eagerneſs and ſollicitude about this temple, it was never actually built by him [q].

[r] In

[q] *Abbe Mongault, ad Att.* xii. 1. and *Dr. Middleton, p.* 190, remark, that this fact ſeems to confirm what the author of the book of *Wiſdom* obſerves on the origin of idolatry; that it was owing to the fond affection of parents, ſeeking to do honour to their deceaſed children. *The father*, ſays he, *oppreſſed with unexpected grief for the ſudden death of his child, after making an image of him, began to worſhip him as a god, though he was but a dead man; and enjoined certain rites and myſteries to his ſervants and dependants.* (Wiſd. xiv. 15.) But it was not *Cicero*'s real thought, after all, to exalt his daughter into a deity; he knew it to be abſurd, as he often declares, *to pay divine honours to dead mortals*; and tells us how their very *publicans* had decided that queſtion in *Bœotia*: For, when the lands of the *immortal gods* were excepted out of their leaſe, by the law of the Cenſors, they denied *that any one could be deemed an immortal god, who had been once a man; and ſo made the lands of Amphiaraus and Trophonius pay the ſame taxes with the reſt*: (De Nat. Deor. iii. 19.) Yet, in a political view, he ſometimes recommends the worſhip of thoſe ſons of men, whom their eminent ſervices to mankind had advanced to the rank of inferior gods, as it inculcated, in a manner the moſt ſenſible, the doctrine of *the ſoul's immortality*: (De leg. ii. 11.) And, ſince a temple was the moſt ancient way of doing honour to the dead who deſerved it, (Plin. Hiſt. 27.) he conſidered it as the moſt effectual method of perpetuating the memory and praiſe of *Tullia*; and was willing *to take the benefit of the popular ſuperſtition*, and follow the

[r] In the leiſure of the retired life which he led, after the death of *Tullia*, *Cicero* compoſed ſeveral works; his *Hortenſius*; a treatiſe in the way of dialogue, in which he undertakes the defence of philoſophy againſt *Hortenſius*, to whom he aſſigned the part of arraigning it: His *Academics*, in four books, containing a particular account and defence of the philoſophy of the Academy, which

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the example of thoſe ancients, who had poliſhed and civiliſed human life by conſecrating ſuch patterns of virtue to the veneration of their fellow-citizens.

[r] His extraordinary affliction, it may be here remarked, gave occaſion to ſuſpicions very diſhonourable, which are thought to be hinted at in the 38th letter of the xiith book to *Atticus*: "You ſay, that it is time to ſhew a little more "ſtrength of mind, and you tell me, *that certain perſons "talk concerning me in more ſevere terms than either you or "Brutus have informed me by your letters.* If ſome people look "upon my ſpirit to be broken, and my faculties impaired, "let them know in what company I employ my time, and "they will be ſenſible that I cannot be blameable, ſince I "have already ſo much recovered, as to bring my mind to "ſuch a compoſed ſtate as to be able to write on difficult ſub-"jects: And that, if I have choſen them as an amuſe-"ment to my grief, I am praiſe-worthy to have taken up with "one ſo becoming a man of letters." The author of an invective againſt him, under the name of *Salluſt*, openly accuſes him of an inceſtuous commerce with this beloved daughter. And *Servius* tells us, that *Virgil* was thought to have glanced at him in this verſe:

Hic thalamum invaſit natæ vetitoſque Hyenæos.

Dio, who betrays every-where the greateſt rancour againſt our orator, has inſerted the ſame charge againſt him, in a ſpeech he has made for *Calenus*, in anſwer to his ſecond Philippic: But there is nothing in all *Cicero*'s letters, or in his behaviour in any part of his life, that gives the leaſt credit to ſo malicious an aſperſion.

He

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he addreſſed to *Varro* [s]: His excellent treatiſe de *finibus*, or *of the chief good and ill of man*, in five books, which he addreſſed to *Brutus*, in return for a preſent of the ſame kind, which *Brutus* had ſent him a little before, viz. *a treatiſe upon virtue*; and his *Tuſculan diſputations*, in five books alſo, upon as many different queſtions in philoſophy, the moſt important and uſeful to the happineſs of human life. The firſt teaches *how to contemn the terrors of death, and to look upon it as a bleſſing rather than an evil*; the ſecond, *to ſupport pain and affliction with a manly fortitude*; the third, *to appeaſe all our complaints and uneaſineſſes under the accidents of life*; the fourth, *to moderate all our paſſions*; the fifth, *to evince the ſufficiency of virtue to make men happy* [t].

After

[s] *Cicero* wrote alſo at this time a little piece, in the way of a funeral encomium, in praiſe of *Porcia*, the ſiſter of *Cato*, and wife of *Domitius Ahenobarbus*, *Cæſar*'s mortal enemy. *Varro* and *Lollius* attempted the ſame ſubject; and *Cicero* deſires *Atticus* to ſend him their compoſitions: But all the three are now loſt: Though *Cicero* took the pains to revive and correct his, and ſent copies of it afterwards to *Domitius*, the ſon, and *Brutus*, the nephew of that *Porcia*.

[t] It appears, likewiſe, that he was preſſed at this period by *Atticus*, and his other friends, and even by *Brutus* himſelf, to draw up ſomething to be addreſſed to *Cæſar*; and it was certainly an undertaking ſuitable to his dignity and character. He drew up a letter accordingly, which was communicated to *Hirtius* and *Balbus*, for their judgment upon it, whether it was proper to be ſent to *Cæſar*: But theſe, not thinking it adviſeable to ſend it, unleſs ſome paſſages were ſoftened, *Cicero* was ſo much diſguſted, that he dropped entirely the deſign. "As for the letter to *Cæſar*, ſays he to "*Atticus*, I was always very willing that *Hirtius* and *Balbus* "ſhould

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After *Cæſar*'s arrival, *Cicero* was perſuaded by his friends to leave ſolitude and the country, and to come to *Rome*; where he ſoon found an opportunity of employing his intereſt and eloquence in the ſervice of King *Dejotarus*. This Prince had already been deprived by *Cæſar* of part of his dominions, for his adherence to *Pompey*; and was now in danger of loſing the reſt, from an accuſation preferred againſt him by his grandſon, of a deſign pretended to have been formed by him againſt *Cæſar*'s life, when *Cæſar* was entertained in his houſe, four years before on his return from *Egypt*. The charge was groundleſs and ridiculous; but, under his preſent diſgrace, any charge was ſufficient to ruin him; and *Cæſar*'s countenancing it ſo far as to receive and hear it ſhewed a ſtrong prejudice againſt the King; and that he wanted only a pretence for ſtripping him of all that remained to him. *Brutus* alſo intereſted himſelf very warmly in the ſame cauſe; and, when he went to meet *Cæſar*, on his road from *Spain*, made an oration to him at *Nicæa*, in favour of *Dejotarus*; which ſtartled *Cæſar*, and gave him occaſion to reflect on what he had never perceived before, *the invincible fierceneſs and vehemence of Brutus's temper*. The preſent trial was held in *Cæſar*'s houſe; where *Cicero* ſo manifeſtly expo-

" ſhould firſt read it; for, otherwiſe, I had both been want-
" ing in civility to them, and, if I had happened to give
" offence, expoſed myſelf alſo to danger. They have dealt
" ingenuouſly and kindly with me, in not concealing what
" they thought; but what pleaſes me the moſt is, that by
" requiring ſo many alterations, they give me an excuſe for
" not writing at all." *Ad Att.* xii. 51.

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ſed the malice of the accuſer and the innocence of the accuſed, that *Cæſar*, being determined not to acquit, yet aſhamed to condemn him, choſe the expedient of reſerving his ſentence to farther deliberation till he ſhould go in perſon into the Eaſt, and inform himſelf of the whole affair upon the ſpot. *Cicero* ſays, "that *Dejotarus*, neither "preſent nor abſent, could ever obtain any fa-"vour or equity from *Cæſar*: And that, as often "as he pleaded for him, which he was always rea-"dy to do, he could never perſuade *Cæſar* to "think any thing reaſonable that he aſked for "him." He ſent a copy of his oration to the King; and, at *Dolabella*'s requeſt, gave another likewiſe to him: Excuſing it, as a trifling performance, and hardly worth tranſcribing; but *I had a mind*, ſays he, *to make a ſlight preſent to my old hoſt and friend, of coarſe ſtuff, indeed, yet ſuch as his preſents uſually are to me.*

Ep. Fam. ix. 12.

Middl. p. 217.

Some little time after this trial, *Cæſar*, to ſhew his confidence in *Cicero*, invited himſelf to ſpend a day with him at his houſe in the country, and choſe the third day of the *Saturnalia* for his viſit; a ſeaſon always dedicated to mirth and feaſting amongſt friends and relations [t]. *Cicero* gives *Atticus* the following account of the entertainment, and how the day paſſed between them. "O this "gueſt, ſays he, whom I ſo much dreaded! "Yet I had no reaſon to repent of him, for he "was pleaſed with his reception. When he "came

Ad Att. xiii. 52.

[t] This feſtival, after *Cæſar*'s reformation of the calendar, began on the 17*th* of *December*, and laſted three days. *Macrob. Saturn.* i. 10.

" came the evening before, on the 18*th*, to my
" neighbour *Philippus*, the houſe was ſo crouded
" with ſoldiers, that there was ſcarce a room
" left empty for *Cæſar* to ſup in: But *Barba*
" *Caſſius* relieved me; for he aſſigned me a guard,
" and made the reſt encamp in the field; ſo that
" my houſe was clear. On the 19*th*, he ſtayed
" at *Philippus*'s till one in the afternoon; but
" ſaw nobody; was ſettling accounts, I gueſs,
" with *Balbus*; then took a walk on the ſhore;
" bathed after two; heard the verſes on *Mamurra*[a],
" at which he never changed countenance; was

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[a] *Mamurra* was a *Roman* Knight, and General of the Artillery to *Cæſar* in *Gaul*; where he raiſed an immenſe fortune, and is ſaid to have been the firſt man in *Rome* who *incruſted his houſe with marble, and made all his pillars of ſolid marble.* (Plin. Hiſt. xxxvi. 6.) He was ſeverely laſhed, ſays Dr. *Middleton*, together with *Cæſar* himſelf, for his exceſſive luxury, and more infamous vices, by *Catullus*, whoſe verſes are ſtill extant, and the ſame, it has been thought, that *Cicero* refers to, as being firſt read to *Cæſar* at his houſe. *Middl.* p. 217. The verſes of *Catullus* are as follow:

Quis hoc poteſt videre, quis poteſt pati,
Niſi impudicus, et vorax, & helluo?
Mamurram habere quod comata Gallia
Habebant unctum et ultima Britannia:
Cinæde Romule, hæc videbis et feres,
Et impudicus, et vorax, et aleo. Ep. 30.

Pulchrè convenit improbis Cinædis,
Mamurræ Pathicoque Cæſarique. Ep. 58.

Suetonius, ſpeaking of theſe verſes, ſays, *Valerium Catullum, a quo ſibi verſiculis de Mamurra perpetua ſtigmata impoſita non diſſimulaverat, ſatisfacientem, eadem die adhibuit cœnæ: Hoſpitioque*

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" rubbed, anointed, ſat down to table. Having " taken a vomit juſt before [x], he eat and drank, " free-

pitioque patris ejus, ſicut conſueverat, uti perſeveravit. In Cæſ. 73. Now *Bayle, art. Catulle,* remarks very juſtly, that, if what *Suetonius* aſſerts be true, *viz.* that, if *Cæſar* continued to lodge at the houſe of *Catullus*'s father, after his reconciliation with the ſon, theſe cannot be the verſes read at *Cicero*'s houſe: Becauſe *Cæſar,* after this ſupper, never ſaw *Verona,* where *Catullus*'s father lived: And we muſt conclude, that the offence given by *Catullus,* and his reconciliation, were before *Cæſar*'s laſt journey to *Gaul*; and the verſes now read to him were by another hand.

The reader, perhaps, will not readily underſtand the time and manner of *Cæſar*'s paſſing from *Philip*'s houſe to *Cicero*'s in this ſhort account of it: But it muſt be remembered, that their villa's were adjoining to each other on the *Formian* coaſt near *Cajeta*; ſo that, when *Cæſar* came out of *Philip*'s at one, he took a walk upon the ſhore for about an hour, and then entered into *Cicero*'s; where the bath was prepared for him, and, in bathing, he heard the verſes on *Mamurra*; not produced by *Cicero,* for that would not have been agreeable to good manners, but by ſome of his own friends, who attended him, and who knew his deſire to ſee every thing that was publiſhed againſt him, as well as his eaſineſs in ſlighting or forgiving it.

[x] The cuſtom of taking a vomit both immediately before and after meals, which *Cicero* mentions *Cæſar* to have done on different occaſions, (Pro *Dejot.* 7.) was very common with the *Romans,* and uſed by them as an inſtrument both of their luxury and of their health: *They vomit,* ſays *Seneca, that they may eat*; *and eat, that they may vomit.* (Conſ. ad Helv. 9.) By this evacuation before eating, they were prepared to eat more plentifully; and, by emptying themſelves preſently after it, prevented any hurt from repletion. Thus *Vitellius,* who was a famous glutton, is ſaid to have preſerved his life by conſtant vomits, while he deſtroyed all his companions, who did not uſe the ſame caution: (*Sueton.* 12. *Dio,* lxv. 734.) and the practice was thought ſo effectual for ſtrengthening the

" freely and was very chearful. The ſupper was " good and well-ſerved: Y. R. 708. Bef. Chr. 44. 407 Conſ.

" But our diſcourſe at table, as we eat,
" For taſte and ſeaſoning ſtill excell'd our meat.

" Beſides *Cæſar*'s table, his friends were plenti-
" fully provided for in three other rooms; nor
" was there any thing wanting to his freedmen
" of lower rank and his ſlaves; but the better
" ſort were elegantly treated: In a word, I ac-
" quitted myſelf like a man: Yet he is not a
" gueſt, to whom one would ſay, at parting,
" Pray call upon me again as you return: Once
" is enough. We had not a word on buſineſs, but
" many on points of literature: In ſhort, he was
" delighted with his entertainment, and paſſed
" the day agreeably. He talked of ſpending
" one day at *Puteoli*, another at *Baiæ*. Thus you
" ſee the manner of my receiving him; ſome-
" what troubleſome, indeed, but not uneaſy to
" me. I ſhall ſtay here a little longer, and then
" to *Tuſculum*. As he paſſed by *Dolabella*'s villa,
" his troops marched cloſe by his horſe's ſide, on
" right and left; which was done nowhere elſe.
" This I had from *Nicias* [y]."

the conſtitution, that it was the conſtant regimen of all the *Athletæ*, or profeſſed wreſtlers, trained for the public ſhews, in order to make them more robuſt. So that *Cæſar*'s vomiting before dinner was a ſort of compliment to *Cicero*, as it intimated a reſolution to paſs the day chearfully, and to eat and drink freely with him. *Middl.* p. 217.

[y] It is certainly to be regretted that *Cicero* ſuppreſſed the letter

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letter which, as we juſt now obſerved, he had prepared to addreſs to *Cæſar* on the ſtate and regu'ation of public affairs. There remain, however, two epiſtles, which were written to *Cæſar* on the ſame ſubject, and which have been generally, and with good reaſon, aſcribed to *Salluſt*. Theſe, as they contain many important truths, and throw a conſiderable light on the times of which we write; and as they diſcover to us the regulations which an eminent genius and hiſtorian thought neceſſary to remove the diſorders into which the *Roman* State had fallen, and are generally but little attended to; we ſhall beg leave to offer to the reader. That epiſtle, which is called the *ſecond*, was certainly the *firſt*; and was written before the battle of *Pharſalia*: The other, called the *firſt*, was written after *Cæſar* had obtained that battle. It is for this reaſon that we have altered the order in which theſe pieces appear in the different editions of the *Roman* hiſtorian.

The firſt Epiſtle of SALLUST *to* C. JULIUS CÆSAR, *concerning the Regulation of the Commonwealth.*

"I AM not inſenſible how difficult and nice a taſk he "undertakes, who ventures to offer advice to Princes and "Governors; or to any one inveſted with high authority. "The number of Counſellors with whom ſuch perſons are "ſurrounded, and the great uncertainty of future contingen- "cies, which the moſt cautious and penetrating politician "cannot ſufficiently guard againſt, are very diſcouraging "conſiderations: And, what makes the office ſtill more un- "grateful, the worſt-laid ſchemes will frequently have a "more proſperous event than the moſt rational and prudent "counſels. So capricious is the ſway of fortune in the diſ- "poſal of almoſt all human affairs!

"But, notwithſtanding theſe diſcouragements, ſince my "early inclinations led me to the ſtudy of ſtate affairs, and "as I have, with the utmoſt application, purſued that "knowledge, not ſo much with a view to obtain employ- "ments, which I have often ſeen procured by means the "moſt baſe and unworthy; but rather that I might thoroughly "inform myſelf of the nature of our conſtitution civil and

" military; what is the true ſtate of her ſtrength with regard
" to her men, her arms, and her revenue: Therefore, though
" I may, perhaps, ſuffer in my reputation, and be thought
" too forward in the attempt, yet my regard to your dignity
" and fame has, after mature deliberation, prevailed with me
" above ſuch apprehenſions; and I am determined to run
" any hazard, where I have the leaſt proſpect of an acceſſion
" to your glory. And be aſſured it was not without previ-
" ous conſideration, nor ſo much with a view to the circum-
" ſtances of your fortune, that I took up this reſolution, as
" becauſe, among your other diſtinguiſhed qualities, I have
" ever experienced in you this moſt admirable one, that the
" greatneſs of your ſoul is more conſpicuous in adverſity than
" proſperity.—But the fame of your illuſtrious qualities is a
" ſubject I need not expatiate on: It is already ſo great, that
" ſooner were men wearied in admiring and celebrating, than
" you in performing glorious actions. Nor was it out of any
" fond conceit of my own abilities, that I have preſumed to
" lay before you my ſentiments concerning the Common-
" wealth; but, as your thoughts have been hitherto taken up
" with another ſcene of buſineſs, with the toils of a camp,
" with battles, with triumphs, and military commands, I
" thought it not unſeaſonable to awake your attention to the
" regulation of civil affairs: For, if your only aim and inten-
" tion be to repel the furious attack of you enemies upon
" your dignity, and defend the grants of the people againſt
" the Conſul who oppoſes them, theſe are views below the
" virtue of *Cæſar*. But, if you are ſtill animated by the ſame
" ſpirit *with which, from your firſt entrance into public life,*
" *you ſucceſsfully oppoſed and overſet the faction of the Nobility,*
" *and reſcued the Roman people from the yoke of ſlavery; and*
" *with which you baffled, in your prætorſhip, though unarmed,*
" *all the attempts of your armed adverſaries, and have ſince per-*
" *formed ſuch great and glorious exploits, that even your enemies*
" *have nothing to object againſt you but your ſuperior greatneſs:*
" If the ſame virtuous ſpirit ſtill poſſeſs you, give your atten-
" tion to the plan I ſhall propoſe for the regulation and go-
" vernment of the Commonwealth; which plan I am per-
" ſuaded you will find to be proper and adviſeable, or, at
" leaſt, to require but little alteration.

" Now, ſince *Pompey*, either from a kind of infatuation, " or blindly bent upon oppoſing you, has been ſo raſh and " imprudent as to throw the whole power of the State into " the hands of its enemies [the ariſtocracy] and has thus put " all into confuſion, it is incumbent upon you to reſtore the " Commonwealth, and replace it upon its proper foun- " dation. [by aſſerting the ſovereignty of the people] The firſt " ſtep he took was *that of committing to a few Senators an ab-* " *ſolute authority in the direction of the revenue, the ſumptuary* " *laws, and judicial proceedings; whilſt the people, in whom* " *the ſovereign power had before been lodged, were left in a ſtate* " *of ſubjection and ſlavery.* The judicial authority is, indeed, " as formerly, nominally veſted in the three orders of the Re- " public; but the real power is in the hands of the faction, " who, with unbridled dominion, controul all things; who " give to one man and take from another; diſpoſe of every " thing, as they pleaſe; who inſnare the virtuous and inno- " cent, and raiſe none but their own creatures to poſts of ho- " nour: How notorious ſoever their crimes be, how flagitious " ſoever their lives, and infamous ſoever their reputation, this " ſcandalous inſufficiency excludes them not from the " magiſtracy; and thus exalted, they ſeize, they plunder " whatever they have an inclination to: In ſhort, their " whole conduct is like that of a victorious army ravaging " an enemy's city: Luſt and paſſion animate them; licenti- " ouſneſs is their only law. But, under theſe afflicting circum- " ſtances, it would, I own, be ſome alleviation to our miſ- " fortunes to ſee men of abilities in poſſeſſion of arbitrary " dominion acquired by bravery; but, inſtead of that, we ſee " a deſpicable faction of baſe, cowardly wretches, whoſe " only ſtrength and courage lie in the feeble efforts of words, " maſters of ſovereign power, which fell into their hands by " accident, and has been yielded to them by a baſe, perfidi- " ous man [*Pompey*] and exerciſing that power with extreme " arrogance and cruelty. For in any of our former conteſts " and civil wars, were ever ſo many and ſuch illuſtrious fami- " lies extirpated? Did ever any before purſue their conqueſts " with ſuch impetuous fury, ſuch exorbitant unbridled licen- " tiouſneſs? Even *Sylla*, who thought the laws of war gave " an unlimited licenſe to the Conqueror, though he conceived " that the terror of puniſhment added ſtrength to his cauſe,

" yet

" yet was ſatisfied with a few inſtances of ſeverity to his ene-
" mies, and choſe to win others to his party by lenity and
" benevolence, rather than the dread of revenge. But ſuch
" moderate reſentment ſuits not the ſanguinary temper of
" *Cato*, *Domitius*, and the reſt of that faction. No leſs than
" forty Senators, together with numbers of young men of
" promiſing abilities, have, by their orders, been butcher-
" ed, like ſo many victims deſtined to ſlaughter; nor could
" the blood of all theſe miſerable citizens glut the thirſt of
" thoſe moſt implacable tyrants. The doleful cries of
" helpleſs orphans, the weakneſs of aged parents, the groans
" of men and the lamentations of women, made not the leaſt
" impreſſion on their unrelenting hearts: So far from it,
" that they grew every day more and more inflamed, both
" in their words and actions; and, by injurious practices,
" degraded many from their employments, drove many into
" exile." [*Pompey* was guilty of *great partiality* in his third conſulſhip, and probably of *cruelty*, ſince *Tacitus*, ſpeaking of his conduct at this time, ſays, *that, being choſen to correct the public enormities, his remedies proved more grievous to the State than its diſtempers. Appius*, in his *cenſorſhip*, acted in the ſame *partial* manner, and his authority was ſubſervient to the views of the ariſtocracy. Among others of the contrary faction he degraded our author and turned him out of the Senate. Hence this deſcription of the injuſtice and cruelty of his enemies is, perhaps, full of reſentment, and may be exaggerated] " And there is no occaſion to ſhew how they ſtand
" affected towards you. Baſe cowards as they are, they
" would yet gladly ſacrifice their lives to procure your diſgrace
" and ruin. Yes,—far leſs is the pleaſure they taſte in that
" ſovereignty, which is unexpectedly fallen into their hands,
" than the anxiety they feel, when they view your exalted
" glory: for, to accompliſh your deſtruction, they chuſe ra-
" ther to run the hazard of ſlavery, and eſteem it a more
" eligible ſituation, than to ſee you the happy inſtrument of
" raiſing the empire of *Rome*, great as it is, to the higheſt
" pitch of glory and dominion.

" Theſe conſiderations will convince you, how abſolutely
" neceſſary it is to uſe the utmoſt care and circumſpection
" in forming your ſchemes for the eſtabliſhment and ſecu-
" rity of the Commonwealth. What occurs to me I ſhall

" free-

" freely offer without any reſerve: But, how far the methods " I ſhall propoſe are juſt and practicable, I leave to the deter- " mination of your own judgment.

" By the primitive conſtitution of the Republic, as our " hiſtories inform us, the people were divided into two orders, " *Patricians* and *Plebeians:* Originally the exerciſe of the " ſupreme juriſdiction was lodged in the former; but, as the " latter was the ſtronger body, this ſuperior force often excited " them to withdraw to Mount *Aventine*, in defence of their " liberties: The conſtant effect of which ſeceſſion was, that " the power of the Patricians was diminiſhed, and the rights " and privileges of the people augmented. But what contri- " buted moſt to the ſecurity of their liberty was this, the " laws had their due force, and the power of the magiſtrate " was ſubſervient to them. Nor was it then" [during the perfect democracy ſettled by the *Licinian* laws] " affluence of " fortune, or an arrogant paſſion for precedence, but the cha- " racter of a regular life and gallant exploits, that diſtin- " guiſhed the nobility from the commonalty: Even men in " the loweſt ſtation, whether occupied in their farms at " home, or ſerving in the wars, juſt provided with the ne- " ceſſary and decent ſupports of life, were amply ſatisfied " themſelves, and gave ample ſatisfaction to the State. But " when, being thruſt out of poſſeſſion of their lands by a gra- " dual uſurpation, they through indigence and idleneſs (ha- " ving nothing to do) could no longer have any fixed abodes, " then they began to covet the wealth of other men, and " to put their own liberty and the Commonwealth to ſale. " *Thus fell, by degrees, the ancient power of the Roman people,* " who had before been Lords of the world, and given laws " to all nations; and *they, who jointly exerciſed ſovereign* " *authority, have, each individual ſeparately, ſold themſelves* " *to ſlavery and bondage.*

" Now a *multitude, thus diſpoſed,* not only corrupt and " degenerate in their manners, but alſo, by their different " courſes and purſuits, ſo alienated from each other, as to " be incapable of any coalition and unanimity, are, I appre- " hend, very ill qualified to aſſume the government of the " Commonwealth. But, if the number of citizens be aug- " mented, ſuch a regulation would rouſe up a general ardour " in ſupport of the common liberty; for then one part of the

" peo-

" ple will be animated to preſerve the liberty they are admit-
" ted to; and the other to ſhake off the yoke of ſlavery,
" which has hitherto diſgraced them. Theſe new enfran-
" chiſed citizens, joined to ſome of the old ones, ſhould,
" I think, be ſettled in our colonies; by which means we
" ſhall not only be furniſhed with greater ſupplies for re-
" cruiting our armies, but the people, being then employed
" in uſeful occupations, will no longer diſturb and embroil
" the State." [We have ſeen above, that this was one of the meaſures taken by *Caſar* for the better ſettlement of the State.] " I am not inſenſible, that, when you attempt the
" execution of this ſcheme, you will expoſe yourſelf to the
" fury and ſevere reſentments of the nobility; who will im-
" mediately take fire, grow angry, and exclaim, that the
" very foundation of the conſtitution is undermined, that
" the ancient citizens are robbed of their privileges, and
" reduced to a ſtate of ſlavery, and this free Republic con-
" verted into a regal government, when any ſingle perſon
" aſſumes an arbitrary power of augmenting the number of
" citizens. I confeſs, indeed, it is my ſettled opinion, that
" whoever attempts to render himſelf popular, at the ex-
" pence of the Commonwealth, is guilty of a crime, the
" grievous effects of which will fall on his own head: yet,
" at the ſame time, *I will venture to ſay, He who has not reſo-*
" *lution enough to undertake ſuch deſigns, as are at once beneficial*
" *to the public, as well as his own private intereſts, is juſtly*
" *chargeable with the imputation of indolence and puſillanimity.*
" When *M. Livius Druſus* was Tribune of the people, it was
" his fixed purpoſe and reſolution to exert his utmoſt en-
" deavours *in favour of the nobility*; nor did he, at firſt, ever
" enter upon any meaſures without their conſent and au-
" thority. And yet thoſe *ſon of faction*, ever influenced by
" the maxims of treachery and falſhood, rather than fidelity
" and honour, no ſooner conſidered what a number of men,
" ſhould *Druſus* ſucceed, would owe the mighty obligation to
" one ſingle perſon; and, as it is reaſonable to imagine,
" when each reflected on his own baſe and perfidious heart,
" conceived, that *Druſus* would act in the ſame manner they
" were conſcious they themſelves ſhould act in the ſame ſitu-
" ation; apprehending therefore, that his profeſſions of
" ſuch ſingular regard for their intereſt was only an artifice

" to

" to raiſe himſelf to ſovereignty, they oppoſed him with the " utmoſt vigour, and fruſtrated all his deſigns in their favour. " Theſe obſervations will engage you to fortify yourſelf with " the greateſt attention and circumſpection with all the ſup- " port you can poſſibly procure.

" To ſubdue a fair and open enemy is, to the brave and " gallant man, no mighty difficulty: But, in contriving or " in avoiding ſecret ſtratagems and latent perils, generous and " noble ſouls are by no means adroit and expert. For your " better ſecurity therefore, when you have augmented the " number of citizens, as the power of the people will be re- " ſtored, *let it be your principal concern to cultivate good man-* " *ners, and, by a firm coalition, unite the old and new citizens.* " But the greateſt ſervice you can poſſibly do to your coun- " try, to your fellow-citizens, to yourſelf, and your poſterity, " is *to extinguiſh that extravagant paſſion for riches*, which is " ſo prevalent amongſt us; or, at leaſt, *give ſuch a check to it* " *as the circumſtances of the times will permit.* And, unleſs this " be done, neither in the city nor in the camp, neither in " the adminiſtration of public or private affairs, can any " due order, any regular œconomy, be expected. For, where " the love of money once prevails, it proves always too " powerful for diſcipline, and ſuppreſſes all good diſpoſitions; " nor is the firmeſt mind able to reſiſt its efforts; but, " ſooner or later, falls a victim to this paſſion. Numerous " are the inſtances that occur in hiſtory, what Princes, what " States and Nations, have intirely owed, to the oppreſſive " weight of their opulence, the loſs of thoſe mighty empires, " which have been the glorious acquiſitions of virtuous pover- " ty. Nor is it at all ſurpriſing: For when an upright man " beholds one of leſs merit, more careſſed and eſteemed, up- " on no other recommendation but a ſuperior fortune; at " firſt, it has no other effect than to raiſe his indignation, and " ſtagger him with perplexities: But, when he has ſtill eve- " ry day freſh experience that pomp and ſplendor triumph " over genuine glory and honour; wealth and opulence over " worth and merit; his mind is at laſt alienated; he deſerts " the cauſe of virtue, and flies to the tents of voluptuouſneſs. " It is doubtleſs the love of glory that ſtimulates and ſupports " induſtry: Stripped of that attracting charm, virtue in herſelf " appears to men with a very forbidding aſpect, and under

" a very

" a very unamiable form. In ſhort, wherever riches are in " high eſteem, there all worthy accompliſhments, there ho- " nour and probity, modeſty and chaſtity, muſt loſe all their re- " gard, become neglected and deſpiſed. For, in the purſuit " of virtue, men are confined to one road only; a road too ſur- " rounded with perils and difficulties: But, in queſt of riches, " great is the latitude they take, and every one puſhes for- " ward what way he pleaſes; and by any means, honourable " or diſhonourable, ſtrives to obtain his end. Above all things, " therefore, you muſt determine to cruſh this prevailing pow- " er of gold. And I am perſuaded, that no one hereafter " will judge a man more or leſs qualified for judicial offices, " or the adminiſtration of the Commonwealth, if you put " election of Conſuls and Prætors upon ſuch a footing, that " the real worth and merit, and not wealth and riches, muſt " of neceſſity prevail in the choice." [We have ſeen alſo that *Cæſar* had nothing ſo much at heart as the execution of his ſumptuary laws.]

" *As to the appointment of magiſtrates,* it will be the ſafeſt " and moſt convenient method to inveſt that power in the " people. If you confine it to a few, you approach too " near a regal government: If you ſuffer the elections to be " carried by bribery, that were baſe and diſhonourable. It " is my opinion, therefore, *that all of the firſt claſs of the people* " *ſhould be intitled to the privilege of ſtanding candidates for ju-* " *dicial offices*; but I think it adviſeable that their number " ſhould be augmented. It is well known that neither the " people of *Rhodes*, nor any other free State, were ever diſſa- " tisfied with the judgments of their courts, where rich or " poor, juſt as it fell out, were promiſcuouſly joined together " in all conſultations, even of the greateſt, as well as the " ſmalleſt importance. But, as to the election of magiſtrates, " the law enacted by *C. Gracchus*, when Tribune of the peo- " ple, is by no means to be deſpiſed: *That, out of the five* " *claſſes, promiſcuouſly, thoſe centuries who were to give their* " *ſuffrages ſhould be choſen by lot.* When the people are thus " reduced to an equality, and ſuperiority of fortune no lon- " ger gives ſuperior claim to dignity and honour, the only con- " tention, that can then remain, will be, who ſhall ſurpaſs " each other in virtue and merit. Theſe remedies, which I " have preſcribed, will, I apprehend, prove a very eaſy and

" effec-

" effectual cure for the evils attending riches. For our ad-
" miration, or deſire of any objects, ariſes from the uſe and
" advantage we propoſe from them; it is from the hopes of
" *gain* that men are prompted to iniquitous courſes: Take
" away that incitement, and you will find no man alive will be
" any longer a villain, when a villain can be no longer a gain-
" er. But, whilſt the temptation to riches remains, avarice,
" like a ſavage beaſt of the deſart, is unſufferably outrageous
" and cruel: Which way ſoever ſhe flies, ſhe lays waſte whole
" towns and countries; confounds all things, human and
" divine, without diſtinction: Nor walls nor armies are able
" to obſtruct her imperious violence; ſhe falls upon all in
" her way, robs all ſhe meets, robs them of their reputati-
" on, their chaſtity, their children, parents, and country:
" All become the prey of this univerſal plunderer. And yet
" there is a remedy for this mighty evil: Take away all
" eſteem and honour from riches, and virtue will inſtantly
" recover her vigour, and be able to triumph over the rage of
" this devouring peſtilence.

" But, though all men, whether friends or enemies, al-
" low this to be true, yet, ſuch is the factious ſpirit of the
" nobility, that you muſt expect violent oppoſition from that
" quarter. This is the grand obſtruction you will meet with;
" if you can remove that, by guarding yourſelf againſt their
" dark deceit and baſe ſtratagems, all the reſt of your way
" will be ſmooth and eaſy. Baſe ſtratagems I may juſtly call
" them, for, were they influenced by any virtuous principle, it
" would prompt them rather to emulate than envy the wor-
" thy. But as ſloth and indolence, and dulneſs and invinci-
" ble ſtupidity, preſs heavy upon them, the only efforts they
" can make are clamorous complaints and invidious re-
" proaches againſt that high renown, which they look up-
" on as a tacit reflection on their own infamous reputations.
" But what neceſſity is there to ſay any more about them?
" You want not to be informed of their characters. You are
" no ſtranger to *M. Bibulus*, the man who, by irreſiſtible
" courage and great abilities, forced his way to the conſular
" dignity! Yes—You muſt doubtleſs be ſenſible of this, be-
" cauſe you know him to be a creature ſcarce endowed with
" the faculty of ſpeech; who has, indeed, a heart diſpoſed
" to any villainy, but not a head to contrive and execute it!

" What

" What is there to be apprehended from ſuch a man as this, " a man to whom the very conſulſhip, the higheſt office in the " State, was the higheſt diſgrace. And, as to *L. Domitius*, what " magnanimity can there be in him, when every part of his " body is defiled with ſome foul vice, ſome deteſtable crime " or other; his tongue with falſhood and lyes, his hands with " blood, his feet with ignominious flight; and his pollutions, " in other reſpects, are ſo abominably ſhameful, that even " the bare mention of them would be an unpardonable inde- " cency? *Cato is the only man amongſt them who has any ſort* " *of merit*: The dexterity of his parts, his eloquence, his " artifice and penetration, are no contemptible qualifica- " tions: But they are no other than what may be acquired by " *Grecian* diſcipline. The nobler qualifications, fortitude, " vigilance, and unwearied induſtry, are not to be learn- " ed from the *Greeks*. For can a people, who had neither " vigour nor ſpirit to defend the liberty of their own country, " be qualified to inſtruct others in thoſe arts and accompliſh- " ments, that are neceſſary for the ſupport of empire? *As to* " *the reſt of the faction*, they are a ſet of noblemen ſo utterly " inſignificant, ſo exceſſively dull and ſenſeleſs, that, like " ſtupid ſtatues, their names and titles are their only orna- " ments.—As for *L. Poſthumius* and *Favonius*, they appear to " me not unlike the additional lading, which is taken into " a large ſhip, above the ordinary burden: If ſhe arrives " ſafe at her port, it may be of uſe; but had the mariners " met with tempeſtuous weather, thoſe goods would have been " firſt thrown over-board, as they were of the leaſt value."

[What *Salluſt* ſays here of the *nobles* agrees very well with the character *Cicero* gives, in his letters to *Atticus*, of the *Honeſt* or the *Fiſhpondmen*; but the picture he draws of *Cato* is very unlike that which he has given us of the ſame man in his hiſtory of *Cataline*'s conſpiracy. There *Cato is put upon an equality with* CÆSAR *in noble birth, eloquence, greatneſs of ſpirit and glory: And ſimplicity of life, regular conduct, and invincible ſtrictneſs, are mentioned as his acknowledged virtues. He contended not*, it is ſaid, *in wealth with the wealthy, nor with the factious in practices of faction; but in bravery he yielded not to the moſt courageous; nor in temperance to the moſt reſerved; nor in purity of morals to the moſt innocent: He aimed not ſo much to appear, as to be a virtuous man; and, the leſs he courted renown, the more*

it

it followed him. *Salluſt*, when he wrote the conſpiracy of *Catiline*, had not, probably, been exaſperated by perſecutions, or had retired from all public buſineſs, and was perfectly at his eaſe: Whereas, in this epiſtle, his language is that of a lately provoked enemy. *Cicero ad Att.* vii. 15. ſpeaks of *Favonius* and *Poſthumius*, as vain weak men, of importance only in their own conceit: *Uni Favonio leges ab illo nobis imponi non placebat; ſed is haud auditus in concilio.—Poſthumius autem, de quo nominatim Senatus decrevit, ut ſtatim in Siciliam iret, Fuffanoque ſuccederet, negat ſe ſine Catone iturum: Et ſuam in Senatu operam auctoritatemque magni æſtimat.* This *Poſthumius* is probably the ſame man whom *Cicero* mentions, in another letter to *Atticus*, ix. 2. as having joined *Cæſar* before *Pompey* left *Italy*: And this circumſtance ſeems to prove that this epiſtle of *Salluſt* was written upon the rupture between *Cæſar* and *Pompey*, and before the former was maſter of *Brunduſium*.]

"Having thus given you my judgment *concerning the reſtitution of the plebeian power, and the reformation of their manners*; I will now point out to you the ſteps which it will be adviſeable to take, *with regard to the Senate.*

"No ſooner was my age and reaſon ripe for application, but I turned my thoughts to literature, rather than the exerciſe of arms and riding: And, as nature had given me greater ſtrength of mind than body, I choſe to inure the moſt able and vigorous part to labour and fatigue; and, in the purſuit of this courſe, the obſervations I have made, in my conſtant application to ſtudy, and the informations of men, as well as books, have thoroughly convinced me that all empires and ſtates in the world have proſpered and flouriſhed, as long as they purſued wiſe and wholſome counſels: But, when partiality, fear, and voluptuouſneſs corrupted thoſe counſels, their ſtrength ſoon began to decline: Then they loſt their dominion, and, at laſt, their liberty.

"I confeſs it is my ſettled opinion, that whoever is placed in an eminent ſtation, and has a greater ſhare of property in any State, is ever found to be moſt concerned for its ſecurity and preſervation. As to others, they have but one motive to engage their attention, their *liberty*. But the man who, by virtue and bravery, has acquired riches,

"fame,

"ſame, and dignity, has thoſe additional incitements.
"And therefore, whenever he ſees any dangers threatening
"the State, the apprehenſion alarms his mind, rouſes all his
"thoughts and cares, and excites his utmoſt pains and la-
"bour; his liberty, his glory, his property are at ſtake, and
"he will defend them. His vigilance is ſeen in all places, his
"activity in every quarter: For, the more flouriſhing his cir-
"cumſtances are, when the conſtitution is ſecure, the more
"anxious, the more reſolute and vigorous, will be his endea-
"vours, when he apprehends it to be in danger. Theſe
"conſiderations convince me, that, in a conſtitution, where
"the people are to put in execution the determinations of
"the Senate, as the body does the dictates of the mind, pru-
"dence and policy are indiſpenſable qualifications in the Fa-
"thers; ſagacity and penetration talents unneceſſary in the
"People.—Our anceſtors, though oppreſſed with grievous
"wars, held out with unwearied induſtry, after infinite loſ-
"ſes, and when their money was exhauſted. Such was their
"magnanimity, that neither the formidable ſtrength of their
"enemies, nor the emptineſs of their treaſury, nor any un-
"proſperous events could ſubdue their invincible ſpirit.
"The acquiſitions they made by virtue they did not part
"with but with life: And they owed their ſucceſs, not ſo
"much to their courage in the field, as to the wiſdom, the
"boldneſs, and the conſtancy of their counſels. For, in
"thoſe happy days, all the members of the Commonwealth,
"firmly cemented together, acted as one man; had no other
"views but her welfare; entered into no cabals but againſt
"the public enemy; and every individual exerted his abili-
"ties both of mind and body, not to aggrandiſe himſelf, but
"his country. Far different are the practices which prevail in
"this age; for now a ſet of noblemen, enervated with indo-
"lence and ſloth, who never faced an enemy in battle; un-
"experienced in war, unacquainted with military toils and
"hardſhips, trained up to faction only within the walls of
"the city; arrogantly uſurp ſovereign authority over all the
"nations upon earth: Whilſt the Fathers, whoſe ſalutary coun-
"ſels have hitherto preſerved the State in all her difficulties,
"are driven, like the waves of the ſea, this way or that, by
"arbitrary impulſe; one day enact laws, the next repeal them,
"juſt as it ſuits the caprice, the reſentments, and arrogance

" of theſe lordly oppreſſors; for that alone is allowed to be " the rule to eſtimate public good or evil.

" But if now, in your regulations, *you reſtore to the Sena-* " *tors their common privileges and equal liberty,* or *contrive for* " *them ſome ſecret method of giving their ſuffrages,* then would " the exorbitant power ſome of the nobility poſſeſs ſoon be " diminiſhed, and the Commonwealth would riſe again and " proſper. But, though an attempt to bring the intereſt and " influence of the whole body upon a level may be thought " impracticable, ſince ſome of them made their entrance into " the world upon the bottom of anticipated honours and dig- " nity, and a numerous train of clients; whereas the gene- " rality of others, Senators, not by deſcent but creation, can- " not have, in all reſpects, equal influence and advantages: " *Yet they ſhould, at leaſt, be freed from any reſtraint of awe or* " *terror in giving their ſuffrages.* When every one can thus " act, as it were, in obſcurity, then the dread of any man's " arrogant power will no longer force him to comply with " meaſures prejudicial to his own intereſt and liberty. Li- " berty is a jewel of high eſtimation; the worthy and the un- " worthy, the coward and the brave, equally love and admire " it. But, admired as it is, we often ſee men, alarmed by " the dread of ſuperior ſtrength, tamely give up that ineſti- " mable treaſure to the demands of a public robber. Weak " and infatuated man! Liberty or bondage is the ſubject of " contention; and, whilſt the victory is yet uncertain, they " receive the ignominious yoke; the worſt lot that could have " befallen them, had their reſiſtance been unſucceſsful.

" *Two expedients,* therefore, I would propoſe to confirm the " ſenatorial power; *firſt to augment their number*; and then to " make is a rule, *that each ſhall give his ſuffrage by tablets.* " By the one, every man, being ſkreened under the protec- " tion of a veil, will not be intimidated from acting accord- " ing to the dictates of his own mind. By the other, the ad- " ditional numbers will be an additional ſervice and ſecurity " to the State. *For ſuch is our preſent ſituation, that our public* " *deliberations are very ill attended:* Some few are engaged in " judicial offices; ſome are taken up with domeſtic concerns or " the ſervice of their friends; but the more general cauſe of " their abſence is, not ſo much any other avocation, as the " intolerable arrogance of thoſe lofty oppreſſors, who have

" uſurped

" uſurped ſuch exorbitant power, for *now* ſome of the ancient
" nobility, with a few of the new-created Senators, whom
" they have taken in as a farther ſupport to the faction, cen-
" ſure, approve, and decree, by their own abſolute autho-
" rity; and act, in every inſtance, juſt as their own arbitrary
" will inclines them. But, *if you augment the number of Se-*
" *nators*, and *oblige them to give their ſuffrages by tablets*, then
" would thoſe haughty rulers ſoon abate their arrogance, when
" they found they muſt ſubmit to the determination of thoſe
" very men, over whom they have exerciſed ſuch rigorous,
" ſuch deſpotic ſway.

" When you have examined theſe expedients, you may,
" perhaps, aſk me, what number it is adviſeable to add to the
" ſenatorial order; and in what manner, and for what pur-
" poſes, I would adviſe the diſtribution of them into their ſe-
" veral parts and diſtinct offices: And, as I have propoſed the
" committing the judicial proceedings to the firſt claſs of the
" people, in what form they ſhould be diſtributed, and what
" ſhall be the number of each different diviſion? It would
" not be difficult to draw up a particular plan; but I thought
" it adviſeable, firſt, to propoſe a general ſcheme, and to have
" your approbation of *that*, before I proceeded farther. If
" you think my expedients juſt and true in general, you will
" find the reſt very eaſy and obvious. I will not deny, that
" I have a ſtrong ambition to ſee the juſtneſs and propriety of
" theſe regulations confirmed by their happy conſequences:
" For, from your ſucceſs and proſperity, I ſhall expect to
" derive ſome ſhare of glory and reputation to myſelf. But
" yet far greater is my deſire, much more ardent my paſſion,
" *to ſee the Commonwealth reſtored*, whatever expedients are
" uſed, with as much expedition as it can poſſibly be effected.
" Liberty is a happineſs I prefer infinitely above the higheſt
" acquiſitions of fame and glory: And let me intreat, let
" me beſeech and exhort you, now that you have raiſed your-
" ſelf to the higheſt military renown, and glorioufly triumph-
" ed over the warlike nation of the *Gauls*, not to ſuffer the
" mighty *Roman* empire, hitherto invincible, to periſh and
" decay, or be diſſolved by civil wars or inveterate diſcord.
" Should ſuch a calamity happen through your fault, be aſ-
" ſured, *Cæſar*, that, neither day nor night, will you be free
" from pungent remorſe; the ſenſe of ſuch a corroding guilt

" will ever diſturb your reſt, and your afflicted mind will be " inceſſantly racked with madneſs and deſpair. For I look " upon it as an inconteſtable truth, that the Deity conſtantly " inſpects the actions of all the human race; nor will the vir- " tues or vices of any one paſs unregarded; but, agreeably " to the different nature of them, they will be followed by a " different retribution. Theſe may not, indeed, be the im- " mediate effects, but they are the conſtant expectation of " every man, ariſing from the conſciouſneſs of his actions.

" Imagine now that the Genius of *Rome*, attended by your " anceſtors, were to accoſt you at this important criſis: You " would hear them delivering their ſentiments in the follow- " ing ſtrain: *Remember*, CÆSAR, *that it is from us you deri-ve* " *your deſcent, from a race of virtuous and valiant heroes. We* " *gave thee exiſtence in this flouriſhing city, to be the ſupport of* " *our dignity, a ſtrength to our eſtabliſhment, and a terror to our* " *adverſaries. And, when from us you received your life, you* " *received, with it, all the acquiſitions, which were the fruits* " *of our infinite toils and perils, a country the moſt powerful and* " *extenſive, a place and family the moſt illuſtrious in that coun-* " *try; to all which, we took care to add many excellent accom-* " *pliſhments, joined to an affluent fortune, acquired with honour;* " *in ſhort, all the felicities that adorn a ſettled peace, all the re-* " *wards that crown a ſucceſsful war. Think not that, in return* " *for theſe extenſive obligations, we require from thee any under-* " *taking inconſiſtent with virtue and probity. No—what we ex-* " *pect at thy hands* IS THE RESTORATION OF FALLING LI- " BERTY. *Accompliſh* THIS, *and every corner of the univerſe* " *will inſtantly be filled with the applauſe of ſuch a virtuous* " *atchievement. What! though you have already given many* " *illuſtrious proofs of great abilities, both in your civil and mi-* " *litary capacity, yet in this,* CÆSAR, *thou art not ſingular;* " *there are many brave, magnanimous ſpirits, who have arrived* " *to the ſame degree of glory. But, if you would ſurpaſs all* " *others, ariſe now and reſcue, from the brink of ruin, this moſt* " *renowned, this mighty Empire. Then, indeed, wilt thou riſe* " *to matchleſs greatneſs, and ſhine in unrivalled luſtre! But* " *ſhould a different fate attend this State, ſhould it periſh through* " *the malignity of the diſtemper that afflicts it; who ſees not that* " *univerſal wars, deſolation, and ſlaughter will attend her fall?* " *But if you feel a generous ardour to do the moſt acceptable ſer-*

" *vice*

" *vice to us and to your country, aſſert the liberty of the Com-*
" *monwealth, and ſave the ſinking State: Then will ſucceeding*
" *ages view thee exalted above all the human race, and, even*
" *after death, with ſingular felicity, gathering freſh laurels of*
" *praiſe. For it ſometimes happens that the clouds of adverſe*
" *fortune caſt a ſhade on living grandeur, and oftentimes the*
" *blaſts of envy check its growth. But, when the hero yields to*
" *fate, malice and detraction expiring with him, his merit be-*
" *comes more and more conſpicuous, and daily riſes to higher degrees*
" *of fame and glory.*

" Thus, *Cæſar*, I have preſented you with a brief plan of
" ſuch regulations as, I apprehend, will contribute moſt to
" the public good, and your own intereſt. But, whatever
" ſcheme you think proper to purſue, I beſeech the immor-
" tal gods that it may have a proſperous event, and that both
" you and your country may reap the fruits of your ſucceſsful
" endeavours."

The ſecond Epiſtle of SALLUST *to* C. JULIUS CÆSAR, *concerning the Regulation of the Commonwealth.*

" IT heretofore prevailed, as an eſtabliſhed truth, that
" kingdoms and empires, and whatever other objects men
" eagerly purſue, were only the gifts of fortune; ſince they
" were often capriciouſly beſtowed upon the undeſerving, and
" never enjoyed by any, without a ſenſible diminution and de-
" cay. But experience has convinced us that *Appius* the poet
" was not miſtaken when he ſaid, *that every man is the archi-*
" *tect of his own fortune.* In you, eſpecially, *Cæſar*, is this
" maxim verified; in you, who have ſo far ſurpaſſed all
" others, that ſooner were men wearied in celebrating your
" glorious actions, than you in performing them. But ſtill,
" as in the finiſhed works of architecture, ſo in the acquiſi-
" tions of heroic virtue, the utmoſt attention is required; if
" they are neglected, their beauty will ſoon be impaired; or,
" for want of care to ſupport them, the nobleſt ſtructures may
" fall to ruin. For it is not without reluctance that any
" man ſubmits to the ſovereign authority of another; and,
" however juſt and mild he may be in the exerciſe of ſuch

" power, ſtill we are apt to be under apprehenſions of op-
" preſſion from him whoſe ſituation enables him to oppreſs
" when he pleaſes. Nor are ſuch apprehenſions without foun-
" dation; for thoſe who get the reins of government into their
" hands are, in their conduct, generally influenced by an ab-
" ſurd maxim, *that, the more baſe and degenerate the people are,*
" *the more ſecure is the power of the Sovereign.* But far diffe-
" rent ought to be your meaſures, *Cæſar*; and, as you your-
" ſelf are virtuous and brave, who are to give laws, it is high-
" ly expedient to make the people ſo, who are to receive
" them. *For the worſt of men are always found moſt impatient*
" *under the reſtraints of government.*

" Indeed, when I conſider, that the exerciſe of your pow-
" er, in the courſe of the war, has been more gentle than that
" of others in the times of peace; when I ſee your victorious
" troops demanding the gratification of plundering the con-
" quered; and when I conſider, that the conquered are your
" fellow-citizens; I muſt confeſs that theſe difficulties, which
" you have to encounter in ſettling your conqueſts are greater
" than any, before you, have met with. But out of theſe
" difficulties you muſt reſolve to extricate yourſelf, and ſettle
" the Commonwealth upon a firm eſtabliſhment for the fu-
" ture; an undertaking to be effected, not ſo much by the
" force of arms, or by triumphs over enemies, as by a me-
" thod much more noble as well as difficult; by the whol-
" ſome inſtitutions of laws, and the ſanctions of diſcipline and
" peace. An affair, therefore, of ſuch high importance, calls
" upon all, not only thoſe of eminent abilities, but alſo thoſe
" who are leſs diſtinguiſhed, to communicate their ſentiments,
" and offer the beſt advice in their power: For it is my opi-
" nion, *that the future happineſs or miſery of Rome entirely de-*
" *pends upon the methods you take in ſettling your victories.*

" That this great end may be more eaſily and effectually ac-
" compliſhed, I beg your attention to a few things, which
" occur to my thoughts upon this occaſion.

" You have been engaged, illuſtrious General, in a war
" againſt *an eminent adverſary, a man of immenſe wealth and*
" *boundleſs ambition; but more diſtinguiſhed by his fortune than*
" *any prudence and ſagacity in his conduct.* Amongſt his ad-
" herents, *ſome few followed his arms, whoſe enmity to you*
" *had no other foundation, than the injuſtice they had done you:*

"*Others were drawn to his party by the tye of affinity, or ſome* "*perſonal obligation. Not one of them had any ſhare in his pow-* "*er; for, could he have ſubmitted to a participation of dominion,* "*the whole world would not have felt the ſhock of a devouring* "*war. The reſt of his party, the vaſt multitudes of the common* "*people, that were in his camp, were drawn thither, not ſo* "*much by their own judgment, as by the prevailing example of* "*others, whom they looked upon as more diſcerning than them-* "*ſelves.*" [The evidence of theſe truths we have already ſeen in the courſe of this hiſtory.] "In this juncture, a ſet of "wretches, whoſe infamous luxury had left nothing unpol- "luted, encouraged by malicious reports, with the hopes of "ſeizing the Commonwealth, came over to your camp; and "there, without any reſerve, threatened death and rapine, "and all the miſeries of unreſtrained licentiouſneſs, to thoſe "who engaged in neither party. But many of them, when "they found you would neither cancel their debts, nor ſuffer "your fellow-citizens to be treated as public enemies, with- "drew from your camp. Some few of them, indeed, ſtill re- "mained, imagining they ſhould enjoy greater eaſe and ſe- "curity there, than they could in the city: So terrible an "apprehenſion had they of the power and rage of creditors. "It is almoſt incredible what numbers, and what men of "high rank and diſtinction went over to *Pompey* alſo upon the "very ſame motives; and, during the whole courſe of the "war, adhered to him, as a ſacred and inviolable ſanctuary "to people under ſuch difficulties and diſtreſſes.

"Now, as the ſucceſs of your arms has made you the ar- "biter of war and peace; that you may put ſuch an end to "the one, as may be a demonſtration of your regard to your "fellow-citizens, and make the other as honourable and laſt- "ing as poſſible; conſider well what are the moſt adviſeable "ſteps for the regulation of your own conduct; ſince it is on "*You* only that this affair intirely depends. It is my opinion, "that the rigid exerciſe of power tends rather to render it "vexatious and uneaſy, than firm and laſting; nor is it poſ- "ſible for any man to make himſelf an object of dread to the "many, but, at the ſame time, a reciprocal dread of the ma- "ny muſt recoil upon himſelf. And to be in ſuch a ſitua- "tion is to be eternally involved in a ſtate of warfare on all

" ſides perilous: For, to whatever quarter you betake
" yourſelf, no ſecurity is to be found, ſurrounded as you are
" with continual dangers, and alarmed with terrible appre-
" henſions Very different is the ſituation of thoſe, whoſe
" power is tempered with mildneſs, and moderated by
" humanity and benevolence! Every thing around them ap-
" pears fair, flouriſhing, and happy; and the very enemies
" of the nation ſhew them more favour and eſteem than
" thoſe of a contrary character meet with from their own ci-
" tizens. And can any one ſay that I am prompted to give
" this advice by a partial regard to the conquered party, of
" a ſiniſter view to detract from the glory of your triumphs?
" No doubt I deſerve this cenſure, for declaring that ſuch
" treatment as foreign nations, nations naturally our foes,
" have met with from us, and our anceſtors, ought not to be
" denied to our fellow-citizens, and that we *Romans* ſhould
" not, like ſavage barbarians, inſiſt upon the retaliation of
" blood and ſlaughter.

" Have they then forgot the reproaches they lately caſt up-
" on *Pompey*, and upon *Sylla*'s cruel uſe of victory? How
" *Domitius*, *Carbo*, and *Brutus*, with *ſeveral others*, were
" ſlain; that they fell not, when under arms in the field;
" not in the heat of battle, by the common calamity of war;
" but, after that was over, even when they were ſuppli-
" cating mercy, they were moſt inhumanly murdered by
" *Pompey*. Have they forgot how the people of *Rome* were,
" like ſo many cattle, butchered in the field of *Mars*? Bloody
" and inhuman has been the uſe other conquerors, before
" you, have made of their victories! Dreadful were the
" ſcenes of private ſlaughters, unexpected maſſacres, women
" flying into the boſoms of their children, and children into
" the boſoms of their parents, and, in all quarters, our habi-
" tations plundered and demoliſhed! The very men who
" acted this bloody part would now perſuade you to purſue
" the ſame meaſures: As if the only motive of the war had
" been, whether *you* or *Pompey* ſhould have an arbitrary power
" of oppreſſing mankind; as if you had not reſtored the
" Commonwealth, but ſeized it as a prey of your ſucceſsful
" arms; and as if the flower of our army, and the choiceſt
" of our veteran troops, took up arms againſt brethren and
" parents, and ſome even againſt their own offspring, from

" this

" this motive only, that the moſt abandoned of men might, " from the calamities of others, procure means to indulge " their inſatiable appetites, or that their enormous lives might " reflect diſhonour on the worthy men engaged in the ſame " cauſe, and ſo ſtain the glory of their conqueſts. I venture " to ſpeak thus, becauſe I am perſuaded you are no ſtranger " to the conduct of every individual amongſt them, and how " far they obſerved the rules of moderation, even when the " event of the war was uncertain; and how ſome of them gave " ſuch a looſe to debauchery and licentious feſtivity, in the " very field of battle, as men of their years could not have " indulged themſelves in, without a blemiſh to their reputa- " tion, even in time of peace and tranquillity.

" I ſee no occaſion to ſay any more of the diſpoſition of " military affairs.

" As to the eſtabliſhing of peace, ſince that is the great " point you and your friends have in view; conſider, in the " firſt place, I beſeech you, the nature of the affair now un- " der deliberation: For thus, by diſtinctly ſeparating the ar- " guments on both ſides, you will, of courſe, open a way to " right meaſures. I own, when I reflect with myſelf, that " whatever had a beginning has naturally a determined pe- " riod, I am perſuaded, that, whenever the fatal deſtruction of " *Rome*'s empire approaches, it can only happen when her " citizens are harraſſed with inteſtine wars: In that critical " juncture, when their ſtrength is worn out and their ſpirits " exhauſted, they will fall a prey to ſome foreign Prince or " State. But, were it poſſible to preſerve harmony amongſt " ourſelves, the whole world, all the nations of the earth in " confederacy, would not be able to diminiſh or ſhake this " mighty empire. Therefore, to ſecure all the advantages of " unanimity, and to remove and prevent all the miſchiefs of " diſſenſions and diviſions, is the great point that requires " your perpetual attention. The beſt way to effect this is to " give a check to the faſhionable vices of licentious pro- " fuſeneſs and rapine; not by reinforcing thoſe obſolete " laws, which the depravity of the times has rendered con- " temptible; *but by obliging every man to live within the* " *bounds of his fortune.* For now a prevailing cuſtom has " taught the *Roman* youth to look upon it as a laudable and " gallant behaviour to ſquander away, not only their own,

" but

"but other men's fortunes; and to deny themſelves, or their "dependents, no ſort of gratification whatſoever. This they "call manly conduct, this, true greatneſs of ſoul; whilſt mo-"deſty paſſes for ſtupidity; and moderation, as the quality of "an abject, inactive ſpirit. Poſſeſſed with ſuch notions, "when once engaged in a profligate courſe, they run on with "unbridled fury; and no ſooner do their old ſupplies fail "them, but they fall with impetuous violence upon our al-"lies, ſometimes upon our fellow-citizens, diſturb the order "and tranquillity of government, and, by any means whatſo-"ever, would raiſe a new fortune to repair the ruins of the "old one.

"Since, therefore, this is the preſent ſituation of our affairs, "it ſeems to me abſolutely neceſſary to cruſh the power of "the uſurers, that every man may take upon him the ma-"nagement of his own affairs. To effect this, the only true "and natural method would be to oblige the magiſtrates, in "their judicial proceedings, to promote rather the intereſt "of the people in general, than to favour the narrow inter-"eſt of the creditors, and to eſtabliſh their glory and reputa-"tion upon their endeavours to add ſtrength to the Common-"wealth, and not on ſuch meaſures as tend to diminiſh it.

"I am very ſenſible what diſguſt the firſt advances in this "reformation will give, to thoſe eſpecially, who, after vic-"tory, expected rather greater latitude to their licentious in-"clinations, than any ſtricter diſcipline and reſtraints. But, "if you regard more the true intereſt of the Commonwealth, "than the looſe deſires of theſe men, you will prevent their "outrageous intentions, and ſettle both them and us, and all "our allies, in a firm ſtate of peace and tranquillity. But, "if the youth are permitted to go on in their preſent pur-"ſuits, then will *Cæſar*'s exalted glory ſoon fall to the "ground; and *Rome* itſelf will fall with *Cæſar*. Give me "leave to add, that it is, with a view of procuring peace, "that men of ſenſe and underſtanding enter into war; and, "under all the toils and hardſhips attending it, they are ſup-"ported by the proſpect of future tranquillity. If this great "end be not effectually accompliſhed, what does it avail, "whether you conquer, or are conquered?

"Wherefore, in the name of the immortal gods, take upon "you the care and protection of the Commonwealth, and

"bravely

" bravely puſh through all difficulties, with your wonted vi-
" gour and reſolution. For either you, *Cæſar*, can heal the
" wounded State, or it will be in vain for any other to attempt
" the cure. And what is that we now require at your hands?
" You are not called to bloody executions, to cruel and
" rigorous proceedings; methods which would ſooner depo-
" pulate the State, than correct its manners; but only to give
" a check to the baſe practices and licentious debauchery
" of the *Roman* youth. This, this only, is the true notion
" of clemency; to prevent ſuch vices as deſerve the puniſh-
" ment of expulſion; to put a ſtop to extravagant follies, and
" the purſuits of falſe pleaſures; and to eſtabliſh union and
" harmony in the State.

" I muſt confeſs here, I am ſenſible, that the greatneſs of
" this important undertaking raiſes doubts and fears in other
" men; but to me it gives the ſtrongeſt aſſurances of ſucceſs:
" For matters of *ſmall* moment are below the notice of ſo *ex-*
" *alted* a genius. *Great* indeed is the taſk, and *great* will be
" the reward, if you accompliſh it!

" Now one grand point, which demands your attention,
" is, that the People, whoſe minds are at preſent corrupted,
" with gifts of corn, and other public largeſſes, apply them-
" ſelves to their reſpective occupations. Such an applica-
" tion would divert their thoughts from giving any diſturb-
" ance to the government: The youth alſo ſhould be taught
" to turn their purſuits from riotous expence, and the thirſt
" of riches, to a courſe of induſtry and the ſtudy of virtue.
" And this great end you will accompliſh, by putting an ef-
" fectual ſtop to the uſe which men now make of money, and
" ſtripping that fruitful ſource of evils of the eſteem it has
" gained in the world. For, whenever I have examined by
" what ſteps illuſtrious heroes roſe to the height of renown, by
" what means any people enlarged their conqueſts, and to
" what cauſes the ruin of mighty Kingdoms and States was
" to be aſcribed; in either caſe I always diſcovered the ſame
" good or evil cauſe, conſtantly producing the ſame good or
" evil effects: And that the ſucceſsful were always ſuch as
" held riches in contempt; the unſucceſsful ſuch as coveted
" and admired them. Nor, indeed, is there any poſſible me-
" thod to riſe to glory and immortal fame, but by ſubduing the
" thirſt of riches and ſenſual pleaſures, and giving a free ſcope

" to

" to the exerciſe of the mind; not fondly ſoothing and gra-
" tifying the demands of unreaſonable and corrupt inclina-
" tions; but by inuring it to labour and patience, to whol-
" ſome diſcipline and valiant exploits. A man may raiſe a
" pompous palace in the town, or villa in the country; he
" may furniſh them with magnificent hangings and ſtatues,
" with other expenſive ornaments, and thus make every
" thing in them conſpicuous, but himſelf; yet, from the rich-
" neſs of ſuch decorations, he is ſo far from deriving any
" honour or glory, that he himſelf caſts a blemiſh upon their
" luſtre. And, as for ſuch as are ſo abandoned, that they paſs
" not a day without twice overcharging their ſtomachs, not
" a night without diſhonouring their bed with polluted em-
" braces; when once the mind, deſigned by nature to govern
" and controul, is thus become a ſlave to degenerate paſſions,
" in vain will they attempt to rouſe her up to exerciſe, when
" her vigour is decayed, and her faculties impaired. Men
" of this character, having neither ſpirit nor abilities, muſt
" unavoidably confound and deſtroy themſelves and every
" ſcheme they engage in. Now theſe and all other evils which
" afflict the State, together with the high value and eſteem that
" is ſet upon riches, would be effectually cured, if neither the
" offices of magiſtracy, nor any other things, which are the
" objects of mens eager purſuits, can hereafter be obtained by
" the influence of money. *Proper care ſhould, at the ſame time,*
" *be taken, that Italy and the provinces be put in a more ſecure*
" *ſituation*; an affair which requires no great penetration to
" accompliſh: The ſame remedy will anſwer, where the evil
" is the ſame; for there too, as well as in the city, the public
" ravagers have plundered and ſeized every thing they met
" with, forſaking their own habitations, and, in violation of
" all juſtice and equity, poſſeſſing thoſe of other people. It
" is no leſs neceſſary to put a ſtop to that *unjuſtifiable partiality*,
" which has hitherto prevailed in our army, *where ſome of*
" *the people have been forced to bear the fatigue of warfare for*
" *thirty years, whilſt others have been entirely excuſed from the*
" *ſervice.* It is likewiſe my opinion, *that the corn, which*
" *has hitherto been uſually the reward of the worthleſs and inac-*
" *tive, ſhould be ſent to our municipal towns and colonies, and*
" *there diſtributed to the ſoldiers, when they return home after*
" *their diſcharge from ſervice.*

" I have

" I have now, as briefly as the caſe would admit, laid be-
" fore you ſuch regulations as appear to me moſt conducive
" to the good of the Commonwealth, as well as your own
" reputation and glory: And, I apprehend, it will not be im-
" proper for me to add a word or two in relation to this my
" undertaking. There is ſcarce any man who does not be-
" lieve himſelf furniſhed with all the faculties that make up a
" true and diſtinguiſhing judgment; or, at leaſt, endeavours
" to make the world believe ſo: but, certainly, all men in
" general have ſo violent a propenſity to blaſt and condemn
" the performances of others, that the faculties of ſpeech are
" too ſlow, to utter the quick ſuggeſtions of their hearts.
" That I have laid myſelf open to ſuch men is a conſidera-
" tion, that does not, in the leaſt, afflict me. Had I been ſi-
" lent on ſuch an occaſion, I ſhould have been leſs able to
" have borne the reflection. For, whether you purſue the
" methods I have pointed out, or others occur, which may
" be thought more adviſeable, ſtill I have given the beſt ad-
" vice I was capable of, and contributed my utmoſt aſſiſtance
" towards the regulation of the Commonwealth.

" I have nothing more to do, but to follow you with my
" earneſt wiſhes, that whatever meaſures you purſue may be
" attended with approbation, and crowned with ſucceſs by
" the immortal gods."

End of the TENTH VOLUME.

MVSEVM
BRITAN
NICVM